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Prosecutorial discretion—i.e. a prosecutor’s ability to choose among different 
courses of action with regard to the opportunity of opening (or not opening) an 
investigation or starting (or not starting) a prosecution—has been a constant feature 
of international criminal justice throughout its momentous evolution in the past 
decades. This prosecutorial selective power is inextricably linked to the concept of 
judicial oversight of discretionary choices as a necessary antidote against 
arbitrariness in the enforcement of international criminal law. 
The permanent system of international criminal justice created through the 
Rome Statute envisages a wide margin of discretion for prosecutorial action, under 
the constraint of various forms of judicial supervision. Nevertheless, legal texts 
provide only very limited guidance to the Office of the Prosecution and judges as to 
the concrete exercise of these powers and responsibilities. For this reason, 
prosecutorial and judicial dynamic practice plays a fundamental creative role in 
integrating—and sometimes transforming—the ICC static legal framework.  
The present research has aimed at analysing the patterns of prosecutorial and 
judicial practice at the pre-trial stage of the proceedings of the ICC, with a view to 
comparing the law in the books and the law in action in this area of crucial 
importance for the legitimacy of the Court. The hypothesis that in this field there are 
areas of interpretive agreement (smooth relationship) and disagreement (open clash) 
between the relevant actors, as well as a certain degree of dissociation between the 
textual formant and the prosecutorial/judicial formant has been tested against the 
relevant practice. These empirical phenomena have then been assessed as to their 
possible institutional causes and (potentially detrimental) consequences, with a view 
to proposing institutional, procedural, administrative and legislative adjustments that 
may help fostering the predictability and consistency of the system. 
The conclusion is that practice in this field is a fundamental test-bench for the 
institutional functioning of the ICC, and that it is still in the process of establishing—
by means of the interplay between the OTP and judges—a satisfactory balance 
among the conflicting needs of flexibility and predictability; one that only pragmatic 
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“The notion of the perfect whole, the ultimate solution, in which all good 
things coexist, seems to me to be not merely unattainable—that is a truism—but 
conceptually incoherent; I do not know what is meant by a harmony of this 
kind.  Some among the Great Goods cannot live together.  That is a conceptual 
truth.  We are doomed to choose, and every choice may entail an irreparable loss. 
These collisions of values are of the essence of what they are and what we are.” 
(Isaiah Berlin, The Pursuit of the Ideal, 





The Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), in setting up the most 
advanced mechanism for the judicial enforcement of international criminal law 
(ICL), endows the Prosecutor with a wide—albeit not unlimited and judicially 
supervised—margin of discretion both as to the selection of situations (i.e. whether 
or not to open an investigation once the Court’s jurisdiction has been triggered with 
regard to a certain set of facts falling under the material, temporal, territorial and 
personal jurisdiction of the Court) and of cases (i.e. whether or not to prosecute 
specific individuals within a given situation, and for which crimes and modes of 
responsibility)†.  
Despite the centrality of prosecutorial discretion for the functioning of the 
Court, legal texts governing the ICC (Statute, Rules of Procedure and Evidence and 
Regulations of the Office of the Prosecutor, Registry and Court), provide only very 
limited guidance for its concrete exercise, leaving the development of principled 
selection criteria—as well as of an overarching and coherent prosecutorial strategy—
to the practice of the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP), in constant dialectic with the 
Judiciary (in particular the Pre-Trial Chamber) in the exercise of its supervisory 
powers.  
Sixteen years after the entry into force of the Rome Statute, the growing 
practice of the OTP—in the form of specific prosecutorial choices as well as with the 
																																																								
* This introduction is only meant to synthetically present the justification, objectives, methodology 
and prospective outcomes of the research. For this reason bibliographical references are limited, 
leaving the punctual analysis of the relevant doctrinal and jurisprudential sources to the parts and 
chapters to follow. 
† On the distinction between ‘situations’ and ‘cases’ in the ICC regime see, generally, H. OLÁSOLO, 
Essays on International Criminal Justice, Oxford, 2012, pp. 22-26; R. RASTAN, What is a ‘Case’ for 
the Purpose of the Rome Statute?, in Criminal Law Forum, vol. 19, issue 3, 2008, 435-436; W. A. 
SCHABAS, Prosecutorial Discretion v. Judicial Activism at the International Criminal Court, in 
Journal of International Criminal Justice, vol. 6, issue 4, 2008, 734-736. The distinction has been 
extensively discussed at the preparatory stage, with particular regard to the breadth of the UN Security 
Council’s power to trigger the Court’s jurisdiction. See, Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the 
Establishment of an International Criminal Court, United Nations, General Assembly Official 
Records, Fiftieth Session, A/50/22, Supplement No. 22, 1995 par. 120-121 and Report of the 
Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Volume I 
(Proceedings of the Preparatory Committee during March-April and August 1996), United Nations, 




adoption of various documents containing prosecutorial strategies and policies‡—and 
of the Chambers (Pre-Trial Chambers and Appeals Chamber in particular), has shed 
some light on the empirical functioning of prosecutorial discretion at the ICC.  A 
number of legal and institutional issues have emerged with respect to the coherence 
of the Prosecutor’s choices, the degree and latitude of judicial oversight of his or her 
selection decisions and ultimately the overall functioning of the checks and balances 
mechanism with regard to prosecutorial discretion at the ICC. It is of immediate 
evidence that the solution of said issues is of fundamental importance for the 
credibility, viability and effectiveness of the Court’s mandate, in the pursuit of its 
statutory goal to  “put an end to impunity”, while guaranteeing full respect of 
internationally recognized human rights (among which are those accruing to the 
Accused and victims). 
The theoretical, legal and institutional rationales for a reasonably wide 
margin of prosecutorial discretion have been the object of a significant body of 
scientific enquiry both at the time of the adoption of the Rome Statute and in the 
subsequent years. There have been various academic attempts to provide the OTP 
with more precise legal criteria for the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, with 
authors polarizing between those supportive of a more principled and constrained 
exercise of discretion and those in favour of a wider and substantially unfettered 
margin of discretion. Academic discussion has nevertheless been mainly confined to 
the theoretical justifications for discretion in international criminal prosecutions, only 
very recently focusing on the empirical dimension of its exercise at the ICC. In 
addition, research so far has sometimes relied on potentially misleading analogies 
between domestic and international prosecutions, therefore failing to underline the 
unique features of international criminal law—and of the ICC in particular—as to the 
exercise of prosecutorial discretion and judicial oversight thereof.  
																																																								
‡ In recent years the OTP issued a number of documents of this sort. Among them the most relevant 
are the so-called Strategic Plan (once referred to as Prosecutorial Strategy), a document issued every 
three years and indicating the broad strategic objectives of the OTP’s activities for the years to come, 
and the so-called Policy Papers, a wide range of public documents stating the position of the OTP on 
specific issues relevant to the work of the Office, such as preliminary examinations, case selection and 
prioritisation, victims’ participation, the interests of justice, gender-based crimes, etc. These 
documents, notwithstanding their lack of binding force, are an important source for the evaluation of 
prosecutorial practice and raise interesting questions as regards their legal nature and relationship with 
the primary legal sources applicable at the ICC. An analysis of the theoretical and practical relevance 
of these documents will be provided in Chapter Two of Part Two of this work. 
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In the light of the aforementioned current state of development of the 
international debate on prosecutorial discretion at the ICC, the scope of the present 
study is essentially to analyse—based on a solid theoretical background in 
international and criminal law—how the practice of the relevant actors (namely the 
OTP and PTC) has contributed to concretely shape the legal dimension of 
prosecutorial discretion with particular regard to the preliminary examination and 
pre-investigation stage of the proceedings at the ICC, and how these actors interact 
with each other in the implementation of the statutory and regulatory provisions that 
have a bearing on the selection mechanism of the ICC. In contrast with other 
scientific contributions on the subject, the present study relied on an institutional 
approach (in conjunction with a strictly procedural one) to said prosecutorial 
practice, focusing on the dialectical relationship between the Prosecutor and Judges, 
in order to elucidate the current functioning of the checks and balances system at the 
ICC and to clarify its normative structure. In particular, the legal and institutional 
boundaries of prosecutorial discretion, as well as the degree and latitude of judicial 
oversight on its exercise, have been tested through a comparison between the law in 
the books and the law in action. 
It is purported that a comprehensive practice-based enquiry into the 
discretionary practice of the OTP—with a particular focus on its somehow 
problematic relationship with the PTC during the preliminary examination and 
investigative stage—needs to be developed in order to assess (if any) the degree of 
dissociation between the statutory model of prosecutorial discretion and the way in 
which the relevant actors have concretely interpreted and implemented it. It is 
maintained that such an enquiry would not only be beneficial in terms of increased 
knowledge of the institutional balance between the various actors of the Court, but 
could also form the basis for prospective adjustments in their course of action and/or 
to the legal standards they act (or pretend to act) upon, with a view to securing the 




Objectives of the research 
In line with the abovementioned conceptual framework and justification of 
the research project, the present study aims to attain the following objectives. 
First, to establish a more accurate understanding of the theoretical, legal and 
institutional structure of the model of prosecutorial discretion at the ICC. 
Second, to understand the creative/transformative role of practice as to the 
concrete functioning of such mechanism, with a specific attention to the degree and 
latitude of judicial interference with the Prosecutor’s choices, through a 
comprehensive analysis of said practice. 
Third, to provide a quantitative and qualitative analysis of the degree of 
dissociation—if any—between the static legal framework and its practical 
implementation, with particular emphasis on patterns of cases showing conflicting 
behaviour (‘open clash’) or cooperation (‘smooth relationship’) on the part of the 
relevant actors. 
Fourth, to assess whether the degree of such dissociation is physiologic or if 
it reveals normative, procedural or institutional shortcomings that may have adverse 
consequences in terms of consistency, coherence, viability and credibility of the 
Court. 
Fifth and last, to propose any legal, regulatory and institutional adjustments 
that may help to advance the goals of the ICC, stabilising the relationships between 
Prosecutors and Judges, without encroaching on potentially competing rights (such 
as those of the Accused and victims) and preserving the principle of 
complementarity. 
 
Delimitation of the study 
In order to deliver consistent research results it is of utmost importance to 
carefully and reasonably delimit the scope of the proposed enquiry. Since the study 
aims at analysing an already wide—and continuously expanding—body of 
prosecutorial and judicial practice, the choice has been made to mainly focus on the 
procedural phase of preliminary examination and its possible outcomes—namely the 
decision to open (or not to open) an investigation, or to ask judicial authorisation to 
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do so in case of proprio motu. The decision to limit the enquiry to this segment of the 
proceedings needs further elaboration. The proposed delimitation can be justified on 
grounds of both logical-chronological and normative considerations. 
With regard to the logical-chronological aspect of the question, it seems 
reasonable to start a practice-based enquiry on prosecutorial discretion from the early 
manifestations of the OTP’s selection powers, which undoubtedly take place at the 
pre-investigation stage. Obviously, it cannot be denied that a significant amount of 
discretion is also exercised at later procedural stages, such as at the time of the 
formulation of and eventual amendment to the Document Containing the Charges; 
the conduct of trial proceedings; the decision to appeal judicial decisions; the 
sentencing stage; reparations; etc., but it is fair to conclude that any prosecutorial 
choice at those later stages is heavily influenced by the initial determinations made at 
the time of preliminary examination and opening of an investigation. 
With regard to strictly normative considerations, it must be observed that the 
preliminary examination procedure—and more generally the pre-investigation 
stage—is characterised by a degree of ‘normative rarefaction’, i.e. by the paucity of 
clear rules and directives for the OTP with regard to the concrete exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion, especially when compared to the more densely regulated 
phases of investigation, confirmation of charges, trial or appeals. The vague nature of 
evidentiary standards and the prevalence of principles on rules at the procedural 
phase considered emphasise the inherent discretionary power of the Prosecutor, as 
well as the gap-filling and creative function of both the Office’s and judges’ 
interpretive practices. Therefore, at these topical junctures of the proceedings 
prosecutorial discretion is probably exercised at its highest, also in the light of the 
limited—or sometimes virtually non-existent—judicial remedies available at these 
stages. This makes it all the more necessary to provide a careful assessment of the 
limits of prosecutorial discretion, as well as of the substantive and procedural 
obligations surrounding its exercise. 
In any event, since prosecutorial discretion is undeniably exercised at 
subsequent stages of the proceedings, due consideration has been given to the 
downstream consequences of early prosecutorial selection choices—for instance as 
regards the rights of states, the right of victims to reparations, or the accused’s fair 
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trial rights—in order to place them in the wider context of the proceedings at the 
ICC. 
Despite the choice to limit the present enquiry to the pre-investigation stage, 
it is alleged that the analysis carried out in the present work could provide the 
methodological and empirical basis for a process of continued and incremental 
assessment of other aspects of prosecutorial practice. 
 
Methodological approach 
The study starts from the methodological premise that in the realm of 
international criminal justice the practice of the relevant institutional actors involved 
in the exercise of prosecutorial discretion—and control thereof—plays a decisive 
role in “[shaping] the path of law”§.  
A broad and inclusive understanding of the concept of prosecutorial and 
judicial practice constitutes the cornerstone of the study. The term is therefore 
intended as to designate any identifiable choice, decision, act, declaration or 
externally manifested behaviour of the relevant actors—namely the OTP and 
Chambers—bearing legal and/or institutional consequences as to the concrete 
functioning of the mechanism of prosecutorial discretion at the ICC. With regard to 
the OTP, the term encompasses first and foremost the publicly available decisions 
and motions (mostly concerning the preliminary examination and investigation 
phase) and in the second place—due consideration given to their general lack of 
binding force—positions, policies (policy papers), strategies, declarations and 
statements revealing a connection with the exercise of discretion. With regard to the 
Chambers (especially the Pre-Trial Chamber and Appeals Chamber), the term 
encompasses decisions directly or indirectly dealing with the most relevant aspects 
of prosecutorial discretion, with particular emphasis on those decisions adopted 
while carrying out the judicial review of prosecutorial choices (e.g., authorisation 
decisions under art. 15 of the Statute; review decisions under art. 53(3) of the Statute; 
etc.).  
																																																								
§ See C. BURCHARD, The International Criminal Legal Process: Towards a Realistic Model of 
International Criminal Law in Action, in C. STAHN, L. VAN DEN HERIK (eds.), Future Perspectives on 
International Criminal Justice, The Hague, 2010, 96. 
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It is purported that such a broad understanding of the concept of practice, 
performs both an ‘explicative/descriptive’ and a ‘normative/creative’ function. As to 
the former, the concept enables the observer to track all the relevant behaviours of 
the concerned actors and to fit them within the underlying institutional and 
procedural scheme of interplay between such actors. As to the latter, the concept 
enables the observer, through careful assessment of the normative consequences of 
the decisions of the relevant actors, to evaluate their transformative capacity thereby 
elucidating the volatile boundaries of legally permissible prosecutorial discretion and 
of reasonable judicial oversight. 
Therefore, the approach towards prosecutorial practice in the present study 
has been mainly—but not exclusively—an empirical, case-based and practice-driven 
one. The collection, cataloguing and quantitative-qualitative analysis of patterns of 
prosecutorial practice and their legal consequences have been at the heart of the 
work. 
This realistic and institutional approach, aimed at the analysis of the 
international criminal law in action, builds on the methodological proposal of 
conceptualising the work of international criminal courts and tribunals—and of the 
“legal officialdom” through which they act—in terms of legal process, i.e. “a social 
process, and thus a sequence of interrelated situation-sensitive, context dependent as 
well as historically contingent . . . events and of interlinked operations, which legally 
transform an input in an output” **. Attention has been mainly devoted to a specific 
set of “sub-processes”†† in the context of the ICC’s pertinent practice, namely those 
relating to the selection activities performed by the OTP, and to the judges’ activities 
in the exercise of judicial supervision of prosecutorial discretionary choices. 
Nevertheless, reference to the explicative language of legal process theories does not 
import a general endorsement of a merely descriptive and sociological approach 
towards the relevant practice. To the contrary, the study aims at complementing 
descriptive analysis with a normative/prescriptive assessment of the consequences of 
the ICC’s current practice, in order to formulate proposals aimed at fostering the 
effectiveness and legitimacy of its mandate. 
																																																								
** Ibidem, 81-87 (emphasis added). 
†† Ibidem, 98-99. 
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 Before proceeding to a detailed analysis of prosecutorial practice according 
to the proposed methodology, it has been necessary to clearly define and 
theoretically defend a few core concepts (such as the dichotomy between open clash 
and smooth relationship in the analysis of practice; the dissociation of formants 
hypothesis, etc.), thereby providing solid ground for the case-based enquiry to 
follow. It must be stressed that the objective of the present study is not to provide a 
mere collation of prosecutorial and judicial practice. To the contrary, after having 
developed a reasoned approach to such practice, the study aims at dynamically 
comparing it with the legal framework considered in its static form, in order to assess 
the performance of the current prosecutorial and judicial practices from the point of 
view of their legal soundness, predictability and overall fairness.  
Comparative analysis has complemented the empirical survey and critical 
assessment of the relevant prosecutorial practice in two ways. On one hand, 
comparative reasoning has guided the study of the ICC’s prosecutorial regime in the 
broader context of international criminal justice’s mechanisms (i.e. underlining the 
Court’s specificities vis-à-vis other international courts and tribunals). On the other 
hand, a critical comparison between the static legal framework and its practical 
implementation with regard to prosecutorial discretion and its judicial oversight has 
been carried out and represents the true raison d'être of the study. The hypothesis is 
made that a certain degree of dissociation between different ‘legal formants’ within 
the ICC’s legal order may exist and needs to be carefully assessed in order to better 
understand the current degree of effectiveness of the ICC prosecutorial regime‡‡. 
																																																								
‡‡ The concept of ‘dissociation of formants’ is derived—solely for explicative purposes—from 
comparative law literature. See, in particular, R. SACCO, Legal Formants: A Dynamic Approach to 
Comparative Law (Instalment I of II), in American Journal of Comparative Law, vol. 39, no. 1, 1991, 
1, and of the same author Legal Formants: A Dynamic Approach to Comparative Law (Instalment II 
of II), in American Journal of Comparative Law, vol. 39, no. 2, 1991, 343. It must be clarified from 
the outset that the present study does not in any way suggest that instruments of analysis derived from 
the methodology of comparative law can be uncritically transposed to the international (criminal) law 
realm. In the past, especially before the end of the Cold War, literature in the field of Comparative 
International Law attempted to apply methodologies of comparative legal studies to the analysis of 
different ‘cultural’ approaches to international law (such as Soviet, Chinese or Third World 
approaches), but this discussion is far beyond the scope of the present study. Nevertheless, at a more 
general and systemic level, the suggestion that a given legal order within the broader context of 
international law, such as the ICC, can be assessed as to the overall coherence of its formants in order 
to fully understand its concrete functioning seems appropriate and useful for the purposes of the 
present practice-based study. This is the main reason for scratching beyond the surface of statutory 
provisions and abstract procedural models in search of the operative rules that practically shape the 
prosecutorial discretion mechanism at the ICC. 
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While the importance of such analytical methods in the field of international criminal 
law must not be overstated, it is alleged that the cautious use of certain comparative 
law tools may help explaining and presenting in a systematic fashion the current 
trends in the practice of prosecutorial discretion at the ICC. 
As to the academic contributions and scholarly literature referred to for 
bibliographical purposes, the present study relied on a broad, multidisciplinary and 
inclusive approach. The analysis of the issues related to prosecutorial discretion and 
its judicial oversight in international criminal justice presupposes the knowledge of 
some of the most relevant scientific contributions on the subject with regard to 
national legal systems. Nevertheless, given the internationalist and institutional 
approach adopted in this study, general literature on international criminal law—both 
substantive and procedural—and international criminal justice regimes has provided 
solid ground for the analysis of the relevant legal issues, together with the numerous 
contributions specifically addressing the Prosecutor’s and Court’s powers and duties 
as regards the exercise of and control over discretion. Notwithstanding the 
preponderance of literature in the English language on the subject, efforts have been 
made to expand readings and references to works in French, Italian, and Spanish, so 
to reflect a wider range of scholarly perspectives. In disciplinary terms, the attempt 
has been made to bring together the sometimes-diverging perspectives of 
international and criminal lawyers, in the firm belief that only through dialogue and 
creative integration of these approaches international criminal law could progress as 
a scientific and applicative enterprise.  
 
Structure of the present study 
Based on the abovementioned methodological approach, the research is 
organised and presented in four parts, reflecting the logical and argumentative steps 
of the enquiry into the prosecutorial practice at the ICC. 
 
Part One provides an analysis of the theoretical rationale for prosecutorial 
discretion and its judicial oversight in international criminal justice in general and at 
the ICC in particular. After introducing certain fundamental definitions and concepts, 
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Chapter One aims at placing the analysis of prosecutorial discretion in a genuinely 
international perspective, thereby attempting to underline the most relevant 
institutional and legal differences vis-à-vis national prosecutorial regimes.  In 
addition, Chapter Two attempts to contextualise the legal and institutional design of 
the ICC through a comparison between different international (and internationalised) 
criminal justice mechanisms. It is alleged that while ‘vertical’ comparative 
analysis—i.e. between the international and domestic level—in the field of 
substantive criminal law and procedure may be of great assistance in understanding 
certain features of prosecutorial discretion—as well as providing a significant body 
of common problem-solving strategies—the specificity of international criminal 
prosecutions must not be overlooked. For this reason it is purported that a 
‘horizontal’ comparative analysis—both synchronic and diachronic—should be 
carried out as a preliminary step to the analysis of the specific legal and interpretive 
issues relevant to the practice of the ICC. 
 
Part Two concentrates on a concise analysis of the statutory and regulatory 
framework governing the ICC’s system of prosecutorial discretion and judicial 
oversight, with a view to shed light on some of its most relevant interpretive issues. 
In Chapter One, the study recalls the statutory and regulatory provisions that have a 
bearing on the subject of prosecutorial discretion at the ICC. More than commenting 
upon their relatively laconic content—which has been the object of extensive 
academic commentary—efforts have been made to understand how these provisions 
functionally relate one another, thereby contributing to the overall design of 
prosecutorial discretion and its judicial oversight. This chapter also analyses the 
specific acts and decisions that constitute an exercise of discretion, with particular 
regard to the preliminary examinations and pre-investigation phase; their legal 
significance and their statutory—formal and substantive—requirements (e.g. request 
for authorisation in case of proprio motu; decisions pursuant to art. 53 of the Rome 
Statute; etc.). 
In Chapter Two the legal nature and relevance of the OTP’s internal 
documents such as policy papers and prosecutorial strategies are analysed with a 
view to establish their role in the broader context of prosecutorial practice. Issues 
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such, inter alia, the lack of bindingness; the contribution to the crystallisation of 
prosecutorial practices; the relationship with statutory and regulatory standards are 
considered in order to assess the function of these documents and how they are 
implemented in the practice of the OTP. The analysis of said materials also provided 
an occasion to reflect on the OTP’s self-perception as to the exercise of prosecutorial 
discretion vis-à-vis other organs of the Court and other international actors such as 
states, the UNSC, NGOs and civil society at large. 
Chapter Three concentrates on the fundamental issue of judicial controls over 
prosecutorial discretionary choices, underlining the role of judges (especially of the 
PTC) and their powers of judicial oversight/review of the OTP’s decisions. These 
powers can be exercised at various stages of proceedings and their degree and 
latitude—hence the amount of judicial interference with prosecutorial choices—vary 
according to the specific acts concerned and the competing interests at stake. The 
opportunities to challenge discretionary prosecutorial choices at the preliminary 
stage have been analysed as regards the subjects legally permitted to provoke judicial 
oversight; the procedures to trigger such controls; the latitude and degree of judicial 
control over prosecutorial choices; the possible outcomes of such control and the 
consequences on subsequent OTP’s decisions, as well as the potential loopholes in 
this checks and balances mechanism. The analysis of this supervisory mechanism 
has unveiled a system where a delicate balance between the assertion of prosecutorial 
independence and control of legality and reasonableness still needs to be reached in 
practice, through a constructive OTP-Judges dialogue.  
 
Part Three is at the core of the contribution of the present study to the 
understanding of the empirical dimension of prosecutorial practice at the ICC. It 
aims at collecting and analysing in a systematic manner the concrete practice of the 
OTP and Judges as to the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, with a view to 
conducting—in the following part—a comparative analysis between the static 
statutory/regulatory framework and its practical dynamic implementation. Consistent 
with the statement of the research’s objectives, the analysis focuses on the procedural 
junctures where discretion explicates its most evident function of selection, namely 
preliminary examination and the decision on the opening (or not opening) of an 
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investigation, or in case of proprio motu, to ask or not to ask a judicial authorisation 
to open one. 
In Chapter One a few core conceptual tools are introduced, namely a more 
precise explication of the concept of ‘practice’ for the purposes of the present study 
and of the ‘institutional approach’ towards the analysis and presentation of said 
practice. As to the former, it is alleged that a wide understanding of the concept of 
prosecutorial practice allows for an assessment of the transformative role played by 
the decisions of the OTP and judges in concrete cases, in a system where statutory 
provisions provide rather scarce practical directives on the exercise of prosecutorial 
discretion and its judicial review. As to the latter, it is alleged that the best way to 
analyse such practice is to adopt an institutional approach that focuses on the 
respective mandates of the OTP and judges and their dialectical interplay. In the 
same chapter the working hypothesis of the ‘dissociation of formants’ (statutory, 
prosecutorial/judicial, doctrinal) as to the exercise of prosecutorial discretion is 
introduced. The proposition is made that at the present stage of development of the 
Court’s work, some degree of dissociation between the statutory/regulatory 
framework and its practical implementation by the relevant actors exists. The 
concepts of open clash and smooth relationship between OTP and judges shall be 
introduced as explicative tools for an overall evaluation of the selected practice. 
These hypotheses will then be tested against the concrete practice, in order to 
assess—if any—the degree of such dissociation or opposition and their causes. 
Chapter Two provides a collection and categorisation of the relevant practice 
of the OTP and Chambers. It focuses on the phases of preliminary examinations and 
the opening (or not opening) of investigations by presenting cases—or patterns of 
cases—showing the current trends in the exercise of selection powers on the part of 
the OTP and the role played by the judiciary in supervising these choices. The 
discussion of the relevant decisions and cases proceeds in logical-chronological 
order, dedicating separate sections to the discrete phases of the preliminary 
examinations and investigation proceedings. In some instances the relevant practice 
examined is relatively scarce (sometimes a few or even a single OTP’s and/or 
Chamber’s decision), therefore extreme caution has been used in evaluating these 
few instances of practice, in order not to draw excessive or unreasonable inferences 
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from such limited empirical evidence. This collection of practice then formed the 
basis for the elaboration, comparison and assessment presented in Part Four of the 
work.  
 
In Part Four, the study tries to draw some preliminary conclusions on the 
current status of the exercise of prosecutorial discretion and its judicial oversight at 
the ICC. A comparison between the law in the books and the law in action—as it 
results form the collected practice—is conducted in order to verify whether the 
hypotheses formulated in the preceding part have any empirical foundation. In 
Chapter One a quantitative and qualitative analysis of areas of dissociation between 
the theoretical legal framework and its practical implementation is carried out, with 
particular emphasis on patterns of cases showing either clearly conflicting 
behaviours (open clash) or cooperation (smooth relationship) on the part of the 
relevant actors. Attention has been be given to the instances of apparent or real 
contraposition in the OTP’s and Judges’ courses of action, in order to assess the 
degree of coherence of their decisions. The focus has been on the internal coherence 
of the OTP’s action (i.e. the degree of conformity to the self-imposed guidelines and 
policies) and on the inter-institutional relationship between the OTP and Judges (i.e. 
the degree of judicial deference to or interference with the Prosecutor’s choices). In 
Chapter Two, the study turns to the analysis of the causes of the dissociation between 
theory and practice, focusing on the necessity to preserve a balanced relationship 
between prosecutorial independence and the control of legality over the OTP’s 
actions. It is alleged that a certain degree of flexibility is necessary in order to cope 
with the Court’s institutional goals. A certain degree of discrepancy between theory 
and practice might be considered physiologic but could reveal certain fundamental 
issues in the institutional and procedural functioning of the Court that need to be 
assessed as to their possibly adverse consequences. Additionally, the chapter briefly 
illustrates the potentially negative consequences of an excessive degree of 
dissociation of formants as well as of deep interpretive disagreements, especially 
when they translate into a constant tension between prosecutors and judges. It is 
alleged that both unfettered discretion and excessive judicial interventionism may 
endanger the functionality of the Court—thereby transforming the institutional role 
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of its organs—and its international credibility. The possible downstream adverse 
consequences of an unreasonably unclear prosecutorial discretion practice are 
analysed, with particular regard to the position of the accused and victims. Finally, in 
Chapter Three, drawing on past experiences and building on the existing academic 
debate, we shall formulate proposals and adjustments that may prove helpful in order 
to tackle the issues and the potential downsides of the current practical 
implementation of prosecutorial discretion at the ICC. Focus is first and foremost on 
the institutional and procedural adjustments that could be enacted de lege lata by 
means of organisational good practices and a more coherent strategic planning. It is 
further purported that a progressive clarification of the concrete functioning of the 
prosecutorial discretion system will necessarily take some time and additional 
judicial practice, which can greatly contribute to the normalisation of the OTP-judges 
relationship in the future. To conclude, a few proposals for the amendment of 
regulatory texts (RPE and Regulations of the Court) are formulated with a view to 
promote practices that may advance the predictability and overall consistency of the 
exercise of prosecutorial discretion and of its judicial supervision at the ICC. 
  1 
PART ONE 
PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION AS AN INHERENT FEATURE OF 





THE THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL FOUNDATIONS  
OF PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION IN INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL LAW 
 
1. On the concept of prosecutorial discretion in general and its implications 
The concept of prosecutorial discretion and its legal implications in the 
administration of international criminal justice in general—and at the International 
Criminal Court in particular—have increasingly attracted scholarly attention in 
recent years1.  
																																																								
1 The topic became the object of wide scholarly discussion after the ICC came into operation and the 
first Prosecutor of the Court Luis Moreno Ocampo was appointed in April 2003, as rightly pointed out 
by L. CÔTÉ, Reflections on the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion in International Criminal Law, in 
Journal of International Criminal Justice, vol. 3, issue 1, 2005, 163. While theoretically and 
empirically understudied, as noted by J. D. OHLIN, Peace, Security, and Prosecutorial Discretion, in 
C. STAHN, G. SLUITER (eds.), The Emerging Practice of the International Criminal, Leiden/Boston, 
2009, 185-186, the issue of the role and powers of the Prosecutor of the newly established Court had 
been at the centre of fierce debates at the time of the elaboration of the Rome Statute, especially as 
regards the introduction of a power to initiate proceedings proprio motu. Delegations of various states 
expressed the fear that endowing the Prosecutor with vast discretionary powers would have 
encroached in a pervasive manner upon their sovereignty and resulted in the creation of an 
‘irresponsible’ Prosecutor (see, e.g., the Opening General Statement of the Honourable Bill 
Richardson, United States Ambassador at the United Nations, according to whom the provision of 
proprio motu powers would have been “unrealistic and unwise”, resulting in a situation of “overload 
[of] the limits of the Court’s design, leading to greater confusion and controversy”; or the unequivocal 
stance taken by the Chinese Government in the Opening General Statement of Mr Wang Guangya, 
Head of the Chinese delegation, according to whom: “granting the Prosecutor the right to initiate 
prosecutions places State sovereignty on the subjective decisions of an individual. The pre-trial 
chamber provisions to check those powers fall short”). For a summary of the main issues regarding 
the role of the Prosecutor that have been discussed during the negotiation phase of the Rome Statute, 
see S. A. FERNÁNDEZ DE GURMENDI, The Role of the International Prosecutor, in R. S. LEE (ed.), The 
International Criminal Court: The Making of the Rome Statute, The Hague, 1999, 175-188 and, 
especially on the US position on the proprio motu powers of the ICC Prosecutor, D. SCHAFFER, False 
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The purpose, extension and limits of prosecutorial prerogatives in criminal 
proceedings, while widely explored in domestic and comparative literature, have 
been long neglected in academic contributions specific to the field of international 
criminal law2. The issue only started to gain critical attention with regard to certain 
prosecutorial selection decisions made by the Prosecutors of the ICTY and ICTR 
(such as not opening an investigation on the NATO bombing of Serbia or 
abandoning the perspective of investigating ethnic Tutsis for the crimes in Rwanda)3 
as well as during the implementation of the so-called Completion Strategy of the 
work of the ad hoc tribunals4. 
Since the early days of activity of the International Criminal Court, various 
authors have contributed to the debate on the theoretical rationale, institutional 
design and procedural implementation of prosecutorial discretion, with a view to 
enhance the legitimacy and coherence of action of the Office of the Prosecutor5, 
regarded as the true “engine” of the newly established permanent court6. 
																																																																																																																																																													
Alarm about the Proprio Motu Prosecutor, in M. MINOW, C. C. TRUE-FROST, A. WHITING (eds.), The 
First Global Prosecutor, Ann Arbor, 2015, 29-44. 
2 In the field of comparative criminal procedure various works provided an insightful analysis of the 
different national approaches to the institutional and procedural design of prosecutorial regimes. See, 
e.g., A. PERRODET, The Public Prosecutor, in M. DELMAS-MARTY, J. R. SPENCER (eds.), European 
Criminal Procedures, Cambridge/New York, 2002, 415-458. 
3 As noted by J. D. OHLIN, Peace, Security, and Prosecutorial Discretion, cit., 185-186. On the 
specific issue of the NATO bombing of Serbia in 1999, see, critically, A.-S. MASSA, NATO's 
Intervention in Kosovo and the Decision of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the Former Yugoslavia Not to Investigate: An Abusive Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion, in 
Berkeley Journal of International Law, vol. 24, issue 2, 2006, 610-649, who draws a comparison 
between the almost unfettered discretion of the Prosecutors of the ad hoc tribunals and the tempered 
and judicially supervised discretion of the ICC Prosecutor; at 648-649 the Author concludes that 
opening an investigation on the NATO bombing “would have given the impression, in the eyes of the 
international community, that justice was equally exercised against the weak and the powerful”. As 
regards the influence of realpolitik on the attitude of the ICTR’s Prosecutor towards crimes committed 
by the Rwandan Patriotic Front and the decision not to reappoint Carla Del Ponte partly due to her 
intention to pursue those investigations, see L. CÔTÉ, Independence and Impartiality, in L. REYDAMS, 
J. WOUTERS, C. RYNGAERT (eds.), International Prosecutors, Oxford, 2012, 382-385. 
4 See, A. D. MUNDIS, The Judicial Effects of the “Completion Strategies” on the Ad Hoc International 
Criminal Tribunals, in American Journal of International Law, vol. 99, no. 1, 2005, 142-158. 
5 See, among the many works that are referred to in the present study, the contributions of D. D. 
NTANDA NSEREKO, Prosecutorial Discretion Before National Courts and International Tribunals, in 
Journal of International Criminal Justice, vol. 3, issue 1, 2005, 124-144; L. CÔTÉ, Reflections on the 
Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion in International Criminal Law, cit.; W. A. SCHABAS, 
Prosecutorial Discretion v. Judicial Activism at the International Criminal Court, in Journal of 
International Criminal Justice, vol. 6, issue 4, 2008, 731-761; M. R. BRUBACHER, Prosecutorial 
Discretion within the International Criminal Court, in Journal of International Criminal Justice, vol. 
2, issue 1, 2004, 71-95; A. M. DANNER, Enhancing the Legitimacy and Accountability of 
Prosecutorial Discretion at the International Criminal Court, in American Journal of International 
Law, vol. 97, no. 3, 2003, 510-552; M. M. DEGUZMAN, Choosing to Prosecute: Expressive Selection 
at the International Criminal Court, in Michigan Journal of International Law, vol. 33, issue 2, 2012, 
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While it goes beyond the scope of the present study to provide an all-
encompassing and philosophically satisfactory definition of the concept of 
prosecutorial discretion in international criminal law, it is nevertheless appropriate to 
start the present analysis of the empirical dimension of prosecutorial practice at the 
ICC from a few widely shared definitional coordinates. As a matter of fact, although 
authors’ views differ significantly on the scope and boundaries of the prosecutor’s 
discretionary powers—and on its very desirability in the realm of international 
criminal law—the core meaning of this notion appears to be relatively 
uncontroversial. 
In general legal terms, according to the much quoted and authoritative Oxford 
Companion to Law, discretion can be defined as “the faculty of deciding or 
determining in accordance with circumstances and what seems just, right, equitable, 
and reasonable in those circumstances”7. In a more context-specific sense, the 
Oxford Companion to International Criminal Justice defines prosecutorial discretion 
as “the power of a prosecutor to make autonomous (independent and impartial) 
choices as to whom to incriminate, on which charges, on the basis of which evidence 
and at which moment in time, within a given legal order”8. 
Therefore, whatever the definition one may adopt, what characterises a 
criminal system based on prosecutorial discretion—sometimes referred to as 
‘principle of opportunity’ of criminal prosecutions in opposition to the ‘principle of 
legality’—is the prosecutor’s ability—or freedom—to choose between different 
courses of action in the exercise of the powers and prerogatives that the legal order 
																																																																																																																																																													
J. KNOOPS, Challenging the Legitimacy of Initiating Contemporary International Criminal 
Proceedings: Rethinking Prosecutorial Discretionary Powers from a Legal, Ethical and Political 
Perspective, in Criminal Law Forum, vol. 15, issue 4, 2004, 365-390. 
6 More in general, international prosecutors have been regarded as the fundamental clog in the 
jurisdictional machinery of international criminal tribunals. In this vein, L. CÔTÉ, Independence and 
Impartiality, cit., 321: “Considered as the driving force of all international criminal tribunals, 
international prosecutors are the engines that set in motion the whole adjudication process in which 
they play a central role”. 
7 This definition from D. M. WALKER, The Oxford Companion to Law, Oxford, 1980, is quoted by D. 
D. NTANDA NSEREKO, op. cit., 124. In the more recent work of P. CANE, J. CONAGHAN (eds.), The 
New Oxford Companion to Law, Oxford, 2008, 330 the Authors stress that thanks to prosecutorial 
discretionary powers it is possible to “individualize the implementation of the law, softening the 
harshness or injustices that sometimes arise from rules dispassionately applied”. 
8 See, S. ZAPPALÀ, Prosecutorial Discretion, in A. CASSESE (ed.), Oxford Companion to International 
Criminal Justice, Oxford, 2009, 471. 
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under consideration entrusts him or her9, including the faculty not to exercise his or 
her powers to trigger or continue criminal proceedings (nolle prosequi)10. 
Coessential to the idea of discretion is that the freedom of choice it entails, in 
order not to drift into arbitrariness, must somehow be limited by certain general 
principles and constrained by a combination of substantive and procedural rules11. 
Additionally, its exercise should be guided and restrained by some sort of criteria—
not necessarily legal, mandatory and externally imposed on prosecutors—allowing to 
discern the logic behind those choices and to control and if necessary review their 
legality and reasonableness12. As CÔTÉ convincingly points out, quoting a passage of 
																																																								
9 See A. M. DANNER, op. cit., 518, quoting a definition of discretion given by H. M. HART JR., A. M. 
SACKS, in W. N. ESKRIDGE JR., P. P. FRICKEY (eds.), The Legal Process: Basic Problems in the 
Making and Application of the Law, Westbury, 1994, 144. 
10 The following paragraphs address the influence and relevance of national prosecutorial regimes vis-
à-vis those of various international criminal justice mechanisms. It is alleged that the traditional 
dichotomy between (national) criminal systems based on the ‘principle of opportunity’ and those 
based on the ‘principle of legality’ (i.e. compulsory criminal prosecutions upon receipt of a notitia 
criminis), does not always offer a valid key to the understanding of the rationale behind prosecutorial 
discretion in ICL. In this vein, see C. STAHN, Judicial Review of Prosecutorial Discretion: Five Years 
On, in C. STAHN, G. SLUITER (eds.), op. cit., 248-249. Comparing the institutional development of the 
checks and balances of prosecutorial action at the national and international level, the Author writes 
that “international criminal courts are almost of a different species”, particularly in the sense that 
“there is recognizable asymmetry between prosecutorial duties and judicial control”. 
11 See, S. ZAPPALÀ, Prosecutorial Discretion, cit., 471: “Prosecutorial discretion should never imply 
arbitrariness”, and C. STAHN, Judicial Review of Prosecutorial Discretion: Five Years On, cit., 252: 
“discretionary powers are not arbitrary or unchecked powers”. For a judicial recognition of this 
principle, see ICTY, Judgment, Prosecutor v. Delalić et al. (Čelebići case), IT-96-21-A, AC, 20 
February 2001, par. 602: “It is beyond question that the Prosecutor has a broad discretion in relation 
to the initiation of investigations and in the preparation of indictments . . . It is also clear that a 
discretion of this nature is not unlimited”. 
12 The determination of principles and selective criteria that should guide the exercise of prosecutorial 
discretion has been the object of various academic collective endeavours, such as the extensive study 
of M. BERGSMO (ed.), Criteria for Prioritizing and Selecting Core International Crimes Cases, 2nd 
edition, Oslo, 2010. The prosecutors of international criminal tribunals themselves have developed 
strategies and prosecutorial policies to guide the action of their offices. In the case of the ICTY and 
ICTR, unfortunately, those documents were never made public, which led to serious transparency 
concerns on their selection choices, also considering the extremely limited judicial review of 
prosecutorial action available in the procedural context of the ad hoc tribunals. See, critically, L. 
CÔTÉ, Reflections on the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion in International Criminal Law, cit., 
171-172 and C. ANGERMEIER, Case Selection and Prioritization Criteria in the Work of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, in M. BERGSMO, op. cit., 27, who stresses 
that in any event those principles have not been consistently followed. On the contrary, in the 
framework of the ICC, in a significant effort towards transparency, the OTP decided to publish every 
three years the so-called Prosecutorial Strategy (or Strategic Plan) containing the broad objectives of 
the Office’s activity and a number of policy documents (known as Policy Papers), stating the 
principles and guidelines to be followed by the Office on specific issues. Particularly relevant for the 
present discussion are the Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations of 2013 and the Policy Paper on 
Case Selection and Prioritisation of 2016. These policy documents will be thoroughly examined in 
Part Two, Chapter Two of the present work. For a discussion of the general principles guiding the 
work of the OTP from the point of view of the current Prosecutor, see F. BENSOUDA, Challenges 
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DWORKIN’s seminal book, it is only through the study of the limits and constraints 
that a legal system imposes on the exercise of discretion that one can understand how 
it really performs in practice13. Such limits to discretionary powers can be normative, 
judicial, political, institutional, financial and disciplinary in character—or more 
frequently a combination thereof14—and are usually enforced by organs whose 
dialectical relation with the prosecutor decisively contributes to shape the dynamics 
of prosecutorial discretion of a criminal justice system15. 
Inextricably connected to the constraints and controls over the exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion are the concepts of independence, impartiality, 
accountability and transparency of prosecutorial action as constitutive elements of 
the rule of law in the administration of international criminal justice16. These 
concepts must be succinctly addressed in turn before examining the rationales 
generally adduced in favour of prosecutorial discretion in ICL—sometimes resorting 
to incorrect analogies with national legal systems—and the different schemes of its 
implementation across various international(ised) criminal tribunals. 
																																																																																																																																																													
Related to Investigation and Prosecution at the International Criminal Court, in R. BELLELLI (ed.), 
International Criminal Justice: Law and Practice from the Rome Statute to its Review, Farnham, 
2010, 131-134. 
13 See L. CÔTÉ, Reflections on the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion in International Criminal 
Law, cit., 163 quoting R. DWORKIN, Taking Rights Seriously, London, 1984, 31. The American 
philosopher, through one of his incisive metaphors affirms that “discretion, like the hole in a 
doughnut, does not exist except as an area left open by a surrounding belt of restriction”. 
14 With regard to the constraints to prosecutorial discretion at the ICC see, C. STAHN, Judicial Review 
of Prosecutorial Discretion: Five Years On, cit., 250 and 258-265. The Author stresses the fact that, 
notwithstanding the scarce indications in the Rome Statute as to the concrete exercise of discretion, 
the system of the ICC provides for a “multi-layered model of accountability. It combines professional 
responsibility (according to which Prosecutors may be held accountable for discretionary decisions 
based on professional misconduct) with elements of judicial review”, adding that “The Prosecutor and 
the Deputy Prosecutor are ultimately responsible to the Assembly of States and act under their 
budgetary scrutiny”. He then goes on to examine the various types of constraints that can play a role 
in the checks and balances mechanism of the ICC (respectively described as “political”; “process-
based”; “self-regulation” and “judicial review”). For an overall evaluation of the various mechanisms 
of oversight of international prosecutors, with particular regard to the ICC framework, see J. I. 
TURNER, Accountability of International Prosecutors, in C. STAHN (ed.), The Law and Practice of the 
International Criminal Court, Oxford, 2015, 382-407. 
15 The preliminary methodological contention of the present enquiry is that any meaningful study of 
the prosecutorial regime of the ICC must above all acknowledge these fundamental legal and 
institutional dialectics (freedom to choose v. rules and procedures limiting such freedom; powers of 
the prosecutorial organ v. powers of the judicial supervisory organs), and subsequently proceed to 
scrutinise how practice compares with the static legal framework of the system under consideration. 
16 See, S. ZAPPALÀ, Prosecutorial Discretion, cit., 471 and L. CÔTÉ, Independence and Impartiality, 
cit., 352: “prosecutorial discretion and prosecutorial independence can be seen as opposite sides of the 
same coin”. 
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Independence is an attribute that attaches both to the individuals exercising 
prosecutorial functions (‘personal independence’) and—collectively—to the 
organ/institution vested with prosecutorial authority (‘institutional independence’)17. 
Its concrete configuration is strictly connected to the choices of institutional design 
made at the time of the creation of a given system of (international) criminal justice, 
and is heavily influenced by the structure, sources of production of the rules and 
subjects of the legal order under consideration18. While any criminal justice system 
based on the rule of law must be premised on the individual predisposition of its 
actors—among which are prosecutors—to act out of their own will without being 
subject to (personal) undue interferences, legal systems differ as to the guarantee and 
safeguard of such autonomy vis-à-vis other organs and institutions19. 
On this point, it can be safely concluded that the evolutionary trajectory of 
international criminal justice has witnessed a growing trend towards the explicit 
normative recognition of the prosecutors’ institutional independence both vis-à-vis 
the other organs of international tribunals (such as the Judiciary and Registry) and 
external subjects (such as states, international organisations and their organs, NGOs 
and individuals)20. In the case of the ICC, the Statute also entrusts the OTP with “full 
																																																								
17 Ibidem, 324-325. 
18  Ibidem, 320, 324. The Author establishes a clear link between the concrete measure of 
independence enjoyed by international prosecutors and the specificities of the international legal 
order: “the existence of international prosecutors is determined by and inextricably associated with the 
setting-up of new international criminal jurisdictions. If one can affirm that prosecutors working 
within international criminal jurisdictions can be labelled as ‘international prosecutors’, their specific 
functions—prosecuting war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide—and the legal nature of 
the judicial institution itself will often govern the extent of independence afforded to their prosecution 
attorneys”. 
19 Ibidem, 323-324. Not all legal systems provide for a formal institutional independence of the 
prosecutor from other branches of government. In various jurisdictions prosecutors are at least 
formally subject to the executive power, though various operational mechanisms ensure an 
appropriate level of impartiality and autonomy of their action. On this point, see the UN Guidelines on 
the Role of Prosecutors adopted in Cuba in 1990. As CÔTÉ points out this document does not 
explicitly make reference to the issue of independence, while it establishes that prosecutors shall 
“carry out their functions impartially” (Guideline 13(a)). In the European context, recent 
developments at the Council of Europe lean toward a more explicit recognition of independence as an 
essential requirement of prosecutorial status and action. See, e.g., the so-called Bordeaux Declaration 
(“Judges and Prosecutors in a Democratic Society”) on the relations between judges and prosecutors 
in a democratic society, adopted jointly by the Consultative Council of European Judges and the 
Consultative Council of European Prosecutors in 2009 (particularly, paragraphs 6-8 of the declaration 
and paragraph 10 of the Explanatory Note: “The independence of the public prosecution service 
constitutes an indispensable corollary to the independence of the judiciary”). 
20 L. CÔTÉ, Independence and Impartiality, cit., 325: “Most of the international criminal jurisdictions 
created after Nuremberg and Tokyo have recognised in their statutes the institutional independence of 
their prosecutors using two main features. Characterizing the OTP as a ‘separate organ of the Court’ 
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authority over the management and administration of the office” 21 , thereby 
recognizing that “true substantive independence is only possible if there is 
administrative or managerial independence as well”22. 
As it will be seen, in parallel with the recognition of institutional and 
administrative independence, a trend towards the extension of various forms of 
judicial review of prosecutorial discretionary choices can be observed at the 
international level23. 
Impartiality of prosecutorial action is strictly connected to both personal and 
institutional independence, but whereas those are essentially ‘relational’ concepts 
(independence from something or somebody), impartiality centres on the behaviour 
and actual conduct of the prosecutor in discharging of his or her duties24. The 
obligation to act impartially can even be the object of a specific normative sanction, 
																																																																																																																																																													
affirms his independence both as part of and with regards to the judicial institution as such. 
Stipulating that the prosecutor ‘shall act independently’ and ‘shall not seek or receive instructions 
from any external source’ establishes his independence towards third parties such as states and other 
non-governmental organizations”. For normative references see, article 42(1) of the ICC Statute; 
article 16(2) of the ICTY Statute; article 15(2) of the ICTR Statute; article 11(2) of the STL Statute; 
article 15(1) of the SCSL Statute; article 19(1) of the Law on the Establishment of the ECCC. In the 
case of the ICC, the Code of Conduct for the Office of the Prosecutor, entered into force on 5 
September 2013, contains detailed provisions on the issue of independence (see, Section 2 of the 
Code). 
21 Article 42(2) of the Rome Statute. 
22 See, L. CÔTÉ, Independence and Impartiality, cit., 336. The Author recalls how drafters of the 
Rome Statute learned from the experience of the ad hoc tribunals, where the administrative 
dependency of the OTP on the Registry gave rise to significant conflicts and inefficiencies. 
23 See, S. ZAPPALÀ, Prosecutorial Discretion, cit., 471. At the ad hoc tribunals, until the advent of the 
completion strategy, the latitude and degree of judicial review of discretionary choices had been rather 
limited, consistently with the common law-oriented procedural scheme prevailing in those 
jurisdictions. Nevertheless, with the UNSC authoritatively setting the broad objectives of the 
prosecutorial policy to be implemented by the tribunals’ respective prosecutors through Resolutions 
1503 and 1534, the latitude of judicial interference on prosecutorial choices was significantly 
increased. In particular, Res. 1503 called the prosecutors to concentrate on “the most senior leaders 
suspected of being most responsible” (UNSC Resolution 1503 (2003), S/Res/1503, 28 August 2003, 
seventh recital); while Res. 1534 went on to intensify judicial review and confirmation of any new 
indictments, calling on each of the ad hoc Tribunal “to ensure that any such indictments concentrate 
on the most senior leaders suspected of being most responsible” (UNSC Resolution 1534 (2004), 
S/Res/1534, 26 March 2004, section 5). As it will be seen in greater detail, in the case of the ICC both 
the Statute and the other regulatory documents—as well as the relevant case law—provide for a wider 
and deeper supervisory role of judges with respect to prosecutorial discretionary choices and certain 
acts of the OTP. In this sense, M. R. BRUBACHER, op. cit., 86: “This aversion to judicial intervention 
in prosecutorial decisions was weakened in the ICC Statute” and C. STAHN, Judicial Review of 
Prosecutorial Discretion: Five Years On, cit., 250-251. At the same time, a certain degree of political 
oversight is maintained through the disciplinary role of the ASP (see articles 46, 47 and 112 of the 
Statute) and, more importantly, the powers attributed to the UNSC as regards the triggering of the 
Court’s jurisdiction pursuant to article 13(a) and the faculty to temporarily block its activity pursuant 
to article 16 of the Rome Statute. 
24 See, L. CÔTÉ, Independence and Impartiality, cit., 357-359. The Author speaks of “symbiotic” 
relationship between independence and impartiality. 
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such as the unprecedented one contained in article 54(1)(a) of the Rome Statute and 
imposing on the OTP the duty to “investigate incriminating and exonerating 
circumstances equally” for the establishment of the truth25. Nevertheless, in the 
highly politicised environment in which international prosecutors operate, the duty of 
impartiality may give rise to the “paradox” that in order to be—and appear—truly 
impartial and even-handed, prosecutors are sometimes required to make selective 
choices that might raise concerns of bias on the part of the Accused, states or other 
external observers26. The duty of impartiality, while not depriving the prosecutor of 
his or her quality of party to the proceedings, is therefore entangled with a general 
duty to act fairly and to cooperate with other actors at trial in the proper 
administration of justice27. To quote the eloquent words of Judge Shahabuddeen in 
one of his separate opinions as appellate judge of the ad hoc tribunals 
																																																								
25 On this relevant issue see the critical assessment of the first years of prosecutorial practice and the 
analysis of the judicial reactions thereof provided by C. BUISMAN, The Prosecutor’s Obligation to 
Investigate Incriminating and Exonerating Circumstances Equally: Illusion or Reality?, in Leiden 
Journal of International Law, vol. 27, issue 1, 2014, 205-226. While the same duty is not statutorily 
established for the prosecutors of the ad hoc tribunals, it has been argued that the jurisprudence of the 
ICTY and ICTR supports the existence of a similar obligation also in those judicial regimes. See S. 
ZAPPALÀ, The Prosecutor’s Duty to Disclose Exculpatory Materials and the Recent Amendment to 
Rule 68 ICTY RPE, in Journal of International Criminal Justice, vol. 2, issue 2, 2004, 620-630. The 
duty of impartially is also linked to the general principle of non-discrimination in the application of 
the law provided for by article 21(3) of the Rome Statute. References to impartiality are also made by 
other documents, such as the OTP Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, November 2013, par. 
28-29 and the Code of Conduct for the Office of the Prosecutor, Chapter 2, Section 6. 
26 See, L. CÔTÉ, Independence and Impartiality, cit., 366, 368-370. The Author discusses at length the 
issue of prosecutorial selection choices in relation to the victor’s justice paradigm, which is frequently 
invoked in criticizing the activity of international criminal tribunals. As he correctly points out, in 
certain circumstances prosecutors may need to select potential accused persons not only on the basis 
of the evidence available but also on considerations regarding their affiliation with a certain social 
group, in order to provide a more “balanced” account of the various forms of criminality occurred in a 
certain spatial and temporal framework (such as an armed conflict or other serious episodes of 
violence). Case law of the ad hoc tribunals has clarified the limits of this discretionary power, 
insisting on the fact that while the prosecutorial policy to investigate all the parties to a conflict is not 
per se in violation of the duty of impartiality and equality before the law, such selection choices must 
not be based on discriminatory or otherwise “impermissible motives”. See ICTY, Judgment, 
Prosecutor v. Delalić et al. (Čelebići case), IT-96-21-A, AC, 20 February 2001, par. 605, 607, 611, 
614-615 and, similarly, ICTR, Judgment, Prosecutor v. Akayesu, ICTR-96-4-A, AC, 1 June 2001, par. 
94-96; ICTR, Judgment and Sentence, Prosecutor v. Ntakirutimana, ICTR-96-10 and ICTR-96-17-T, 
TC, 21 February 2003, par. 870-871. 
27  See L. CÔTÉ, Independence and Impartiality, cit., 357. International documents stress the 
importance of the duty to act impartially. See, e.g., the already quoted (supra, footnote 19) UN 
Guidelines on the Role of Prosecutors (article 13(a)) and Bordeaux Declaration (paragraph 6 of the 
Declaration and paragraphs 11, 12, 40, 55 of the Explanatory Note). In particular paragraph 55 of the 
Explanatory Note provides a very clear explanation on the connection between impartiality, fairness 
and cooperation in the administration of justice: “The impartiality of the prosecutors during the 
procedure should be understood in this sense: they should proceed fairly and objectively to ensure that 
the court is provided with all relevant facts and legal arguments and, in particular, ensure that 
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The Prosecutor of the ICTR is not required to be neutral in a case; she is a 
party. But she is not of course a partisan . . . The implications of that 
requirement suggest that, while a prosecution must be conducted vigorously, 
there is room for the injunction that prosecuting counsel ‘ought to bear 
themselves rather in the character of ministers of justice assisting in the 
administration of justice’28. 
Mechanisms to ensure the accountability for prosecutorial action and the 
transparency of selection decisions are closely connected to prosecutorial discretion 
and its latitude. At the national level, notwithstanding the divergent traditions and 
cultural approaches to the issue, a variety of institutional and procedural solutions—
formal and informal, internal and external—is employed to strike a balance between 
the need for flexibility of prosecutorial action and the demand for accountability29. At 
the international level, the significant ‘institutional distance’ of the judicial and 
prosecutorial organs from a clearly discernible constituency—coupled with the 
highly politicised environment in which such organs are inevitably embedded—
makes it particularly difficult to design effective accountability mechanisms 30. 
Nevertheless, statutory and regulatory documents—as well as the case law of 
international tribunals—have contributed to gradually develop a multi-layered 
system of principles, rules and remedies against major prosecutorial misconducts 
and/or failures to act fairly and reasonably in the administration of international 
criminal justice 31 . The effectiveness of such procedures and remedies at the 
																																																																																																																																																													
evidence favourable to the accused is disclosed; take proper account of the position of the accused 
person and the victim; verify that all evidences have been obtained through means that are admissible 
by the judge according to the rules of a fair trial and refuse to use evidence obtained through human 
rights violations, such as torture”. 
28 Separate Opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen, ICTR, Decision (Prosecutor’s Request for Review or 
Reconsideration), Prosecutor v. Barayagwiza, ICTR-97-19-AR72, AC, 31 March 2000, par. 68 also 
cited by H. B., JALLOW, Prosecutorial Discretion and International Criminal Justice, in Journal of 
International Criminal Justice, vol. 3, issue 1, 2005, 154. 
29 See, F. MÉGRET, Accountability and Ethics, in L. REYDAMS, J. WOUTERS, C. RYNGAERT (eds.), op. 
cit., 418-419. The Author speaks of a “regulatory dilemma” as regards the quest for a fair balance 
between independence and accountability, pointing out that the two extremes of “absolute 
independence” and “absolute accountability” both fail to properly address the values at stake and that 
“accountability should not be so pervasive as to defeat the purpose of having an independent 
Prosecutor, it should not be so absent as to condone arbitrariness, which is the opposite of justice”. 
After recalling the different national approaches to the issue of prosecutorial accountability, the 
Author stresses the fact that while domestic experiences may be a source of inspiration, no single 
national legal system offers solutions that can be easily transplanted to international criminal justice 
mechanisms, considering their institutional and normative specificities. 
30 Ibidem, 418-420. In the same vein, see J. I. TURNER, Accountability of International Prosecutors, 
cit., 384-386. 
31 See, F. MÉGRET, Accountability and Ethics, cit., 420-424, 457-466. The Author addresses in turn 
the various sources of legal standards for the evaluation and enforcement of prosecutorial 
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international level—especially those of political and disciplinary character—is the 
object of debate, with particular regard to the lack of coordination in the action of the 
supervising authorities and the rather generic standards for the evaluation of 
prosecutorial (mis)conduct32. The role of judicially imposed sanctions in cases of 
prosecutorial misconduct at trial has gained significant relevance in the early practice 
of the ICC and various Chambers’ decisions provide an interesting point of 
observation on the dialectical OTP-Judiciary relationship as regards the use of 
prosecutorial discretionary powers and their judicial supervision33. 
Transparency of prosecutorial choices and decision-making processes is one 
additional dimension of prosecutorial discretion, especially in the context of 
international judicial institutions that constantly struggle to strengthen the 
(perception of) legitimacy of their action34. 
																																																																																																																																																													
accountability (international human rights law; international prosecutorial standards; staff regulations; 
tribunals’ Statutes and RPE; internal regulations) and the different bodies responsible for their 
application and enforcement (the OTPs themselves; the Judiciary; the Registry, the political governing 
bodies such as the ASP of the ICC; other external bodies). 
32 Ibidem, 422-423, stressing the “lack of specificity” of the underlying rules as well as the fact that 
they usually deal exclusively with “worst case scenarios” (i.e. serious misconduct hypothesis, 
especially at trial) and not with the many other aspects involving ethical and deontological issues as 
regards the prosecutor’s conduct. On the lack of coordination of the supervising authorities see J. I. 
TURNER, Accountability of International Prosecutors, cit., 406-407. 
33 See, in particular, the decisions of both the TC and AC regarding the OTP’s failure to disclose 
certain exculpatory materials in the Lubanga case and the imposition of two stays of proceedings as a 
remedy to prosecutorial action that had caused prejudice to the Accused’s rights: ICC, Decision on the 
Consequences of Non-Disclosure of Exculpatory Materials Covered by Article 54(3)(e) Agreements 
and the Application to Stay the Prosecution of the Accused with certain other issues raised at the 
Status Conference on 10 June 2008, Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Situation in the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo, ICC-01/04-01/06-1401, TC I, 13 June 2008; ICC, Judgment on the Appeal of the 
Prosecutor against the Decision of Trial Chamber I entitled ‘Decision on the consequences of non-
disclosure of exculpatory materials covered by Article 54(3)(e) agreements and the application to stay 
the prosecution of the accused, together with certain other issues raised at the Status Conference on 10 
June 2008’, Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, ICC-01/04-
01/06-1486, AC, 21 October 2008; ICC, Redacted Decision on the Prosecution’s Urgent Request for 
Variation of Time-Limit to Disclose the Identity of Intermediary 143 or Alternatively to Stay 
Proceedings Pending Further Consultations with the VWU, Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Situation in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, ICC-01/04-01/06-2517-Red, TC I, 8 July 2010; ICC, Judgment on 
the appeal of the Prosecutor against the decision of Trial Chamber I of 8 July 2010 entitled “Decision 
on the Prosecution’s Urgent Request for Variation of Time-Limit to Disclose the Identity of 
Intermediary 143 or Alternatively to Stay Proceedings Pending Further Consultations with the VWU”, 
Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, ICC-01/04-01/06-2582, 
AC, 8 October 2010. As pointed out by J. I. TURNER, Accountability of International Prosecutors, cit., 
391-394, the TCs and AC, both in later decisions in Lubanga and in other cases such as Kenyatta and 
more recently Ruto and Sang, have gradually shifted to a less draconian, more “structured” and 
“diversified” approach to remedies. 
34 Various authors link the quest for legitimacy to the enhancement of transparency of decision-
making and in particular to the publicity of the criteria for selection decisions. See, e.g., A. M. 
DANNER, op. cit., 546-547; P. WEBB, The ICC Prosecutor's Discretion not to Proceed in the ‘Interests 
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At a minimum, the principle of transparency requires the prosecutor to make 
the strategic objectives and selective criteria guiding his or her discretionary action 
public, which in the case of the ICC has increasingly been done with the issuance of 
the so-called Strategic Plan and Policy Papers35. The publicity of such documents, as 
well as a regular reporting on the activities of the Office—especially at the 
preliminary examination stage—may significantly help in keeping track of 
prosecutorial performances through a comparison between the stated objectives and 
the results achieved36. Moreover, transparency requires the prosecutor to justify and 
provide adequate reasons at least for certain major discretionary choices (such as the 
one not to open an investigation or proceed with a prosecution)37. It is on the basis of 
these reasons that it is possible to carry out—when permitted under the relevant 
provisions—the judicial review of the prosecutor’s discretionary choices38.  
																																																																																																																																																													
of Justice’, in Criminal Law Quarterly, vol. 50, no. 3, 2005, 324-325; L. CÔTÉ, Independence and 
Impartiality, cit., 354-357, recognizing that the publication of such documents is necessary but 
insufficient to ensure legitimacy. Others, such as M. M. DEGUZMAN, Choosing to Prosecute: 
Expressive Selection at the International Criminal Court, cit., 298-299, take issue with such a 
straightforward approach, articulating that ex ante selection criteria do not inherently enhance the 
legitimacy of prosecutorial choices, and that transparency can only contribute to that end if it “exposes 
to public discourse the decision makers' understanding of the appropriate goals and priorities for the 
institution”. This particular view, while heavily influenced by an expressivist approach towards 
international criminal law that may be otherwise seriously questioned, has the merit of demystifying 
the idea that transparency alone can solve the issues of credibility of international criminal 
institutions. 
35 See, supra, footnote 12, and infra, Part Two, Chapter Two of this work. For a positive appraisal of 
the publication of such documents, see also L. CÔTÉ, Independence and Impartiality, cit., 357 and C. 
STAHN, Judicial Review of Prosecutorial Discretion: Five Years On, cit., 251. 
36 The OTP publishes every year a report on the activities performed at the preliminary examination 
stage, presenting the work carried out by the Office in each situation according to a ‘phase-based’ 
approach. As regards preliminary examinations and the reporting activity thereof, the OTP in its 
Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations points out at par. 94 that one additional function of 
reporting on these activities is to “enable the Office to carry out its mandate without raising undue 
expectations that an investigation will necessarily be opened, while at the same time encouraging 
genuine national proceedings and contributing towards the prevention of crimes”. Transparency on 
the activities performed by the Office is therefore linked to the correct public perception of the 
Court’s legitimacy and to the complementarity regime. 
37 See, article 53(3)(a) and (b) of the Statute and Rule 105(3) and (5) of the RPE. There is nevertheless 
a serious issue concerning the effectiveness of this duty to provide reasons in relation to the possibility 
to trigger judicial review, for instance, of the decision to decline the opening of an investigation. In 
fact, as pointed out by C. STAHN, Judicial Review of Prosecutorial Discretion: Five Years On, cit., 
271, “Review under Article 53 (3) is based on a vicious cycle”, since the possibility to ask for judicial 
review is dependent on the prosecutor’s notification of his or her negative decision to the referring 
entity and/or the Court (the Statute mandates such a communication to the Court only if the negative 
decision is based “solely” on considerations regarding the interest of justice). In the absence of such 
notification it may prove procedurally impossible to trigger such judicial control over the 
discretionary choice under consideration. 
38 Article 15 of the Statute concerning the authorization to open an investigation pursuant to a request 
of the Prosecutor acting proprio motu and article 53(3)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute provide the two 
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While assertions of the need for transparency are present in a number of 
prosecutorial documents—especially at the ICC 39 —and notwithstanding the 
commendable efforts made on the point under the tenure of Fatou Bensouda, many 
argue that its overall implementation in the OTP’s practice is still insufficient40. As it 
will be seen in greater detail, recent practice also shows that fulfilling the need for 
transparency through extensive reasoning in the absence of solid and coherent 
principles guiding prosecutorial action can result in serious blows to the prosecutor’s 
credibility and encourage judges to extend the boundaries of judicial interference 
with his or her selection choices41. 
 
2. ‘Selectivity’ as an ontological feature of international criminal law 
It flows from the above general considerations that attributing to the 
prosecutor the ability to exercise a measure of discretion in discharging his or her 
duties—albeit under certain conditions and subject to both judicial and non-judicial 
																																																																																																																																																													
most relevant mechanisms for the judicial supervision of such discretionary decisions. On these 
provisions and their limits see, infra, Part Two, Chapter One and Three. 
39 See, e.g., ICC-OTP Strategic Plan 2012-2015, 11 October 2013, par. 8, 10, 32, 38, 53, 65, 86. 
Transparency is mentioned as an essential component in the enhancement of the effectiveness of 
preliminary examinations, as well as listed as one of the six overall goals of the prosecutorial strategy. 
This approach has been confirmed more recently in the ICC-OTP, Strategic Plan 2016-2018, par. 54, 
81. Other prosecutorial documents mention the requirement of transparency as regards specific issues, 
see e.g., ICC-OTP, Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, November 2013, par. 94; ICC-OTP, 
Policy Paper on Case Selection and Prioritization, 15 September 2016, par. 3, 5. 
40 See, e.g., L. CÔTÉ, Independence and Impartiality, cit., 356-357 and C. STAHN, Judicial Review of 
Prosecutorial Discretion: Five Years On, cit., 251: “These guidelines, however, are predominantly 
geared towards internal application by OTP and not meant to be targeted towards judicial review. This 
has shifted the focus from formalism and external scrutiny to self-regulation and internal review”. 
41  In this sense, see M. M. DEGUZMAN, Choosing to Prosecute: Expressive Selection at the 
International Criminal Court, cit., 298-299: “Transparency enhances legitimacy when it exposes good 
process, but may undermine legitimacy when it reveals incoherence” and  “Transparency without 
goals may therefore harm the ICC's legitimacy”. A very clear example of this unwanted consequences 
is provided by the way in which the OTP decided, at the end of preliminary examination, not to open 
an investigation on the facts occurred on the Mavi Marmara. The OTP produced a very detailed 
document discussing at length the reasons behind the nolle prosequi decision, thereby stimulating the 
request for judicial review by the referring entity (the Union of the Comoros) pursuant to article 
53(3)(a) of the Statute. The PTC severely criticised the OTP’s approach toward the construction of the 
gravity requirement on the basis of which the Prosecutor declined to open an investigation, and asked 
her to reconsider her previous decision (see ICC, Decision on the request of the Union of the Comoros 
to review the Prosecutor’s decision not to initiate an investigation, Situation on the Registered Vessels 
of the Comoros, Greece and Cambodia, ICC-01/13-34, PTC I, 16 July 2015). Irrespective of the fact 
that the decision at hand does not have the effect of mandating the Prosecutor to open an 
investigation, it is evident that the analysis of the PTC reveals a profound disagreement between the 
OTP and judges on the latitude of prosecutorial discretion not to proceed with an investigation on the 
basis of the purported insufficient gravity of the facts. For a discussion of this decision see, infra, Part 
Three, Chapter Two, par. 3.1.3. 
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constraints—has very far-reaching legal and institutional consequences on the 
concrete functioning of a criminal justice mechanism, its performances and 
legitimacy42. 
Prosecutorial discretion necessarily implies complex selection decisions, such 
as those on if, when, where, who, and for what crimes to investigate and prosecute43. 
But are these choices necessarily ‘selective’ (arbitrary) in a negative connotation, and 
is ‘selective enforcement’ of international criminal law intrinsically disruptive of the 
rule of law (however this concept may be construed at the international level)44? The 
answer to such questions is of even greater relevance since international criminal 
justice—even in its more recent and evolved forms—has historically been confronted 
with allegations of ‘selectivity’, both ratione personae and ratione materiae45, i.e. of 
targeting exclusively certain individuals or crimes based on considerations that have 
more to do with realpolitik than with any applicable legal (or moral) standard46. 
																																																								
42 For a discussion of the academic literature on the relations between prosecutorial discretion, 
selectivity and the legitimacy of international criminal law according to the rule of law discourse, see 
R. CRYER, Prosecuting International Crimes: Selectivity and the International Criminal Law Regime, 
Cambridge, 2005, 194-199. 
43 Authors largely agree on the fact that at the international level such selection choices are 
particularly complex, considering factors such as the limited jurisdictional reach of international 
judicial institutions; their dependency on state cooperation; the finite resources at their disposal; etc. 
See, e.g., F. MÉGRET, Accountability and Ethics, cit., 418: “It is in the nature of the Prosecutors’ work, 
especially that of international criminal tribunals, that they make very complex decisions” stressing 
that it is even more so “in an international realm fraught with conflicts of interest, values, and culture. 
International criminal justice often operates in environments where it is facing an uphill struggle in 
terms of its legitimacy”; M. M. DEGUZMAN, Choosing to Prosecute: Expressive Selection at the 
International Criminal Court, cit., 297, who goes on to call into question the feasibility of ex ante 
selection criteria in international criminal law, stating that “Each situation presents such a complex 
mix of relevant circumstances that application of rigid criteria may be impossible and is probably 
undesirable”. 
44 There has been significant scholarly debate on the appropriateness of applying the ‘rule of law 
discourse’ to the realm of international law, provided that such an approach has historically been 
developed in the context of domestic legal systems. On this debate see the seminal book by T. 
FRANCK, Fairness in International Law and Institutions, Oxford, 1998. See also I. BROWNLIE, The 
Rule of Law in International Affairs: International Law at the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United 
Nations, The Hague, 1998. 
45 This distinction is used by R. CRYER, Prosecuting International Crimes: Selectivity and the 
International Criminal Law Regime, cit., 191-231 (for the aspects concerning selectivity ratione 
personae), 232-326 (for the aspect concerning selectivity ratione materiae as regards both the 
definition of the crimes and the general principles of liability and defences). 
46 See T. L. H. MCCORMACK, Selective Reaction to Atrocity: War Crimes and the Development of 
International Criminal Law, in Albany Law Review, vol. 60, no. 3, 1997, 681-731. Allegation of 
victor’s justice, the tu quoque argument and accusation of overall selectivity have been the object of 
in-depth analysis, especially from the perspective of international relations and political science, as 
recalled by R. CRYER, Prosecuting International Crimes: Selectivity and the International Criminal 
Law Regime, cit., 199-202, footnotes 50-53. For a very critical account on the legitimacy of 
international criminal law from this standpoint see D. ZOLO, La giustizia dei vincitori. Da Norimberga 
PART ONE – CHAPTER ONE 
 14 
One possible way of conceptualizing the issue would be to distinguish 
between a ‘negative/pathologic’ and a ‘neutral/physiologic’ understanding of the 
concept of selectivity of international prosecutions, and reflect on whether it is 
																																																																																																																																																													
a Baghdad, Bari, 2006, 39-42, who speaks of a “dualistic system” of international criminal justice, 
whereby different standards of justice apply to powerful and less powerful states and their leaders. 
Recently, the debate on selectivity and double standards in international criminal justice has re-
emerged with regard to the severe critiques to the work of the ICC coming from the African continent. 
Allegations of bias and (judicial) neo-colonialism towards Africa in the selection decisions of the OTP 
have been put forward both at the political level (as part of a wide anti-ICC campaign at the African 
Union) and in academic writings. The most contentious issues at stake relate not only to the selection 
of situation and cases by the OTP, but also to the issue of immunity of Heads of State under 
international customary law and its relationship with the obligation to cooperate with the ICC under 
Part IX of the Statute. For an example of such political manoeuvres see the AU, Assembly, Decision 
on Africa’s Relationship with the International Criminal Court, Extraordinary Session of the 
Assembly of the African Union, 12 October 2013, Doc. Ext/Assembly/AU/ Decl. 1–2 (October 2013) 
Ext/Assembly/AU/Decl.1–4. As a result of controversies regarding requests for cooperation with the 
Court, late 2016 saw the first three cases of notification of withdrawal from the Rome Statute of 
Burundi, South Africa and Gambia. At the time of writing, the act of withdrawal deposited by the 
Government of South Africa with the UN Secretary General according to article 127(1) of the Rome 
Statute on 19 October 2016 has been invalidated by a decision of the High Court of Pretoria sitting as 
judge of first instance, which ordered the Government to revoke its notice of withdrawal (High Court 
of Pretoria, Gauteng Division, Democratic Alliance v. Minister of International Relations and 
Cooperation et al., case 83145/2016, 22 February 2017). On 7 March 2017 the Government of South 
Africa, in compliance with the court’s ruling, deposited with the Secretary General of the United 
Nations an act of revocation of the notice of withdrawal (available at 
https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/CN/2017/CN.121.2017-Eng.pdf, last retrieved 6 November 
2018). After presidential elections in Gambia, the new Government notified to the UNSG the 
annulment of the decision to withdraw previously notified on 10 November 2016. With regard to 
Burundi, the African state became the first State Party to effectively withdraw from the Rome Statute 
pursuant to article 127(1) of the Statute on 27 October 2017, one-year after the receipt of the 
notification of withdrawal. Nevertheless, before withdrawal became effective the OTP had already 
submitted to the PTC—under seal—a request for authorisation to open an investigation pursuant to 
article 15 of the Statute, which the preliminary judges granted with a decision adopted on 25 October 
2017 and made public on 9 November 2017 (See, ICC, Public Redacted Version of “Decision 
Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an Investigation into the Situation 
in the Republic of Burundi”, ICC-01/17-X-9-US-Exp, 25 October 2017, Situation in the Republic of 
Burundi, ICC-01/17-9-Red, PTC III, 9 November 2017). This swift move of the OTP finds support in 
article 127(2) of the Statute, establishing that the withdrawal of a state “shall [not] prejudice in any 
way the continued consideration of any matter which was already under consideration by the Court 
prior to the date on which the withdrawal became effective”. Notwithstanding this apparent setback of 
the pan-African withdrawal strategy, relationships with the ICC remain tense and a recent AU draft 
decision—adopted prior to the most recent legal and political developments in South Africa and 
Gambia—has reaffirmed the existence of such a withdrawal strategy in the political agenda of the 
organization (see AU, Assembly, Draft Decision on the International Criminal Court, 28th Ordinary 
Session of the Assembly of the African Union, 30-31 January 2017, Doc. 
Assembly/AU/Draft/Dec.1(XXVIII)Rev.2). On the ICC-AU relationship a growing literature is 
available. See, e.g., K. M. CLARKE, Fictions of Justice: the International Criminal Court and the 
Challenge of Legal Pluralism in Sub-Saharan Africa, New York, 2009; K. AMBOS, Expanding the 
Focus of the “African Criminal Court”, in W. A. SCHABAS, Y. MCDERMOTT, N. HAYES (eds.), The 
Ashgate Research Companion to International Criminal Law: Critical Perspectives, Burlington, 
2013, 499–529; R. DICKER, The International Criminal Court (ICC) and Double Standards of 
International Justice, in C. STAHN (ed.), The Law and Practice of the International Criminal Court, 
cit., 3-12; J.-B. J. VILMER, The African Union and the International Criminal Court: Counteracting 
the Crisis, in International Affairs, vol. 92, issue 6, 2016, 1319-1342. 
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possible to discern a progressive development of international criminal justice from 
the former to the latter47. 
The ‘negative/pathologic’ understanding of selectivity refers to situations 
where the selection decisions made in the exercise of prosecutorial discretion are: i) 
To a large extent pre-determined by unchecked political and/or administrative 
actors48; ii) Not constrained by legal criteria susceptible of external control; iii) 
Adopted by subjects who cannot be held accountable for such choices; iv) Based on 
irrelevant or arbitrary criteria leading to unpredictability and lack of consistency in 
the application and enforcement of the law49. 
On the contrary, a ‘neutral/physiologic’ understanding of selectivity points at 
situations where—as it happens in most national jurisdictions, including those 
theoretically subscribing to the principle of mandatory prosecutions50—selection 
choices are made by the prosecutorial authorities: i) Independently from—at least –
direct political interference; ii) Based on formal and/or informal criteria that allow a 
certain measure of external review; iii) Subject to accountability procedures and 
professional ethics requirements; iv) Based on patterns of conduct revealing a 
sufficient degree of consistency and coherence in the application and enforcement of 
the law. 
While the first of these understandings of selectivity points towards 
arbitrariness, the second points towards the recognition of the simple truth that “no 
criminal justice system has nowadays the capacity to prosecute all offences no matter 
how serious they are”51, and therefore that “the question is not whether selective 
																																																								
47 On the relationship between selectivity and the idea of “progress” of international criminal justice, 
see A. V. ARMENIAN, Selectivity in International Criminal Law: An Assessment of the ‘Progress 
Narrative’, in International Criminal Law Review, vol. 16, issue 4, 2016, 642-672. 
48 On this fundamental aspect for the purposes of distinguishing between acceptable and unacceptable 
selectivity, while recognizing the inevitable political dimension of selection choices at the 
international level, see L. CÔTÉ, Reflections on the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion in 
International Criminal Law, cit., 171 and R. CRYER, Prosecuting International Crimes: Selectivity 
and the International Criminal Law Regime, cit. 193. 
49 Ibidem, 196, echoing Thomas Franck’s conception of legitimacy in international law, centred on the 
requirements of consistency and coherence. 
50 K. AMBOS, Comparative Summary of the National Reports, in L. ARBOUR, A. ESER, K. AMBOS, A. 
SANDERS (eds.), The Prosecutor of a Permanent International Criminal Court, Freiburg, 2000, 525: 
“even if strict mandatory prosecution is called for there are mechanisms of factual discretion”. 
51 Ibidem. The passage is also quoted by R. CRYER, Prosecuting International Crimes: Selectivity and 
the International Criminal Law Regime, cit., 192. 
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prosecution should occur . . . but when selective enforcement is unacceptable”52. This 
holds particularly true in the case of international criminal justice, considering the 
institutional, jurisdictional and—last but not least—practical and logistical 
limitations of its judicial enforcement, given the generally massive scale of 
international crimes53. 
Selectivity—sometimes in the first more problematic, sometimes in the 
second more acceptable form—has been a historically unavoidable reality of 
international criminal justice 54 . Nevertheless, it must be conceded that—
notwithstanding the often well-grounded critiques to certain prosecutorial choices—
normative and institutional developments of ICL such as those reflected in the ICC’s 
legal regime contain the seeds of a significant improvement in the pursuit of a more 
principled selectivity compared to previous experiences55. One evident example of 
this trend is the fact that the jurisdiction of the permanent court, contrary to that of 
the ad hoc and internationalised tribunals, is not subject to statutorily pre-determined 
temporal or territorial limitations56. The extent to which such potential improvements 
are met in the actual functioning of the selection mechanism at the ICC is one of the 
key issues that the presents study tries to address. 
In sum, notwithstanding the current mainstream claims that in the era of the 
International Criminal Court all international crimes should always be punished 57 
																																																								
52 Ibidem. 
53 On the rationales and practicalities that contribute to make selectivity a necessity for international 
criminal justice, see, infra, paragraph 3 of the present chapter. 
54 For an overview of the ‘metamorphic’ expressions of selectivity in the experience of the various 
generations of international criminal justice institutions, see A. V. ARMENIAN, op. cit., 647-652 (as 
regards the IMT and IMTFE), 652-655 (as regards the ad hoc tribunals, especially the ICTY) and 655-
658 (as regards the ICC). 
55 See R. CRYER, Prosecuting International Crimes: Selectivity and the International Criminal Law 
Regime, cit., 231, stressing the fact that the Court represents a “quantum leap beyond what went 
before” and that the new regime may prove to be less susceptible to critiques based on selectivity. 
56 As to jurisdiction ratione temporis there is no time limit as it was the case with the ICTY and ICTR, 
provided that the conduct took place (or was still on-going) after the entry into force of the Statute 
(with specific regard to the state whose territory or citizens are concerned). As to jurisdiction ratione 
loci, its scope is determined by states’ participation to the founding treaty (or acceptance of the 
Court’s jurisdiction pursuant to article 12(3) of the Statute), and can in any event be extended by 
means of a UNSC resolution adopted pursuant to article 13(b) of the Rome Statute, and at least 
potentially, in a universal fashion. 
57 See, e.g., the position—shared among globally active NGOs—expressed by C. K. HALL, The 
Danger of Selective Justice: All Cases Involving Crimes  Under International Law Should Be 
Investigated and the Suspects, When There is Sufficient Admissible Evidence, Prosecuted, in M. 
BERGSMO, op. cit., 174-176, stressing that all international crimes must be punished and that the 
criteria to guide prosecutorial action must only have a prioritization and not a selection function. 
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and the prosecutorial mantra that purely legal criteria are applied in reaching 
selection decision58, a healthy dose of realism makes it necessary to recognise the 
inherent selectivity of the enforcement of international criminal law59. It is the task of 
jurists to reasonably tame such selectivity, to provide a persuasive theoretical 
framework and practical correctives to limit the risk of arbitrariness and, as SCHABAS 
explains with his usual frankness, “to ensure the greatest legitimacy without at the 
same time encouraging the myth that what they are doing is devoid of any political 
dimension”60.  
	
3. The (incorrect) analogies with national prosecutorial regimes: Differences in 
perspective and the rationale for prosecutorial discretion in ICL 
When analysing prosecutorial regimes across different international(ised) 
criminal law institutions, it is natural to look at domestic experiences as sources of 
																																																								
58 See the words of the Court’s first prosecutor L. MORENO-OCAMPO, The International Criminal 
Court in Motion, in C. STAHN, G. SLUITER (eds.), op. cit., 18: “As the Prosecutor of the ICC, I was 
given a clear judicial mandate; my duty is to apply the law without political considerations and I will 
not adjust to political considerations. Other actors have to adjust to the law”. In the same vein, see the 
Statement of the ICC Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda “The Public Deserves to Know the Truth about 
ICC’s Jurisdiction over Palestine”, 2 September 2014, released in reply to media allegations about the 
failure to open an investigation into alleged crimes committed in Gaza: “It is my firm belief that 
recourse to justice should never be compromised by political expediency. The failure to uphold this 
sacrosanct requirement will not only pervert the cause of justice and weaken public confidence in it, 
but also exacerbate the immense suffering of the victims of mass atrocities. This, we will never 
allow”. See, additionally, F. GUARIGLIA, E. ROGIER, The Selection of Situations and Cases by the OTP 
of the ICC, in C. STAHN (ed.), The Law and Practice of the International Criminal Court, cit., 354, 
358-359, 363-364. The two Authors, who both hold high-level positions at the OTP, strongly reaffirm 
the exquisitely legal nature of the assessments carried out by the OTP in the selection of situation and 
cases.  Various authors, while conceding that such bold claims may be justified as part of the 
communication strategy of the OTP towards the public at large, consider them to be somehow 
disingenuous. See, e.g., A. K. A. GREENAWALT, Justice Without Politics? Prosecutorial Discretion 
and the International Criminal Court, in New York University Journal of International Law and 
Politics, vol. 39, no. 3, 2007, 586-587; J. A. GOLDSTON, More Candour about Criteria. The Exercise 
of Discretion by the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, in Journal of International 
Criminal Justice, vol. 8, issue 2, 386-387: “such formulations are incomplete; they may not 
sufficiently explain the complexity of the decisions the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) is asked to 
make in practice. However powerful the aspiration for neutral principles, experience and common 
sense suggest that law can never be entirely divorced from its surrounding environment”; W. A. 
SCHABAS, Selecting Situations and Cases, in C. STAHN (ed.), The Law and Practice of the 
International Criminal Court, cit., 380-381. 
59  Ibidem, 373-375. The Author points out that the positive developments concerning the 
independence of the prosecutor and the increased supervisory role of judges have not made selectivity 
disappear, particularly as regards the prosecutor’s decisions not to open an investigation pursuant to a 
preliminary examination. 
60 W. A. SCHABAS, Victor's Justice: Selecting “Situations” at the International Criminal Court, in 
John Marshall Law Review, vol. 43, issue 3, 2010, 552. 
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possible institutional and procedural solutions that may fit the needs of the particular 
international criminal law mechanism under consideration. Comparative criminal 
law and procedure have provided a vast body of knowledge both in theoretical and 
practical terms for the purposes of drafting the Statutes and Rules of Procedure of 
international criminal tribunals61. 
Nevertheless, from a methodological point of view, it must always be borne 
in mind that the specificities of the international legal order in which such 
institutions are created and called to operate impose a measure of caution in resorting 
to national legal models and categories to explain such international phenomena and 
their development. In a classic passage worth quoting, LAUTERPACHT summarised 
this methodological attitude as follows 
To attribute to one system of a particular time and space the qualities of a 
universal law and to see in it a vehicle of the development of international 
law, may well result in checking that development62. 
  
With specific regard to prosecutorial regimes in ICL, SCHABAS adamantly 
explains that 
Mechanistic extrapolation based upon the model of the national prosecution to 
the context of international criminal tribunals is fundamentally flawed because 
there is no expectation that all perpetrators of serious international crimes will 
be brought to justice by such institutions63. 
	
																																																								
61 On the lessons that ICL can learn from comparative law scholarship see C. STEER, Legal 
Transplants or Legal Patchworking? The Creation of International Criminal Law as a Pluralistic 
Body of Law, in E. VAN SLIEDGRET, S. VASILIEV (eds.), Pluralism in International Criminal Law, 
Oxford, 2014, 64-67 and M. DELMAS-MARTY, The Contribution of Comparative Law to a Pluralist 
Conception of International Criminal Law, in Journal of International Criminal Justice, vol. 1, issue 
1, 2003, 13-25. 
62 H. LAUTERPACHT, Private Law Sources and Analogies of International Law, London, 1927, 178. 
The words of one of the most prominent internationalists of the 20th century are also a wise warning 
against the temptations of hegemony of any particular—national—legal tradition on the development 
of international law. In this sense and more specifically as regards international criminal law, see E. 
VAN SLIEDGRET, S. VASILIEV, Pluralism. A New Framework for International Criminal Justice, in E. 
VAN SLIEDGRET, S. VASILIEV, op. cit., 32: “international criminal justice is no forum for rhetorical 
dominance of one legal culture over the other(s) . . . While it can be hoped that the ICL will eventually 
develop its own coherent culture, it is clear that it will take hold only if it accommodates pluralism 
and does not settle the cultural differences between constitutive legal traditions by means of 
comparative ‘hegemony’”. 
63 W. A. SCHABAS, Victor's Justice: Selecting “Situations” at the International Criminal Court, cit., 
542. While it is true that virtually all ICL scholars consider it obvious that it is practically impossible 
that international criminal tribunals deal with all the perpetrators of all international crimes, this view 
is apparently not so obvious for external—and particularly political—commentators of the work of 
international criminal tribunals. 
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For these reasons the abstract typification derived from comparative law that 
distinguishes between prosecutorial regimes based on the ‘principle of legality’ and 
those based on the ‘principle of opportunity’, while useful for explicative purposes, 
falls short of providing a safe guide in analysing the rationales behind the choices 
made at the international level64. The reasons why international criminal justice 
clearly leans towards prosecutorial regimes relying—to a variable degree—on 
discretionary powers, must therefore be examined on the basis of a genuinely 
internationalist and historically informed approach to the issue. 
In the following sections such an analysis will be synthetically carried out 
with a view to explain why at least a certain degree of prosecutorial discretion is both 
theoretically and practically warranted in the realm of ICL, and to underline the most 
relevant differences with national criminal jurisdictions. 
 
3.1 The inevitably limited scope of international prosecutions: Jurisdictional 
limitations and large-scale character of international crimes 
A first element that differentiates international criminal justice from national 
jurisdictions—bearing important consequences on the desirability and necessity of 
prosecutorial discretion—is the fact that international criminal tribunals possess, with 
the only partial exception of the ICC, a jurisdiction which is very limited ratione 
																																																								
64 For a succint but accurate presentation of this traditional dichotomy and the respective rationale 
behind the ‘principle of opportunity’ (prosecutorial discretion) and ‘the principle of legality’ 
(compulsory prosecution) see K. DE MEESTER, The Investigation Phase in International Criminal 
Procedure. In search of Common Rules, Cambridge, 2015, 214-219. The two models, in any event, 
suffer from excessive abstraction and typification even when compared with the reality of domestic 
contexts. For instance, scholars who have carefully assessed national prosecutorial practices stress the 
fact that even in national legal systems formally based on the Legalitäsprinzip—such as Germany or 
in an even stricter fashion Italy—there are various practical ways for public prosecutors to exercise a 
measure of discretion and selection in investigating and prosecuting. See, e.g., K. AMBOS, 
Comparative Summary of the National Reports, cit., 525 and M. CAIANIELLO, The Italian Public 
Prosecutor: An Inquisitorial Figure in Adversarial Proceedings?, in E. LUNA, M. WADE (eds.), 
Transnational Perspectives On Prosecutorial Power, Oxford, 2011, 255-256: “mandatory prosecution 
pursuant to the legality principle is far from absolute in practice. On a daily basis, prosecution offices 
have to deal with too many cases, making it impossible to scrutinise each one. The situation is 
exacerbated by huge dockets resulting from decades of inefficient administration of justice. Under 
these circumstances, it is inevitable that prosecution offices will neither process all the information 
nor investigate all of the crimes . . . For all these reasons, even though the Constitution prohibits 
prosecutorial discretion, it is clear that such discretion exists; although it is hard to precisely measure 
its extent, the discretion is undoubtedly quite broad”. 
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loci, temporis, materiae and personae65. At a superficial view this obvious normative 
fact seems to contradict the proposition that international prosecutors should 
generally enjoy a wider degree of discretion compared to their national counterparts, 
based on the ingenuous equation: more restricted jurisdiction = less potential cases 
and perpetrators = more prosecutions and less discretionary selection choices. 
Unfortunately, the logic of the argument immediately falls in front of the 
consideration that international crimes are generally committed on a massive scale, 
involving a high number of potentially punishable conducts and perpetrators (as well 
as of affected victims)66. Sometimes it is the very normative structure of these crimes 
to postulate such character67. This observation alone, coupled with the constraints of 
resources and enforcement capacities faced by international criminal tribunals, is 
sufficiently compelling to consider realistically impossible to subscribe—in the 
realm of international criminal law—to the ‘principle of legality’, not only in its 
standard understanding (all crimes must be investigated and prosecuted), but also in 
																																																								
65 National criminal courts do not suffer from this kind of limitations, at least in the same way that 
international criminal tribunals do. Their jurisdiction naturally flows from the application of the 
fundamental rules and principles of national substantive criminal law and procedure, and is not 
generally limited to a certain temporal or territorial framework, or to a few relevant conducts or 
categories of persons (such as those ‘most responsible’ or the ‘senior leaders’, when such labels serve 
as a jurisdictional criteria). 
66 On the large-scale character of international crimes see, A. CASSESE, P. GAETA (eds.), Cassese’s 
International Criminal Law, 3rd ed., Oxford, 2013, 7; G. WERLE, F. JEßBERGER, Principles of 
International Criminal Law, Oxford, 2014, 33-34, 84; W. A. SCHABAS, The Cambridge Companion to 
International Criminal Law, Cambridge, 2016, 57, underlying the frequently high number of victims 
and perpetrators; E. AMATI, M. COSTI, E. FRONZA, P. LOBBA, E. MACULAN, A. VALLINI, Introduzione 
al diritto penale internazionale, Torino, 2016, 1-2, who speak of “macro-offensive” and “pluri-
subjective” character of these crimes. As correctly pointed out by K. DE MEESTER, op. cit., 285, one 
notable exception in the panorama of international criminal justice is represented by the Special 
Tribunal for Lebanon, which has been created to deal with limited episodes of criminality (the 
assassination of Prime Minister Hariri and other 21 in a terrorist attack and other “connected” attacks) 
involving a relatively limited number of victims and of alleged perpetrators. Nevertheless the 
purposes and jurisdiction of the tribunal, including the fact that it deals with terrorism, which is not 
usually considered one of the core international crimes, make it a rather eccentric experiment of 
internationalised criminal justice. On the STL see, infra, Chapter Two, par. 4. 
67 The generally mass-scale character of genocide, crimes against humanity and of war crimes is 
rather evident from the very legal formulations of such crimes. For instance, as regards crimes against 
humanity, the contextual element as formulated pursuant to article 7(1) of the Rome Statute refers to a 
“widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population”; similarly the contextual 
element for war crimes under article 8(1) of the Rome Statute refers to the commission of the 
enumerated acts “in particular when committed as part of a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale 
commission of such crime”. On the historical evolution of these contextual elements see AMBOS, K., 
Treatise on International Criminal Law, Vol. II, The Crimes and Sentencing, Oxford, 2014, 50-63 (for 
crimes against humanity) and 118-119 (for war crimes and the formulation of article 8(1) of the Rome 
Statute). 
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its reasonably more restricted version (all serious crimes must be investigated and 
prosecuted)68. 
These observations are even more true with regard to the ICC, due 
consideration given to its potentially universal jurisdictional reach and are 
fundamentally reflected in the complementarity regime that assigns precedence to the 
national level in the prosecution of international crimes69. 
 
3.2 Selecting upwards: Dealing with those who ‘bear the greatest responsibility’ and 
the role of gravity 
A second fundamental aspect that distinguishes international criminal law 
from domestic criminal jurisdictions—and with significant consequences on the 
justifications for prosecutorial discretion—is its historical focus on those individuals 
‘who bear the greatest responsibilities’ for the commission of the ‘most serious 
international crimes’. 
These or similar propositions, which can be found in at least some of the 
founding instruments of international(ised) criminal tribunals 70 , introduce two 
additional elements that deserve to be briefly analysed, namely the influence of an 
																																																								
68 See, K. DE MEESTER, op. cit., 218-219, agreeing with L. ARBOUR, Progress and Challenges in 
International Criminal Justice, in Fordham International Law Journal, vol. 21, issue 2, 1997, 534 on 
the proposition that in national jurisdiction there is a presumption that all serious crimes should 
normally be prosecuted, provided that there is sufficient evidence, whereas “the differing nature of 
international criminal prosecutions does not allow to do so”. 
69 See, K. DE MEESTER, op. cit., 285-286. 
70 Going back to the early days of international criminal justice, see the preamble of the London 
Agreement of 8 August 1945 and article 1 of the Charter of the IMT, referring to “the major war 
criminals of the European Axes” and article 1 of the Charter of the IMTFE, referring to the “major 
war criminals in the Far East”. In the case of the ad hoc tribunals, the founding documents do not 
explicitly make reference to the category of the “most responsible ones”, although with the advent of 
the Completion Strategy, the UNSC clearly mandated the Prosecutors and Judges concentrate on “the 
most senior leaders suspected of being most responsible for the crimes” (see UNSC Resolution 1503 
(2003), S/Res/1503, 28 August 2003, seventh recital, emphasis added). Article 1 of the Statute of the 
Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) explicitly makes reference to the “persons who bear the 
greatest responsibility”. Article 1 and 2 of the UN-Royal Government of Cambodia Agreement on the 
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) and article 1 and 2 new of the Law on 
the Establishment of the ECCC make reference to the two categories of “senior leaders of Democratic 
Kampuchea” and “those who were most responsible for the crimes” in shaping the Extraordinary 
Chambers’ jurisdiction ratione personae (although the Supreme Court Chamber has held that such 
categories do not function as jurisdictional requirements, see infra, footnote 71). Finally, as regards 
the ICC, the Statute does not make an explicit reference to the concept of “those who bear the greatest 
responsibility”, but contains various indications pointing towards the conclusion that a selection in 
this sense is consistent with the object and purpose of the Statute. See, e.g., the Preamble and article 5 
referring to “the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole”, as well as 
article 17(1)(d) referring to the concept of gravity as a central element of the admissibility test. 
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explicit or implicit focus on those ‘most responsible’ as a guiding principle for the 
decisions to initiate an investigation or prosecution; and the role of 
‘gravity/seriousness’ as a multifunctional concept enabling international prosecutors 
to exercise a certain measure of discretion. 
As regards the issue of the ‘most responsible ones’, while it is true that the 
founding documents and case law of the various international (or internationalised) 
tribunals have framed the concept differently71 or, as in the case of the ICC do not 
even openly make reference to it, it is reasonable to conclude that ICL has 
historically shown a tendency—with notable exceptions in certain phases of its 
development—to ‘select upwards’ the potential targets for prosecutions 72 . 
Nevertheless, this does not warrant the conclusion that ICL exclusively focuses on 
leadership crimes, concentrating only on the alleged perpetrators in positions of civil, 
																																																								
71See, supra, footnote 70. In particular, an aspect worth considering is whether in the various 
international and internationalised regimes at hand the categories of the ‘most responsible ones’ or 
‘senior leaders’ function as jurisdictional criteria, legally capable of limiting the tribunal’s jurisdiction 
ratione personae, or not. As underlined also by K. DE MEESTER, op. cit., 272-278, probably the most 
instructive discussion of the issue can be found in the ECCC’s case law, provided that the founding 
documents of the ECCC make reference to both categories in defining the Chambers’ personal 
jurisdiction. In Duch, the Trial Chamber subscribed to the view that the two categories constitute 
jurisdictional criteria and that therefore an Accused could challenge the ECCC’s jurisdiction alleging 
that he or she does not belong to either of them (ECCC, Judgement, Co-Prosecutors v. KAING Guek 
Eav (Duch), 001/18-07-2007/ECCC/TC, TC, 26 July 2011, par. 17). The Supreme Court Chamber 
disagreed, considering that while the requirement of being a Khmer Rouge official is jurisdictional in 
character, the fact of being “most responsible” and “senior leader” are not justiciable and only operate 
as “investigatorial and prosecutorial policy” (ECCC, Appeal Judgement, Co-Prosecutors v. KAING 
Guek Eav (Duch), 001/18-07-2007/ECCC/SC, SCC, 3 February 2012, par. 62-63, 76-77). 
72 It has been correctly pointed out that especially in the early days of the ad hoc tribunals (especially 
of the ICTY), the Prosecutors frequently concentrated on lower level perpetrators (‘small fishes’), 
essentially for the practical impossibility to reach the most senior military and political leaders. This 
trend was only corrected with time and more decisively after the adoption by the UNSC of the 
Completion Strategy. For this discussion see H. TAKEMURA, Big Fish and Small Fish Debate—An 
Examination of the Prosecutorial Discretion, in International Criminal Law Review, vol. 7, issue 4, 
2007, 678–679, referring to the admission by the ICTY’s former prosecutor Justice Goldstone that 
early selection decisions had been heavily influenced by the prospects of arrest and the necessity to 
produce a viable indictment. See also R. GOLDSTONE, Crimes Against Humanity—Forgetting The 
Victims, The 2001 Ernest Jones Lecture, The British Psychoanalytical Society & Institute of 
Psychoanalysis, Tuesday 25 September 2001 (available at 
http://psychoanalysis.org.uk/articles/crimes-against-humanity-forgetting-the-victims-justice-richard-
goldstone, last retrieved 6 November 2018). With regard to the ICC, authors have expressed doubts on 
the choice to concentrate on relatively minor perpetrators such as in Lubanga, the first trial resulting 
in a final conviction at the ICC. See, e.g., W. A. SCHABAS, Prosecutorial Discretion v. Judicial 
Activism at the International Criminal Court, cit., 741-747, discussing the soundness of the decision 
to investigate and prosecute Thomas Lubanga both from the point of view of gravity and the relevance 
of leadership positions for the purposes of discretionary choices. The Author concludes at 744 that 
such decision “had more to do with the fact that this was an accused who was accessible to a Court 
starved for trial work rather than any compelling analysis based upon either gravity or 
complementarity”. 
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military or political seniority. To the contrary, case law at the ICC has clarified that 
at least in that system the category of the “most responsible ones” and that of “senior 
leaders” must not be conflated in order to avoid an unjustified restriction of the 
Court’s jurisdiction73. In any event, even when the concept at hand does not function 
as a jurisdictional criterion (defining the scope of ratione personae jurisdiction of a 
court or tribunal), prosecutorial strategies and policy documents frequently refer to 
the label of “those who bear the greatest responsibility” as one of the policy criteria 
to guide the exercise of discretion74. In this sense, international criminal jurisdictions 
mark the distance with most national jurisdictions where such ‘big fish/small fish’ 
contraposition is not necessarily central to the work of the prosecuting authorities, 
																																																								
73 The issue has been discussed at length by the PTC and AC of the International Criminal Court in 
their decisions regarding the Lubanga warrant of arrest pursuant to article 58 of the Statute. PTC I 
expressed the view that only by concentrating on the highest ranking perpetrators the deterrent effect 
of the Court could be maximised (ICC, Decision concerning Pre-Trial Chamber I’s Decision of 10 
February 2006 and the incorporation of documents in the record of the case against Mr Thomas 
Lubanga Dyilo, Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, ICC-
01/04-01/06-08-US-Corr, PTC I, 24 February 2006, par. 51-55). The Appeal’s Chamber disagreed, 
clarifying that seniority is not a necessary requirement for the purposes of the Statute in the 
determination of gravity as part of the admissibility test, maintaining that “also individuals who are 
not at the very top of an organization may still carry considerable influence and commit, or generate 
the widespread commission, of very serious crimes” and that nowhere in the text of the Statute the 
drafters “had intended to limit its application to only the most senior leaders suspected of being most 
responsible” (ICC, Judgment on the Prosecutor’s Appeal against the Decision of the Pre-Trial 
Chamber I Entitled: “Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest, Article 58”, 
Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, ICC-01/04-169, AC, 13 
July 2006, par. 73-75, 78-79). This position has been recently confirmed by the PTC I in its first 
review decision pursuant to article 53 of the Statute (ICC, Decision on the request of the Union of the 
Comoros to review the Prosecutor’s decision not to initiate an investigation, Situation on the 
Registered Vessels of the Comoros, Greece and Cambodia, ICC-01/13-34, PTC I, 16 July 2015, par. 
23-24). 
74 See the references to this concept in the ICC-OTP, Paper on Some Policy Issues Before the Office 
of the Prosecutor, September 2003, 7: “the Office of the Prosecutor should focus its investigative and 
prosecutorial efforts and resources on those who bear the greatest responsibility, such as the leaders 
of the State or organisation allegedly responsible for those crimes” (italicised in the original text) and 
the ICC-OTP, Draft Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, 4 October 2010, par. 22, 51. In the 
final and more recent version of the same document the OTP still refers to the concept (with a slight 
linguistic change to the expression “those most responsible for the most serious crimes”), though 
specifying that the investigation and prosecution of mid-level and low-level perpetrators may be 
considered when appropriate (ICC-OTP, Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, November 2013, 
par. 42, 49, 66, 103). See also, ICC-OTP, Strategic Plan 2012-2015, par. 22 and ICC-OTP, Strategic 
Plan 2016-2018, par. 35. These last two documents explain the current position of the OTP and the 
prosecutorial shift from “focused investigations” to “open-ended, in-depth investigations” and to a 
“building-upwards strategy” that proceeds “by first investigating and prosecuting a limited number of 
mid- and high-level perpetrators in order to ultimately have a reasonable prospect of conviction for the 
most responsible”. Regulation 34(1) of the Regulations of the OTP refers to the concept of the most 
responsible with regard to the formulation of the case hypothesis. 
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since there is at least a presumption that—irrespective of the subjective position of 
the alleged perpetrators—all crimes of a certain gravity shall be prosecuted75. 
With regard to the second aspect, namely the relevance of gravity as a 
criterion for the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, it has been correctly pointed out 
that the selective function of this concept has long been overlooked in ICL, 
especially in the context of the ICC 76. The reason behind this early lack of 
elaboration of the concept lays in the common understanding that international 
crimes are ontologically characterised by their extreme gravity, and that any further 
consideration on the seriousness of such conducts would therefore be unnecessary 
for the purposes of deciding in which cases their investigation and prosecution is 
warranted at the international level77. Nevertheless, gravity has been at the basis of 
some fundamental choices of institutional and legal design of most international 
tribunals and certainly of the Rome Statute, although normative texts carefully avoid 
defining its function(s), in line with the “constructive ambiguity” that characterises 
many aspects of the Statute’s drafting78.  
As it will be seen in greater detail, many scholars agree on the fact that in the 
context of the ICC there exist at least two conceptually distinct dimensions of gravity 
(in particular at the situation stage). First, a strictly legal/objective dimension 
connected to gravity as an admissibility criterion laid down by article 17(d) and 
																																																								
75 See, K. DE MEESTER, op. cit., 218. 
76 See, W. A. SCHABAS, Prosecutorial Discretion v. Judicial Activism at the International Criminal 
Court, cit., 736-737, underlining the fact that the most authoritative commentaries on the Rome 
Statute, at least in their first editions, devoted a very limited space to the concept. Ibidem, at 739-748 
the Author discusses the OTP’s and Chamber’s views on the concept in the light of the first practice 
of the ICC. In the same vein, see M. M. DEGUZMAN, Gravity and the Legitimacy of the International 
Criminal Court, in Fordham International Law Journal, vol. 32, issue 5, 2008, 1401: “despite the 
acknowledged centrality of gravity to international criminal law, there is virtually no discussion in 
academic or judicial sources of the theoretical basis and doctrinal contours of this concept”. 
77 Various Chambers of the ICC, while certifying the obvious truth that all international crimes are 
particularly serious, have explained the function of the sufficient gravity criterion in relation to the 
Prosecutor’s discretionary powers. See, e.g., ICC, Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute 
on the Authorization of an Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Situation in the 
Republic of Kenya, ICC-01/09-19-Corr, PTC II, 31 March 2010, par. 56: “all crimes that fall within 
the subject-matter jurisdiction of the Court are serious, and thus, the reference to the insufficiency of 
gravity is actually an additional safeguard, which prevents the Court from investigating, prosecuting 
and trying peripheral cases”. 
78 See, M. M. DEGUZMAN, Gravity and the Legitimacy of the International Criminal Court, cit., 1400: 
“the concept of gravity or seriousness resides at the epicenter of the legal regime of the International 
Criminal Court”. The expression “constructive ambiguity” to describe the drafting technique of 
certain parts of the Rome Statute has been used by various authors. See, e.g., C. KRESS, The 
Procedural Law of the International Criminal Court in Outline: Anatomy of a Unique Compromise, in 
Journal of International Criminal Justice, vol. 1, issue 3, 603, 605. 
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recalled by article 53(1)(b) of the Statute. Second, a policy/selection dimension of 
gravity related to the Prosecutor’s discretionary determinations under article 53(1)(c) 
of the Statute 79 . Things become even more complicated bearing in mind the 
functional distinction between situations and cases in the context of the ICC, and the 
fact that gravity may perform a different function—and therefore needs to be 
construed accordingly—at these two stages of the ICC’s proceedings80. Prosecutorial 
documents—both policy papers and specific decisions of the ICC’s OTP—make 
reference to the concept and to the factors to be considered as indicators of gravity, 
albeit not always in a consistent fashion81. Certain decisions of the Prosecutor, 
formally based on gravity considerations, have been severely criticised for their 
inconsistency and in at least one occasion have been subject to a negative judicial 
review of the PTC under the mechanism provided for under article 53(3)(a) of the 
Statute82. In any event, while case law has started to provide some clarifications on 
the concept of gravity and its relationship with prosecutorial discretionary powers, 
contrasts between the OTP and Chambers (and between different Chambers), reveal 
a situation of persistent uncertainty in framing the legal boundaries of the concept83. 
																																																								
79 For a discussion of these authors’ positions and the points of disagreement among them, see K. DE 
MEESTER, op. cit., 253-256. In particular, the position taken by I. STEGMILLER, The Pre- Investigation 
Stage of the ICC, Berlin, 2011, 331-334, who maintains that prosecutorial discretion can only be 
linked to article 53(1)(c) in order not to undermine the review mechanism provided for under article 
53(3) seems to have been shared by the PTC in its first review decision under the same article. In this 
already quoted decision (see, supra, footnotes 41 and 73), PTC I affirmed that the evaluation of 
sufficient gravity—as part of the admissibility assessment that the Prosecutor must conduct in 
reaching a decision under article 53(1)(b) of the Statute—requires the application of “exacting legal 
requirements”, thereby confining the Prosecutor’s discretion to the choices based on the “interests of 
justice” (see, ICC, Decision on the request of the Union of the Comoros to review the Prosecutor’s 
decision not to initiate an investigation, par. 14 and, on the interests of justice, infra, next paragraph). 
80 On the concept of situational gravity see, K. J. HELLER, Situational Gravity Under the Rome Statute, 
in C. STAHN, L. VAN DEN HERIK (eds.), Future Perspectives on International Criminal Justice, The 
Hague, 2010, 227-253. K. DE MEESTER, op. cit., 255 where the Author recalls the views of different 
scholars and the case law of various ICC Chambers on the different standards in the evaluation of 
gravity at the situation and at the case stage. 
81 Ibidem. As to OTP’s documents concerning the criteria for the evaluation of gravity see Regulation 
29(2) of the Regulations of the OTP, echoed by the ICC-OTP, Policy Paper on Preliminary 
Examinations, November 2013, par. 59-65, which establish that gravity must be assessed on the basis 
of a combined quantitative-qualitative analysis taking into consideration the scale, nature, manner of 
commission and impact of the crimes. The Policy Paper further elaborates on the meaning of each of 
these factors. 
82 See, supra, footnote 72 for the critique expressed by SCHABAS and footnotes 41, 73, 79 concerning 
the PTC’s decision on the Comoros’ situation. 
83 See, supra, note 73 on the PTC-AC disagreement concerning gravity. K. DE MEESTER, op. cit., 249 
concludes that at this point “the gravity-criterion . . . lacks clarity” and that “The Court’s case law 
should further elucidate its meaning” (ibidem, 256). The Court’s decision in the Comoros’ situation 
provided an additional, albeit highly problematic, element of clarity, in the sense of limiting 
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In sum, international prosecutors—notwithstanding the uncertainties and 
fluctuations in the practice—heavily rely on the concepts of the “most responsible 
ones” and gravity in justifying their selection choices. On some occasions they have 
tried to downplay the discretionary character of such choices, whereas in other cases 
they have attempted to defend their discretionary powers under these concepts 
against judicial interference. In any event, the ‘atrocity character’ of international 
crimes and the practical impossibility to prosecute each and every international crime 
certainly justify the recognition of prosecutorial discretion, of which these concepts 
are clear manifestations. 
 
3.3 Policy considerations and the “interests of justice” 
Given the extremely politicised environment in which international criminal 
justice operates, many have argued that prosecutorial discretion finds one of its 
justifications in the necessity to take into account the political implications of certain 
prosecutorial choices, both in the case of positive intervention and nolle prosequi 
decisions84. Prosecutors have clearly and publicly rejected the idea that political 
considerations play any role in their decision-making process but, as various 
commentators have shown, it is difficult to deny that similar considerations do play a 
role in the prosecutors’ determinations85. The influence of international politics on 
the legal determinations of the OTP and more in general on the work of the Court 
have also been widely studied from the point of view of the triggering mechanisms, 
provided that two of them (namely state and Security Council referrals) are fraught 
with political implications, as the practice of self-referrals has shown86. One specific 
																																																																																																																																																													
prosecutorial discretion under article 53 of the Statute only to the assessment of the interests of 
justice. 
84 See, C. STAHN, Judicial Review of Prosecutorial Discretion: Five Years On, cit., 256: “The most 
compelling argument in favour of prosecutorial discretion in the initiation of investigation, the choice 
of perpetrators and prosecutorial strategy is not the quantity and nature of crimes, but the political 
ramifications of indictments and selection. Prosecutorial discretion may be defended on the ground 
that it involves certain political choices which the Office of the Prosecutor is best placed to make in 
light of its presence on the ground and its close ties to domestic and international authorities”; L. 
CÔTÉ, Reflections on the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion in International Criminal Law, cit., 
170; G.-J. KNOOPS, op. cit., 365-366. On the Prosecutor’s claim that political considerations play no 
role in her selection decision see, supra, footnote 58. 
85 Ibidem. 
86 One of the most prominent critics of the practice of self-referrals is W. A. Schabas, who has 
explained his opposition to their development in various works. See, e.g., W. A. SCHABAS, 
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area in which political considerations concerning the intervention of ICL 
mechanisms may play a significant role is that of transitional justice, a theme 
explored by a vast literature that has problematized the relationship between 
international criminal justice and national political processes, such as reconciliation 
and peace processes (including the recourse to restorative justice mechanisms and 
amnesties)87. 
In the case of the ICC, the Statute contains a ‘general clause’ that at least in 
theory—under certain conditions and subject to judicial supervision—may introduce 
discretionary policy considerations in the equation of prosecutorial choices: the 
faculty to decline the opening of an investigation or the starting of a prosecution if 
they would run contrary to the “the interests of justice”88. This provision has been at 
the centre of some debate at the time of the adoption of the Statute, and is generally 
considered to be one of the most evident statutory recognitions of the Prosecutor’s 
discretionary powers89. It is beyond the scope of this section to examine the latitude 
																																																																																																																																																													
Prosecutorial Discretion v. Judicial Activism at the International Criminal Court, cit., 751, 760-761, 
underlining the fact that this solution finds no support in the travaux préparatoires and is in any event 
an “interpretive deviation” accepted by the Court and motivated by the necessity to generate activity 
in its early days. Of the same Author see also “Complementarity in Practice”: Some 
Uncomplimentary Thoughts, in Criminal Law Forum, vol. 19, issue 1, 2008, 12-18, 33 and 
Complementarity in Practice: Creative Solutions or a Trap for the Court?, in M. POLITI, F. GIOIA 
(eds.), The International Criminal Court and National Jurisdictions, Aldershot, 2008, 25, calling the 
self-referrals a “trap” for the Court. Doubts have been expressed also by P. GAETA, Is the Practice of 
“Self-Referrals” a Sound Start for the ICC?, in Journal of International Criminal Justice, vol. 2, issue 
4, 2004, 951-952, who stresses the risk that self-referrals may be used opportunistically by state 
authorities to fight against opposition forces in the context of civil wars. D. ROBINSON, The 
Controversy over Territorial State Referrals and Reflections on ICL Discourse, in Journal of 
International Criminal Justice, vol. 9, issue 2, 2011, 355-384, takes issue with these critical positions. 
While conceding that self-referrals may prove problematic for political reasons, the Author explains 
how in his view the text, drafting history and purpose of the relevant provisions of the Statute fully 
support the Court’s conclusions on their admissibility at the ICC. 
87 The legal and political debate on transitional justice has been one of the most flourishing areas of 
scholarly debate in recent years. On the role of ICL in the context of transitional justice (including the 
issue of amnesties) see K. AMBOS, The Legal Framework of Transitional Justice: A Systematic Study 
with a Special Focus on the Role of the ICC, in K. AMBOS, J. LARGE, M. WIERDA (eds.), Building a 
Future on Peace and Justice: Studies on Transitional Justice, Peace and Development, 
Berlin/Heidelberg, 2009, 19-103 and J. N. CLARK, Peace, Justice and the International Criminal 
Court: Limitations and Possibilities, in Journal of International Criminal Justice, vol. 9, issue 3, 
2011, 521-545. The issue is briefly touched upon also by the ICC-OTP, Policy Paper on the Interests 
of Justice, September 2007, 7-8, par. 6(a) and (b). See, infra, footnote 92. 
88 Article 53(1)(c) and (2)(c) of the Rome Statute. 
89 Various authors have argued that this clause gives the prosecutor ample discretionary powers to 
decline an investigation or prosecution. See, G. TURONE, Powers and Duties of the Prosecutor, in A. 
CASSESE, P. GAETA, J. R. W. D. JONES (eds.), The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A 
Commentary, Oxford, 2002, 1153 who stresses that such discretion not to proceed is akin to that 
enjoyed by public prosecutors of common law countries; H. OLÁSOLO, The Prosecutor of the ICC 
before the initiation of investigations: A quasi-judicial or a political body?, in International Criminal 
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and limits of this rather vague concept, but a few preliminary observations on its 
relationship with the exercise of prosecutorial discretion seem necessary. 
First of all, the Prosecutor’s own understanding of the interests of justice, as 
reflected in a dedicated policy paper, is extremely limited and circumscribed. The 
OTP maintains that recourse to the interests of justice as a justification for nolle 
prosequi decisions should only be made in exceptional cases and that there is a 
presumption in favour of the investigation and prosecution of the crimes falling 
under the Court’s jurisdiction90. In other words, the Prosecutor does not bear the 
burden to show that an investigation or prosecution is in the interest of justice and 
“shall proceed with investigation unless there are specific circumstances which 
provide substantial reasons to believe it is not in the interests of justice to do so at 
that time”91. The Policy Paper also makes reference to other justice mechanisms and 
peace processes at the national level as “other potential considerations” for decisions 
under article 53, but cautiously avoids entering into an abstract discussion on their 
concrete influence on the determination concerning the interests of justice, in 
particular excluding that the interests of justice embrace “all issues related to peace 
and security”92. 
																																																																																																																																																													
Law Review, vol. 3, issue 2, 2003, 135 who labels such discretion as “unlimited”; and P. WEBB, op. 
cit., 318 who speaks of “enormous discretion”. As recalled by K. DE MEESTER, op. cit., 257, footnote 
791, some authors such as F. Razesberger do not share this view, arguing—not very convincingly—
that because the assessment of the interests of justice must be based on objective criteria, this criterion 
leaves little room for discretion to the OTP. In any event, the contention that considerations under the 
interests of justice entail an absolute and unlimited discretion is excessive, given that article 53(3)(b) 
of the Statute provides for a mechanism of judicial review by the PTC—even acting ex officio—with 
respect to nolle prosequi decisions based “solely” on the contrariety of an investigation or prosecution 
with the interests of justice. On the interests of justice and the prosecutorial policy of the OTP see also 
C. CÁRDENAS ARAVENA, Revisión crítica del criterio “Interés de la justicia” como razón para no 
abrir una investigación o iniciar un enjuiciamiento ante la Corte Penal Internacional, in Revista de 
Derecho Universidad Católica del Norte Sección: Estudios, vol. 18, no. 1, 2011, 21-47. 
90 ICC-OTP, Policy Paper on the Interests of Justice, September 2007, 3, par. 4(a) and (b). 
91 Ibidem, 2-3, par. 3. 
92 Ibidem, 8-9, par. 6(b). The Policy Paper recognises the primacy of the UNSC in matters relating to 
the maintenance of international peace and security (“the broader matter of international peace and 
security is not the responsibility of the Prosecutor; it falls within the mandate of other institutions”), 
thereby distinguishing the “interests of justice” from the broader concept of the “interests of peace”. 
This approach has been criticised by J. DONDÉ MATUTE, La política criminal de la Fiscalía de la 
Corte Penal Internacional para el inicio de investigaciones, in Anuario Mexicano de Derecho 
Internacional, vol. 14, 2014, 62-63 who underlines the connection between international criminal 
justice and the maintenance of peace, as recalled by the Preamble of the Statute. In the same vein, K. 
A. RODMAN, Is Peace in the Interests of Justice? The Case for Broad Prosecutorial Discretion at the 
International Criminal Court, in Leiden Journal of International Law, vol. 22, issue 1, 2009, 99-126, 
arguing in favour of broad prosecutorial discretion, contends that a consequentialist approach to the 
matter justifies the fact that peace processes—and the consequences of the ICC intervention in 
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  Secondly, article 53(1)(c) and (2)(c) of the Statute indicate—albeit in a non-
exhaustive way—the explicit factors to be taken into consideration when carrying 
out the assessment of the interests of justice, respectively the gravity of the crime and 
interests of victims (for the decision not to open an investigation), and the additional 
circumstances relating to the age or infirmity of the alleged perpetrator and his or her 
role in the alleged crime (for the decision not to proceed with a prosecution). 
Thirdly, the same article of the Statute provides for a mechanism of judicial 
supervision over such discretionary choices, centred on the oversight functions of the 
PTC. Decisions of no-action based solely on the purported conflict with the interests 
of justice must be communicated to the referring entities and the competent PTC—
which can exercise its review also ex officio—and are only effective if confirmed by 
the PTC93. 
At least one scholar has suggested a parallelism between the Rome Statute 
and certain national jurisdictions—especially of the common law area—with respect 
to the interests of justice (or similar general discretionary clauses), indicating that 
ICL may learn from such national experience94. While there is certainly some merit 
in comparing these situations, it must be maintained that the reasons for attributing to 
the ICC Prosecutor the discretionary power to decline action based on the interests of 
justice are in many ways different from those envisaged in national legal systems, 
																																																																																																																																																													
situations of pending conflict—should be factored in by the OTP while reaching its conclusions on the 
opening of an investigation or starting of a prosecution. 
93 Article 53(3)(b) of the Rome Statute. The judicial review of the OTP’s decision not to open an 
investigation or start a prosecution can also take place if the decision is not based “solely” on grounds 
of alleged contrariety with the interests of justice, according to par. (3)(a) of the same article. 
Nevertheless, in this case the review procedure can only be triggered by an ex parte request of the 
referring entity (state or UNSC). Another relevant difference between these two cases of judicial 
review is that the review under par. (3)(b) entrusts the PTC with the power to determine the outcome 
of the preliminary examination phase (if the Chamber confirms the decision of the OTP, the procedure 
comes to an end, whereas if judges do not confirm the nolle prosequi decision, they can mandate the 
opening of an investigation or of a prosecution). On the contrary, the review under par. (3)(a) only 
allows the PTC to request the Prosecutor to reconsider his or her previous decision not to open an 
investigation or start a prosecution, therefore leaving to the OTP the final decision on the outcome of 
the preliminary examination. On this issue, see, infra, Part. Two, Chapter Three, par. 2.3 and Part 
Three, Chapter Two, par. 3.1. 
94 See L. M. KELLER, Comparing the “Interests of Justice”: What the International Criminal Court 
Can Learn from New York Law, in Washington University Global Studies Law Review, vol. 12, issue 
1, 2013, 1-39. The Author suggests that some lessons could be learned from the law and courts’ 
practice of the state of New York, where a similar criterion to decline investigations or prosecutions is 
provided for under Section 210.40 of the New York Criminal Procedure Law. On the same topic see J. 
F. WIRENIUS, A Model of Discretion: New York’s “Interests of Justice” Dismissal Statute, in Albany 
Law Review, vol. 58, issue 1, 1994, 175-222. 
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and that solutions adopted by the courts of one jurisdiction in the US—informative 
as they may be—cannot light-heartedly be transplanted at the international level95. 
It must nevertheless be emphasised that up to date the OTP has never relied 
on the interests of justice in order decline an investigation or prosecution, and that 
consequently any judicial clarification on the scope and correct construction of the 
concept is still lacking. 
 
3.4 Limited resources and other practical constraints 
Among the proposed justifications for prosecutorial discretion in ICL, one of 
the most controversial—given its utilitarian character—relates to the issue of the 
limited financial resources at the disposal of international criminal institutions, and to 
prosecutorial authorities in particular, to carry out their mandate 96 . Critics of 
international criminal justice have long maintained that the costs of these institutions 
far outweigh their achievements, although these views largely overlook the available 
data and some insightful comparisons with the costs of the very few national 
criminal trials of analogous complexity97. 
Prosecutors in every jurisdiction have to deal with limited resources in 
carrying out their mandate, and legal systems significantly differ on the solutions to 
																																																								
95 Ibidem, 17-20 for a comparison of the two normative systems. The Author seems conscious of the 
fundamental differences between the two legal orders (both substantive and procedural), but 
concludes that recourse to the interest of justice in order to decline investigations or prosecutions is 
even more warranted at the international level. Additionally, the article argues that—in line with the 
prosecutorial and judicial experience of NY law—the duty to provide detailed reasons for the choice 
not to proceed and the existence of formal criteria to exercise discretion under the “interests of 
justice” clause may prove counterproductive in terms of legitimacy and efficacy of such discretionary 
mechanism (ibidem, 23-32). 
96 For a detailed and relatively up-to-date analysis of the cost and performances of international 
criminal tribunals, especially of the ad hoc ones, see S. FORD, Complexity and Efficiency at 
International Criminal Courts, in Emory International Law Review, vol. 29, issue 1, 2014, 1-69. The 
Author focuses on the concept of complexity of international criminal trials, which he tries to measure 
and compare with that of national criminal trials, showing that the claim of inefficiency of 
international criminal trials is very often empirically unfounded. See also, D. WHIPPMAN, The Cost of 
International Justice, in The American Journal of International Law, vol. 100, no. 4, 2006, 880 who 
stresses the complexity of international criminal trials, stating that “the perception that international 
criminal trials are costly and slow is accurate but misleading”. See also, with regard to the length of 
international criminal trials, A. WHITING, In International Criminal Prosecutions, Justice Delayed 
Can Be Justice Delivered, in Harvard International Law Journal, vol. 50, no. 1, 2009, 323-364. 
97  S. FORD, Complexity and Efficiency at International Criminal Courts, op. cit., 50-62 (see, 
particularly the tables comparing the different efficiency index of various large-scale domestic trials 
and how they relate to facts and figures of international criminal trials). 
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adopt in order to maximise the efficiency of their criminal justice institutions98. 
Nevertheless, empirical studies show that the complexity of international trials is 
rarely matched by their national counterparts, making certain comparisons and the 
reference to crude data of little explicative significance99. What really matters from 
the point of view of the sustainability—and efficiency assessment—of a criminal 
justice mechanism is the correct proportion between the available financial and 
human resources, and the number and complexity of the proceedings to be 
conducted. 
International prosecutors face a number of challenging practical and logistical 
difficulties connected to the specific configuration of international jurisdictions and 
the context where crimes occur. To provide just a few examples: the high number of 
criminal incidents, conducts and potential perpetrators that may be the object of 
investigation and prosecution (given the large-scale character of international 
crimes); the conduct of investigations in difficult conditions and with the necessity to 
rely on cooperation with national authorities for most of the investigative tasks; the 
cultural and linguistic barriers that make it necessary to contract qualified personnel 
(anthropologists, psychologists, interpreters and translators, etc.); and the inherent 
complexity of pre-trial and trial procedures, provided that in ICL the settlement of 
cases through procedures alternative to full trial (such as plea bargaining) is still the 
exception100. 
Against this background—and with particular regard to the ICC’s broad 
territorial and personal jurisdiction—any ambition of investigating and prosecuting 
the vast majority of international crimes must be abandoned in favour of pragmatic 
																																																								
98 Ibidem, 62. The Author recalls that in the US most of the criminal prosecutions are resolved through 
a plea deal, whereas at the ICTY more than 80% of the Accused have received a full trial. 
99 Ibidem, 29-30. 
100 On this issue see the recent article by J. I. TURNER, Plea Bargaining and International Criminal 
Justice, in University of the Pacific Law Review, vol. 48, issue 2, 2017, 219-246. For a comparative 
perspective on the issue of plea bargaining that may shed light on the solutions adopted under the 
Rome Statute and the respective influence of domestic models see Y. MA, Prosecutorial Discretion 
and Plea Bargaining in the United States, France, Germany and Italy: A Comparative Perspective, in 
International Criminal Justice Review, vol. 12, issue 1, 2012, 22-52. It should be noted that up to date 
only one trial at the ICC has been defined through a guilty plea under article 65 of the Statute, namely 
in the case against Ahmad al-Faqi Al-Mahdi, in the context of the Malian situation. TC VIII of the 
Court accepted the guilty plea and sentenced the Accused to nine years of imprisonment for the war 
crime of attacking protected objects as defined under article 8(2)(e)(iv) of the Statute. See, ICC, 
Judgment and Sentence, Prosecutor v. Al-Mahdi, Situation in the Republic of Mali, ICC-01/12-01/15, 
TC VIII, 27 September 2016. 
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selection decisions that take into consideration, in the allocation of the available 
resources, also the concrete prospects of success in opening specific situations and 
cases101. 
In addition, prosecutorial discretion and its judicial review may even 
reinforce each other in the quest for a reasonable balance between the need to fight 
impunity and the necessity of making an efficient use of the financial and human 
resources available to the OTP. As a matter of fact, as argued by STAHN, the fact that 
prosecutorial choices may be subject to judicial review can contribute to prevent the 
waste of resources and avoid procedural challenges at later stages in the 
proceedings102. Nevertheless, the recent—albeit very limited—practice of the ICC on 
the point seems to prove that the opposite can also be true. Discretionary decisions 
based—although not primarily—on practical considerations such as the efficient use 
of resources in relation to the prospects of success of an investigation or prosecution 
have been called into question by the judges in the exercise of their functions of 
judicial supervision over the Prosecutor’s decision not to open an investigation103. 
In other words, this pragmatic rationale for prosecutorial discretion—
frequently invoked also at the national level—seems to be even more warranted at 
the international level, also in response to criticism as regards the negative 
perception concerning the performances of international criminal tribunals.
																																																								
101 See, K. DE MEESTER, op. cit., 286, footnote 992. OTP’s documents often make reference to the 
efficient use of resources as one of the elements to consider in exercising prosecutorial discretion. 
See, e.g., ICC-OTP, Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, November 2013, par. 57. 
Additionally, references to the issue of limited resources are omnipresent in the Strategic Plan for 
2016-2018. 
102 See K. DE MEESTER, op. cit., 286, footnote 992 quoting the position of C. STAHN, Judicial Review 
of Prosecutorial Discretion: Five Years On, cit., 256-258. 
103 Again, this is the case of the decision not to open an investigation in the Situation on the 
Registered Vessels of the Comoros, Greece and Cambodia, and of the PTC’s request for 
reconsideration, whereby judges have invited the Prosecutor to reconsider her previous decision. 
While concerns regarding the use of resources haven’t been explicitly mentioned in the OTP’s 
decision, the rather limited perspectives of successful prosecutions in the potential cases arising out of 
the situation under preliminary examination may have been among the decisive factors in declining 
the opening of an investigation. See, supra, footnotes 41, 73, 79. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE DIFFERENT 
PROSECUTORIAL MODELS ACROSS INTERNATIONAL(ISED) 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE MECHANISMS 
	
1. Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to succinctly present a comparative survey of 
the different prosecutorial models across international criminal jurisdictions. 
Consistently with the methodological approach adopted in the present work and the 
theoretical framework set out in the previous chapter, horizontal comparison is 
carried out—synchronically and diachronically—within the realm of international 
criminal justice mechanisms, in order to better reflect the specificities of the 
institutional and procedural regimes at the international level104.  
Comparative analysis of the normative design of the relevant jurisdictions 
shows that prosecutorial discretion has always played a significant role in the 
concrete functioning of international criminal justice. Nevertheless, important 
structural differences exist among these experiences as to the practical 
implementation of prosecutorial discretion, with particular regard to the institutional 
position of the Prosecutor, the purpose and latitude of his or her discretionary 
powers, as well as the degree of judicial oversight of prosecutorial choices. As it will 
be seen, the historical trajectory of ICL—both at the legislative and applicative 
level—shows a gradual trend towards a more legally constrained prosecutorial 
discretion and a more incisive judicial oversight, in parallel with increased 
institutional safeguards of the prosecutor’s independence. 
An in-depth analysis of all the normative and procedural aspects of the 
various systems of international criminal procedure with regard to the functioning of 
the prosecutor’s office is clearly beyond the scope of this chapter, and has been 
thoroughly carried out elsewhere in ICL literature105. 
																																																								
104 For the reasons of this methodological approach see, supra, the Introduction. 
105 See, e.g., the monumental work of L. REYDAMS, J. WOUTERS, C. RYNGAERT (eds.), op. cit. Another 
extremely informative comparative contribution on the subject is that of M. BERGSMO, C. CISSÉ, C. 
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The focus of the chapter is therefore limited to elucidating the broad lines of 
development and transformation of the concept of prosecutorial discretion and its 
judicial oversight, in order to gradually approach the study of the prosecutorial 
regime of the ICC, making it possible to fully appreciate its specificities vis-à-vis its 
predecessors (especially the ad hoc tribunals) and its contemporary internationalised 
peers. 
This preliminary work will prepare the ground for the detailed analysis of the 
theory and practice of the ICC prosecutorial regime to be carried out in the 
subsequent parts of the work. 
 
2. The IMT and IMTFE: The lack of independence and the Prosecutor as longa 
manus of states 
The creation of the international military tribunals of Nuremberg and Tokyo 
at the end of World War II is unanimously considered the moment of birth of 
(modern) international criminal justice. For this reason the analysis of the 
prosecutorial regimes of the IMT and IMTFE is the necessary starting point for any  
comparative survey. 
Despite the significant differences in the political and institutional genesis of 
the two tribunals—reflected in various legal and procedural aspects—these 
unprecedented jurisdictional mechanisms share many features with regard to the 
fundamental design of their prosecutorial regimes106. 
																																																																																																																																																													
STAKER, Les Procureurs des Tribunaux internationaux: Étude comparative des Tribunaux de 
Nuremberg et de Tokyo, du TPIY et du TPIR et du projet de Statut de la CPI, in L. ARBOUR, A. ESER, 
K. AMBOS, A. SANDERS (eds.), op. cit., 155-189. 
106 On the major political events and discussions leading to the creation of the two tribunals see L. 
REYDAMS, J. WOUTERS, C. RYNGAERT, The Politics of Establishing International Criminal Tribunals, 
in REYDAMS, J. WOUTERS, C. RYNGAERT (eds.), op. cit., 16-19. Literature on the institution, 
functioning, achievements and legacy of the two tribunals is immense and even a partial selection of 
the available materials would not faithfully depict the breadth of scholarly debate that their activity 
has elicited. Nevertheless, for an accurate historical report of the events leading to the creation of the 
two tribunals see, on the IMT, B. F. BRADLEY, The Road to Nuremberg, New York, 1981; T. TAYLOR, 
The Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials: A Personal Memoir, New York, 1992 and, on the IMTFE, A. 
C. BRACKMAN, The Other Nuremberg: The Untold Story of the Tokyo War Crimes Trials, New York, 
1987. For two relatively recent books dealing with the main legal and institutional issues related to the 
work of the tribunals and their importance for the development of ICL see G. METTRAUX (ed.) 
Perspectives on the Nuremberg Trial, Oxford, 2008 and N. BOISTER, R. CRYER, The Tokyo 
International Military Tribunal: A Reappraisal, Oxford, 2008. 
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The first element that the contemporary international criminal lawyer would 
find in stark contrast with the more recent generation of international criminal 
tribunals concerns the fact that the prosecutorial authorities of both the IMT and 
IMTFE did not enjoy any formal—and to an extent even substantive—independence 
from the governments of the victorious Powers that had established the tribunals107. 
To the contrary, they substantially served as agents of their governments, 
implementing the criminal policy priorities of the Allied Powers108. It is well known 
that the Chief of Counsel for the prosecution at Nuremberg Robert H. Jackson—who 
at the time of his appointment was serving as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court 
of the United States—not only played a pivotal role in the negotiations leading to the 
creation of the tribunal and the preparation of the trial, but was also directly and 
formally answerable to the US President Truman for his activities as prosecutor in 
Nuremberg109. Similarly, other key members of the four prosecuting teams in 
Nuremberg held high-level posts in the—civil or military—judicial system of their 
countries110. In addition to that, the lack of attention for the requisite of independence 
was evidenced by the fact that most of the personnel attached to the prosecution both 
at the IMT and IMTFE was of military extraction, and the rigid and hierarchically 
organised structure of the prosecuting authorities further reinforced the prevalence of 
																																																								
107 In the Charters of the two tribunals no provisions can be found to the effect of guaranteeing the 
independence of the prosecutors vis-à-vis their Governments, such as those found in the statutes of the 
ad hoc tribunals, internationalised courts and the ICC (for the punctual normative references see, 
supra, footnote 20). On this crucial issue see M. BERGSMO, C. CISSÉ, C. STAKER, op. cit., 159 and L. 
CÔTÉ, Independence and Impartiality, cit., 372-373. 
108 L. REYDAMS, J. WOUTERS, C. RYNGAERT, op. cit., at 14: “The four Chief Prosecutors leading four 
separate prosecuting teams were accountable directly to their respective governments. There was no 
delegation of authority to an international bureaucracy and hence no danger that the tribunal might 
turn against its creators”. 
109 G. TOWNSEND, Structure and Management, in L. REYDAMS, J. WOUTERS, C. RYNGAERT, op. cit., 
174-178. See also, T. TAYLOR, op. cit., 215-216 where it is argued that—because of his exclusive and 
direct link with the US President—Jackson was in practice largely independent and able to make his 
own decisions without any undue influence from Washington officials. On the role of Jackson in the 
preparation of the trial and the establishment of the prosecution structures at Nuremberg see M. 
BERGSMO, C. CISSÉ, C. STAKER, op. cit., 159 and G. TOWNSEND, op. cit., 179-192. 
110 Ibidem, 174. As recalled by the Author, most of the national officials appointed as state 
representatives at the London Conference later came to hold some of the most relevant posts—such as 
that of Chief Prosecutor—in the four investigation and prosecution teams (or those of Judges or 
Alternate judges of the IMT). Virtually all those nominated to these posts held some of the highest 
judicial offices in their own country, such as Sir Hartley Shawcross and Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe 
(respectively Chief and Deputy Prosecutors of the British team) who had been Attorney General in the 
United Kingdom. 
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the ‘military’ over the ‘international’ character of these judicial institutions111. In the 
case of the IMTFE, such military imprinting of the Tribunal was further evidenced 
by the legal source of its creation, namely a unilateral act of the Supreme 
Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP), General Douglas MacArthur112. 
With regard to the prosecutorial structures at the two tribunals, different 
models were chosen113. At Nuremberg the choice was made to create four national 
prosecution teams, one for each of the victorious Powers (US, UK, Soviet Union and 
France), each headed by a Chief-Prosecutor 114 . The preparation for trial and 
presentation of the case followed this division of labour along national lines, 
pursuant to a suggestion of the Soviet delegate at the London Conference and later 
Judge of the IMT General Nikitchenko, although the working capacity of the 
American and British teams significantly surpassed that of the other two teams115. To 
the contrary, in Tokyo, the choice was made to create a single International 
Prosecution Section, comprising prosecutors from all participating states, led by a 
Chief Prosecutor—also acting as Chief of Counsel—a post for which Joseph B. 
Keenan was nominated by President Truman116. 
One relevant consequence of the lack of formal and substantive independence 
of the IMT and IMTFE prosecutors is the fact that the instituting Powers imposed—
																																																								
111 L. REYDAMS, J. WOUTERS, C. RYNGAERT, op. cit., 14 and L. CÔTÉ, Independence and Impartiality, 
cit., 372 quoting D. SPRECHER, Inside the Nuremberg Trial: A Prosecutor's Comprehensive Account, 
Vol. II, Lanham, 1999, 1532-1534. 
112 MacArthur’s Special Proclamation for the creation of the tribunal was adopted on 19 January 1946 
and was based on the US State War Navy Co-ordinating Committee (SWNCC) Directive on the 
Identification, Apprehension and Trial of Persons Suspected of War Crimes adopted on 2 October 
1945 (see in particular paragraphs 5 and 7 of Appendix “D” to document SWNCC 57/3, United States 
Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945. The British 
Commonwealth, the Far East, vol. VI, Washington DC, 1945, 932-936). See also, L. REYDAMS, J. 
WOUTERS, C. RYNGAERT, op. cit., 17-18. As the Authors point out, although the creation of the 
IMTFE had been marked by an extremely unilateralist approach, the composition of the tribunal was 
markedly more international than that of its European counterpart and included Judges from countries 
who had experienced the crimes under Japanese military occupation. 
113 On this differences see S. ZAPPALÀ, Human Rights in International Criminal Proceedings, Oxford, 
2003, 30-33. 
114 G. TOWNSEND, op. cit., 174-175. 
115 Ibidem, 200 (on the Soviet suggestion to divide the case for the presentation at trial), 192-200 (for 
a very detailed presentation of the structure of the American prosecuting office, which had been 
frequently changed over time), and 202-207 (respectively on the British, French and Soviet 
organizational charts). At 203 the figure is given on the size of the British delegation, which was 
composed of nearly 170 people, bigger than the French and Soviet ones, but significantly smaller—
roughly one-tenth—than the American one led by Jackson. 
116 Ibidem, 209-212, 219 for the organisational chart of the IPS. See also article 8 of the IMTFE 
Charter. 
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formally and informally—to the prosecuting authorities a de jure and de facto 
preliminary selection of the alleged crimes and suspects that were eligible for trial. In 
other words there was no real autonomous prosecutorial policy, and prosecutors’ 
choices closely followed the political priorities of the states that had set up the 
tribunals117. Not only the Statutes limited the prosecution at the two tribunals to the 
“major criminals” of the Nazi and Japanese regimes, but in addition the process 
leading to the formation of the two list of respectively 24 and 28 Accused people was 
heavily influenced by the states’ desire to balance realpolitik and legal 
considerations118. Among the most notable examples of these political influences are 
the instruction of the Soviet leadership to Prosecutor Rudenko in order to have the 
Katyn massacre attributed to the Nazis or the explicit directive to General MacArthur 
not to pursue the prosecution of Emperor Hirohito and other members of the 
Japanese Imperial Family119. Additionally, an important role in preparing the initial 
list of indictees was played by the United Nations War Crimes Commission and, in 
the case of the IMTFE, by the Far Eastern Commission, although the refinement of 
																																																								
117 The list of the 24 Accused for the Nuremberg trial was drawn up after negotiation between the four 
delegations and the indictment was first made public in October 1945, roughly one month prior to the 
opening of the trial. The list of the 28 defendants at the Tokyo trial (known as “List A”) was made 
public on 29 April 1946. 
118 In this sense see, N. BOISTER, R. CRYER, op. cit., 62: “The non-selection of some prominent leaders 
was at least partly the result of the political exigencies of the day”; and F. DE VLAMING, Selection of 
Defendants, in L. REYDAMS, J. WOUTERS, C. RYNGAERT, op. cit., 547: “In short, both in Nuremberg 
and Tokyo circumstances and politics influenced the selection of defendants. Though the suspects’ 
responsibility did play a role, several factors undermined a consistent selection process”. 
119 L. CÔTÉ, Independence and Impartiality, cit., 373. Ibidem, other relevant cases of opportunistic 
exclusions from the prosecutions are reported, such as “instructions given by Chiang Kai-shek to the 
prosecutor of the Republic of China not to investigate crimes committed by Japan in communist-based 
areas . . . and US prosecutors granting immunity to those involved with Unit 731 of the Japanese army 
in charge of biological and chemical warfare and to high-ranking Nazis who had collaborated with the 
United States in the final months of the war”. As regards the exclusion from prosecution of the 
Japanese Emperor, see in particular paragraph 17 of Appendix “D” to document SWNCC 57/3, 
SWNCC, Directive on the Identification, Apprehension and Trial of Persons Suspected of War 
Crimes adopted on 2 October 1945 (United States Department of State, Foreign Relations of the 
United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945. The British Commonwealth, the Far East, vol. VI, 
Washington DC, 1945, 936), where the SWNCC directs General MacArthur to “take no action against 
the Emperor as a war criminal pending receipt of a special directive concerning his treatment”. On the 
notable omissions from the indictment at the IMTFE see also N. BOISTER, R. CRYER, op. cit., 61-69. 
The Authors recall how the exclusion of Hirohito was formally decided by a majority of the acting 
prosecutors, but reflected the official policy of the SCAP, clearly backed by the US Government, with 
the only significant opposition of the Australian delegation (ibidem, at 65). It must also be recalled 
that at the IMTFE the focus of the indictment had been on aggression and war crimes, whereas crimes 
against humanity were not targeted, leading to the exclusion of massive episodes of criminality such 
as the phenomenon of the so-called ‘comfort women’ (ibidem, at 64). 
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the lists was carried out by the restricted executive bodies of the prosecuting 
authorities of the two tribunals120. 
Lastly, as explained by AMBOS, the criminal procedure applicable at the two 
international military tribunals did not provide for any form of judicial supervision of 
prosecutorial selection choices prior to trial: “Prosecutors were vested with the 
exclusive control over the investigation” 121 . In the absence of any pre-trial 
procedure—for instance in the form of a confirmation of the indictments—judicial 
oversight of prosecutorial selection choices could only be exercised indirectly and ex 
post when considering the guilt or innocence of the Accused at trial. 
In sum, the experience of the international military tribunals shows that the 
unique events and geopolitical conditions leading to their creation were reflected in 
procedural regimes where, on the one hand, prosecutors did not enjoy independence 
from political authorities (to the contrary, they contributed to the enactment of their 
governments’ policies), and on the other hand, no judicial oversight of the 
politically-influenced prosecutorial choices was available. 
 
3. The ad hoc Tribunals: From broad discretion to increased judicial interventionism 
The revival of international criminal justice in the 1990s with the creation of 
the two ad hoc tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda—after decades of 
dormancy in its judicial implementation at the international level—brought back to 
the attention the issue of prosecutorial discretionary powers and their decisive role in 
the jurisdictional machinery of international criminal tribunals. 
It should come as no surprise that almost half a century after the experience 
of the IMT and IMTFE the choices of institutional design for the newly established 
tribunals took different paths, both as to the legal parameters delimiting their 
jurisdiction and as to the unprecedented formal recognition of the prosecutors’ 
																																																								
120 The UNWCC prepared a first list of Axis war criminals in December 1944, when the Great Powers 
had not yet reached an agreement on how to deal with the “major” Nazi criminals (see, L. REYDAMS, 
J. WOUTERS, C. RYNGAERT, op. cit., 12-13). The role played by the FEC—and its relationship with the 
SWNCC—as regards the selection of defendants in Tokyo, as well as the definitive selection made by 
the prosecution’s Executive Committee of the IMTFE, are analysed by BOISTER, R. CRYER, op. cit., 
50-54. 
121 K. AMBOS, S. BOCK, Procedural Regimes, in L. REYDAMS, J. WOUTERS, C. RYNGAERT, op. cit., 
492-493. 
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independence122. Among the reasons behind these choices are the radically different 
international situation leading to the establishment of the two tribunals as well as the 
increased influence of international human rights law (and particularly fair trial 
rights) on the development of international criminal justice123. 
For the purposes of the present comparative analysis of international 
prosecutorial regimes, four main points shall be briefly touched upon as regards the 
experience of the ad hoc tribunals, respectively: a) The influence of the jurisdictional 
criteria defined by the UNSC on the exercise of prosecutorial discretion; b) The 
importance of the novel provisions on the prosecutor’s independence contained in 
the Statutes; c) The concrete latitude of prosecutorial discretion and its substantive 
and procedural limitations; d) The (increasingly incisive) role played by the Judiciary 
in carrying out the judicial review of prosecutorial choices (with particular regard to 
the implementation of the Completion Strategy). 
In the first place, it must be recalled that the founding documents of the two 
ad hoc tribunals provide a clear delimitation of the jurisdictional reach of these 
judicial institutions, thereby preliminarily establishing the perimeter for the exercise 
of prosecutorial discretionary powers124 . The UNSC, in particular, framed the 
temporal and territorial jurisdiction of the two tribunals differently, providing for an 
open-ended jurisdiction that could extend to on-going conflicts in the case of the 
ICTY, while imposing a clear-cut timeframe for prosecutions at the ICTR125. As a 
																																																								
122 See article 16(2) of the ICTY Statute and 15(2) of the ICTR Statute. 
123 On the increasingly important role of international human rights law on the development of 
procedural safeguards for the Accused in both international and domestic criminal proceedings see the 
in-depth empirical study by M. C. BASSIOUNI, Human Rights in the Context of Criminal Justice: 
Identifying International Procedural Protections and Equivalent Protections in National 
Constitutions, in Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law, vol. 3, no. 2, 1993, 267-291. On 
the relevance of human rights law on the work of the ad hoc tribunals, see the general introductory 
remarks in S. ZAPPALÀ, Human Rights in International Criminal Proceedings, cit., 2-7. 
124 See article 1 of the ICTY Statute: “The International Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute 
persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory 
of the former Yugoslavia since 1991 in accordance with the provisions of the present Statute”; Article 
1 of the ICTR Statute: “The International Tribunal for Rwanda shall have the power to prosecute 
persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory 
of Rwanda and Rwandan citizens responsible for such violations committed in the territory of 
neighbouring States between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994” and article 2 of the same Statute 
concerning the crime of genocide (in the light of this double reference to genocide and other serious 
violations of IHL, the ICTR has been described as a ‘dual mandate’ tribunal, although the focus has 
been clearly put on genocide crimes). 
125 In addition to the wider temporal scope, the territorial jurisdiction of the ICTY extended to the 
entire territory of the former Yugoslavia. As pointed out by L. REYDAMS, J. ODERMATT, Mandates, in 
L. REYDAMS, J. WOUTERS, C. RYNGAERT, op. cit., 92, this fact “produced an unanticipated effect: the 
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consequence, the area for the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in the case of the 
ICTY has been, at least potentially and from a ‘quantitative’ point of view, wider 
than that the one enjoyed under the ICTR founding document. 
In the second place, the formal recognition of prosecutorial independence in 
the Statute of both tribunals marked a significant step forward compared to the 
international military tribunals of the post-World War II era126. The relevant shift 
from the Nuremberg and Tokyo paradigm of the Great Powers ‘prosecuting in their 
own name’ to the UNSC delegating the task to investigate and prosecute 
international crimes to subsidiary but autonomous judicial organs, resulted in the 
necessity to guarantee the institutional independence of the prosecutor, for the first 
time conceived as “a separate organ of the International Tribunal”127. It must also be 
borne in mind that from the establishment of the ICTR in 1994 to September 2003, 
the tribunals had a common Office of the Prosecution, which was subsequently split 
up into two separate organs in order to tackle certain organisational and 
administrative issues128. As recalled by CÔTÉ, one major limitation to the operative 
independence of the prosecutors at the ad hoc tribunals was linked to the lack of full 
administrative autonomy vis-à-vis the Registry129. 
In the third place, it must be observed that within the outer jurisdictional 
boundaries traced by the UNSC, the prosecutors of the ad hoc tribunals—especially 
in the first years of their activity—enjoyed an extremely wide degree of discretion in 
																																																																																																																																																													
Kosovo war, altogether an entirely different conflict four years after Dayton, fell within ICTY 
jurisdiction, as did the insurgency in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”. See, supra, 
footnote 124 for a comparison of the exact jurisdictional parameters set by the UNSC for the two 
tribunals. It must also be noted that the more restricted timeframe envisaged for prosecutions at the 
ICTR has been the object of significant political controversy at the time of the establishment of the 
tribunal, see L. REYDAMS, J. ODERMATT, op. cit., 94-97. 
126 See, supra, footnote 20. 
127 Ibidem. See also, L. REYDAMS, J. WOUTERS, C. RYNGAERT, op. cit., 27-28. 
128 See UNSC Resolution 1503 (2003), S/Res/1503, 28 August 2003 through which the UNSC 
amended Article 15 of the ICTR Statute, creating a distinct position of Prosecutor for the ICTR. The 
difficulties of running an office in charge of investigating and prosecuting crimes in separate and far-
apart contexts had been evident form the beginning, although there has also been speculation on 
additional—and more political—reasons behind the splitting of prosecutorial mandates. See, e.g., the 
criticism of the UNSC’s decision expressed in the Press Release of the ICTY Prosecutor Carla Del 
Ponte of 12 September 2003 and interviews released around the same time recalled by L. CÔTÉ, 
Independence and Impartiality, cit., 347-348. The Author quotes an interview of December 2003 
found in V. PESKIN, International Justice in Rwanda and the Balkans, Cambridge, 2008, 221 where 
Del Ponte says that the decision to split the mandate is a “political” one. See also the words of Del 
Ponte to The Guardian, 13 September 2003: “I was sacked as Rwanda genocide prosecutor for 
challenging President [Kagame]”. 
129 See, supra, footnote 22. 
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the selection of the specific crimes and alleged perpetrators to investigate and 
prosecute130. The two Statutes placed on the Prosecutor the task to determine whether 
there existed a “sufficient basis to proceed” with an investigation, thereby 
recognizing his or her margin of discretion131. In other words, no duty to investigate 
could reasonably be derived from the two Statutes132. Part of the doctrine has 
argued—on the basis of a reasonable reading of articles 18(4) of the ICTY Statute 
and 17(4) of the ICTR Statute—that once the Prosecutor had established the 
existence of a sufficient basis to proceed, he or she was under an obligation to 
prosecute 133 . Nevertheless, as correctly pointed out by DE MEESTER, the 
jurisprudence of the ICTY denied the existence of such an unconditional duty134. As 
already clarified, the existence of broad discretionary powers does not mean that 
prosecutors can arbitrarily exercise (or deny to exercise) their functions135, and 
various procedural and substantive restraints have been imposed on their 
discretionary choices, in particular through the prism of the principle of non-
discrimination and equality before the law, as constitutive elements of the duty of 
impartiality, and through the gravity criterion embedded in the provisions defining 
the subject-matter jurisdiction of the tribunals136. 
																																																								
130 K. AMBOS, S. BOCK, op. cit., 502. Case law of both tribunals certified the existence of such broad 
discretion, introducing certain restraints. See, ICTY, Judgment, Prosecutor v. Delalić et al. (Čelebići 
case), IT-96-21-A, AC, 20 February 2001, par. 602; and, in an even more forceful way ICTR, 
Decision on Ntabakuze Petition for a Writ of Mandamus and Related Defence Requests, Prosecutor v. 
Bagosora et al., ICTR-98-41-T, TC I, 18 April 2007, par. 6 where discretion is described as 
“unfettered”. Resorting, for explicative purposes only, to the ICC ‘nomenclature’, it could be said that 
for the ad hoc tribunals the situation (i.e. the complex of temporal-spatial boundaries in which 
conducts constituting international crimes have allegedly been committed) had been pre-determined in 
its scope by the UNSC, whereas prosecutors enjoyed broad discretion on the selection of cases (i.e. 
the individual instances in which an investigation and/or prosecution at the international level was 
warranted). 
131 See article 18(1) of the ICTY Statute and 17(1) of the ICTR Statute. 
132 In this sense see K. DE MEESTER, op. cit., 219-220. 
133	K. DE MEESTER, op. cit., 220 quoting the position expressed by I. STEGMILLER, The Pre-
Investigation Stage of the ICTY and the ICC Compared, in T. KRUESSMANN (ed.), ICTY: Towards a 
Fair Trial?, Wien/Graz, 2008, 329; D. D. NTANDA NSEREKO, op. cit., 135-136. 
134 Ibidem, footnote 550 for the case law confirming the inexistence of such obligation to prosecute all 
cases where prima facie evidence existed. 
135 See, supra, Chapter One, par. 1 (particularly footnotes 11, 26, 29). See also, K. AMBOS, S. BOCK, 
op. cit., 502-503. 
136 See K. DE MEESTER, op. cit., 221-223 and supra, Chapter One, par. 1. With regard to gravity, it 
must be noted that the Statutes refer to “serious violations of international humanitarian law”, 
although no explicit reference to the ‘most responsible ones’ or the ‘major criminals’ had originally 
been made. Only with the Completion Strategy there has been a substantial refocus on senior 
leadership crimes. See, supra, Chapter One, par. 3.2, footnote 70 and, infra, this paragraph. 
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Lastly, the fundamental issue of judicial review of prosecutorial discretionary 
choices and its progressive development at the ad hoc tribunals must be addressed. 
As a starting point, it should be stressed that the system of criminal procedure 
applicable at the ICTY and ICTR had been—at least originally—predominantly akin 
to the common law adversarial model, with elements of continental law only more 
recently acquiring a significant influence on the tribunals’ procedural regimes137. 
Along these lines, and differently from the ICC procedural regime, at the ad hoc 
tribunals if the Prosecutor at the end of the investigation had collected sufficient 
evidence to establish a prima facie case, he or she could go on to prepare the 
indictment, which was then subject to the review of a Single Judge of the competent 
Trial Chamber138. Such review consisted in a completely written procedure that could 
take place in the absence of the suspect, and where the reviewing judge “is merely 
examining whether a prima facie case exists, without filtering cases or safeguarding 
the rights of the suspect”139. No procedural remedy existed against the prosecutor’s 
decision not to start a prosecution through the filing of an indictment (nolle 
prosequi)140.  
As various authors have correctly pointed out, at the beginning of the work of 
the ad hoc tribunals the judicial review of prosecutorial choices had been rather 
“abstensionist” to become increasingly “interventionist” with the implementation of 
																																																								
137 For an accurate discussion of international criminal procedure from the perspective of adversarial 
and inquisitorial models—including a critique of the excessive reliance on an abstract conception of 
such models—see K. AMBOS, International criminal procedure: “adversarial”, “inquisitorial” or 
mixed?, in International Criminal Law Review, vol. 3, issue 1, 2003, 1-37. Ibidem, at 5-6 the Author, 
writing in 2003, close to the procedural reforms imposed by the UNSC Completion Strategy, 
underlines that “only recent developments . . . have strengthened the civil law elements in international 
criminal procedure. Originally, the law of the Ad Hoc Tribunals was drafted by common lawyers 
[and] adopted a largely adversarial approach”. 
138 See articles 18(4) and 19(1) of the ICTY Statute and Rule 47(B),(E) and (F) of the ICTY RPE; 
Articles 17(4) and 18(1) of the ICTR Statute and Rule 47(B),(E) and (F) of the ICTR RPE. In the case 
of the ICC, the judicial review of the choices made by the Prosecutor during the investigation stage 
and resulting in the “Document Containing the Charges” (DCC) is carried out in a significantly more 
formalised way through a dedicated hearing for the confirmation of charges in front of the competent 
PTC (see, article 61 of the Rome Statute). 
139 K. AMBOS, S. BOCK, op. cit., 505. In the case of the ICC, the hearing for the confirmation of 
charges must, as a rule, take place in the presence of the person charged, except in the two cases listed 
under article 61(2) of the Statute. 
140 Ibidem. See also, K. DE MEESTER, op. cit., 220. On the contrary, as already pointed out supra 
(Chapter One, par. 3.3) the procedural regime of the ICC allows a certain degree of judicial 
supervision with regard to decisions not to open an investigation or start a prosecution under article 53 
of the Rome Statute. 
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the Completion Strategy 141 . Following the adoption of the relevant UNSC’s 
Resolutions, important changes to the procedural rules were introduced to the effect 
of reducing the margin of prosecutorial discretion and increasing the latitude of 
judicial interference, in the perspective of concentrating on the “the most senior 
leaders suspected of being the most responsible for the crimes within the jurisdiction 
of the Tribunal” 142 . The reforms that impacted the most on the exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion were the introduction of Rule 28(A) of the ICTY RPE (not 
replicated at the ICTR) and Rule 11bis of the RPE of both tribunals. The first of 
these provisions, highly criticised by the OTP as an infringement of the Prosecutor’s 
independence143, provided for a novel pre-indictment review procedure whereby the 
indictment—prior to being sent to the Single Judge for review—must be forwarded 
to the Bureau (consisting of the President, Vice-President and Presiding Judge of the 
Trial Chambers)144, which must determine “whether the indictment, prima facie, 
concentrates on one or more of the most senior leaders suspected of being most 
responsible for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal”145. The provision of 
Rule 11bis, in addition, provided a procedural mechanism of burden-sharing between 
the international and national jurisdictions on grounds—inter alia—of “the gravity of 
the crimes charged and the level of responsibility of accused”, allowing a Referral 
Bench to refer back cases for prosecution at the national level under certain 
conditions, while retaining at the international level only the most serious cases146. 
Other amendments to the rules further reduced the discretionary powers of the OTP 
																																																								
141 Ibidem, 224. See also, K. AMBOS, S. BOCK, op. cit., 505. 
142  UNSC Resolution 1503 (2003), S/Res/1503, 28 August 2003, seventh recital and UNSC 
Resolution 1534 (2004), S/Res/1534, 26 March 2004, section 5. 
143 As reported by K. DE MEESTER, op. cit., 226, footnote 584 (quoting A. D. MUNDIS, op. cit., 148) 
the introduction of this procedure did not make its way in the ICTR RPE because judges considered it 
to infringe the ICTR Statute and the Prosecutor’s independence. See also the ICTY, Tribunal’s 
Prosecutor Addresses Security Council on Completion Strategy progress, Press Release, 
AN/MOW/1085e, 7 June 2006, where Prosecutor Carla Del Ponte expressed the view that “such [Rule 
28(A)] directions by the Chambers can only be interpreted as advisory in nature. Only the Security 
Council has the power to modify the Tribunal Statute, which guarantees the independence of the 
Prosecutor and assigns to her the responsibility of determining which charges to bring in a 
prosecution”. 
144 Rule 23(A) of the ICTY RPE. 
145 Rule 28(A) of the RPE. 
146 Rule 11bis(A) and (C) of the ICTY and ICTR RPE. 
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once the indictment had been confirmed, in favour of a more directive role of judges 
in the management of the scope and latitude of the charges147.  
In sum, the over twenty-year experience of the ad hoc tribunals saw the 
definitive acquisition of the prosecutor’s formal and institutional independence and 
of a gradually increased judicial supervision of his or her discretionary choices, as 
part of a new and original merging of adversarial and inquisitorial procedural 
schemes considered functional to the attainment of the Completion Strategy’s 
objectives. Such developments, while not dispelling all doubts on the appropriateness 
of certain prosecutorial selection choices148, had a significant influence on the 
drafting of the Rome Statute149. 
 
4. The hybrid (or internationalised) Tribunals: Heterogeneity and the influence of 
national models 
The expression ‘hybrid (or internationalised) courts/tribunals’—with a 
number of equivalent terminological variants 150 —indicates an extremely 
heterogeneous category of judicial institutions created starting from the early 2000s, 
generally as a response to serious episodes of criminality of concern for the 
international community and under the auspices of the United Nations, frequently as 
part of post-conflict transitions151. While authors disagree on the specific definitional 
																																																								
147 See Rule 73bis(D) and (E). See, C. STAHN, Judicial Review of Prosecutorial Discretion: on 
Experiments and Imperfections, in G. SLUITER, S. VASILIEV, International Criminal Procedure: 
Towards a Coherent Body of Law, London, 2009, 240 who speaks of the judges’ “managerial” 
approach in the implementation of the completion strategy. 
148 For an analysis of some of the most controversial selection decisions of the OTP see L. CÔTÉ, 
Independence and Impartiality, cit., 375-379 (particularly on the Milošević case and the failure to 
open an investigation concerning the NATO bombing of 1999), 379-385 (on the Barayagwiza case 
and the political pressures to avoid an investigation on the RPF’s crimes). On the selection policies of 
the various prosecutors of the ad hoc tribunals see F. DE VLAMING, op. cit., 547-562. 
149 See K. AMBOS, International criminal procedure: “adversarial”, “inquisitorial” or mixed?, cit., 
5-7. 
150 Many other similar expressions have been used in literature, including “mixed courts”, “hybrid-
domestic courts”, “internationalized domestic courts”. 
151 Literature on these tribunals, some of which are still operational to the present day, has 
increasingly developed in recent years. See, e.g., C. P. R. ROMANO, A. NOLLKAEMPER, J. K. KLEFFNER 
(eds.),  Internationalized Criminal Courts and Tribunals: Sierra Leone, East Timor, Kosovo, and 
Cambodia , Oxford, 2004; A. C. MARTINEAU, Les juridictions pénales internationalisées: un nouveau 
modèle de justice hybride?, Paris, 2007; E. CIMIOTTA, I tribunali penali misti, Padova, 2009; S. DE 
BERTODANO, Current Developments in Internationalized Courts. East Timor—Justice Denied, in 
Journal of International Criminal Justice, vol. 2, issue 3, 2004, 910-926; S. LINTON, Cambodia, East 
Timor and Sierra Leone: Experiments in International Justice, in Criminal Law Forum, vol. 12, issue 
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elements of the category, with some even questioning the feasibility of grouping 
such diverse experiences in one single category152, there is wide agreement on the 
fact that these institutions are characterised by a mix—in variable proportions—of 
national and international elements as regards the legal sources, composition, 
applicable law and procedural models adopted153. The following judicial institutions 
have been generally included in the category: the Special Panels for Serious Crimes 
in East Timor (SPSC); Regulation 64 Panels in the Courts of Kosovo; The Special 
Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL); The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of 
Cambodia (ECCC) and, although not unanimously, the Special Tribunal for Lebanon 
(STL)154. It is obviously beyond the scope of the present work to offer an overarching 
analysis of the procedural regimes of all these institutions. A few summary remarks 
must be made with regard to the most distinctive features of the prosecutorial 
regimes of the SCSL, the ECCC and the STL. 
The Special Court for Sierra Leone, established pursuant to an international 
agreement between the UN and the Government of Sierra Leone concluded in 2002, 
is arguably among the hybrid courts the one in which the international component is 
more accentuated155. In this sense, the provisions of the Statute regarding the powers 
and duties of the Prosecutor largely mimic those of the ICTY and ICTR Statutes156. 
The SCSL Statute therefore establishes that the Prosecutor is an independent and 
separate organ of the Court, bearing the ultimate responsibility for the decision to 
investigate and prosecute157. Nevertheless, contrary to the Statute of the two ad hoc 
tribunals, the founding documents of the SCSL established that the jurisdiction of the 
																																																																																																																																																													
2, 2001, 185-246; S. M. H. NOUWEN, ‘Hybrid courts’. The hybrid category of a new type of 
international crimes courts, in Utrecht Law Review, vol. 2, issue 2, 2006, 190-214. 
152 S. M. H. NOUWEN, op. cit., 192-193. 
153 Ibidem. 
154 Ibidem, 192. The STL is not referred to in the article since it has been established only in 2007. For 
a monographic work on the STL see A. ALAMUDDIN, N. N. JURDI, D. TOLBERT, The Special Tribunal 
for Lebanon: Law and Practice, Oxford, 2014. 
155 On the events leading to the establishment of the SCSL and the decisive American and British 
influence on the political-diplomatic process see L. REYDAMS, J. WOUTERS, C. RYNGAERT, op. cit., 
65-71. According to article 12 of the Statute the majority of the Judges is international (nominated by 
the UN Secretary General), whereas a minority is nominated by the Government of Sierra Leone. The 
post of Prosecutor and Acting Prosecutor have been mostly occupied by American citizens (namely 
David Crane, Stephen Rapp, Brenda Hollis). 
156 K. DE MEESTER, op. cit., 230. 
157 Article 15(1) of the SCSL Statute. 
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court was limited to the persons “bearing the greatest responsibilities”158. Although 
such provision clearly seems to introduce a jurisdictional criterion limiting the 
Court’s jurisdiction ratione personae (and the prosecutor’s discretionary powers 
thereof) the AC, in the face of contradictory case law of the Chambers, established—
similarly to the SCC of the ECCC159—that this only worked as a guide for the 
exercise of prosecutorial discretion160. For this reason DE MEESTER, while strongly 
criticising the AC’s interpretation of the Statute, describes the prosecutorial regime 
of the SCSL as a system characterised by “guided discretion”161. As regards the 
prosecutorial policy informing the work of the OTP of the SCSL, it must be observed 
that especially under the tenure of David Crane efforts have been made to investigate 
and prosecute members of all the three main actors of the Sierra Leonean conflict, 
namely the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), the Revolutionary United 
Front (RUF) and the Civil Defence Forces (CDF)162. 
The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia have been created –
pursuant to a ten-year strenuous political-diplomatic process163—in order to “bring to 
trial senior leaders of Democratic Kampuchea and those who were most responsible 
for the crimes” committed under the Khmer Rouge rule, spanning from 17 April 
1975 to 6 January 1979164. Among the mixed tribunals, the ECCC are undoubtedly 
																																																								
158 Article 1(1) of the SCSL Statute establishes that “The Special Court shall, except as provided in 
subparagraph (2), have the power to prosecute persons who bear the greatest responsibility for serious 
violations of international humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean law committed in the territory of 
Sierra Leone since 30 November 1996, including those leaders who, in committing such crimes, have 
threatened the establishment of and implementation of the peace process in Sierra Leone”. 
159 See, supra, footnote 71. 
160 See, SCSL, Judgment, Prosecutor v. Brima et al. (AFRC), Case No. SCSL-2004-16-A, AC, 22 
February 2008, par. 280. See also K. DE MEESTER, op. cit., 232-235 for a discussion and a critique of 
the reasoning of the Appeals Chamber in the light of both textual arguments and preparatory works. 
161 K. DE MEESTER, op. cit., 230. 
162 Faithful to this policy of alleged even-handedness the prosecution indicted four members of the 
AFRC, six of the RUF and three of the CDF respectively, to which the case against Charles Taylor 
must be added. As reported by F. DE VLAMING, op. cit., 568-570, a closer analysis of the charges and 
of the conclusions reached by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, reveals that the CDF may 
have been overrepresented in the selection decisions, both in qualitative and quantitative terms, and 
that “Crane may have considered the gravity criterion subordinate to membership of and position in a 
certain group”. 
163 For a summary of the political events and the long negotiations leading to the establishment of the 
ECCC, see L. REYDAMS, J. WOUTERS, C. RYNGAERT, op. cit., 47-54 and P. LOBBA, Ai confini della 
giustizia penale internazionale: i Khmer Rossi a processo davanti alle “Extraordinary Chambers” di 
Cambogia, in L’Indice Penale, anno XV, n. 2, 2012, 612-615. 
164 See article 1 and 2 new of the Law on the Establishment of the ECCC (as amended on 27 October 
2004, emphasis added). As recalled by P. LOBBA, op. cit., 614 the establishing law had been 
unilaterally passed by the Cambodian Parliament in 2001 amid a stalemate in the negotiations with the 
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the one in which the national component is the strongest, particularly as regards the 
legal sources of its establishment165, its institutional position within the Cambodian 
Judiciary166 and the composition of its organs167. In terms of criminal procedure 
models the ECCC stands as an exception in the wider panorama of hybrid courts. In 
fact, it is the only tribunal where—in line with the French tradition influencing the 
organisation of the Judiciary and Cambodian criminal procedure168—there are Co-
Investigating Judges (COJ) entrusted with the task of carrying out a formal judicial 
investigation based on the Co-Prosecutors’ introductory submissions169. The judicial 
investigation carried out independently by the OCIJ serves the purpose of 
establishing the factual and legal elements necessary to decide whether or not to 
commit the suspects to trial, through the so-called Closing Order170.  Limiting the 
present analysis to the prosecutorial regime, the margin of prosecutorial discretion 
and the latitude of judicial supervision of discretionary choices, a few considerations 
seem necessary.  
Firstly, it must be recalled that the ECCC Law carefully frames the 
jurisdiction of the ECCC with particular regard to its temporal scope and, at least 
																																																																																																																																																													
UN. After the negotiations were resumed and an international agreement between the Cambodian 
Government and the UN was concluded in 2003, the ECCC Law has been amended to reflect the 
content of the Agreement. 
165 While it is true that the legal source of the establishment of the ECCC may be regarded as 
composite with particular regard to the involvement of both UN acts, an international agreement and 
domestic legislation, it must be stressed that the formal act of creation of the Chambers is a piece of 
Cambodian legislation (only followed two years later by a ‘cover’ international agreement). 
166 The ECCC are extraordinary judicial organs within the framework of the Cambodian judicial 
system (as the name suggests “in the Courts of Cambodia”). Nevertheless, they maintain a close 
relationship with the UN, especially from the administrative and financial point of view, as well as 
with regard to the appointment of the international component of the judicial and prosecutorial posts. 
167 According to the ECCC Law and the UN-RGC Agreement, certain organs of the ECCC are formed 
according to the criterion of equal representation of the national and international component, while 
others are formed by a majority of Cambodian nationals. Therefore according respectively to article 
16 and 23 new of the ECCC Law, there are two Co-Prosecutors and two Co-Investigating Judges (one 
Cambodian, one international). To the contrary, according to article 9 new of the ECCC Law, the 
judicial posts in the Pre-Trial, Trial and Supreme Court Chamber, are occupied by a majority of 
national judges (3 out of 5 judges for the PTC and TC, and 4 out of 7 judges in the Supreme Court 
Chamber). Nominations to the office of ECCC judge are made in accordance with article 11 new of 
the ECCC Law, which provides for a role of the Supreme Council of the Magistracy also in the formal 
appointment of the international judges, who are chosen among those included in a list formed by the 
UN Secretary-General and submitted to the Cambodian Government. 
168 See K. AMBOS, S. BOCK, op. cit., 520-525. Ibidem at 523 the Author stresses the fact that “the 
ECCC follows the French inquisitorial model which is the historical origin of Cambodia's legal 
system”. See also G. ACQUAVIVA, New Paths in International Criminal Justice? The Internal Rules of 
Cambodian Extraordinary Chambers, in Journal of International Criminal Justice, vol. 6, issue 1, 
2008, 133, 135. 
169 Rule 53 of the Internal Rules. 
170 Rule 67 of the Internal Rules. 
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apparently, as to the personal scope. Nevertheless, as already pointed out171, the SCC 
in Duch has interpreted the reference to “senior leaders of Democratic Kampuchea” 
and “those most responsible” not as imposing jurisdictional hurdles, but as terms that 
“operate exclusively as investigatorial and prosecutorial policy to guide the 
independent discretion of the Co-Investigating Judges and Co-Prosecutors as to how 
best to target their finite resources in order to achieve the purpose behind the 
establishment of the ECCC”172. A residual review of such discretionary choices is 
only allowed if discretion is not exercised according to “good faith, based on sound 
professional judgement”173.  
Secondly, it must be added that according to the pertinent substantive and 
procedural provisions, it is the sole responsibility of the Co-Prosecutors to decide 
whether to initiate a preliminary investigation (either ex officio or on the basis of a 
complaint)174. Complaints lodged with the Co-Prosecutors do not trigger per se a 
criminal investigation175. As correctly pointed out by DE MEESTER, a textual reading 
of Rule 53(1) of the IR seems to support the idea that, once the preliminary 
investigation is completed and there are reasons to believe that crimes within the 
ECCC jurisdiction have been committed, the Co-Prosecutors have an obligation to 
send an introductory submission to the OCIJ for a judicial investigation176. The OCIJ, 
in addition, can only dismiss a case on specific grounds laid out in Rule 67(3) of the 
IR177. While such provisions seem to significantly curtail prosecutorial discretion, it 
should be stressed that the triggering of any proceeding depends exclusively on the 
																																																								
171 See, supra, Chapter One, Par. 3.2, footnote 71. 
172 Ibidem. The SCC held, on the contrary, that the circumstance of being a Khmer Rouge official is a 
jurisdictional requirement, hence justiciable before the TC. It must be recalled that the issue of the 
jurisdictional or non-jurisdictional nature of the two categories at hand has been at the centre of 
disputes non only in the Duch case, but also in cases 003 ad 004, leading to a prolonged controversy 
among the national and international component of the Office of the Co-Prosecutors, Office of the Co-
Investigating Judge and Pre-Trial Chamber on whether the suspect belonged or not to one of the two 
categories for the purposes of establishing the ECCC’s jurisdiction.  
173  ECCC, Appeal Judgement, Co-Prosecutors v. KAING Guek Eav (Duch), 001/18-07-
2007/ECCC/SC, SCC, 3 February 2012, par. 80, quoting SCSL, Appeal Judgment, Prosecutor v. 
Brima, SCSL-2004-16-A, AC, 22 February 2008, par. 282. 
174 Article 5(3) and 6(3) of the ECCC Agreement and Rule 49(1) IR. See also G. ACQUAVIVA, op. cit., 
134-135. 
175 Rule 49(4) IR. 
176 K. DE MEESTER, op. cit., 279, based in particular on the use of the expression “shall open a judicial 
investigation”. 
177 Namely when: “a) The acts in question do not amount to crimes within the jurisdiction of the 
ECCC; b) The perpetrators of the acts have not been identified; or c) There is not sufficient evidence 
against the Charged Person or persons of the charges”. 
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initiative of the Co-Prosecutors and no judicial remedy is available in case of no-
action, therefore leaving significant space for the exercise of discretion in selection 
decisions178. 
Lastly, it should be added that certain decisions of the ECCC concerning the 
scope of Case 002, inspired by the necessity to enact drastic trial management 
measures to help bringing about the conclusion of the trial—also considering the 
advanced age and precarious health conditions of most of the defendants179—
somehow had the effect of introducing an additional dimension of judicially enforced 
discretionary selection180. The extremely complex procedural history leading to the 
severance(s) of Case 002 reveals that in the presence of a Closing Order 
encompassing an enormous amount of incidents and crime locations—all of which 
should be in principle discussed at trial—an ex post selection of the charges for 
actual prosecution at trial may be imposed by the TC on grounds, inter alia, of 
judicial economy181. As a matter of fact, in a system where no formal mechanisms for 
																																																								
178 In the case of the ECCC an implicit decision of nolle prosequi may also be the result of the lack of 
agreement among the Co-Prosecutors and/or Co-Investigating Judges on the procedural steps 
necessary to proceed with an investigation and prosecution. Such disagreements can be brought to the 
attention of the Pre-Trial Chamber for settlement pursuant to articles 20 new and 23 new of the ECCC 
Law and Rules 71 and 72 of the IR respectively, but may significantly hinder the practical viability of 
an investigation or prosecution, also considering the requirement of a ‘supermajority’ for the adoption 
of all the Chambers’ decisions (see article 14 new, 20 new and 23 new of the ECCC Law). The 
provision that in case of failure to reach such majority the default outcome is that the investigation 
shall proceed or the intended action shall stand or be executed does not solve all practical issues, nor 
makes it easier to proceed if the disagreement is radical and protracted. 
179 Originally there were four Accused in Case 002: Khieu Samphan, Nuon Chea, Ieng Sary and Ieng 
Thirith. Pending the proceedings Ieng Sary and Ieng Thirith died (the latter after having been declared 
unfit to stand trial). The two surviving Accused are also in their advanced years and in rather 
precarious health conditions. 
180 For a very detailed analysis of the procedural events concerning Case 002, see S. WILLIAMS, The 
Severance of Case 002 at the ECCC. A Radical Trial Management Technique or a Step Too Far?, in 
Journal of International Criminal Justice, vol. 13, issue 4, 2015, 815-843. 
181 Manageability of the trial(s) and judicial economy have been accepted by both the TC and SCC as 
reasonable factors to take into account in deciding whether a severance is in “the interest of justice” 
pursuant to Rule 89ter. See ECCC, Decision on Co-Prosecutors’ Request for Reconsideration of the 
Terms of the Trial Chamber’s Severance Order (E124/2) and Related Motions and Annexes, 002/19-
09-2007-ECCC-TC, TC, 18 October 2011, par. 10; ECCC, Decision on the Co-Prosecutors’ 
Immediate Appeal of the Trial Chamber’s Decision Concerning the Scope of Case 002/01, 002/19-09-
2007-ECCC-TC/SC(18), SCC, 8 February 2013, par. 36, 50. Contra, ECCC, Decision on Immediate 
Appeals Against Trial Chamber’s Second Decision on Severance of Case 002, 002/19-09-2007-
ECCC-TC/SC(28), SCC, 25 November 2013, par. 75, where appellate judges rejected the idea that 
considerations on the financial situation at the ECCC are appropriate in deciding on severance. It 
should be noted that, notwithstanding the disagreements between the OCP and TC on the concrete 
way in which severance had originally been ordered (i.e. without prior consultation with all interested 
parties), the Co-Prosecutors were clearly in favour of a substantial reduction of the charges to be heard 
at trial. 
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the reduction of the scope of the trial or the withdrawal of charges originally existed, 
the power of severance under Rule 89ter of the IR has been used in order to give 
priority to the prosecution of specific incidents and crime sites, provided that those 
ultimately selected for trial were “reasonably representative of the totality of 
charges”182. More recently, and drawing from this experience, the IR have been 
amended in order to provide the OCIJ and TC with more incisive powers to reduce 
the scope of a trial, through measures alternative to severance183. 
In sum, even in the unique procedural context of the ECCC—which 
compared to other internationalised tribunals leans more towards procedural models 
built around the principle of legality of prosecutions—a good margin of discretion is 
concretely exercised by the Co-Prosecutors. Such discretion may be further judicially 
reinforced through the trial management measures adopted by the OCIJ and TC (at 
least when there is a convergence between the prosecutorial objectives and the 
pursuit of such judicial measures). 
One of the most recent examples of internationalised criminal tribunals is the 
Special Tribunal for Lebanon184. As many commentators have rightly pointed out, the 
																																																								
182 There have been profound disagreements between the TC and SCC on the purpose and nature of 
the severance power under Rule 89ter and on the way in which the reasonable representativity 
requirement—judicially introduced by the SCC—had to be concretely applied. See, S. WILLIAMS, The 
Severance of Case 002 at the ECCC. A Radical Trial Management Technique or a Step Too Far?, cit., 
827-834. Leaving aside such legal disagreements, and in particular the issue whether the severance 
should give rise to multiple smaller trials (as advocated by the TC) or to a single trial with reduced 
charges (as advocated by the OCP and SCC), the practical effect of the severance decisions has been 
that of prioritizing the prosecution at trial of certain charges over others contained in the original 
Closing Order. 
183 See the Rules 66bis and 89quater of the IR(rev.9) as amended at the Plenary Session of the ECCC 
Judges on 16 January 2015. It should be noted that such new rules could in principle be seen as 
sources of potential judicial interference with prosecutorial choices. Nevertheless, as trials at the 
ECCC concretely unfolded, the Co-Prosecutors had been the first to realise the practical necessity of a 
reduction of the scope of the trial and of the introduction of more incisive rules to that effect. 
184 The actual legal nature of the STL has been the object of debate among scholars (see, infra, 
footnote 185). The establishment of the STL followed a very convoluted legal and political path. An 
Agreement for its establishment had originally been concluded between the UN and the Lebanese 
Government in early 2007, but could not be approved and ratified according to Lebanese 
constitutional law due to internal political obstacles. Subsequently the UNSC, acting under Chapter 
VII of the UN Charter, sought to ‘put into effect’ the Agreement, with the adoption of Resolution 
1757 (UNSC Resolution 1757 (2007), S/Res/1757, 30 May 2007). On the legality of the establishment 
of the STL see B. FASSBENDER, Reflections on the International Legality of the Special Tribunal for 
Lebanon, in Journal of International Criminal Justice, vol. 5, issue 5, 2007, 1091-1105 arguing that 
the UNSC established the Tribunal by incorporating the provisions of the negotiated Agreement—
which did not entered into force—into a Chapter VII Resolution and not, as others have argued, by 
substituting “a decision made under Chapter VII of the UN Charter for the missing ratification of the 
Agreement by Lebanon”. The most recent institution of this kind are arguably the Kosovo Specialist 
Chambers and the Specialist Prosecutor’s Office, established in 2015 pursuant to Kosovo Law 
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uniqueness of the political events leading to its institution, the legal sources of its 
establishment, as well as the extremely limited jurisdiction and the circumstance 
that—at least in theory—only Lebanese criminal law is applicable at the Tribunal, 
make it difficult to compare the STL with other international(ised) criminal 
institutions185. Having regard to the criminal procedure model chosen for the STL, it 
should be preliminarily noted that notwithstanding the significant French influence 
on the Lebanese legal tradition and judicial structures, the inquisitorial model based 
on the role of the juge d’instruction has not been replicated in the institutional design 
of the STL186. With regard to the prosecutorial model and the latitude of discretionary 
powers, the following observations suffice for the purposes of the present 
comparative analysis. 
First, it should be noted that the UNSC has very narrowly delimited the 
jurisdiction of the tribunal ratione loci, temporis, materiae and personae in 
Resolution 1757 (to which the STL Statute is attached)187. The focus is therefore 
placed on the terrorist attack leading to the death of Prime Minister Hariri (as well as 
to the death and injury of other people) occurred on 14 February 2005. “Other 
attacks” connected with this one and occurred in a specified timeframe—which can 
be extended with the agreement of the UNSC and Lebanese Government—are 
eligible for investigation and prosecution under certain conditions188. Therefore, the 
																																																																																																																																																													
no.05/L-053 (after the amendment of the Kosovar Constitution with the introduction of article 162 
envisaging the new institution), in the context of EULEX mission in Kosovo, in order to bring to trial 
the persons allegedly responsible for crimes against humanity, war crimes and other crimes under 
Kosovo law which allegedly occurred between 1 January 1998 and 31 December 2000, on the basis of 
the Report on Inhuman treatment of people and illicit trafficking in human organs in Kosovo, Council 
of Europe, Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, Doc. 12462, 7 January 2011. 
185 See C. APTEL, Some Innovations in the Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, in Journal of 
International Criminal Justice, vol. 5, issue 5, 2007, 1107-1108; K. DE MEESTER, op. cit., 282; W. A. 
SCHABAS, The Special Tribunal for Lebanon: Is a “Tribunal of an International Character” 
Equivalent to an “International Criminal Court”?, in Leiden Journal of International Law, vol. 21, 
issue 2, 2008, 513-528. 
186 C. APTEL, op. cit., 1108, footnote 3: “Lebanon was under French mandate 1918-1943, and, during 
that period, the French legal system substantially influenced the development of Lebanese laws and 
judiciary in criminal matters”; M. GILLET, M. SCHUSTER, The Special Tribunal for Lebanon Swiftly 
Adopts Its Rules of Procedure and Evidence, in Journal of International Criminal Justice, vol. 7, issue 
5, 2009, 895 (especially footnote 80, focusing on the differences between the STL and the ECCC on 
this point). 
187 See article 1 of the STL Statute on the personal, territorial and temporal jurisdiction. 
188 Ibidem: “If the Tribunal finds that other attacks that occurred in Lebanon between 1 October 2004 
and 12 December 2005, or any later date decided by the Parties and with the consent of the Security 
Council, are connected in accordance with the principles of criminal justice and are of a nature and 
gravity similar to the attack of 14 February 2005, it shall also have jurisdiction over persons 
responsible for such attacks”. 
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jurisdictional parameters of the Tribunal place significant limitations on the 
Prosecutor’s ability to exercise discretion, pre-determining to a large extent the scope 
of investigations and cases at the STL189. In addition, as regards the identification of 
the “other attacks”, the Prosecutor has up to date heavily relied on the work of the 
pre-existent UN International Independent Investigative Commission (UNIIIC), 
whose relevance for the activities of the Tribunal is formally recognised under article 
19 of the Statute190. 
Second, it should be underlined that—as it happens in all the other post-
Nuremberg international or internationalised jurisdictions—the Statute establishes 
that the Prosecutor is required to act independently as a separate organ of the 
Tribunal and not to seek or accept instructions191. The Prosecutor is in charge of the 
decisions on the investigation and prosecution of the crimes within the jurisdiction of 
the Tribunal and his or her powers, with particular regard to investigation phase, are 
specifically laid out in the Statute and RPE192. Nevertheless, recognizing that the STL 
is somehow incardinated in the Lebanese judicial system, the Statute allows the 
international prosecutor, in discharging his or her investigative duties, to seek the 
assistance of the “Lebanese authorities concerned”193. Additionally, in line with the 
influences of the inquisitorial model, the RPE provide that the Prosecutor “shall 
assist the Tribunal in establishing the truth”194. 
Lastly, it should be noted that the procedural system of the STL envisages a 
significant role of judges in the direction of proceedings and a certain degree of 
oversight on prosecutorial choices, in particular through the functions of the single 
Pre-Trial Judge at the preliminary stage195. In particular, the Prosecutor’s selection 
decisions are subject to judicial supervision in the form of a confirmation of the 
																																																								
189 In this sense C. APTEL, op. cit., 1111: “The limited mandate and number of cases which the STL 
could potentially try will certainly constrain the STL ‘prosecutorial strategy’”.  
190 See article 19 of the STL Statute and UNSC Resolution 1595 (2005), S/Res/1595, 7 April 2005 
establishing the Commission. On the relationship between the Prosecutor and the Commission see C. 
APTEL, op. cit., 1112-1116 and K. AMBOS, S. BOCK, op. cit., 527-528. 
191 Article 11(2) of the Statute. 
192 Article 11(1) of the Statute and Rules 61, 62 of the RPE. 
193 Article 11(5) of the Statute. 
194 Rule 55(C) of the RPE. On this civil law and inquisitorial influence on the RPE see critically, D. 
JACOBS, The Unique Rules of Procedure of the STL, in A. ALAMUDDIN, N. N. JURDI, D. TOLBERT, op. 
cit., 112 underlying the “strong and exaggerated normative belief on the part of the judges that only 
the inquisitorial system can satisfy the requirements of justice and truth in international trials”. 
195 On the role of the single Pre-Trial Judge at the STL see M. GILLET, M. SCHUSTER, op. cit., 889-
890. See Rules 88-97 of the RPE for the detailed discipline of the functions of the Pre-Trial Judge. 
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indictment196, and as far as “connected” attacks are concerned, through the necessary 
preliminary ruling of the Pre-Trial Judge under Rule 11 of the RPE. Nevertheless, no 
judicial remedy is available against the prosecutor’s decision not to proceed in a 
“connected” case197. As far as “other attacks” falling beyond the ordinary temporary 
jurisdiction of the Tribunal are concerned, the Prosecutor can only forward a 
reasoned request to the effect of extending the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to 
encompass them, but any such decision is a matter for the Lebanese Government and 
UNSC to decide198. Finally, as regards the selection of defendants, it should be noted 
that the STL stands as an exception among international(ised) criminal institutions in 
that it allows, under certain conditions, for trials in absentia199. 
In sum, the very limited jurisdiction of the STL, the institutional position of 
the Prosecutor vis-à-vis the Lebanese authorities and the UNIIIC, as well as the 
original mix of inquisitorial and adversarial procedural elements, create a 
prosecutorial organ with limited and judicially supervised discretionary powers, 
although the area of discretion is not negligible especially as regards nolle prosequi 
decisions. 
 
5. The ICC: Tempered discretion or tempered legality? 
After having provided a comparative overview of the prosecutorial regimes 
across various international(ised) criminal jurisdictions other than the ICC, it is 
possible to extend the analysis to the permanent international criminal court, which 
constitutes the principal focus of the present research. Since an in-depth analysis of 
some the most relevant institutional and legal issues regarding the prosecutorial 
regime of the ICC—in the light of the current practice of both the OTP and 
Chambers—will be thoroughly carried out in the following parts, the purpose of the 
present paragraph is exclusively to sketch out some of the most distinctive features 
																																																								
196 Rule 68 of the RPE. 
197 See Rules of Procedure and Evidence: Explanatory Memorandum by the Tribunal’s President, 25 
November 2010, par. 9 (commenting on Rule 11, the Memorandum asserts that in such a decision the 
Prosecutor enjoys “broad prosecutorial power”). 
198 Rule 12(A) and (B) of the RPE. 
199 Articles 16(4)(d) and 22 STL Statute. See also, P. GAETA, To Be (Present) or Not to Be (Present): 
Trials in Absentia before the Special Tribunal  for Lebanon, in Journal of International Criminal 
Justice, vol. 5, issue 5, 2007, 1165-1174. 
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of the prosecutorial model of the ICC, thereby distinguishing it from the jurisdictions 
studied in the previous paragraphs. 
The most evident element of commonality between the ICC’s prosecutorial 
regime and those of other contemporary institutions—as already pointed out supra—
is the recognition of the institutional independence of the Prosecutor200. The ICC 
legal texts further reinforce the position of the Prosecutor by formally recognising his 
or her administrative autonomy201. Additionally, the role of the Prosecutor as a 
‘minister of justice’ is underscored by the recognition of his or her role in the 
establishment of the truth (and the corresponding obligation to investigate equally 
the incriminating and exonerating circumstances)202. 
Nevertheless the specific features of the ICC as a treaty-based institution—
independent from but connected to the UN system—contribute to shape its original 
physiognomy in terms of prosecutorial institutional and procedural schemes. 
First of all, the jurisdiction of the Court, established by the Statute according 
to the usual ratione loci, temporis, personae and materiae parameters, is significantly 
wider than that of its predecessors. In particular, territorial jurisdiction is potentially 
universal and is exclusively constrained by the subjective participation of states to 
the Statute—or acceptance of the Court’s jurisdiction through a declaration made 
under article 12(3) of the Rome Statute203—and can be further expanded through the 
conferral of jurisdiction over non-Parties by means of a UNSC’s resolution adopted 
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter204. In other terms, contrary to the experience of 
the IMTs, ad hoc and internationalised courts, in the case of the ICC there is no legal 
(and political) pre-determination of a specific situation (or set of situations) that can 
																																																								
200 Article 42(1) of the ICC Statute. 
201 Article 42(2) of the ICC Statute. 
202 Article 54(1)(a) of the ICC Statute. 
203 This provision is a sort of opt-in clause allowing a state that is not a party to the Rome Statute to 
accept the Court’s jurisdiction on ad hoc basis through a specific declaration to that effect lodged with 
the Registrar. On this mechanism and with particular regard to the declarations lodged by the 
Palestinian Authority before the formal ratification of the Rome Statute by Palestine, see M. M. EL 
ZEIDY, Ad Hoc Declarations of Acceptance of Jurisdiction: The Palestinian Situation Under Scrutiny, 
in C. STAHN (ed.), The Law and Practice of the International Criminal Court, cit., 179-209. 
204 Article 13(b) of the ICC Statute. On the UNSC’s power to extend the territorial jurisdiction of the 
Court while complying with the other jurisdictional parameters set out in the Statute, see L. 
CONDORELLI, S. VILLALPANDO, Can the Security Council Extend the ICC’s Jurisdiction?, in A. 
CASSESE, P. GAETA, J. R. W. D. JONES (eds.), op. cit., 571-582. 
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE DIFFERENT PROSECUTORIAL MODELS ACROSS INTERNATIONAL(ISED) 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE MECHANISMS 
 55 
form the object of the Prosecutor’s investigating and prosecuting efforts205. Since this 
“dormant”—complementary—jurisdiction must somehow be triggered, drafters have 
envisaged three possible ways to put the jurisdictional machinery of the Court in 
motion, namely state referrals, UNSC referrals and proprio motu initiatives of the 
Prosecutor206. 
It is particularly this power of the ICC Prosecutor to proceed proprio motu 
that sets the Court apart from its predecessors, in that the OTP has the power to 
select, within the boundaries set out in the Statute, both the situation (i.e. the spatial 
and temporal framework for the exercise of the Court’s jurisdiction) and the cases 
(i.e. the individual instances of exercise of criminal action through the formulation of 
specific charges)207. In any event, even when the jurisdiction of the court is triggered 
through a state or UNSC referral the true dominus of preliminary examinations, 
investigation and prosecution remains the OTP208. 
																																																								
205 For a clear description of this novel feature of the ICC compared to previous generations of 
international criminal justice mechanisms, see H. OLÁSOLO, The Triggering Procedure of the 
International Criminal Court, Leiden, 2005, 39-40. The Author—who uses the expression “dormant 
jurisdiction” to indicate the areas of potential exercise of the Court’s jurisdiction before the 
“activation prerequisites” of the Statute have been established leading to a “triggered jurisdiction”—
stresses the fact that because of this particular institutional architecture “it is impossible to determine 
a priori in which situations the ICC will get involved” and that “only after defining the situation at 
hand and verifying that the activation prerequisites provided for in arts. 15(3) and (4), 16, 18(2) and 
53(1) RS, and rule 48 RPE are met in connection with it, will the Court’s competent organs activate 
its dormant jurisdiction”. 
206 Article 13 of the Rome Statute lists the three possible triggering mechanisms of the Courts’ 
jurisdiction, respectively letter (a) (state referrals), letter (b) (UNSC referrals), and letter (c) 
(Prosecutor’s proprio motu, pursuant to article 15 of the Statute). Article 14 and 15 respectively deal 
in greater detail with state referrals and the OTP’s proprio motu powers (with particular regard to the 
procedure of authorization to open an investigation). 
207 See K. AMBOS, S. BOCK, op. cit., 552: “Thus, the ICC Statute grants the Prosecution for the first 
time in history the power to select not only individual defendants but entire situations for 
investigation”. The conceptual distinction between situations and cases is fundamental in the 
understanding of the Court’s jurisdictional architecture (on this issue see, supra, the Introduction of 
the present work). As early as 2006, PTC I of the ICC recognised the importance of the distinction, in 
that case in relation to the procedural status of victims at the situation stage. See ICC, Decision on the 
Applications for Participation in the Proceedings of VPRS-1, VPRS-2, VPRS-3, VPRS-4, VPRS-5 
and VPRS-6, Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, ICC-01/04-
101-tEN-Corr PTC I, 17 January 2006, par. 65: “The Chamber considers that the Statute, the rules of 
Procedure and Evidence and the Regulations of the Court draw a distinction between situations and 
cases . . . Situations, which are generally defined in terms of temporal, territorial and in some cases 
personal parameters . . . entail the proceedings envisaged in the Statute to determine whether a 
particular situation should give rise to a criminal investigation as well as the investigation as such. 
Cases, which comprise specific incidents during which one or more crimes within the jurisdiction of 
the Court seem to have been committed by one or more identified suspects, entail proceedings that 
take place after the issuance of a warrant of arrest or a summons to appear” (emphasis added). 
208 As correctly pointed out in doctrine, the Prosecutor is not under an unconditional statutory duty to 
launch an investigation of a situation or eventually start individual prosecutions based on the mere 
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The Prosecutor’s unprecedented ability to select both situations and cases for 
the exercise of the Court’s jurisdiction is nevertheless counterbalanced by a number 
of legal constraints that contribute to shape the concrete latitude of the OTP’s 
discretionary powers. In particular, apart from the jurisdictional requirements under 
the Statute, the exercise of discretion at the ICC must comply with a filtering system 
that governs the admissibility of situations and cases, and with various procedural 
avenues for judicial review of the OTP’s most relevant selection decisions. 
																																																																																																																																																													
fact that the Court’s jurisdiction has been triggered pursuant to a state or UNSC referral. He or she 
will conduct a preliminary examination of the situation with a view to establish—inter alia—whether 
or not the conditions set out in article 53 of the Statute are met for the purposes of deciding to open an 
investigation or start a prosecution. See, e.g., H. OLÁSOLO, The Triggering Procedure of the 
International Criminal Court, cit., 42-43; W. A. SCHABAS, The International Criminal Court: A 
Commentary on the Rome Statute, 2nd edition, Oxford, 2016, 829: “even when there is a referral or 
‘triggering’ by the Security Council or by a State Party, the Prosecutor also conducts a preliminary 
examination. This is implied by article 53 because it is necessarily the basis for the decision of the 
Prosecutor about whether or not to proceed with an investigation. The consequence of this scheme is 
that an investigation under article 53 cannot begin until the Prosecutor has carried out a preliminary 
examination . . . Ultimately, then, the Prosecutor must decide in all cases whether or not to conduct an 
investigation”; J. TRAHAN, The Relationship Between the International Criminal Court and the U.N. 
Security Council: Parameters and Best Practices, in Criminal Law Forum, vol. 24, issue 4, 2013, 
423-424: “Under the Rome Statute, regardless of how a situation is referred—that is, including if 
there is a Security Council referral—the Prosecutor undertakes a preliminary examination . . . The 
Security Council cannot make the Prosecutor act in the event of a referral. He or she must 
independently conclude that there is a reasonable basis to proceed”. This position has always been 
shared by the OTP (see ICC-OTP, Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, November 2013, par. 
76 “Upon receipt of a referral or a declaration pursuant to article 12(3), the Office will open a 
preliminary examination of the situation at hand. However, it should not be assumed that a referral or 
an article 12(3) declaration will automatically lead to the opening of an investigation”). Contra, see J. 
D. OHLIN, International Law and Prosecutorial Discretion, in Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy and 
International Relations, vol. 8, issue 2, 2007, 146-150 and, of the same author, On the Very Idea of 
Transitional Justice, in Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations, vol. 8, issue 1, 
2007, 61. The Author argues—on the basis of the normative relationship between obligations flowing 
from the UN Charter and the ICC Statute—that in case of referral of the UNSC, the ICC Prosecutor 
does not enjoy discretion on the opening of an investigation, because resolutions adopted under 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter can have the effect of removing such discretion, limitedly to the 
decision on the opening of an investigation (while discretion in deciding whether or not to prosecute 
specific individuals would be retained). This reasoning is not convincing for various reasons. First, 
because UNSC resolutions, including those referring a situation to the ICC, are binding upon UN 
Member States and not per se on the organs of a separate international organization independent from 
the UN. Second, because it is highly questionable that the UNSC, via a Chapter VII resolution, could 
in substance alter the jurisdictional machinery of an international treaty-based institution, and require 
its organs to act in terms that might be contrary to its founding instrument. As a matter of fact, once 
the Court’s jurisdiction is triggered by the UNSC resolution, the jurisdictional machinery of the 
ICC—of which the OTP is a fundamental actor—must proceed according to the rules of the Rome 
Statute, which does not provide any differentiated treatment for UNSC referrals as regards the OTP’s 
sole responsibility in determining whether or not to open an investigation pursuant to article 53(1) of 
the Statute. In this sense see L. CONDORELLI, S. VILLALPANDO, op. cit., 577-580. 
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For instance, the OTP’s decisions revolving around the admissibility test—
which comprises the assessment of complementarity209, gravity210 and ne bis in 
idem211—can lead to a judicial review of prosecutorial choices on the initiation of 
investigations and prosecutions, and to rulings on the admissibility of a situation or 
case pursuant to the prosecution’s selection decisions212. In the same vein, the OTP’s 
power to proceed proprio motu is subject to judicial supervision and it does not entail 
the faculty to directly launch an investigation or prosecution, since the Prosecutor 
must preventively seek the PTC’s authorization to do so 213. The Prosecutor’s 
decisions not to open and investigation or start a prosecution—at the conclusion of 
the preliminary examination—pursuant to article 53 of the Statute can be subject to 
judicial review, pursuant to a dual supervision scheme that can lead—depending on 
																																																								
209 Article 17(1)(a) and (b), as well as par. 2 and 3 of the same article concentrate on the concepts of 
unwillingness and inability and the criteria to be taken into consideration in their assessment, thereby 
giving substance to the principle of complementarity, one of the normative cornerstones of the Rome 
Statute, as evidenced by paragraph 10 of the Preamble and article 1 of the Rome Statute. As recalled 
by W. A. SCHABAS, The International Criminal Court: A Commentary on the Rome Statute, cit., 453, 
the PTC has considered that complementarity is “the first part of the admissibility test” (see ICC, 
Decision concerning Pre-Trial Chamber I’s Decision of 10 February 2006 and the incorporation of 
documents in the record of the case against Mr Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Prosecutor v. Lubanga, 
Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, ICC-01/04-01/06-08-US-Corr, PTC I, 24 
February 2006, par. 30, 41). It should be observed that in its practice the OTP—particularly in the 
reports on preliminary examinations and decisions pursuant to article 53 of the Statute—has given 
logical priority to the assessment of gravity over the complementarity profiles (only dealing with the 
latter if the former had been satisfied). See, e.g., ICC-OTP, Article 53(1) Report, Situation on 
Registered Vessels of Comoros, Greece and Cambodia, ICC-01/13-6-AnxA, 4 February 2015 (dated 6 
November 2014), par. 1, 133-134, 148. On complementarity in general, see C. STAHN, M. EL ZEIDY 
(eds.), The International Criminal Court and Complementarity: From Theory to Practice, Cambridge, 
2011. 
210 Article 17(1)(d) of the Rome Statute. 
211 Article 17(1)(c) and 20 of the Rome Statute define the parameters for the assessment of ne bis in 
idem (or double jeopardy) at the ICC. 
212 Articles 18 (“Preliminary rulings regarding admissibility”) and 19 (“Challenges to the jurisdiction 
of the Court or the admissibility of a case”) of the Rome Statute set the procedures to obtain a ruling 
on admissibility. In the case of article 18, it should be noted that such provision—which only applies 
to situations arising from state referrals and proceedings initiated proprio motu pursuant to article 
13(c) and 15 of the Statute—allows states to obtain a ruling on admissibility as early as at the situation 
stage, i.e. well before the initiation of a ‘case’ for the purposes of prosecution (see W. A. SCHABAS, 
The International Criminal Court: A Commentary on the Rome Statute, cit., 475). To the contrary, 
article 19 deals, inter alia, with challenges to the admissibility of cases that have already been 
identified within a given situation. Both provisions introduce procedural incentives to deal with 
admissibility challenges as soon as possible, through the introduction of time limits (e.g. the one-
month time limit provided for under article 18(2) of the Statute) or the reduction of the opportunities 
to submit an admissibility challenge (e.g., the ‘one-shot’ opportunity to challenge the admissibility of 
a case under article 19(4) of the Statute). On the practice of the ICC regarding admissibility 
challenges—exclusively under article 19, given the absence of relevant practice under article 18(2) of 
the Statute—see C. STAHN, Admissibility Challenges before the ICC From Quasi-Primacy to 
Qualified Deference?, in C. STAHN (ed.), The Law and Practice of the International Criminal Court, 
cit., 228-259. 
213Article 15(3) and (4) of the Rome Statute. 
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the grounds on which the nolle prosequi decision is based—either to an ex parte 
request of review and a PTC’s request to the Prosecutor to reconsider the no-action 
decision; or to a more pervasive form of ‘judicial approval’ on such decision, 
entailing the faculty for the PTC to mandate an investigation or prosecution if judges 
disagree with the Prosecutor’s decision214. Nevertheless, no procedural mechanism is 
provided in order to challenge the Prosecutor’s affirmative decision under article 
53215 or decisions not to put a potentially relevant situation on the list of preliminary 
examinations or to maintain a situation on the list for an indefinite period of time 
without any further determination on the opening of an investigation216. An additional 
																																																								
214 See article 53(3)(a) and (b) and, supra, Chapter One, par. 3.3, footnote 93. The precise nature of 
this dual oversight mechanism has been clarified by the AC of the ICC in the appeal proceedings with 
regard to the Comoros’ request for judicial review of the Prosecutor’s decision not to open an 
investigation as regards the Mavi Marmara. See ICC, Decision on the admissibility of the 
Prosecutor’s appeal against the ‘Decision on the request of the Union of the Comoros to review the 
Prosecutor’s decision not to initiate an investigation’, Situation on Registered Vessels of Comoros, 
Greece and Cambodia, ICC-01/13-51, AC, 6 November 2015, par. 53-60 and ICC, Decision on the 
request of the Union of the Comoros to review the Prosecutor’s decision not to initiate an 
investigation, Situation on the Registered Vessels of the Comoros, Greece and Cambodia, ICC-01/13-
34, PTC I, 16 July 2015, par. 8-15. 
215 See ICC, Decision on Application under Rule 103, Situation in Darfur, Sudan, ICC-02/05, PTC I, 
4 February 2009, par. 21-22: “the Chamber emphasises that article 53(3)(b) of the Statute only confers 
upon the Chamber the power to review the Prosecution's exercise of its discretion when it results in a 
decision not to proceed” adding that it “does not entrust the Chamber with the power to review the 
Prosecution's assessment that the initiation of a case against a given individual through the issuance of 
an arrest warrant or a summons to appear would not be detrimental to the interests of justice”. 
216 This is an especially delicate issue in those situations where information disclosing the possible 
commission of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court is provided by private entities such NGOs 
or groups of victims and aims at instigating a proprio motu of the Prosecutor. As a matter of fact such 
providers of information—contrary to states and the UNSC—do not have access to any remedy 
against the Prosecutor’s decision not to put a situation on the list of preliminary examinations or, after 
completing such analysis, not to open an investigation. According to article 15(1) the Prosecutor is 
only under the duty to assess the seriousness and reliability of the information provided to his or her 
office, and pursuant to paragraph 6 of the same article he or she must inform the providers of his or 
her decision not to seek the PTC’s authorization for the opening of an investigation (without prejudice 
to further evaluations based on new facts). A confirmation of the substantial lack of remedies against 
no-action decisions in such circumstances came from a 2014 decision of the PTC II. The PTC’s 
decision stemmed from a rather peculiar situation in which former Egyptian President Morsi and his 
political party—through a law firm based in London—purported to submit a declaration of acceptance 
of the Court’s jurisdiction under article 12(3) of the Statute. The Prosecutor issued a decision on the 
request on 23 April 2014 and a subsequent press release on 8 May 2014 alleging, inter alia, that the 
senders of the declaration did not possess “full powers” and as a consequence they could not act on 
behalf of the Egyptian state. For this reason the Office decided that the submission (together with the 
accompanying documents) had to be treated as a ‘private’ communication pursuant to article 15 of the 
Statute, and went on to conclude that no further action could be taken because the allegations fell 
outside the territorial and personal jurisdiction of the Court (see Prosecutor’s Decision on the 
‘Declaration under Article 12(3) and Complaint regarding International Crimes Committed in Egypt’, 
OTP-CR-460/13, 23 April 2014 and OTP, Press release, The determination of the Office of the 
Prosecutor on the communication received in relation to Egypt, ICC-OTP-20140508-PR1003, 8 May 
2014). The lawyers of the senders then sought to challenge such decision first resorting to Regulation 
46(2) of the Regulations of the Court and later to Regulation 46(3). The case was assigned to PTC II 
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layer of judicial review of the OTP’s selection choices is then carried out with the 
issuance of a warrant of arrest or summons to appear217 and, even more importantly, 
at the crucial procedural juncture of the confirmation of charges218. 
From the foregoing—cursory and partial—presentation of some of the most 
distinctive features of the ICC’s prosecutorial discretion mechanism and judicial 
review thereof, it can be observed that the Court’s system is characterised by what 
could be described as a ‘paradox of discretion’. The ICC Prosecutor is endowed with 
a margin of discretion at the same time wider and narrower than the one of his or her 
																																																																																																																																																													
and the judges dismissed in limine the application confirming that only a referring entity—state or 
UNSC—can challenge the Prosecutor’s decision not to proceed with an investigation under article 
53(1)(a) and (b). Similarly, in the case of proprio motu, the failure to include a situation in the list of 
preliminary examinations and/or to seek an authorization under article 15 of the Statute cannot be 
challenged by those who had provided the information to the OTP, given the fact that Rule 48 of the 
RPE directs the OTP to consider for that purpose the same elements set out in article 53(1)(a)-(c). See, 
ICC, Decision on the ‘Request for review of the Prosecutor’s decision of 23 April 2014 not to open a 
Preliminary Examination concerning alleged crimes committed in the Arab Republic of Egypt, and 
the Registrar’s Decision of 25 April 2014’, Request under Regulation 46(3) of the Regulation of the 
Court, ICC-RoC46(3)-01/14, PTC II, 12 September 2014, par. 6-7, 9. The same PTC II did not grant a 
request for reconsideration or leave to appeal against this decision (see ICC, Decision on a Request 
for Reconsideration or Leave to Appeal the “Decision on the ‘Request for review of the Prosecutor's 
decision of 23 April 2014 not to open a Preliminary Examination concerning alleged crimes 
committed in the Arab Republic of Egypt, and the Registrar's Decision of 25 April 2014’”, Request 
under Regulation 46(3) of the Regulation of the Court, ICC-RoC46(3)-01/14-5, PTC II, 22 September 
2014, par. 5-8). 
217 Article 58 of the Rome Statute sets out the procedure for the issuance of a warrant of arrest or 
summons to appear, as well as the formal requirements and content of both the Prosecutor’s 
application and warrant of arrest (or summons to appear) itself. For a critical view on the current 
trends in the case law of the Court as regards the issuance of warrants of arrest see M. RAMSDEN, C. 
CHUNG, ‘Reasonable Grounds to Believe’, An Unreasonably Unclear Evidentiary Threshold in the 
ICC Statute, in Journal of International Criminal Justice, vol. 13, issue 3, 555-577. The Authors 
argue that the current jurisprudence of the various PTCs on article 58 has not provided sufficient 
clarity on the relevant standard of evaluation (“reasonable grounds to believe”) and has somehow 
lowered such standard to the point that the judicial review of discretionary choices at this juncture—
especially as regards the kind and amount of evidence needed to sustain a request for a warrant of 
arrest—may have become significantly less effective. 
218 Article 61 of the Rome Statute. On the confirmation of charges procedure and its crucial 
importance in the architecture of the ICC criminal procedure see, K. AMBOS, D. MILLER, Structure 
and Functions of the Confirmation Procedure at the ICC from a Comparative Perspective, in 
International Criminal Law Review, vol. 7, issue 2, 2007, 335-360. At 347-348 the Authors underline 
the two main functions of the confirmation procedure: “On the one hand, it operates as a filter and 
thus ensures that only the really important cases go to trial, and therefore protects the suspect against 
improper or unsubstantiated charges. On the other hand, it serves to avoid time-consuming 
discussions about disclosure of evidence in the trial phase”. The importance of this filtering function, 
which necessarily entails a form of judicial review of the discretionary choices made by the 
Prosecutor and an assessment of the evidence presented for the purposes of confirmation is also 
underlined, with ample references to the Court’s pertinent case law, by V. NERLICH, The Confirmation 
of Charges Procedure at the International Criminal Court: Advance or Failure?, in Journal of 
International Criminal Justice, vol. 10, issue 5, 2012, 1347: “The confirmation process cannot be a 
mere rubber-stamping of the Prosecutor’s charges, lest the confirmation of charges should become 
void of any meaning”. 
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international(ised) counterparts. On the one hand, he or she can choose not only the 
cases for prosecution, but also the situations warranting the intervention of the Court 
(which in the case of other international jurisdictions were in general externally and 
politically pre-determined). On the other hand, his or her selection decisions are 
subject to a more sophisticated multi-tiered system of judicial supervision designed 
to prevent—with a degree of effectiveness that is dependent on the attitude of judges 
in the exercise of their powers 219—arbitrariness and excesses of prosecutorial 
discretion. At the same time, while the position of the independent Prosecutor has 
been significantly reinforced, his or her reliance on the cooperation with states and 
the UNSC—whose decisions are frequently a function of realpolitik 
considerations220—could not have been completely eliminated, in line with the 
consensual treaty-based nature of the institution and the necessity to strike a balance 
between the need for accountability and the recognition of state sovereignty221. 
These innovative normative and institutional features of the ICC prosecutorial 
system, as well as the concrete decisions of the involved actors (OTP and judges in 
primis) and their adherence to the statutory and regulatory framework of the ICC, 
will be carefully examined both in their static and dynamic aspects in the following 
parts, with a particular focus on the creative/transformative role of prosecutorial and 
																																																								
219 The conceptual categories of ‘activism’ and ‘deference’ can be used to describe two possible 
differing approaches on the parts of judges in the exercise of judicial review of prosecutorial 
discretion. As it will be seen in greater detail, the trends in case law towards one or the other approach 
are highly dependent on the specific procedural stage in which judicial review takes place (and the 
corresponding different standards of review), as well as on the specific facts of a case and the 
litigation strategies of the involved actors. On the point see W. A. SCHABAS, Prosecutorial 
Discretion v. Judicial Activism at the International Criminal Court, cit., 731-761. 
220 In particular, the practice of self-referrals has sparked significant controversy, given the risks of 
instrumentalisation of this mechanism on the part of the (self-)referring state. See, supra, Chapter 
One, par. 3.3, footnote 86. The inevitable relevance of political considerations in the UNSC’s 
decisions to refer situations to the ICC seems evident looking at the different approaches taken by the 
Council with regard to international crisis, such as the situations of Sudan or Libya (object of referral) 
and, for instance, Syria. 
221 The whole institutional and procedural construct of complementarity serves this fundamental 
purpose. Another example can be found, for instance, in article 16 of the Rome Statute entrusting the 
UNSC with the power to defer the beginning or continuation of an investigation or prosecution for a 
period of 12 months by means of a resolution under Chapter VII of the UN Charter (resolution that 
can be annually renewed). The significant reliance of the Court (and above all of the Prosecutor) on 
state cooperation is also textually evident from the Statute (see, e.g., the references to state 
cooperation as regards the powers and duties of the Prosecutor under article 54(3) letter (c) and (d); or 
the entire Part IX and X of the Statute dedicated to matters of cooperation between the Court and the 
State Parties). 
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judicial practice in shaping the Court’s system of checks and balances concerning the 
exercise of discretionary powers.
!
 
  63 
PART TWO 
THE STATIC DIMENSION OF PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION AT 
THE ICC AND THE INSTITUTIONAL INTERPLAY BETWEEN 









The purpose of this chapter is to provide a more detailed analysis of the legal 
basis for prosecutorial discretion in the substantive and procedural legal architecture 
of the ICC. Although some of the most distinctive features of the ICC’s prosecutorial 
mechanism have already been outlined in the previous chapters, a closer look at their 
statutory and regulatory foundations is necessary in order to get a better grasp of the 
overall normative design provided by the relevant texts. 
As it will clearly emerge from the following paragraphs, the Statute, RPE and 
the other regulatory texts only provide scarce indications as regards the concrete 
latitude and mode of exercise of prosecutorial discretionary powers, thereby leaving 
to the practice of the OTP and Chambers—in their institutional interplay—the onus 
to strike a reasonable balance between the potentially competing needs of flexibility 
and consistency. The reasons for the existence of areas of broad constructive 
ambiguity in the texts are here considered, in the broader context of the negotiating 
history leading to the adoption of the Statute and the other relevant texts. 
As regards the methodology of this static analysis, it should be preliminarily 
underlined that it has not proceeded by means of a mechanical exegesis of the 
relevant provisions—which have already been the object of extensive commentary—
but has instead attempted to provide a more systematic understanding of the 
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principles and rules governing the exercise of prosecutorial powers. In this regard, 
the focus has been on the normative interaction between the different sources 
constituting the stratified—substantive and procedural—system of norms applicable 
to prosecutorial discretionary choices and their judicial review. Issues such as—inter 
alia—the hierarchy between these different sources, the solution of discrepancies 
between them, the different levels at which they operate, and the ways in which they 
influence the concrete exercise of prosecutorial choices have been considered. 
In addition, it should be stressed that in the present chapter the analysis of the 
legal basis for prosecutorial discretion has been carried out from the subjective 
institutional perspective of the OTP. In other words, the focus has been on enabling 
and constraining principles and rules, i.e. the statutory and regulatory provisions that 
either explicitly/implicitly allow (or presuppose) a margin of discretion on the part of 
the prosecuting authorities, or explicitly/implicitly exclude (or limit) said discretion. 
The conceptual distinction between norms expressing principles and norms 
expressing rules has guided the examination of the relevant provisions, thereby 
elucidating the different degrees in their bindingness and the room left for integrative 
and transformative practices of the judicial actors222. 
The analysis carried out in the present chapter will be complemented in 
Chapter Two through the study of prosecutorial policy documents and in Chapter 
Three with the consideration of the role of judges, with regard to their supervisory 
powers as a necessary component of the dialectical functioning of the checks and 
balances mechanism on prosecutorial discretionary choices at the ICC. 
 
2. The independent Prosecutor in the negotiating history of the Statute 
Much has been written about the negotiating history of the Rome Statute and 
the pragmatic compromises leading to the adoption of the founding document of the 
ICC223. As already pointed out elsewhere in the present work, the prosecutorial model 
																																																								
222 The distinction, which can be traced back—at least in its contemporary formulation—to the 
writings of authors such as R. DWORKIN and R. ALEXY, can prove useful in order to distinguish the 
norms which apply “in an all-or-nothing fashion” (rules) from those expressing “a consideration 
inclining in one direction or another” (principles). See R. DWORKIN, op. cit., 24, 26 and R. ALEXY, A 
Theory of Constitutional Rights, Oxford, 2002, 57. 
223 For a recollection of the main issues regarding the role and powers of the Prosecutor discussed 
during the negotiating phase see S. A. FERNÁNDEZ DE GURMENDI, op. cit., 175-188 and, with 
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to be adopted for the new court—with particular regard to the institutional role, 
powers and attributions of the Prosecutor—proved to be one of the most contentious 
legal and political issues during the preparatory stage and up to the last-minute 
decisive negotiations at the Rome Conference224. Doubts on the feasibility of a 
prosecutor endowed with the power to trigger the Court were expressed as early as of 
1996 in the Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an 
International Criminal Court, and were echoed throughout the preparatory phase by a 
significant group of states 225 . While the idea of an effectively independent 
																																																																																																																																																													
particular regard to the American opposition to the proprio motu powers, D. SCHAFFER, False Alarm 
about the Proprio Motu Prosecutor, cit., 29-44. Some of the most authoritative commentaries to the 
Rome Statute devote significant attention to the negotiating history, the genesis of the Court’s 
procedural regime in general and to the role of the Prosecutor in particular. See, e.g., W. A. SCHABAS, 
The International Criminal Court: A Commentary on the Rome Statute, cit., 394-397; A. CASSESE, P. 
GAETA, J. R. W. D. JONES (eds.), The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court—A 
Commentary, op. cit., 34, 57-58, 82-83, 132. 
224 Ibidem. 
225 See Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court 
(Proceedings of the Preparatory Committee during March-April 1996), A/51/22, Vol. I, Supp. No. 22, 
1996, par. 149-151. For direct references to the doubts expressed by the delegates of various states 
later in the political negotiations as regards the independent Prosecutor and his or her ability to trigger 
the Court’s jurisdiction—especially before the German-Argentinean proposal on the supervisory role 
of the Pre-Trial Chamber gained sufficient consensus—see the Official Records of the United Nations 
Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, 
A/CONR183/13 (Vol. II), 1998. See, particularly, the position of Japan (67, par. 46, considering 
“inappropriate to give the Prosecutor the right to initiate an investigation proprio motu”); India (86, 
par. 50, in the same vein); Malaysia (109, par. 50: “he should not be empowered to initiate an 
investigation proprio motu in view of the principle of complementarity and the danger of adverse 
effects on the integrity and credibility of the office and possible accusations of bias”); Qatar (110, par. 
66, in the same vein); Nigeria (111, par. 88 and 198, par. 77); China (124, par. 39: “The Prosecutor's 
right to conduct investigations or to prosecute proprio motu, without sufficient checks and balances 
against frivolous prosecution, [is] tantamount to the right to judge and rule on State conduct. The 
provision that the Pre-Trial Chamber must consent to the investigation by the Prosecutor [is] not an 
adequate restraining mechanism”); Turkey (124, par. 44: “Conferring a proprio motu role on the 
Prosecutor [risks] submerging him with information concerning charges of a political, rather than a 
juridical nature”); Sudan (126, par. 77: “The Statute gave the Prosecutor, acting proprio motu, a role 
beyond the control of the Pre-Trial Chamber. The Prosecutor should be under reasonable and logical 
control, and should not act ex officio”); Pakistan (128, par. 95: “Only a State party, and not the 
Prosecutor proprio motu, should be competent to activate the trigger mechanism”); Indonesia (200, 
par. 103: “The Prosecutor should not be able to initiate investigations proprio motu”); Israel (201, par. 
11, whose delegation was “unable to support the proposal for ex officio, proprio motu investigations 
by the Prosecutor” and stated that “If the Prosecutor [takes] over the proposed functions, a situation 
might result in which no complaints by States [are] put forward. Furthermore, there would be a risk of 
the Prosecutor being overburdened by a multitude of complaints from bodies of all kinds, including 
frivolous or political complaints which would adversely affect the Prosecutor's independence and 
standing”); United States of America (202-203, par. 125-130, on accounts that “It would be naive to 
ignore the considerable political pressure that organizations and States would bring to bear on the 
Prosecutor in advocating that he or she should take on the causes which they championed” and that 
“Under the proprio motu model, it would become too easy for States parties to abdicate their 
responsibilities and leave it to individuals, organizations and the Prosecutor to initiate cases without 
the foundation of political will and commitment that only States could provide. The Prosecutor might 
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international Prosecutor had been entirely rejected from the start by some states—
and forcefully supported by many others—the final compromise was only reached in 
the last rounds of negotiation in Rome, when significant consensus was gathered 
around the balanced proposal jointly put forward by Germany and Argentina226 to the 
effect of including the Prosecutor’s capacity to trigger proprio motu the Court’s 
jurisdiction, but only subject to the safeguard of a PTC’s authorization for the 
purposes of opening a full investigation227. 
The frequent references in the preparatory works to adequate “safeguards” or 
“constraints” on prosecutorial discretion—also expressed by the states supportive of 
the proprio motu powers—reveal the extreme political sensitiveness of the issue, as 
																																																																																																																																																													
then become isolated in a difficult international arena without the clear, continuing support of States 
parties”. As to the specific issue of prosecutorial discretion the American delegate stated that “in the 
proprio motu setting, the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, which was not universally accepted, 
would become a frequent and essential step in preserving the proper functioning and focus of the 
Court. Considerably expanding the number of instances in which the Prosecutor might intervene was 
unlikely to result in good prosecutions, would undermine the perception of the Prosecutor's 
impartiality and would subject the Prosecutor to incessant criticism by groups and individuals who 
disagreed with his or her choices”); Azerbaijan (299, par. 71); Russian Federation (301, par. 114: 
“Before a case [is] referred to the Court, a State would have to make a complaint. That would make it 
possible to remove any political pressure from the Prosecutor”); Jamaica (306, par. 15, which 
“doubted very much whether the proprio motu power of the Prosecutor would yield the anticipated 
benefits”, but declared to be “prepared to join in any consensus on the issue”); Yemen (310, par. 82); 
Oman (312, par. 129); Bangladesh (314, par. 9: “To endow the Prosecutor with the power to initiate 
proceedings proprio motu would be to invest a single individual with some of the attributes of a 
State”); Kenya (317, par. 33); Islamic Republic of Iran (317, par. 42); Cuba (331, par. 69); Egypt 
(335, par. 6); Algeria (337, par. 32); Sri Lanka (339, par. 46: “there [is] no justification in 
international law for the powers envisaged under [the proposed version of] article 12, which seriously 
threaten[s] the principle of complementarity”); Ethiopia (341, par. 63: “conferral of proprio motu 
powers on the Prosecutor would be detrimental to the independence, universality and effectiveness of 
the Court”); Iraq (341, par. 64). 
226 See the Proposal submitted by Argentina and Germany, A/AC.249/1998/WG.4/DP.35, 25 March 
1998. 
227 The results of this compromise are reflected in the current formulation of article 15 of the Statute. 
The supervisory role of the Pre-Trial Chamber in case of proprio motu envisaged under par. 3-5 of the 
same article proved to be an acceptable compromise in order to reconcile the progressive idea of an 
autonomous Prosecutor and the necessity to exercise reasonable control over his or her choice to 
engage the Court’s jurisdiction. Some delegations, while accepting the formulation later transfused in 
article 15, expressed fears that this authorisation mechanism would introduce unjustified limitations 
on the Prosecutor’s independence. See A/CONR183/13 (Vol. II), 1998 for the moderately critical 
position of Ecuador (315, par. 14, accepting the safeguards only for the purposes of advancing 
consensus); the position of Finland (338, par. 39) and Lithuania (340, par. 60); and the more forceful 
stance taken by Congo (315, par. 17 and 345, par. 16, stating that the Prosecutor should have the 
power to directly open an investigation and the Pre-Trial Chamber “should only intervene once 
proceedings had commenced, to check abuses”) and New Zealand (202, par. 120, stating that “it 
would prefer there to be no judicial review of the Prosecutor's independent powers”). 
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well as an interesting polarisation among states, whose position in Rome did not 
always conform to the respective national legal tradition of criminal procedure228. 
It should nevertheless be noted that the travaux préparatoires reveal how the 
discussion concerning the practicalities of the Prosecutor’s discretionary powers has 
been rather limited, mainly focusing on the core issue of the power to trigger the 
Court’s jurisdiction independently from a state or UNSC referral229. In particular, as 
regards the concrete exercise of discretionary powers at different junctures of the 
proceedings, significant leeway was left to subsequent interpretation and practice of 
both the OTP and Chambers230. 
 
3. The legal basis for discretion in the Statute 
The Rome Statute, the founding document of the ICC’s legal regime, is 
undeniably the primary source of the principles and rules governing the functioning 
of the Court, in accordance with the system of sources delineated by article 21 of the 
																																																								
228 One could have expected the states’ diverging approaches to reflect the different national legal 
traditions in the field of criminal procedure (or at least those of the main legal families across the 
spectrum). Quite to the contrary, the legal systems of many of the states strongly supportive of the 
proprio motu powers and of a wide margin of prosecutorial discretion are premised on various 
procedural and institutional limitations of the prosecutor’s discretion (see, e.g., Germany, Italy), 
whereas the criminal procedure of states opposing such discretionary powers at the international level 
provide for broad prosecutorial discretion in domestic proceedings, allowing for judicial 
supervision/intervention only in extreme cases (see, e.g., most of the criminal procedures in the US, as 
well as China, Israel, Nigeria). This is a clear indication that the issue had been predominantly 
considered in its political implications, more than from the point of view of the technicalities of the 
criminal justice mechanism. 
229 The issue was debated more from the perspective of the jurisdictional reach of the newly 
established court through the role of the Prosecutor, than from the perspective of the procedural 
dynamics of prosecutorial discretion once the Court’s jurisdiction is triggered.  This is confirmed by 
the absence of unambiguous indications in the Statute as to the concrete latitude of these prosecutorial 
selection powers as well as to the exact criteria for their exercise both in the selection of situations and 
cases. It should be noted that at the Rome Conference, even states opposing the proprio moutu powers 
of the Prosecutor favoured the recognition to the Prosecutor of a wide degree of discretion in the 
selection of cases. See, albeit with some degree of incoherence, the American position on the issue in 
Official Records of the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the 
Establishment of an International Criminal Court, A/CONR183/13 (Vol. II), 95, par. 60: “he or she 
should have maximum independence and discretion in prosecuting cases referred by States parties or 
the Security Council” and 202, par. 129: “Some prosecutorial discretion would be necessary and 
appropriate even in the context of a State referral regime”. 
230 As it will be seen in greater detail, the Statute does contain some indications and criteria to orient 
the selection choices to be made by the Prosecutor, thereby ‘channelling’ his or her discretion. 
Nevertheless, one must recognise that the normative standards regarding, for instance, the decision to 
open a preliminary examination and/or an investigation—such as the “reasonable basis to believe” 
test, the exact content of the admissibility and gravity assessment or of the “interests of justice”—have 
been loosely defined by the drafters, thereby promoting a significant degree of flexibility. 
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Statute 231 . Leaving aside the complex issue of its legal relation with other 
international rules—both conventional and customary232—external to the Rome 
system, the primacy of the Statute among the legal texts internal to the ‘Rome 
regime’ is clearly stipulated or implied by various provisions233. 
It is therefore a sensible approach to assume the Statute as a starting point for 
a detailed analysis of the legal foundations of discretion from the point of view of the 
Prosecutor’s attributions and the most relevant legal issues thereof. Nevertheless, the 
undisputed primacy of the Statute does not exclude that significant contributions in 
shaping the concrete latitude and mode of exercise of prosecutorial discretion can be 
																																																								
231 On the system of applicable law under article 21 see G. BITTI, Article 21 and the Hierarchy of 
Sources of Law before the ICC, in C. STAHN (ed.), The Law and Practice of the International 
Criminal Court, cit., 411-443 and in the same volume the contribution of J. POWDERLY, The Rome 
Statute and the Attempted Corseting of the Interpretative Judicial Function: Reflections on Sources of 
Law and Interpretive Technique, 444-498. See, also E. FRONZA, Le fonti, in E. AMATI, M. COSTI, E. 
FRONZA, P. LOBBA, E. MACULAN, A. VALLINI, op. cit., 57-80. 
232 On this fundamental issue see R. CRYER, Royalism and the King: Article 21 of the Rome Statute 
and the Politics of Sources, in New Criminal Law Review: An International and Interdisciplinary 
Journal, vol. 12, no. 3, 2009, 390-405, particularly at 393 and 396-398. The Author criticises the 
approach to the sources of ICL taken by the drafters in designing article 21 of the Statute on accounts 
that “The interrelationship of sources is more complex than Article 21’s apparently rigid hierarchy 
implies”, as well as the early treatment of the interrelation of sources provided by the Court in the first 
Al-Bashir arrest warrant decision. For an analysis of the allegedly diminished role of customary 
international law in the ICC regime see L. VAN DEN HERIK, The Decline of Customary International 
Law as a Source of International Criminal Law, in C. A. BRADLEY (ed.), Custom's Future: 
International Law in a Changing World, Cambridge/New York, 2016, 230-252. See also the 
insightful analysis carried out by J. D’ASPREMONT, The Two Cultures of International Criminal Law, 
in Amsterdam Center for International Law Research Paper 2017-01, 2017, 1-29. The Author argues 
that what he refers to as the “Roman Culture” of international law inspiring the Statute (as opposed to 
the “Bavarian Culture” expressed by the paradigms of Nuremberg and the ad hoc tribunals), does not 
exclude expansionist judicial interpretations of the Statute itself, including through resort to 
international customary international law. In other words, the sibylline formulation of article 21—read 
in conjunction with article 22 of the Statute (“Nullum Crimen Sine Lege”)—“opens a remarkable 
interpretive space for expansion and empowers any expansionist interpreter” resulting in the 
“elevation of interpretation as the central mode of expansion of international criminal law” (ibidem, 
25-26). 
233 A first indication in this sense may be derived from article 21(1)(a), listing the Statute first among 
the other primary legal texts of the Rome legal regime. An unequivocal confirmation of this primacy 
can be found in article 9(3) concerning the Elements of Crimes, which stipulates that “The Elements 
of Crimes and amendment thereto shall be consistent with this Statute” (emphasis added). In the same 
vein, article 51(4) of the Statute establishes that “The Rules of Procedure and Evidence, amendments 
thereto and any provisional Rule shall be consistent with this Statute” (emphasis added), while the 
following par. 5 of the same article provides that “In the event of conflict between the Statute and the 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence, the Statute shall prevail”. Other relevant regulatory—hence sub-
statutory—legal texts explicitly confirm this stance. See, e.g., Regulation 1(2) of the Regulations of 
the Office of the Prosecutor, ICC-BD/05-01-09: “These Regulations shall be read subject to the 
Statute, the Rules, and the Regulations of the Court and in conjunction with the Regulations of the 
Registry and the Staff Rules and Regulations” (emphasis added). On the infra-normative relationship 
between the legal sources internal to the Rome regime and their hierarchically organised layers see, 
G. BITTI, op. cit., 414-422. 
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provided by sub-statutory sources, such as the RPE and the various Regulations, 
which are analysed in turn. As correctly pointed out—in a critical fashion—by G. 
BITTI, various areas of procedural law at the ICC have witnessed a relevant 
contribution of both the RPE and their judicial interpretation—especially at the trial 
level—thereby showing a potential for significant flexibility and “judicial 
creativity”234. 
 
3.1 Indications of principle in the Preamble 
The interpretive value of preambles in international treaties has been the 
object of attention both in scholarly writings and international case law235. It is 
widely accepted that preambular provisions contribute to the ascertainment of the 
object and purpose of a treaty and may assist the interpreter in determining the 
content of specific provisions contained therein236. This is confirmed by article 31(2) 
of the VCLT, which explicitly refers to the preamble when dealing with the 
contextual (or systematic) criterion of treaty interpretation237. In general, preambles 
mainly contain enunciations of principle—frequently to the effect of expressing the 
policy considerations behind the conclusion of the treaty—and of a rather generic 
formulation. The capacity of preambular provisions to give rise per se to legal 
obligations is debated in international law238. 
																																																								
234 G. BITTI, op. cit., 443. 
235 See N. QUOC DINH, P. DAILLIER, A. PELLET, Droit International Public, 8th edition, Paris, 2009, 
146; A. AUST, Modern Treaty Law and Practice, New York, 2007, 425-426; M. E. VILLIGER, The 
Rules on Interpretation: Misgivings, Misunderstandings, Miscarriage? The ‘Crucible’ Intended by the 
International Law Commission, in E. CANNIZZARO (ed.), The Law of Treaties Beyond the Vienna 
Convention, Oxford, 2011, 110. Among the numerous instances of judicial recognition of the 
interpretive value of preambles see—in the pre-VCLT era—ICJ, Case concerning the Application of 
the Convention of 1902 governing the Guardianship of Infants (Netherlands v. Sweden), Judgment, 28 
November 1958, I.C.J. Reports 1958, 67 and, after the adoption of the VCLT, Case concerning a 
dispute between Argentina and Chile concerning the Beagle Channel, Arbitral Award, 18 February 
1977, Reports of International Arbitral Awards, vol. XXI, 89, par. 19. 
236 Ibidem: “Although Preambles to treaties do not usually—nor are they intended to—contain 
provisions or dispositions of substance—(in short they are not operative clauses)—it is nevertheless 
generally accepted that they may be relevant and important as guides to the manner in which the 
Treaty should be interpreted, and in order, as it were, to "situate" it in respect of its object and 
purpose”. 
237 Article 31(2) of the VCLT: “The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall 
comprise, in addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes” (emphasis added). See also M. 
E. VILLIGER, op. cit., 110 stressing that “the contextual or systematic means of interpretation . . . aim to 
avoid inconsistencies between the individual term and its textual surroundings”. 
238	Some authors maintain almost categorically that preambles never give rise to legal obligations. See 
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The Rome Statute makes no exceptions to this well-established practice and 
contains a Preamble eloquently expressing the reasons for the establishment of the 
Court and the institutional objectives that should inspire its activity, elaborating inter 
alia on its relations with national jurisdictions and other relevant international 
organisations (namely the UN)239. While the degree of bindingness of the provisions 
of the Preamble is the object of debate among ICL scholars240, the Court—similarly 
to other international adjudicating bodies—has recognised in various circumstances 
the relevance of the Preamble for the interpretation of the Statute241. 
																																																																																																																																																													
N. QUOC DINH, P. DAILLIER, A. PELLET, op. cit., 146: “Dans l’ordre international, le préambule d’un 
traité ne possède pas de force obligatoire, il constitue toutefois un élément d’interprétation du traité”. 
Other scholars, on the contrary, maintain that the provisions of a preamble are to be considered on 
equal footing with those contained in the operative part of the treaty and can, at certain conditions, 
give rise to legal obligations. See, e.g., E. SUY, Le Préambule, in E. YAKPO, T. BOUMEDRA (eds.), 
Liber Amicorum Judge Mohammed Bedjaoui, The Hague, 1999, 260-261. International tribunals have 
at times recognised that the way in which a particular preambular provision is drafted could point to 
the conclusion that the parties intended to confer it binding force. See, e.g., ICJ, Case concerning 
rights of nationals of the United States of America in Morocco (France v. USA), Judgment, 27 August 
1952, I.C.J. Reports 1952, 184: “Considered in the light of these circumstances, it seems clear that the 
principle [of equality of treatment] was intended to be of a binding character and not merely an empty 
phrase”. 
239 On the negotiating history of the Preamble see T. N. SLADE, R. CLARK, Preamble and Final 
Clauses, in R. S. LEE (ed.), The International Criminal Court: The Making of the Rome Statute, cit., 
421-450. 
240 For instance, J. K. KLEFFNER, Auto-referrals and the Complementary Nature of the ICC, in C. 
STAHN, G. SLUITER, op. cit., 45, footnote 18, maintains that “Nothing in the law of treaties indicates 
that provisions have an inferior legal force or no legal force at all, by virtue of the fact alone that they 
are set forth in the Preamble rather than the dispositif”. On the contrary, M. BERGSMO, O. TRIFFTERER, 
K. AMBOS, Preamble, in O. TRIFFTERER, K. AMBOS (eds.), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court, 3rd edition, München/Oxford/Baden-Baden, 2016, 4 contend that while 
the Preamble “is an integral part of the Statute . . . the operative articles have higher rank than the 
Preamble”. This latter view has been criticised by W. A. SCHABAS, The International Criminal Court: 
A Commentary on the Rome Statute, cit., 32-33, as an “overly technical and conservative 
understanding of the Preamble and one that does not appear to find any confirmation in the case law 
of the Court”. Ibidem at 40, the same Author recalls, with reference to case law, that the Court has 
recognised how the legal significance of the Preamble extends well beyond the mere “hortatory prose” 
(see, ICC, Decision on Prosecutor’s Application for Witness Summonses and resulting Request for 
State Party Cooperation, Prosecutor v. Ruto et al., Situation in the Republic of Kenya, ICC-01/09-
01/11-1274-Corr2, TC V(A), 17 April 2014, par. 64). 
241 See, e.g., ICC, Judgment on the Prosecutor's Application for Extraordinary Review of Pre-Trial 
Chamber I's 31 March 2006 Decision Denying Leave to Appeal, Situation in the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo, ICC-01/04-168, AC, 13 July 2006, par. 33-34: “the purposes [of the Statute] may be 
gathered from its preamble and general tenor of the treaty”. Various Chambers have also derived 
interpretive assistance from the Preamble in order to enlighten the Statute’s provisions on punishment 
and sentencing, in particular in establishing the objectives of punishment at the ICC. See ICC, 
Decision on Sentence pursuant to article 76 of the Statute, Prosecutor v. Katanga, Situation in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, ICC-01/04-01/07-3484-tENG-Corr, TC II, 23 May 2014, par. 37-
38; ICC, Judgment and Sentence, Prosecutor v. Al Mahdi, Situation in the Republic of Mali, ICC-
01/12-01/15-171, TC VII, 27 September 2016, par. 66; ICC, Decision on Sentence pursuant to Article 
76 of the Statute, Prosecutor v. Bemba et al., Situation in the Central African Republic, ICC-01/05-
01/13-2123-Corr, TC VII, 22 March 2017, par. 19. 
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Some of the Preamble’s enunciations bear direct or indirect relevance on the 
issue of prosecutorial discretion, thereby providing some programmatic indications 
that may contribute to shape its exercise. Paragraph 4 of the Preamble is the first of 
such provisions and reads as follows 
Affirming that the most serious crimes of concern to the international 
community as a whole must not go unpunished and that their effective 
prosecution must be ensured by taking measures at the national level and by 
enhancing international cooperation242 
	
At a first glance, the reference to “the most serious crimes of concern to the 
international community as a whole” seems to be the mere recognition—although 
conveyed with a degree of “literary touch”243—that the Court was set up to deal with 
some of the most heinous forms of criminality known to mankind. A more attentive 
and systematic reading of the Statute—i.e. one that links the Preamble to the other 
relevant provisions dealing with the seriousness/gravity of the crimes within the 
jurisdiction of the Court —reveals a more programmatic function of this preambular 
provision. This paragraph sets the broad lines of the criminal policy priorities of the 
Court, preliminarily restricting its mandate to a selected group of particularly serious 
crimes and preparing the ground for their exhaustive enumeration in article 5 of the 
Statute. At the same time, it stresses the necessity to put an end to impunity for the 
perpetrators of such crimes, through the combination of national and international 
efforts to ensure effective prosecution and accountability244. The same formula is 
repeated in paragraph 9 of the Preamble, with the added references to the jurisdiction 
of the Court and its relationship with the UN system245. These references to the 
concept of seriousness/gravity of the crimes—permeating the normative fabric of the 
Statute—are replicated in article 1 and 5 of the Statute, and further developed into 
fully operational legal parameters for the exercise of prosecutorial discretion under 
																																																								
242 Rome Statute, Preamble, par. 4 (bold in the original text, emphasis added). 
243 T. N. SLADE, R. CLARK, op. cit., 425. 
244 Paragraph 4 limits itself to stressing the need for international cooperation and does not deal with 
the principles governing the allocation of labour between the national and international jurisdictions. 
245 See Rome Statute, Preamble, paragraph 9: “Determined to these ends and for the sake of present 
and future generations, to establish an independent permanent International Criminal Court in 
relationship with the United Nations system, with jurisdiction over the most serious crimes of concern 
to the international community as a whole” (bold in the original text, emphasis added). 
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article 17 and 53 of the Statute246. The inextricable nexus amongst them has already 
been recognised by the Prosecutor and the Court’s Chambers, although not always in 
a consistent way247. 
Paragraph 5, besides reaffirming the states’ commitment to put an end to 
impunity, refers to the preventive function of the enforcement of ICL248. Such 
reference to prevention through accountability presents clear connections to the 
Prosecutor’s discretionary powers, both with respect to his or her selection decisions 
(if, when, who and for which crimes to investigate and prosecute) and to the issue of 
the purpose, kind and quantity of the penalties applicable at the ICC249. 
Lastly, Paragraph 6 and 10 of the Preamble lay the foundations of the 
principle of complementarity of the ICC regime250. The entire institutional and 
procedural architecture of the ICC system is premised on a “division of labour”251 
between the national and international jurisdictions, along the lines more specifically 
																																																								
246 See article 17 (“Issues of admissibility”) and in particular its paragraph (1)(d) referring to 
“sufficient gravity to justify further action of the Court” and article 53 on the parameters for the 
Prosecutor’s decision to open or not to open an investigation or to start a prosecution. 
247 The OTP has recognised—making reference to paragraph 4 of the Preamble—that gravity 
considerations play a central role in determining whether or not to open an investigation (see, ICC-
OTP, Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, November 2013, par. 22 and 59-66, more 
specifically footnote 42). See, W. A. SCHABAS, The International Criminal Court: A Commentary on 
the Rome Statute, cit., 40-41 on the allegedly irreconcilable indications derived from this preambular 
phrase by different Chambers as regards the latitude of the definition of crimes against humanity. On 
the correct understanding of the “most serious crimes” clause for the purposes of the selection 
decision of the OTP see ICC, Judgment on the Prosecutor’s Appeal against the Decision of the Pre-
Trial Chamber I Entitled: “Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest, Article 
58”, Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, ICC-01/04-169-US-
Exp, AC, 13 July 2006, par. 73-75, 78-79. 
248 Rome Statute, Preamble, Paragraph 5: “Determined to put an end to impunity for the perpetrators 
of these crimes and thus to contribute to the prevention of such crimes” (bold in the original text, 
emphasis added). 
249 As already pointed out (see, supra, footnote 241) the Court has made reference to the Preamble in 
order to clarify the purposes of the penalty system of the ICC regime, given the absence of any other 
clear indications in the Statute to that end, and in particular in articles 76 and 77 dealing with 
sentencing and the applicable penalties. The Prosecutor not only plays a crucial role in the selection of 
situation and cases, but also contributes—with his or her reasoning and requests on sentencing—to 
give substance to the function of penalties and to the criminal policy reference to prevention in the 
Preamble. 
250 Rome Statute, Preamble, Paragraph 6: “Recalling that it is the duty of every State to exercise its 
criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for international crimes” and Paragraph 10: 
“Emphasizing that the International Criminal Court established under this Statute shall be 
complementary to national criminal jurisdictions” (bold in the original text).  The complementary 
nature of the ICC is further affirmed by article 1 of the Statute. Article 17(1) of the Statute makes a 
direct internal reference to paragraph 10 of the Preamble. As correctly pointed out by W. A. 
SCHABAS, The International Criminal Court: A Commentary on the Rome Statute, cit., 53, it is the 
only case in which an operative provision in the Statute makes an explicit reference to the Preamble. 
251 This expression had been used by the OTP in its Paper on Some Policy Issues Before the Office of 
the Prosecutor, September 2003, 5. 
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defined under articles 17, 18, 19 and 53 252; the Prosecutor being—under the 
supervision of the Chambers—the crucial organ in making the selection decisions 
instrumental to the functioning of the complementarity regime253. Again, while 
stating the principle in a rather laconic fashion, the Preamble sets the ‘horizon of 
possibilities’ for the specific provisions establishing the practicalities of the 
admissibility regime, of which complementarity—in all its aspects—is a fundamental 
component254. 
The preceding analysis clearly demonstrates that there is a fil rouge 
connecting the general preambular provisions of principle—particularly on 
seriousness/gravity of the crimes and complementarity—and the corresponding 
statutory rules governing the Court’s jurisdictional reach and the exercise of 
prosecutorial discretionary powers. Although the purpose of the Preamble is not to 
provide immediately applicable rules capable of directly regulating the behaviour of 
the involved actors, the resort to its provisions in various OTP’s documents and 
Court’s decisions relating to discretionary choices indicates its potential to express 
“the moral and political basis for the specific legal provisions thereafter set out”255, as 
well as its aptitude to orient their systematic and teleological interpretation in the 
context of a ‘principle-to-rule’ relationship. 
 
3.2 Article 15 and the Prosecutor’s proprio motu powers 
Article 15 of the ICC Statute, entitled “The Prosecutor”, contains the first 
unequivocal textual recognition of the Prosecutor’s discretionary powers, with 
																																																								
252 Articles 17 and 18-19 deal respectively with admissibility and challenges to admissibility, while 
article 53 deals with the parameters and procedures to be followed by the OTP in deciding on whether 
or not to start an investigation or prosecution. 
253 From the earliest stages of proceedings, such as at the preliminary examination juncture, the 
Prosecutor assesses the complementarity profiles of a situation under consideration. Articles 53(1)(b) 
and 2(b) of the Statute explicitly mandate the Prosecutor to positively conclude on the admissibility 
profiles according to the parameters—and following the procedures—set out in article 17, in order to 
decide on the opening of an investigation or prosecution. The extent to which such an assessment 
involves an exercise of discretion has been, rather unconvincingly, called into question by at least one 
Pre-Trial Chamber (see ICC, Decision on the request of the Union of the Comoros to review the 
Prosecutor’s decision not to initiate an investigation, Situation on the Registered Vessels of the 
Comoros, Greece and Cambodia, ICC-01/13-34, PTC I, 16 July 2015, par. 14). 
254 The other parameters integrating the admissibility assessment are sufficient gravity and ne bis in 
idem (as defined under article 20(3) of the Statute). 
255  ICJ, South West Africa, Second Phase (Ethiopia v. South Africa; Liberia v. South Africa), 
Judgment, 18 July 1966, ICJ Reports 1966, 32, par. 50. 
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particular regard to his or her ability to trigger the Court’s jurisdiction proprio motu. 
As pointed out by one Pre-Trail Chamber, this article “is one of the most delicate 
provisions of the Statute”256, for its systemic implications on the institutional balance 
between prosecutorial discretion, judicial controls and states’ sovereignty257. 
In essence, the procedural mechanism envisaged under article 15 is relatively 
straightforward and can be summarised as follows in its consecutive steps: 
a) Receipt of information by the OTP (referred to as “communications” in the 
practice of the OTP) 258 on the potential commission of crimes within the jurisdiction 
of the Court. The information may be provided by private individuals, groups (such 
as the alleged victims), NGOs, IOs, states or any other “reliable source”259. 
b) Examination of the information received by the OTP with a view to 
evaluating their seriousness and reliability (a process referred to as “preliminary 
examination” in article 15(6) and in the practice of the OTP)260. In this phase the OTP 
may seek on its own motion additional information to assess the reliability of the 
																																																								
256 ICC, Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an Investigation 
into the Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Situation in the Republic of Kenya, ICC-01/09-19-Corr, 
PTC II, 31 March 2010, par. 17. See also Corrigendum to Judge Fernández de Gurmendi's separate 
and partially dissenting opinion to the Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the 
Authorisation of an Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Côte d'Ivoire, Situation in the 
Republic of Côte d'Ivoire, ICC-02/11-15-Corr, 6 October 2011, par. 7. 
257 The analysis of the present paragraph has been limited to the role of the Prosecutor and Pre-Trial 
Chamber as envisaged under article 15 with regard to the three categories of crimes currently within 
the concrete jurisdictional reach of the Court (genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes). It 
did not delve into the intricate jurisdictional mechanism introduced under articles 15bis and 15ter with 
the amendments adopted in 2010 in Kampala, concerning the crime of aggression. 
258 See ICC-OTP, Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, November 2013, par. 73, 75, 78. As 
clarified in paragraph 78 of the policy paper, the mere receipt of such information does not determine 
per se the opening of a preliminary examination. For obvious reasons of judicial economy the OTP 
first engages in a screening of communications with a view to exclude from further examination those 
situations that that appear to be “manifestly outside the jurisdiction of the Court”, “already under 
preliminary examination” or “already under investigation or forming the basis of a prosecution”. 
259 Ibidem. The policy paper echoes the provision of article 15(2) of the Statute concerning the 
different potential information providers. 
260 See article 15(6) of the Statute: “If, after the preliminary examination referred to in paragraphs 1 
and 2 . . .” (emphasis added) and ICC-OTP, Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, November 
2013. In this important policy document the OTP also explains the procedural approach of the Office 
as regards the concrete conduct of preliminary examinations. In particular, it enucleates four distinct 
phases of the preliminary examination process, respectively Phase 1 (initial assessment for the 
purposes of filtering out situations manifestly ill-founded or outside the Court’s jurisdiction, see par. 
78-79. In this regard W. A. SCHABAS, The International Criminal Court: A Commentary on the Rome 
Statute, cit., 400 speaks of “pre-preliminary examination”); Phase 2 (opening of preliminary 
examination proper with factual and legal assessment of the “potential cases” within the situation 
under examination, culminating in an “Article 5 Report” on jurisdictional issues; see par. 80-81); 
Phase 3 (assessment of the complementarity and gravity profiles; see par. 82); Phase 4 (assessment of 
the interest of justice; see par. 83). The procedure ends with the issuance of a so-called “Article 53(1) 
Report”, containing the decision of the OTP on the opening—or not opening—of an investigation. 
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information received, including through written or oral testimony at the seat of the 
Court261. Upon completing such preliminary examination, there are two possibilities: 
1) If the OTP concludes that there is “a reasonable basis to proceed with an 
investigation”262, it forwards a request of authorisation to open an investigation to the 
PTC, with any supporting material263. The OTP must inform known victims, who 
may at this stage make representations on the request264. Upon consideration of the 
request and accompanying materials, the PTC can either grant—in whole or in 
part265—the authorisation requested by the Prosecutor, in which case he or she can 
proceed with the investigation266, or deny it without prejudice for other future 
requests based on new facts267. The authorisation of the PTC at this stage is 
nonetheless “without prejudice to subsequent determinations by the Court with 
regard to the jurisdiction and admissibility of a case”268. 
																																																								
261 Article 15(2) of the Statute. It is clear that in this phase the Prosecutor does not enjoy the full 
investigative powers listed under article 54 of the Statute. Nonetheless, he or she is not—or not 
exclusively—the passive recipient of information provided by external sources, but can obtain 
additional information as explicitly contemplated in the aforementioned paragraph of article 15. Rules 
46 and 47 of the RPE regulate the relationship between the OTP and the information providers as well 
as the acquisition of testimonies in this preliminary phase. 
262 See article 15(3) of the Statute, setting this procedural standard as the litmus test to be satisfied in 
order for the OTP to submit a request for authorisation to the competent PTC. 
263 See article 15(3) of the Statute and Rule 50 of the RPE as regards the procedure to be followed and 
the substantive and formal requirements of this prosecutorial request. 
264 See article 15(3) of the Statute and Rule 50(1) and (3) of the RPE. 
265 Rule 50(5) of the RPE. 
266 Article 15(4) of the Statute. 
267 See article 15(5) of the Statute and Rule 50(6) of the RPE. 
268 Article 15(4). This means that the PTC’s decision of authorisation, while carrying an assessment of 
the “reasonable basis to proceed” standard and a prima facie consideration that the case (although at 
this early stage both the OTP and PTC are in essence dealing with a situation) “appear to fall within 
the jurisdiction of the Court”, it does not carry any effect of res judicata as regards the issues of 
admissibility and jurisdiction on which the Chambers are called to rule later in the proceedings, nor it 
is binding on the OTP as regards the exact legal characterisation of the facts as they emerge during the 
investigation for the purposes of subsequent prosecutions. In this sense see W. A. SCHABAS, The 
International Criminal Court: A Commentary on the Rome Statute, cit., 399: “findings at the 
preliminary examination phase are not binding for the purpose of future investigations”. 
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2) If the OTP, on the contrary, concludes that there is no reasonable basis to 
proceed, it shall notify such decision to those who provided the information269. The 
decision not to proceed by requesting an authorisation to the PTC is again without 
prejudice to a subsequent reassessment based on new facts270. 
Fig. 1. Diagram showing the procedural steps of the Preliminary Examination (Source: ICC-
ASP, Report of the Court on the Basic Size of the Office of the Prosecutor, ICC-ASP/14/21, 
17 September 2015, 39). 
Fig. 2. Diagram showing the proprio motu procedural steps pursuant to article 15 of the 
Rome Statute. 
																																																								
269 Article 15(6) of the Statute and Rule 49 of the RPE. 
270 Article 15(6) of the Statute. 
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From the above synthesis of the procedural mechanism of article 15 of the 
Statute it should be sufficiently clear that the OTP enjoys—directly or indirectly—a 
significant degree of discretion at this preliminary examination stage, and his or her 
determinations bear relevant consequences on the subsequent developments of 
judicial proceedings. A few additional remarks seem necessary at this point. 
In the first place, when acting proprio motu, the Prosecutor not only enjoys 
discretion as regards which incidents or sets of incidents—technically defining a 
situation—to select or prioritise for preliminary examination among the numerous 
communications received by the OTP, but he or she also has wide discretion with 
regard to the conduct of such examinations. Given the rather scarce indications in the 
Statute and RPE, the process is largely left to the practice and the self-imposed 
standards established by the Office in its Regulations and further expanded in the 
Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations271. Although laudable efforts have been 
made by the OTP to ‘proceduralise’ the conduct of preliminary examinations and 
improve its transparency272, grey areas still persist as to the methodology and 
modality of the selection decisions. One relevant example of these uncertainties 
concerns the ‘time factor’ in the conduct of preliminary examinations273. As a result 
of the lack of any time limit laid down in the Statute, RPE, Regulations or policy 
papers, a situation may remain under preliminary examination for an indefinite 
period of time with only limited information made available to the public and other 
interested parties (such as states and victims) on the progress of the examination and 
																																																								
271 Apart from the provisions of the Statute, Rules 46-47 of the RPE only deal with issues of 
confidentiality and the acquisition of testimonies at the seat of the Court during preliminary 
examination, without establishing a clear procedural framework for its conduct. One clear example of 
the OTP’s discretion in setting the regulatory framework of preliminary examinations can be found in 
Regulations 25-31 of the Regulations of the OTP. As clearly stipulated by the Regulations themselves 
(see, Regulation 1, sub-regulation 1), this document has been adopted in 2009 by the Office pursuant 
to its administrative independence envisaged under article 42(2) of the Statute and Rule 9 of the RPE. 
The relevance of this document is more closely examined, infra, in paragraph 4 of this Chapter. 
272 For instance the Prosecutor, following the indications contained in Regulation 28 of the Regulation 
of the OTP, has inaugurated a practice of annually reporting on the status of preliminary examination 
activities. The reports, which are made available to the public every year in late fall, present the 
progress of the preliminary examination activities according to the phase-based approach established 
in the Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations (see, supra, footnote 260) 
273 This issue should be kept conceptually separate from the one concerning the time limit for the 
conduct of formal investigations and prosecution once the Court’s jurisdiction has been triggered, 
although these two situations raise certain common problems. With regard to the absence of a 
specified time limit for the conduct of investigations and its potentially negative consequences on the 
smooth functioning of the complementarity regime, see F. GIOIA, The Complementarity Role of the 
International Criminal Court: Are there any Time-limits?, in M. POLITI, F. GIOIA (eds.), op. cit., 
Aldershot, 2008, 71-80. 
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the possible future decisions on the opening of an investigation274. Judicial attempts 
to accelerate the pace of certain preliminary examinations or to require the 
Prosecutor to explain their current status through trial management measures, such as 
the convening of so-called Status Conferences 275, have been meet with fierce 
resistance by the OTP and have not yet resulted in a cooperative relationship among 
the Prosecutor, Judges and other interested trial actors on the duration and mode of 
conduct of preliminary examinations276. This OTP’s strong procedural posture can 
possibly be explained on at least two grounds. On the one hand, based on the OTP’s 
willingness to defend its discretionary powers at the preliminary examination stage 
from unwarranted judicial interference 277 . On the other hand, based on the 
consideration that ‘playing’ on the timing of preliminary examinations may be a 
permissible strategy for promoting (positive) complementarity in the relationship 
																																																								
274 While the annual reports surely help to discern the current status of the different preliminary 
examinations, they usually contain only a limited and summary presentation of the activities 
performed by the OTP in the relevant timespan. It should be added that in one of these annual reports, 
the Prosecutor has unequivocally expressed the view that “there are no timelines provided in the 
Statute for a decision on a preliminary examination” (see ICC-OTP, Report on Preliminary 
Examination activities 2015, 12 November 2015, par. 13). On this point see, infra, footnote 277. 
275 The power to convene status conferences—as well as the procedural measures that can be indicated 
by the Chambers on such an occasion—are envisaged by Regulation 30 and 54 of the Regulations of 
the Court. On one occasion the PTC, faced with the Prosecutor’s apparent inaction or delay in the 
completion of a preliminary examination and on the request of the referring state, has attempted to 
force him to provide additional information on the on-going activities and a reasonable estimate of the 
time needed to complete them for the purposes of a decision on the opening of investigations. See, 
ICC, Decision Requesting Information on the Status of the Preliminary Examination of the Situation 
in the Central African Republic, Situation in the Central African Republic, ICC-01/05-6, PTC III, 30 
November 2006. 
276 As recalled by W. A. SCHABAS, The International Criminal Court: A Commentary on the Rome 
Statute, cit., 401-402, in the case of the request of additional information in the situation of the Central 
African Republic, the OTP, while in the end providing certain information to the Chamber, has clearly 
stated that it considered that in “doing so, the OTP is neither accepting the existence of a legal 
obligation to submit this type of information absent any decision under Article 53 being made, nor 
adopting a precedent that it may follow in future cases” (see OTP, Prosecution’s Report Pursuant to 
Pre-Trial Chamber III’s 30 November 2006 Decision Requesting Information on the Status of the 
Preliminary Examination of the Situation in the Central African Republic, Situation in the Central 
African Republic, ICC-01/05-7, 15 December 2006, par. 11). 
277 Ibidem, par. 10: “Finally, the OTP, while committed to reaching decisions under Article 53 (1) as 
expeditiously as possible, submits that no provision in the Statute or the Rules establishes a definitive 
time period for the purposes of the completion of the preliminary examination. The OTP submits that 
this was a deliberate legislative decision that provides the required flexibility to adjust the parameters 
of the assessment or analysis phase to the specific features of each particular situation. That choice, 
and the discretion that it provides, should remain undisturbed”. This position has been confirmed in 
the Policy Paper on Preliminary Examination, November 2013, par. 89: No provision in the Statute 
or the Rules establishes a specific time period for the completion of a preliminary examination”. 
THE LEGAL BASIS FOR PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION AT THE ICC 
 79 
with states278. Keeping states ‘under observation’ for a prolonged period of time—
with the constant threat of the Court’s triggering—could work as an incentive to deal 
with the alleged crimes at the national level, thereby encouraging genuine national 
proceedings279. Obviously, the time necessary for the OTP to assess the information 
received, decide whether or not to open a preliminary examination and eventually 
request an authorisation pursuant to article 15(3) of the Statute cannot be defined in a 
one-size-fits-all fashion, given the obvious differences in complexity of the various 
situations under examination280. Nevertheless, procedural correctives allowing for a 
more predictable conduct and outcome of preliminary examinations, premised on 
good faith cooperation between the OTP and PTC, seem highly desirable in this 
field. 
In the second place, it should be added that discretion at the preliminary 
examination entails not only the power to ‘positively’ decide to request an 
authorization to investigate, but also to ‘negatively’ reach the decision—subject to 
certain procedural obligations281—not to submit such a request to the PTC282. While 
in the case of state or UNSC’s referral the decision not to open an investigation may 
be subject to a limited form of judicial review283, in the case of proprio motu the 
																																																								
278 On the concept of positive (or proactive) complementarity see W. W. BURKE-WHITE, Proactive 
Complementarity: The International Criminal Court and National Courts in the Rome System of 
International Justice, in Harvard International Law Journal, vol. 49, no. 1, 2008, 53-108. The 
concept has been widely referred to in various OTP statements and policy documents in recent years 
(see, e.g., ICC-OTP, Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, November 2013, par. 100-103). 
279 In this vein, see ICC-OTP, Policy Paper on Preliminary Examination, November 2013, par. 90, 
where the OTP states that preliminary examinations “may also entail assessing specific relevant 
national proceedings, where they exist, over a long period of time in order to assess their genuineness 
and their focus throughout the entirety of the proceedings, including any appeals” (emphasis added). 
Ibidem, par. 93-94, 99-103 where the OTP clarifies its policy objectives concerning transparency and 
positive complementarity, resorting to the expression “encouraging genuine national proceedings”. 
280 This position is clearly articulated by the OTP in its Report, quoted supra in footnote 276, par. 8-9: 
“the breadth and scope of an examination under Article 53 (1) is situation-specific: it depends on the 
particular features of each situation, including, inter alia, the availability of information, the nature 
and scale of the crimes, and the existence of national responses in respect of alleged crimes. 
Accordingly, comparison with other situations previously dealt with by the OTP is not helpful for the 
purposes of assessing the required length of the analysis phase of a new situation”. On the same lines 
see ICC-OTP, Policy Paper on Preliminary Examination, November 2013, par. 89, where the OTP 
clarifies that “The deliberate decision by the Statute’s drafters [not to impose a time limit] ensures that 
analysis is adjusted to the specific features of each particular situation,
 
which may include, inter alia, 
the availability of information, the nature, scale and frequency of the crimes, and the existence of 
national responses in respect of alleged crimes”. 
281 Such as the obligation to notify the decision to the information providers pursuant to article 15(6) 
of the Statute and Rule 49 of the RPE. 
282 Article 15(6) of the Statute. 
283 Article 53(3)(a) of the Statute. 
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OTP’s ‘no-action’ decision cannot be challenged, given that the preliminary 
examination activities are performed prior to the start of a fully jurisdictional—or 
judicially supervised—procedure284. While the legislative choice to bar ‘unqualified’ 
information providers (such as generic individuals, NGOs or IO) from challenging 
the OTP’s negative decision is not without merits, the exclusion of any procedural 
remedy against such decision in the case of the alleged victims—who may on the 
contrary exercise participatory rights at a later stage of the proceedings—is more 
problematic, particularly when compared with their procedural rights once a request 
for authorisation has been filed by the OTP285. 
In the third place, and before taking a closer look at the evidentiary standard 
to be satisfied for requesting the authorisation to investigate proprio motu, it should 
be added that when submitting the request to the PTC together with the supporting 
materials, the Prosecutor enjoys a certain discretion with regard to the quantity and 
quality of the information to provide in order to support the request. Obviously, at 
this very early stage of pre-investigation proceedings the supporting materials need 
not to be—and generally cannot be—exhaustive and conclusive 286 , but the 
Prosecutor—in coping with the applicable procedural rules 287 —will carefully 
measure out the information to disclose at this point, providing the PTC with just 
																																																								
284 The intervention of the PTC is envisaged only in particular circumstances, such in the case of the 
acquisition of testimonies at the seat of the Court during the preliminary examination phase, in order 
to ensure the integrity of the procedure and protect the rights of the involved subjects (among whom 
there may be potential suspects). See Rule 47(2) of the RPE. 
285 While generic individuals or organisations who have provided the information to the OTP would 
not in any case enjoy participatory rights in the Court’s proceedings (at the exclusion of the possibility 
to intervene through the amicus curiae procedure pursuant to Rule 103 of the RPE), victims enjoy a 
different legal and procedural status according to the Statute and RPE. With regard to the statutory 
foundation of victims’ rights, see articles 68(3) and 75 of the Statute and Rules 85-99 of the RPE. 
There is a clear asymmetry between their procedural rights in the case of request of authorisation (see 
Rule 50(1) and (3) of the RPE) and in the case of denial of such request by the OTP (see Rule 49 of 
the RPE). 
286 See ICC, Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an 
Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Situation in the Republic of Kenya, ICC-
01/09-19-Corr, PTC II, 31 March 2010, par. 34 according to which the information provided “need 
not point towards only one conclusion”; and ICC, Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute 
on the Authorisation of an Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Côte d'Ivoire, Situation 
in the Republic of Côte d'Ivoire, ICC-02/11-14-Corr, PTC III, 3 October 2011, par. 24: “Thus, the 
information available to the Prosecutor is not expected to be "comprehensive" or "conclusive", which 
contrasts with the position once the evidence has been gathered during the investigation”. 
287 Regulation 49 of the Regulations of the Court. 
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enough to satisfy the relatively low evidentiary standard applicable pursuant to 
article 15 of the Statute288. 
Lastly, with regard to the substantive content of the request for authorisation, 
it should be noted that the Statute and RPE do not prescribe a specific content, only 
requiring that the request be made in writing289. The OTP’s discretion in the drafting 
of the request is nevertheless limited by the Regulations of the Court, which establish 
in some detail its minimum content, not only to the benefit of transparency and 
predictability, but also to facilitate the PTC’s assessment on the merits of the 
request290. 
 
3.2.1 The “reasonable basis to proceed” test and the PTC’s authorisation 
Article 15(3) of the Statute establishes that in order to submit a request for 
authorisation to investigate to the PTC, the Prosecutor must be satisfied that there is 
a “reasonable basis to proceed with an investigation”. This provision, however, does 
not directly stipulate the criteria to be taken into consideration to assess whether or 
not the evidentiary standard is met. This apparent lacuna is filled by Rule 48 of the 
RPE establishing—by means of internal renvoi—that the factors to be considered are 
those set out in article 53(1)(a) to (c)291. In other words, the procedural rule 
introduces a ‘normative symmetry’ between article 15 and article 53, to the effect of 
creating a uniform framework of legal factors to be considered for the opening of an 
investigation in case of referral and for requesting an authorisation pursuant to the 
proprio motu procedure292. Therefore, the “reasonable basis to proceed” test requires 
that the Prosecutor—upon completion of the preliminary examination—be 
																																																								
288 See, infra, next paragraph. 
289 Rule 50(2) of the RPE. 
290 Regulation 49 of the Regulations of the Court. In particular, sub-regulations 1 and 2 refer to the 
necessary indication of the crimes that the OTP believes have been or are being committed, a 
statement of the facts (with certain minimum information on the place, time and persons involved) 
and a reasoned declaration on the existence of the Court’s jurisdiction. 
291 Article 53 governs the opening of investigations and prosecutions by the OTP, as well as the 
supervisory powers of the PTC with respect to the OTP’s nolle prosequi decisions. Although the 
provision seems to refer only to those situations where the Court’s jurisdiction has been triggered by 
means of state or UNSC’s referral (hence their entitlement to challenge the decision not to open an 
investigation or start a prosecution), the same factors apply in case of proprio motu, with the 
difference that in this latter case the Prosecutor cannot directly proceed with the investigation and 
must convince the competent PTC to authorise him or her to open one. 
292 On this point, see W. A. SCHABAS, The International Criminal Court: A Commentary on the Rome 
Statute, cit., 404. 
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cumulatively satisfied that: a) There is “reasonable basis to believe that a crime 
within the jurisdiction of the Court has been or is being committed” 293; b) The “case” 
is or would be admissible under article 17294; c) That opening a investigation would 
not run contrary to the “interests of justice”295. 
In order to assess the level of discretion that the OTP enjoys at the stage of 
deciding whether or not to forward a request for authorisation to the PTC on the 
basis of the applicable evidentiary standard, it is necessary to reflect on two closely 
intertwined aspects, namely the legal nature and function of the standard itself—
particularly when compared to the other evidentiary standards applicable at different 
stages of proceedings—and the scope and depth of the PTC’s supervision when 
considering whether to grant or deny the authorisation to investigate. 
With regard to the first issue, it should be noted that in the context of the 
different evidentiary standards envisaged by the Statute296, the “reasonable basis to 
proceed” test is characterised by a complex and tripartite structure, due to the renvoi 
																																																								
293 Article 53(1)(a) of the Statute. 
294 Article 53(1)(b) of the Statute. The reference to the “case” in this article should be understood as to 
the “potential cases within the context of a situation” once the investigation is authorised. For an 
extensive discussion on the use of the term “case” in article 53, based on a thorough examination of 
the preparatory works, see ICC, Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the 
Authorization of an Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Situation in the 
Republic of Kenya, ICC-01/09-19-Corr, PTC II, 31 March 2010, par. 40-50. The PTC has determined 
that it is for the Court to harmonise the interpretation of the term “case” used both in article 17 and 
53(1)(b), and that its meaning must be construed having regard to “the [specific] context in which it is 
applied” (ibidem, par. 47-48). Because at the stage of preliminary examination—and judicial control 
over the authorisation request—there cannot be any distinguishable cases yet, “the admissibility 
assessment at this stage actually refers to the admissibility of one or more potential cases within the 
context of a situation” (ibidem, par. 48). See also, R. RASTAN, What is a ‘Case’ for the Purpose of the 
Rome Statute?, in Criminal Law Forum, vol. 19, issue 3, 2008, 441-442 (also quoted in the PTC’s 
decision, par. 48, footnote 53). 
295 Article 53(1)(c) of the Statute. 
296 The other applicable evidentiary standards are the “reasonable basis to believe that a crime within 
the jurisdiction of the Court has been or is being committed” under article 53(1)(a) of the Statute, to 
be satisfied for the purposes of the opening of an investigation (which is also a sub-component of the 
“reasonable basis to proceed”); the “reasonable grounds to believe that the person has committed a 
crime within the jurisdiction of the Court”, to be satisfied for the purposes of requesting the Court to 
issue a warrant of arrest or a summons to appear pursuant to article 58(1)(a) of the Statute; the 
“sufficient evidence to establish substantial grounds to believe that the person committed each of the 
crimes charged” provided for under article 61(7) of the Statute for the purposes of the confirmation of 
charges by the PTC; and the “beyond reasonable doubt” with regard to the standard to be satisfied for 
the purposes of convicting an accused pursuant to article 66(3) of the Statute. The idea that the 
“reasonable basis to believe”—as part of the “reasonable basis to proceed” standard—to be applied in 
case of proprio motu is a distinct and lower evidentiary standard compared to the one envisaged by 
article 58 of the Statute was first advanced by the PTC in its Kenya authorisation decision (see ICC, 
Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an Investigation into the 
Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Situation in the Republic of Kenya, ICC-01/09-19-Corr, PTC II, 
31 March 2010, par. 28). 
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of Rule 48 to the criteria laid down in article 53(1)(a)-(c) of the Statute. As already 
pointed out, the standard under examination incorporates three cumulative 
components—namely the “reasonable basis to believe”, admissibility and non-
contrariety to the interests of justice—that must form the basis of the OTP’s request 
for authorisation and that are subject to the judicial review of the PTC297. As regards 
the first component, four different PTC’s have ruled that the “reasonable basis to 
believe” test is “the lowest evidentiary standard provided for in the Statute”298. 
Notwithstanding a certain tendency to conflate the interpretation of the overall 
procedural standard and its first component—thereby falling into a sort of 
synecdoche299—there is wide agreement on the fact that because of the OTP’s limited 
powers at this very early stage of pre-investigation proceedings, the applicable 
standard should be, considered as a whole, relatively low300. As regards the second 
component, the PTCs have reasonably concluded that given the inexistence of 
																																																								
297 See ICC, Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an 
Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Situation in the Republic of Kenya, ICC-
01/09-19-Corr, PTC II, 31 March 2010, par. 26. 
298 Ibidem, par. 27 and ICC, Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorisation 
of an Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Côte d'Ivoire, Situation in the Republic of 
Côte d'Ivoire, ICC-02/11-14-Corr, PTC III, 3 October 2011, par. 24. In its Decision Pursuant to 
Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an Investigation into the Situation in Georgia, 
Situation in Georgia, ICC-01/15-12, PTC I, 27 January 2016, par. 24-25, the Court—while not 
directly using this expression—made ample references to the previous authorisation decisions on the 
point, endorsing their conclusions on the evidentiary standard under consideration. Lastly, see ICC, 
Public Redacted version of the “Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the 
Authorization of an Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Burundi”, ICC-01/17-X-9-US-
Exp, 25 October 2017, Situation in the Republic of Burundi, ICC-01/17-9-Red, PTC III, 9 November 
2017, par. 30. 
299 According to M. J. VENTURA, The ‘Reasonable Basis to Proceed’ Threshold in the Kenya and Côte 
d’Ivoire Proprio Motu Investigation Decisions: The International Criminal Court’s Lowest 
Evidentiary Standard?, in The Law and Practice of International Courts and Tribunals, vol. 12, issue 
1, 2013, 54-56, 60-61, the PTC’s analysis in the Kenya and Côte d'Ivoire decisions failed to provide 
sufficient clarity as regards the nature of the procedural standard under article 15 of the Statute, 
somehow extending to the overall “reasonable basis to proceed” test the findings made with respect to 
only one of its components. The Author then goes on to argue that in practical terms and 
notwithstanding the PTC’s contention on the ‘ranking’ among different evidentiary standards, the test 
provided for in article 15 and the one provided for in article 58 are substantially identical as far as the 
intensity of the evidentiary threshold is concerned (ibidem, 66-69). 
300 It is not entirely clear how low this standard is in practice. Some discrepancies in judicial 
interpretation on this point—and on the connected issue of the scope of the PTC’s judicial control at 
the authorisation stage—may be found comparing the views of the Majority and the dissenting and/or 
concurring opinions attached to the authorisation decisions. See, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Hans-
Peter Kaul, Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an 
Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Situation in the Republic of Kenya, ICC-
01/09-19-Corr, par. 14-15; Separate Opinion of Judge Péter Kovács, Decision Pursuant to Article 15 
of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an Investigation into the Situation in Georgia, Situation in 
Georgia, ICC-01/15-12-Anx-Corr, par. 3-7. 
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individual cases at this early stage, the control of admissibility—sub specie 
complementarity and gravity—must be carried out with regard to the “potential 
cases” likely to arise from the investigation to be opened by the OTP upon 
authorisation of the PTC301. Lastly, with regard to the relevance of the third 
component, namely the non-contrariety of the investigation to the interests of justice, 
the PTCs in their authorisation decisions did not provide any detailed analysis, in 
light of the fact that the OTP had not elaborated on such point in its requests, in 
accordance with its policy302. 
With regard to the second issue, the PTCs have clarified—with ample 
reference to the travaux préparatoires—that the Chamber’s control over the 
Prosecutor’s request for authorisation is meant to “prevent the abuse of power on the 
part of the Prosecutor” in the selection of situations potentially forming the object of 
investigations at the ICC in case of proprio motu 303. Nevertheless, the actual intensity 
of the PTC’s judicial control over the Prosecutor’s discretionary choice at this stage 
is the object of some debate, reflected in the dissenting and/or concurring opinions 
attached to the authorisation decisions adopted to date by the competent Chambers. 
																																																								
301 See, supra, footnote 294. 
302 The OTP in its Policy Paper on the Interests of Justice, September 2007, 2-3, par. 3, maintains that 
it is not required to positively establish that the opening of an investigation (in case of referral) or the 
request for authorisation to investigate in the case of proprio motu are in the interest of justice and that 
the Office “shall proceed with investigation unless there are specific circumstances which provide 
substantial reasons to believe it is not in the interests of justice to do so at that time”. In all the 
authorisation procedures to date, the OTP has not put forward considerations under the heading of the 
interest of justice, hence the relevant PTCs have not entertained an analysis of this profile. In any 
event, the PTCs share the OTP’s position on this requirement as part of the “reasonable basis to 
proceed” test for the purposes of authorising an investigation. See, ICC, Decision Pursuant to Article 
15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of 
Kenya, Situation in the Republic of Kenya, ICC-01/09-19-Corr, PTC II, 31 March 2010, par. 63; ICC, 
Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorisation of an Investigation into the 
Situation in the Republic of Côte d'Ivoire, Situation in the Republic of Côte d'Ivoire, ICC-02/11-14-
Corr, PTC III, 3 October 2011, par. 207-208; ICC, Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome 
Statute on the Authorization of an Investigation into the Situation in Georgia, Situation in Georgia, 
ICC-01/15-12, PTC I, 27 January 2016, par. 58; ICC, Public Redacted version of the “Decision 
Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an Investigation into the Situation 
in the Republic of Burundi”, ICC-01/17-X-9-US-Exp, 25 October 2017, Situation in the Republic of 
Burundi, ICC-01/17-9-Red, PTC III, 9 November 2017, par. 190. 
303 ICC, Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an Investigation 
into the Situation in Georgia, Situation in Georgia, ICC-01/15-12, PTC I, 27 January 2016, par. 3; 
ICC, Public Redacted version of the “Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the 
Authorization of an Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Burundi”, ICC-01/17-X-9-US-
Exp, 25 October 2017, Situation in the Republic of Burundi, ICC-01/17-9-Red, PTC III, 9 November 
2017, par. 28. The same concept, although expressed in different words, can be found in ICC, 
Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an Investigation into the 
Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Situation in the Republic of Kenya, ICC-01/09-19-Corr, PTC II, 
31 March 2010, par. 18, 32. 
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Thus far, all the PTCs involved in authorisation proceedings have maintained that the 
Chamber, in evaluating the OTP’s request for authorisation, must carry out its 
assessment of the relevant facts and information, testing them against the same 
evidentiary standard applied by the OTP in its submissions304. Nevertheless, the 
Majority in three PTCs—as well as Judge De Gurmendi in her partly dissenting 
opinion in the Ivorian situation—argued in favour of a significant degree of judicial 
deference towards the OTP’s assessment, confining the PTC’s supervisory role to a 
formal check on the good faith exercise of prosecutorial powers305. Quite to the 
contrary, Judge Hans-Peter Kaul and Judge Péter Kovács, in their dissenting and 
separate opinion respectively in the Kenyan and Georgian situation, have insisted on 
the necessity of a more stringent and autonomous judicial analysis for the purposes 
of granting—in whole or in part—the authorisation306. Uncertainties on the breadth of 
the PTC’s supervisory powers also concern the temporal and material scope of the 
authorised investigation, a point on which the PTCs—as well as the dissenting and 
																																																								
304 ICC, Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an Investigation 
into the Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Situation in the Republic of Kenya, ICC-01/09-19-Corr, 
PTC II, 31 March 2010, par. 21. See also Corrigendum to Judge Fernández de Gurmendi's separate 
and partially dissenting opinion to the Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the 
Authorisation of an Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Côte d'Ivoire, Situation in the 
Republic of Côte d'Ivoire, ICC-02/11-15-Corr, 6 October 2011, par. 13-14 (agreeing with the Majority 
on the point). 
305 For instance, the Majority in its Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the 
Authorization of an Investigation into the Situation in Georgia, Situation in Georgia, ICC-01/15-12, 
PTC I, 27 January 2016, par. 3, established that “the Chamber’s examination of the Request and the 
supporting material provided by the Prosecutor must be strictly limited” (emphasis added). See also 
Corrigendum to Judge Fernández de Gurmendi's separate and partially dissenting opinion to the 
Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorisation of an Investigation into the 
Situation in the Republic of Côte d'Ivoire, Situation in the Republic of Côte d'Ivoire, ICC-02/11-15-
Corr, 6 October 2011, par. 9-10, 15-16, 19-20, 45. In particular the dissenting judge emphasised the 
risk that the PTC’s control might result in an unwarranted “duplication of the preliminary examination 
conducted by the Prosecutor” (par. 15 of the dissenting opinion). She additionally expressed the view 
that the Chamber had exceeded the supervisory role of the Chamber under Article 15 of the Statute 
and that the approach of the Majority “is incompatible with the neutrality that the Chamber needs to 
maintain with regard to the selection by the Prosecutor of persons and acts to be addressed in the 
investigation” (par. 45 of the dissenting opinion). 
306 See footnote 300. In particular Judge Kaul has maintained that the authorisation procedure requires 
“a substantial and genuine examination by the judges of the Prosecutor's Request. Any other 
interpretation would turn the Pre-Trial Chamber into a mere rubber-stamping instance” (par. 18 of the 
Dissenting Opinion, emphasis added). Judge Kovács, along the same lines, explained that in his view 
the notion of “Judicial control entails more than automatically agreeing with what the Prosecutor 
presents. It calls for “an independent judicial inquiry” of the material presented as well as the findings 
of the Prosecutor . . . This process requires a full and proper examination of the supporting material 
relied upon by the Prosecutor . . . To say otherwise means that the Pre-Trial Chamber will not be 
exercising what the Majority describes as “judicial control”. Nor will the Pre-Trial Chamber be acting 
in a manner which can prevent the abuse of power on the part of the Prosecutor” (par. 6 of the 
Concurring Opinion, emphasis added). 
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concurring judges—have shown different approaches, with particular regard to the 
possibility to extend the investigation to alleged crimes other than those preliminarily 
hypothesised in the OTP’s request and whose commission had begun after the date 
of such request307. 
From the above analysis it can preliminarily be concluded that while the 
states’ desire to subject the OTP’s proprio motu powers to a form of judicial review 
through the authorisation procedure built into article 15 of the Statute, the degree of 
‘judicial intrusion’ in the Prosecutor’s discretionary choices surrounding the pre-
investigation stage of preliminary investigation—both as regards its conduct and 
possible outcomes—is rather limited. Therefore, these early selection choices, also 
taking into account the margin of manoeuvre enjoyed by the OTP in correcting and 
adjusting the geographical, material and personal target of the investigation during its 
conduct, stand out as a clear example of prosecutorial discretion, whose exercise is 
likely to influence in a decisive way the subsequent unfolding of proceedings in front 
																																																								
307 The Kenya PTC, adopted a rather restrictive approach to the temporal and material scope of the 
authorised investigation, establishing that the authorisation to investigate was granted exclusively for 
alleged crimes occurred between the entry into force of the Statute for the state concerned (1 June 
2005) and the date of the OTP’s request for authorisation (26 November 2009), and at the exclusion of 
crimes other than those envisaged in the authorisation request (see ICC, Decision Pursuant to Article 
15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of 
Kenya, Situation in the Republic of Kenya, ICC-01/09-19-Corr, PTC II, 31 March 2010, par. 201-207, 
208-209). To the contrary the Côte d'Ivoire PTC, adopted a significantly more liberal approach to the 
material and temporal scope of the authorised investigation, extending the authorisation to the 
“continuing crimes” occurring after the date of the OTP’s request, provided that “the contextual 
elements of the continuing crimes are the same as for those committed prior [to the date of the OTP’s 
request]”, and establishing that in principle also crimes preceding the “starting date” requested by the 
OTP can be the object of investigation, again under the proviso that they are part of the same situation 
(see, ICC, Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorisation of an 
Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Côte d'Ivoire, Situation in the Republic of Côte 
d'Ivoire, ICC-02/11-14-Corr, PTC III, 3 October 2011, par. 179-180). Nevertheless, Judge De 
Gurmendi, in her partly dissenting opinion, considered this approach to the definition of the temporal 
scope of the investigation too restrictive, also criticising the Majority’s recourse to the concept of 
“continuing crimes” as elaborated by the ad hoc Tribunals. In her view the authorisation should have 
been extended also to crimes whose commission had begun after the date of the OTP’s request, 
provided that the crimes “are sufficiently linked to the situation of [on-going] crisis” under 
consideration (see, Corrigendum to Judge Fernández de Gurmendi's separate and partially dissenting 
opinion to the Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorisation of an 
Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Côte d'Ivoire, Situation in the Republic of Côte 
d'Ivoire, ICC-02/11-15-Corr, 6 October 2011, par. 64-73). This latter approach has been endorsed by 
the Georgia PTC (see, Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an 
Investigation into the Situation in Georgia, Situation in Georgia, ICC-01/15-12, PTC I, 27 January 
2016, par. 60-64) and by the Burundi PTC (see ICC, Public Redacted version of the “Decision 
Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an Investigation into the Situation 
in the Republic of Burundi”, ICC-01/17-X-9-US-Exp, 25 October 2017, Situation in the Republic of 
Burundi, ICC-01/17-9-Red, PTC III, 9 November 2017, par. 191-194). 
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of the Court, bearing consequences on the rights of states, potential accused persons 
and victims. 
 
3.3 Preliminary rulings on admissibility and challenges to jurisdiction and 
admissibility from the point of view of the Prosecutor’s discretion 
The enquiry on the Prosecutor’s discretionary powers at the pre-investigation 
and investigation stage would not be complete without mentioning the role of the 
OTP in the procedures laid down by article 18 and 19 of the Statute, respectively 
with regard to “Preliminary rulings regarding admissibility” and “Challenges to the 
jurisdiction of the Court or the admissibility of a case”. 
Article 18 of the Statute, which applies exclusively in cases of state referral 
and proprio motu 308 , provides for a procedural mechanism to solve disputes 
concerning admissibility as early as at the situation stage, by means of a 
prosecutorial request for a preliminary ruling on the admissibility of the situation as a 
whole (or, rectius, of the “potential cases” likely lo arise from an investigation into 
the situation)309. This procedure is built around a procedural ‘dialogue’ between the 
OTP and the State Parties310, with the possible intervention of the competent Pre-
Trial Chamber, in order ensure the proper functioning of the complementarity 
mechanism with regard to the admissibility limb and for purposes of judicial 
economy311. According to paragraph 1 of the article the OTP, when it determines that 
there is a reasonable basis to open an investigation pursuant to a state referral or 
proprio motu, it shall notify such intention to the State Parties and in particular to 
those “which would normally exercise jurisdiction over the [alleged] crimes 
																																																								
308 The plain text of paragraph 1 of this article refers to situations referred pursuant to article 13(a) 
(i.e. state referrals) and those selected proprio motu by the OTP pursuant to article 13(c) and 15, with 
the exclusion of those referred by the UNSC pursuant to article 13(b) of the Statute. 
309  Article 18(2) of the Statute. See W. A. SCHABAS, The International Criminal Court: A 
Commentary on the Rome Statute, cit., 487. On the concept of “potential cases” see, supra, footnote 
294. 
310 In this sense see J. T. HOLMES, Complementarity: National Courts versus the ICC, in A. CASSESE, 
P. GAETA, J. R. W. D. JONES (eds.), op. cit., 681. 
311 It is of immediate evidence that solving issues of admissibility as early as at the situational stage 
could ensure that the scarce prosecutorial and jurisdictional resources of the Court are not used in the 
pursuit of investigations that will ultimately result in inadmissible cases. This mechanism could also 
promote a more effective allocation of work between national jurisdictions and the ICC. 
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concerned” 312. Within thirty days of the receipt of the notification a state can inform 
the Prosecutor that it is carrying out investigations (or has already investigated) on 
the facts relating to the information contained in the OTP’s notification, thereby 
requesting the Prosecutor to defer to national proceedings313. The OTP at this point 
faces a discretional choice: either to allow the state’s request and defer the situation 
to national proceedings, or to apply to the PTC for a preliminary determination on 
the admissibility of the situation and an authorisation to investigate 314 . The 
preliminary nature of such determination lies in the fact that admissibility is assessed 
before any formal investigation has taken place and, consequently, well before any 
individual case is identified for prosecution. Both in case of deferral to state 
authorities and of request of a preliminary ruling on admissibility, the Prosecutor’s 
discretion plays an additional role in the subsequent development of proceedings. In 
fact, in case of deferral the OTP has the faculty to oversee national proceedings and 
can review—after six months or in the presence of a significant change of 
circumstances—the original deferral decision315. On the contrary, if the PTC rules the 
situation inadmissible, the Prosecutor may either acquiesce to the decision or appeal 
to the Appeals Chamber for a final determination on admissibility316. It should be 
noted that if the PTC rules the situation admissible and the AC rejects the state’s 
appeal, this is without prejudice to the right of the state to challenge the admissibility 
of individual cases that will later arise out of the situation, pursuant to article 19 of 
the Statute317. 
As interesting as this procedural mechanism may be from the point of view of 
the interplay between the OTP, states and judges with regard to the prosecutor’s 
discretional choices with a view to determine the admissibility of a situation, it has 
never so far been used in practice. All interested states have failed to trigger the 
procedure within the specified thirty-day time limit, thereby making the provision 
dead letter. In most of the situations arising out of state referrals, such behaviour may 
																																																								
312 Article 18(1), last part. The OTP may submit such notification to the state on confidential basis 
and, under the circumstances exemplified in the provision, it “may limit the scope of the information 
provided to States”. More details on this notification are provided for under Rule 52 of the RPE. 
313 Article 18(2) of the Statute and Rule 53 of the RPE. 
314 Article 18(2) of the Statute (last part) and Rules 54-55 of the RPE. 
315 Article 18(3) of the Statute and Rule 56 of the RPE. 
316 Article 18(4) of the Statute. 
317 Article 18(7) of the Statute. 
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be explained on grounds that states have self-referred situations concerning their own 
territory, a choice that seems at odds with the intention to carry out genuine 
investigations at the national level and to request a deferral to that effect318. 
Article 19 of the Statute, contrary to the one just examined whose application 
is limited to situations, deals with the procedures for challenging the Court’s 
jurisdiction and/or admissibility with regard to cases 319 . This very complex 
provision320 has been the object of extensive scholarly comments321 and, contrary to 
article 18, has received a number of practical applications322. For the present analysis, 
																																																								
318 Although referred to the context of article 19 challenges to admissibility, the observation of C. 
STAHN, Admissibility Challenges before the ICC: From Quasi-Primacy to Qualified Deference?, cit., 
231 that “cases of self-referrals . . . are often based on a tacit agreement between the prosecution and 
the referring state on the forum of jurisdiction” seems pertinent also with regard to article 18 
proceedings. There is no real incentive for the state which has self-referred a situation to the Court to 
challenge its admissibility and ask for deferral within the specified thirty-days time limit.  
319 Article 19 explicitly makes reference to “cases” both in its heading and in the subsequent 
formulation. On the structural differences between article 18 and 19 along the line of the 
situation/case distinction see W. A. SCHABAS, The International Criminal Court: A Commentary on 
the Rome Statute, cit., 487: “In contrast with article 18 of the Statute, where admissibility of a 
‘situation’ is contemplated, article 19 only applies once a ‘case’ has been identified”. See also ICC, 
Judgment on the appeal of the Republic of Kenya against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber II of 30 
May 2011 entitled ‘Decision on the Application by the Government of Kenya Challenging the 
Admissibility of the Case Pursuant to Article 19(2)(b) of the Statute’, ICC-01/09-01/11-
307, Prosecutor v. Ruto et. al., Situation in the Republic of Kenya, AC, 30 August 2011, par. 340: “In 
contrast [with article 18], article 19 of the Statute relates to the admissibility of concrete cases”. It 
should be noted that according to paragraph 1 of the same article, the Court “shall satisfy that it has 
jurisdiction in any case brought before it” (emphasis added), while it “may, on its own motion, 
determine the admissibility of a case in accordance to article 17” (emphasis added). In other words the 
Court, while it must always ascertain whether or not it has jurisdiction—a clear manifestation of the 
kompetenz-kompetenz principle—it is not mandated to positively ascertain, failing an explicit request 
or challenge of the interested parties to that effect, that the case is admissible.  
320 The article is composed of 11 paragraphs and must be read in conjunction with the procedural 
norms relating to the conduct of these incidental proceedings found in Rules 58-62 of the RPE. 
321 See, e.g., W. A. SCHABAS, The International Criminal Court: A Commentary on the Rome Statute, 
cit., 483-500; C. K. HALL, D. D. NTANDA NSEREKO, M. J. VENTURA, Article 19, Challenges to the 
jurisdiction of the Court or the admissibility of a case, in O. TRIFFTERER, K. AMBOS (eds.), op. cit., 
849-898; C. STAHN, Admissibility Challenges before the ICC: From Quasi-Primacy to Qualified 
Deference?, cit., 228-259. On specific issues of admissibility and the related decisions see, e.g., C. 
STAHN, Libya, the International Criminal Court and Complementarity. A Test for ‘Shared 
Responsibility’, in Journal of International Criminal Justice, vol. 10, issue 2, 2012, 325-349; M. BO, 
The Situation in Libya and the ICC’s Understanding of Complementarity in the Context of UNSC-
referred Cases, in Criminal Law Forum, vol. 25, issue 2-3, 2014, 505-540; F. MÉGRET, M. G. 
SAMSON, Holding the Line on Complementarity in Libya. The Case for Tolerating Flawed Domestic 
Trials, in Journal of International Criminal Justice, vol. 11, issue 3, 2013, 571-589; T. O. HANSEN, 
Reflections on the ICC Prosecutor’s Recent “Selection Decisions”, in Max Planck Yearbook of 
United Nations Law Online, vol. 17, issue 1, 2013, 125-158; S. SÁCOUTO, K. CLEARY, The Katanga 
Complementarity Decisions: Sound Law but Flawed Policy, in Leiden Journal of International Law, 
vol. 23, issue 2, 2010, 363-374. 
322 Proceedings regarding admissibility of cases pursuant to article 19 of the Statute have been brought 
both under paragraph 2(a) by the Defendants against whom a warrant of arrest had been issued in 
accordance with article 58 of the Statute, and under paragraph 2(b) by a State “which has jurisdiction 
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suffices it to focus on the aspects dealing with the Prosecutor’s authority to provoke 
a ruling on jurisdiction or admissibility of a case 323  (and to pursue certain 
investigative steps pending such a ruling)324, to request the review of a decision of 
inadmissibility in the presence of new circumstances, and/or to ultimately defer to 
																																																																																																																																																													
over a case, on the ground that it is investigating or prosecuting the case or has investigated or 
prosecuted”. See ICC, Decision on the Defence Challenge to the Jurisdiction of the Court pursuant to 
article 19 (2) (a) of the Statute, Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, ICC-01/04-01/06-512, PTC I, 3 October 2006; ICC, Judgment on the Appeal of Mr Thomas 
Lubanga Dyilo against the Decision on the Defence Challenge to the Jurisdiction of the Court 
pursuant to article 19(2)(a) of the Statute of 3 October 2006, Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Situation in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, ICC-01/04-01/06-772, AC, 14 December 2006; ICC, Decision on 
the admissibility of the case under article 19(1) of the Statute, Prosecutor v. Kony et al., Situation in 
Uganda, ICC-02/04-01/05-377, PTC II, 10 March 2009; ICC, Judgment on the appeal of the Defence 
against the ‘Decision on the admissibility of the case under article 19 (1) of the Statute’ of 10 March 
2009, Prosecutor v. Kony et al., Situation in Uganda, ICC-02/04-01/05-408, AC, 16 September 2009; 
ICC, Reasons for the Oral Decision on the Motion Challenging the Admissibility of the Case (Article 
19 of the Statute), Prosecutor v. Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui, Situation in the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo, ICC-01/04-01/07-1213-tEng, TC II, 16 June 2009; ICC, Judgment on the Appeal of Mr 
Germain Katanga against the Oral Decision of Trial Chamber II of 12 June 2009 on the Admissibility 
of the Case, Prosecutor v. Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, ICC-01/04-01/07-1497, AC, 25 September 2009; ICC, Decision on the Admissibility and 
Abuse of Process Challenges, Prosecutor v. Bemba, Situation in the Central African Republic, ICC-
01/05-01/08-802, TC III, 24 June 2010; ICC, Judgment on the appeal of Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba 
Gombo against the decision of Trial Chamber III of 24 June 2010 entitled ‘Decision on the 
Admissibility and Abuse of Process Challenges’, Prosecutor v. Bemba, Situation in the Central 
African Republic, ICC-01/05-01/08-962, AC, 19 October 2010; ICC, Decision on the Application by 
the Government of Kenya Challenging the Admissibility of the Case Pursuant to Article 19(2)(b) of 
the Statute, Prosecutor v. Ruto et al., Situation in the Republic of Kenya, ICC-01/09-01/11-101, PTC 
II, 30 May 2011; ICC, Judgment on the appeal of the Republic of Kenya against the decision of Pre-
Trial Chamber II of 30 May 2011 entitled ‘Decision on the Application by the Government of Kenya 
Challenging the Admissibility of the Case Pursuant to Article 19(2)(b) of the Statute’, ICC-01/09-
01/11-307, Prosecutor v. Ruto et al., Situation in the Republic of Kenya, AC, 30 August 2011; ICC, 
Decision on the admissibility of the case against Abdullah Al-Senussi, Prosecutor v. Gaddafi and Al-
Senussi, Situation in Libya, ICC-01/11-01/11-466-Red, PTC I, 11 October 2013; ICC, Judgment on 
the appeal of Mr Abdullah Al-Senussi against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I of 11 October 2013 
entitled ‘Decision on the admissibility of the case against Abdullah Al-Senussi’, Prosecutor v. 
Gaddafi and Al-Senussi, Situation in Libya, ICC-01/11-01/11-565, AC, 24 July 2014; ICC, Public 
redacted Decision on the admissibility of the case against Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi, Prosecutor v. 
Gaddafi and Al-Senussi, Situation in Libya, ICC-01/11-01/11-344-Red, PTC I, 31 May 2013; ICC, 
Judgment on the Appeal of Libya against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I of 31 May 2013 entitled 
‘Decision on the admissibility of the case against Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi’, Prosecutor v. Gaddafi and 
Al-Senussi, Situation in Libya, ICC-01/11-01/11-547-Red, AC, 21 May 2014; ICC, Public redacted 
version of Decision on Côte d’Ivoire’s challenge to the admissibility of the case against Simone 
Gbagbo, Prosecutor v. Simone Gbagbo, Situation in Côte d'Ivoire, ICC-02/11-01/12-47-Red, PTC I, 
11 December 2014; ICC, Judgment on the appeal of Côte d’Ivoire against the decision of Pre-Trial 
Chamber I of 11 December 2014 entitled ‘Decision on Côte d’Ivoire’s challenge to the admissibility 
of the case against Simone Gbagbo’, Prosecutor v. Simone Gbagbo, Situation in Côte d'Ivoire, ICC-
02/11-01/12-75-Red, AC, 27 May 2015. 
323 Article 19(3) of the Statute. 
324 According to article 19(7) the OTP must suspend the investigation pending a determination of the 
Court on the admissibility of a challenge brought by a state under paragraph 2 (a) or (b) of the same 
article. In any event the OTP, pending such ruling, may seek authority from the Court in order to take 
the investigative actions listed in paragraph 8 (a) to (c) of article 19. 
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national jurisdictions for the prosecution of individual cases325. While the OTP could 
potentially be inclined, under certain conditions, to directly seek a ruling pursuant to 
article 19(3) especially on issues of admissibility, practice so far has shown a 
tendency of the Prosecutor only to ‘react’ to challenges first brought by the Defence 
on behalf of the Accused or by the interested state. Depending on the occasion 
leading to the triggering of the Court, the specific circumstances surrounding each 
case, the subject bringing the jurisdiction/admissibility challenge and the prospects 
of effective national prosecutions, the OTP may either argue for the admissibility of 
the case or its inadmissibility326. In other words, there is no fixed pattern of behaviour 
on the part of the relevant actors of this sui generis incidental procedure327. It is 
nevertheless evident that the OTP’s discretional analysis, especially on admissibility 
and through the prism of complementarity, may play a significant role in the judicial 
outcome leading either to retain the case at the international level or defer it to 
domestic authorities.  
																																																								
325 Article 19(11) of the Statute. 
326 For instance, in Al-Senussi the OTP—adhering to the position of the interested state and in contrast 
with the Accused’s defence and victims represented at trial by the OPCV—argued that at the relevant 
time the Libyan authorities were both willing and able to conduct genuine national proceedings in line 
with the principle of complementarity, thereby soliciting a decision of inadmissibility (see ICC, 
Decision on the admissibility of the case against Abdullah Al-Senussi, Prosecutor v. Gaddafi and Al-
Senussi, Situation in Libya, ICC-01/11-01/11-466-Red, PTC I, 11 October 2013, par. 189-190). Both 
the PTC and AC agreed, deferring the case to the national authorities (see, supra, footnote 322 for the 
reference to the Chamber’s decisions). In Gaddafi on the contrary, both the PTC and AC confirmed 
that the case, although arising out of the same situation, was admissible in light of the different factual 
background concerning the specific case at hand. The Court has clarified that in its view there is no 
contradiction between the two opposing conclusions on admissibility reached respectively in Al-
Senussi and Gaddafi (see ICC, Judgment on the appeal of Mr Abdullah Al-Senussi against the 
decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I of 11 October 2013 entitled ‘Decision on the admissibility of the case 
against Abdullah Al-Senussi’, Prosecutor v. Gaddafi and Al-Senussi, Situation in Libya, ICC-01/11-
01/11-565, AC, 24 July 2014, par. 94-97). Contra see M. TEDESCHINI, Complementarity in Practice: 
the ICC’s Inconsistent Approach in the Gaddafi and Al-Senussi Admissibility Decisions, in 
Amsterdam Law Forum, vol. 7, no. 1, 2015, 76-97. It should be noted that the position of the Accused 
might be significantly influenced by the concrete circumstances of the case and his or her trust in the 
overall fairness of national proceedings. For instance, the Al-Senussi Defence expressed—in contrast 
with the state which had brought the admissibility challenge—a clear preference for a trial at the ICC, 
whereas the Accused persons in the cases arising out of the Kenyan situation argued in favour of 
inadmissibility and (potential) domestic prosecution. 
327 On the sui generis nature of the procedure see the Dissenting Opinion of Judge Anita Uŝacka, 
Judgment on the Appeal of Libya against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I of 31 May 2013 entitled 
‘Decision on the admissibility of the case against Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi’, Prosecutor v. Gaddafi and 
Al-Senussi, Situation in Libya, ICC-01/11-01/11-547-Red, AC, 21 May 2014, par. 61. 
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Since the admissibility assessment sub specie complementarity is an 
“ongoing process throughout the pre-trial phase”328—for the obvious reason that the 
situation present at the moment of either deferral or declaration of inadmissibility 
may significantly change over time and make it appropriate to revise the initial 
assessment—procedural instruments are provided in order to cope with such 
changing circumstances. The Prosecutor is therefore discretionally entitled to ask for 
a review of the inadmissibility decision “when he or she is fully satisfied that new 
facts have arisen which negate the basis on which the case had previously been found 
inadmissible”329. If the case had initially been deferred to the national authorities, the 
Prosecutor may subsequently decide to proceed with an investigation after having 
considered the information made available to him or her by the state on the status of 
national proceedings330. 
 
3.4 Article 53 of the Statute and the OTP’s decisions on investigation and 
prosecution 
Earlier in this work the ICC’s institutional design as regards the mechanisms 
leading to the Prosecutor’s decisions to open (or not to open) an investigation and to 
start a prosecution has been analysed with a view to comparing it with those of other 
international(ised) criminal justice mechanisms 331 . In the following paragraphs 
attention is turned in particular to the normative and functional nexus between 
articles 53, 17 and 15 of the Rome Statute and on the legal nature of the parameters 
contained therein. Although the Court’s practice has already contributed to clarify 
the ‘discretionary potential’ of at least certain of these parameters, a systematic 
																																																								
328 See ICC, Decision on the admissibility of the case under article 19(1) of the Statute, Prosecutor v. 
Kony et al., Situation in Uganda, ICC-02/04-01/05-377, PTC II, 10 March 2009, par. 25-28, 52. 
329 Article 19(10) of the Statute and Rule 62 of the RPE. For instance, in the Al-Senussi case it could 
be argued that due to the fragmentation of governmental authority that took place in the territory of 
Libya after the inadmissibility decision, there is margin to request a review of the inadmissibility 
decision and to refer the case back at the ICC, although practical obstacles—both political and legal—
may make this difficult to achieve. In any event, the Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda in her 13th Report to 
the UNSC on the Libyan situation of 8 May 2017, taking note of the conviction of Al-Senussi by the 
Court of Assize of Tripoli in July 2015 and of the UNHCHR report on the many procedural 
shortcomings of this trial, stated that her Office is considering whether these circumstances represent 
new facts that negate the basis of the inadmissibility decision, making it appropriate to apply to the 
Court for its reconsideration (see Records of UNSC Meeting on the Situation in Libya, UN Doc. 
S/PV.7934, 8 May 2017, 3). 
330 Article 19(11) of the Statute. 
331 See, supra, Part One, Chapter One, par. 3.2 and Chapter Two, par. 5. 
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reading of these provisions is necessary in order to interpret the institutional interplay 
between the prosecution and judges as regards the exercise of discretionary powers 
and the check and balances thereof at this crucial procedural juncture. 
The structure of article 53 visually reflects the already examined distinction 
between situations and cases, dealing separately with the criteria that the OTP must 
consider in reaching his or her selection decision to open (or not to open) an 
investigation332—resulting in the opening of a situation—and to start (or not to start) 
a prosecution333—resulting in the opening of a case. As it will be seen in greater 
detail, the criteria laid down in the first two paragraphs of article 53 partially 
coincide, differing only to the extent of reflecting the contextual differences between 
the procedural stages at which the discretionary decision is taken, with particular 
regard to the factors relevant to the determination concerning the interests of 
justice334. 
As regards the systematic connection between article 53 and 17 of the Statute, 
it is the very text to institute an internal normative link between these provisions, by 
requiring the Prosecutor to consider—pursuant to article 17 of the Statute—the 
admissibility of the—potential or concrete—cases, respectively when deciding 
whether or not to open an investigation and to proceed (or not to proceed) with a 
prosecution335. A similar normative connection, although mediated by a regulatory 
provision contained in the RPE336, can be traced between article 53 and 15 of the 
Statute, making it clear that the evaluation under the former must be carried out 
irrespective of the triggering mechanism337. Rule 48 of the RPE establishes that the 
OTP, when carrying out the preliminary examination in case of proprio motu and 
with a view to decide whether to request to the PTC the authorisation to investigate 
																																																								
332 Article 53(1) of the Statute. 
333 Article 53(2) of the Statute. 
334 Compare article 53(1)(c) and 53(2)(c) of the Statute. Differences can also be found comparing 
article 53(1)(a) and 53(2)(a) of the Statute. At the pre-investigation stage the OTP is required to assess 
whether there is a reasonable basis to believe that at least one crime within the jurisdiction of the 
Court has been or is being committed in the situation referred to the Office (or under preliminary 
examination pursuant to a proprio motu) for the purposes of deciding on the opening of an 
investigation. Conversely, at the time of the decision to start or not to start a prosecution—i.e. once 
the investigation has taken place—the OTP is required to assess whether there is sufficient legal and 
factual basis to seek a warrant of arrest or a summons to appear with regard to specific individuals, 
pursuant to article 58. 
335 Article 53(1)(a) and 53(2)(a) of the Statute. 
336 Rule 48 of the RPE. 
337 See G. TURONE, op. cit., 1147-1148. 
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pursuant to article 15(3) of the Statute, shall consider the same criteria laid down in 
article 53(1)(a)-(c)338. 
Notwithstanding the fact that article 53 with its criteria represents the crucible 
for all pre-investigation and pre-trial discretionary decisions, both ‘positive’ and 
‘negative’, it is particularly in this second negative sense relating to the Prosecutor’s 
ability to deny action that it reveals its (potential) function as a procedural selection 
tool in the hands of the prosecution. Nevertheless, the actual degree of discretion 
allowed under this procedural mechanism, and in particular the margin for legitimate 
nolle prosequi decisions, rests on one hand on the legal nature and interpretation of 
the criteria laid down in article 53 and, on the other hand, on the nature of judicial 
review of prosecutorial decisions pursuant to paragraph 3 of the same article. In this 
sense, any attempt to measure in the abstract—both quantitatively and 
qualitatively—the OTP’s margin of discretion at this procedural stage would be a 
purely speculative exercise. For these reasons, an estimation of the concrete latitude 
of such discretion can only be attempted by reference to the OTP’s understanding of 
the relevant criteria and to the analysis of the Court’s decisions bearing on the 
interpretation of article 53, through a careful assessment of the relevant practice in 
the OTP-PTC institutional relations339. 
It should also be recalled that the OTP’s decisions based on article 53 of the 
Statute are not irrevocable, since article 53(4) of the Statute recognises the 
Prosecutor’s power to reconsider a previous decision—and particularly a negative 
one—on the basis of new facts or information. This is nothing but the natural 
recognition that factual changes of circumstances and/or the quantity or quality of the 
available information—together with strictly legal reasoning—have a critical impact 
on the OTP’s determinations pursuant to article 53 of the Statute. 
  
																																																								
338 In this regard K. AMBOS, Treatise on International Criminal Law, Vol. III, International Criminal 
Procedure, Oxford, 2016, 337, speaks of a partial conflation of the requirements under article 15 and 
53 of the Rome Statute. On the relationship between these two provisions see also W. A. SCHABAS, 
The International Criminal Court: A Commentary on the Rome Statute, cit., 394, 828: “Article 53 is 
closely related to article 15. Together, these two provisions define the exercise of discretion by the 
Prosecutor. They are the key to her independent role in the selection of situations for prosecution by 
the International Criminal Court”. 
339 These issues are introduced in the remaining two chapters of Part Two, and analysed in detail on 
the basis of the practice of the involved actors in Part Three and Four of this work. 
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3.4.1 The reasonable/sufficient basis to proceed/believe tests, jurisdictional 
parameters and the admissibility assessment 
The criteria contained in article 53(1) and (2), respectively with regard to the 
decision to open an investigation and the decision to proceed with a prosecution, do 
not possess the same discretionary intensity. It can be argued that letters (a)-(c) of 
these articles, which reproduce the same scheme with some differentiations, 
‘topographically’ place these criteria in order of increasing selection capacity. 
With regard to the decision on the opening of an investigation and 
notwithstanding a certain tendency to conflate the concepts of “reasonable basis to 
proceed” and “reasonable basis to believe”340—the latter being just one of the three 
components of the former341—it is uncontested from the practice of the OTP and of 
various the PTCs that the evidentiary threshold at stake is relatively low (the lowest 
in the statutory framework)342. The formulation in the negative of article 53(1) and 
the use of mandatory language (“The Prosecutor shall . . . initiate an investigation 
unless he or she determines that there is no reasonable basis to proceed”) suggest that 
if the OTP is faced with “a sensible or reasonable justification for a belief that a 
crime falling within the jurisdiction of the Court”343 has been or is being committed, 
he or she shall open an investigation344. Nevertheless, this apparently mandatory 
language is somehow diluted in practice by the fact that only upon completion of the 
preliminary examination activities—whose conduct entails a significant degree of 
discretion and is not subject to any definite time limit according to the Statute or 
																																																								
340 On the point see, supra, paragraph 3.2.1 of this chapter. 
341 See M. J. VENTURA, op. cit., 54-56, 60-61. 
342 Ibidem. See in particular footnotes 296-300 of this chapter for precise reference to case law. 
343 ICC, Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an Investigation 
into the Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Situation in the Republic of Kenya, ICC-01/09-19-Corr, 
PTC II, 31 March 2010, par. 35. 
344 Compare with the language of article 15(1): “The Prosecutor may initiate an investigation proprio 
motu”. In any event, even in the case of proprio motu, if upon completion of the preliminary 
examination the OTP finds that there is a reasonable basis to proceed, it shall submit to the PTC a 
request for authorisation according to article 15(3) of the Statute. See also ICC, Decision on the 
request of the Union of the Comoros to review the Prosecutor’s decision not to initiate an 
investigation, Situation on the Registered Vessels of the Comoros, Greece and Cambodia, ICC-01/13-
34, PTC I, 16 July 2015, par. 13, where the judges established that by virtue of the use of the verb 
shall there is a “presumption . . . that the Prosecutor investigates in order to be able to properly assess 
the relevant facts”. See, contra, ICC-OTP, Final decision of the Prosecution concerning the “Article 
53(1) Report” (ICC-01/13-6-AnxA), dated 6 November 2014, Situation on the Registered Vessels of 
the Comoros, Greece and Cambodia, ICC-01/13-57-Anx1, 30 November 2017, par. 54: “The 
Prosecution does not consider that the word “shall” supports any broader presumption favouring 
investigation where there is not a reasonable basis to proceed in accord with articles 53(1)(a) to (c)”. 
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RPE—the OTP will be able to conclusively assess whether such “reasonable basis to 
proceed” standard is met. In other words, the OTP may avoid an explicit 
determination that a reasonable basis to proceed exists pursuant to article 53(1)—
hence avoiding the opening of an investigation—by simply holding a situation at the 
stage of preliminary examination for a potentially indefinite period of time345. 
If we then proceed to consider the specific criteria listed under letters (a)-(c) 
of article 53(1) of the Statute, it is reasonably clear that they proceed from the least 
discretion-oriented (jurisdiction) 346 , to a moderately discretion-oriented 
(admissibility 347 , especially sub specie gravity), to end with the most heavily 
discretion-oriented (the interests of justice) 348. With regard to jurisdiction, the strictly 
legal nature of the assessment is particularly evident, since the OTP only needs to 
verify whether the information in his or her possession reveals the potential 
commission of crimes falling within the jurisdictional parameters ratione materiae, 
loci, personae and temporis according to the relevant statutory provisions349. Things 
are less clear-cut with regard to the assessment of admissibility pursuant to article 17 
of the Statute and on whether this criterion in its two main components 
(complementarity and gravity) allows for a real discretionary margin of appreciation 
on the part of the Prosecutor. While it seems fair to argue that at least in the 
evaluation of sufficient (situational) gravity the OTP enjoys a certain degree of 
discretion, a consideration implicitly reflected in the drafting of the Policy Paper on 
Preliminary Examinations350, various scholars have suggested that it is necessary to 
distinguish between legal (non-discretionary) gravity pursuant to article 53(1)(b) and 
(2)(b) and relative (discretionary) gravity pursuant to article 53(1)(c), whereby only 
																																																								
345 On the issues related to the timing and duration of preliminary examinations see, critically on the 
current practice of the OTP, A. PUES, Towards the ‘Golden Hour’?: A Critical Exploration of the 
Length of Preliminary Examinations, in Journal of International Criminal Justice, vol. 15, issue 3, 
2017, 435-453. 
346 Article 53(1)(a) of the Statute, establishing that there must be a reasonable basis to believe that a 
crime “within the jurisdiction of the Court has been or is being committed” (emphasis added). 
347 Article 53(1)(b) of the Statute. 
348 Article 53(1)(c) of the Statute. 
349 See W. A. SCHABAS, The International Criminal Court: A Commentary on the Rome Statute, cit., 
833-834. In the same vein, see the position expressed in the ICC-OTP, Policy Paper on Preliminary 
Examinations, November 2013, par. 36-41. 
350 ICC-OTP, Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, November 2013, par. 59-66. This part of the 
document analyses in detail the criteria to be taken into consideration in the assessment of gravity, and 
particularly the quantitative-qualitative factors of scale, nature, manner of commission and impact of 
the alleged crimes. 
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the latter would be a true expression of the OTP’s discretionary powers351. This line 
of reasoning, taken to its extreme logical consequences, seems to have been followed 
by a PTC in the first-ever review decision pursuant to article 53(3)(a) of the Statute, 
where judges established that the assessment of sufficient gravity in the context of 
article 53(1) decisions on the opening of investigations requires the application of 
“exacting legal requirements” 352 . This position has been criticised by various 
scholars353—as well as by a dissenting Judge354—on grounds that it represents an 
excessive encroachment on the Prosecutor’s independence and discretion, and that it 
introduces a sort of unconditional prosecutorial duty to open an investigation in all 
instances where, on the basis of the available information, the scale, nature, manner 
of commission and impact of the crimes are not already reasonably clear at the pre-
investigation stage355.  
																																																								
351  See K. AMBOS, Treatise on International Criminal Law, Vol. III, International Criminal 
Procedure, cit., 292-295, citing the work of I. STEGMILLER, The Pre- Investigation Stage of the ICC, 
cit., 332-335. On the issue of gravity see, infra, the next paragraph. 
352 ICC, Decision on the request of the Union of the Comoros to review the Prosecutor’s decision not 
to initiate an investigation, Situation on the Registered Vessels of the Comoros, Greece and 
Cambodia, ICC-01/13-34, PTC I, 16 July 2015, par. 14.  
353 See the critiques expressed on numerous international law blogs, for instance by K. J. HELLER The 
Pre-Trial Chamber’s Dangerous Comoros Review Decision, Opinio Juris, 17 July 2015, (available at 
http://opiniojuris.org/2015/07/17/the-pre-trial-chambers-problematic-comoros-review-decision/, last 
accessed 6 November 2018), according to whom the PTC’s decision on this point is “nothing less than 
a frontal assault on the OTP’s discretion”; A. WHITING, The ICC Prosecutor Should Reject Judges’ 
Decision in Mavi Marmara, Just Security, 20 July 2015 (available at http://justsecurity.org/24778/icc-
prosecutor-reject-judges-decision-mavi-marmara/, last accessed 6 November 2018). Other 
commentators have praised the decision as an example of “good health” of the ICC checks and 
balances mechanism, see e.g., G. PECORELLA, The Comoros situation, the Pre-Trial Chamber and the 
Prosecutor: the Rome Statute’s system of checks and balances is in good health, An International Law 
Blog, 30 November 2015 (available at https://aninternationallawblog.wordpress.com/2015/11/30/the-
comoros-situation-the-pre-trial-chamber-and-the-prosecutor-the-rome-statutes-system-of-checks-and-
balances-is-in-good-health/, last accessed 6 November 2018). 
354 See Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Péter Kovács, Situation on the Registered Vessels of the 
Comoros, Greece and Cambodia, ICC-01/13-34-Anx-Corr, par. 2, 7-8. The dissenting Judge lamented 
that the Majority decided to “conduct a stringent review, which clearly interferes with the 
Prosecutor’s margin of discretion”, and that the PTC should have opted for “a more deferential 
approach” in the review of her decision not to open an investigation in the Flottilla incident. 
355 For the OTP’s evaluation of these aspects see ICC-OTP, Article 53(1) Report, Situation on the 
Registered Vessels of the Comoros, Greece and Cambodia, 6 November 2014, par. 138-141. The 
Majority of the PTC in the Comoros review decision stigmatised these reasoning, affirming that: 
“Making the commencement of an investigation contingent on the information available at the pre-
investigative stage being already clear, univocal and not contradictory creates a short circuit . . . Facts 
which are difficult to establish, or which are unclear, or the existence of conflicting accounts, are not 
valid reasons not to start an investigation but rather call for the opening of an investigation . . . only by 
investigating could doubts be overcome” (see, ICC, Decision on the request of the Union of the 
Comoros to review the Prosecutor’s decision not to initiate an investigation, Situation on the 
Registered Vessels of the Comoros, Greece and Cambodia, ICC-01/13-34, PTC I, 16 July 2015, par. 
13). This line of reasoning has been recently rejected by the OTP upon reconsideration, on grounds 
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Turning the attention to the criteria laid down in article 53(2) of the Statute, 
one has to consider the slight but sensible differences in formulation when compared 
to article 53(1), reflecting the ‘procedural shift’ from investigation (of a situation) to 
prosecution (of individual cases)356. Since the assessment at this stage must point to 
single individuals worth prosecuting, the whole process reflects a greater degree of 
individualisation in the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. With regard to the 
overall evidentiary standard required under this provision, the text imposes a 
“slightly higher threshold”357 when it mandates the OTP to consider whether there is 
“sufficient basis”358 for a prosecution (instead of “reasonable basis”). The same holds 
true as regards the first prong of the OTP’s evaluation, namely the ascertainment on 
whether there is sufficient legal or factual basis to seek a warrant of arrest or 
summons to appear359. Moreover, the evaluation of admissibility at this later—and 
procedurally more advanced stage—focuses on actual and concrete cases and not, as 
under article 53(1) as interpreted by the OTP and Chambers, on potential cases. In 
this context, it has been argued that nothing prevents that the gravity prong of the 
admissibility assessment may be subject to slightly differing standards under article 
53(1)(a) and 53(2)(a), being less stringent in the first hypothesis (concerned with the 
less in-depth and individualised knowledge available at the stage of the situation) and 
more demanding in the second (concerned with a more developed case hypothesis 
and individualised evidence)360. It is debatable whether the PTC’s understanding of 
																																																																																																																																																													
that the PTC had allegedly failed to accord any deference to the Office’s assessment of the facts (see 
ICC-OTP, Final decision of the Prosecution concerning the “Article 53(1) Report” (ICC-01/13-6-
AnxA), dated 6 November 2014, Situation on the Registered Vessels of the Comoros, Greece and 
Cambodia, ICC-01/13-57-Anx1, 30 November 2017, par. 61-62, 65). 
356 See W. A. SCHABAS, The International Criminal Court: A Commentary on the Rome Statute, cit., 
839-840; K. AMBOS, Treatise on International Criminal Law, Vol. III, International Criminal 
Procedure, cit., 380-381. 
357 Ibidem.  
358 Article 53(2)(a) of the Statute. 
359 Again, see W. A. SCHABAS, The International Criminal Court: A Commentary on the Rome 
Statute, cit., 839-840; K. AMBOS, Treatise on International Criminal Law, Vol. III, International 
Criminal Procedure, cit., 380-381. Obviously, at the stage of the prosecution of a case the OTP must 
have positively concluded on the issue of jurisdiction, since there would be no merit in starting a 
prosecution with regard to conducts that fall outside the jurisdictional parameters set out in the 
Statute. 
360  In this vein, see M. LONGOBARDO, Everything Is Relative, Even Gravity. Remarks on the 
Assessment of Gravity in ICC Preliminary Examinations, and the Mavi Marmara Affair, in Journal of 
International Criminal Justice, vol. 14, issue 4, 2016, 1022-1024. The Author sympathises with the 
PTC’s approach in the Comoros review decision, arguing that the OTP “should have taken into 
account the lower threshold required to establish admissibility—including sufficient gravity—at the 
preliminary examination stage” (ibidem, 1024). 
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gravity as an “exacting legal requirement”, theorised in the Comoros decision, could 
be automatically transposed at the level of the decision on the starting of a 
prosecution, thereby confining the OTP’s discretion to the sole interests of justice 
pursuant to 53(2)(c) of the Statute361. 
The preceding analysis shows that among the legal criteria to be considered 
under the heading of article 53, the gravity requirement, with its “elusive” 
character362, has contributed to a certain degree of inconsistency and uncertainty in 
both prosecutorial and judicial practice, with particular regard to its possibly 
different conceptualisation at the situation and case stage363. It can be argued that the 
OTP can contribute to reduce at least in part this uncertainty by clarifying in a more 
consistent and principled fashion—through its article 53 reports—on what ‘gravity 
paradigm’ it is acting upon364. In this connection, the extent to which the current 
practice of the OTP conforms not only to the statutory and regulatory framework but 
also to the self-imposed policy papers will be the object of a more detailed analysis 
in the next part of this work.  
 
3.4.2 The “interests of justice” as the true (and only) ‘general clause’ for 
prosecutorial discretion at the ICC? 
In the words of the OTP 
The issue of the interests of justice, as it appears in Article 53 of the Rome 
Statute, represents one of the most complex aspects of the Treaty. It is the 
point where many of the philosophical and operational challenges in the 
pursuit of international criminal justice coincide (albeit implicitly), but there is 
no clear guidance on what the content of the idea is365. 
	
The lack of any detailed definition of the interests of justice in the Statute and 
in all the other legal texts governing the ICC is strong evidence of the drafters’ 
intention to leave the door open for discretional considerations in the adoption of 
																																																								
361 ICC, Decision on the request of the Union of the Comoros to review the Prosecutor’s decision not 
to initiate an investigation, Situation on the Registered Vessels of the Comoros, Greece and 
Cambodia, ICC-01/13-34, PTC I, 16 July 2015, par. 14. 
362 In the words of C. STAHN, Damned If You Do, Damned If You Don’t: Challenges and Critiques of 
Preliminary Examinations at the ICC, in Journal of International Criminal Justice, vol. 15, issue 3, 
2017, 426. 
363 Ibidem, 426-427. 
364 In this sense see K. AMBOS, Treatise on International Criminal Law, Vol. III, International 
Criminal Procedure, cit., 295. 
365 See ICC-OTP, Policy Paper on the Interests of Justice, September 2007, 2. 
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crucial prosecutorial decisions at the pre-investigation and investigation stage366. In 
contrast with the other legal criteria relevant for a decision under article 53(1) or 
53(2), this concept introduces a wider margin for policy considerations, although 
mediated by integrative legal parameters, in the equation of the exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion367. The indication of—non-exhaustive368—criteria to be taken 
into consideration in the assessment of the interests of justice only partially 
contributes to give content and meaning to this evasive ‘general clause’369. 
Similarly to the case of the other criteria provided for under article 53, there 
are some textual differences between the legal formulation of the considerations 
integrating the interests of justice at the situational stage and at the case stage370. 
Again, such differences reflect the individualisation that occurs at the case stage, 
whereby the decision not to prosecute can be additionally based also on subjective 
factors relating to the alleged perpetrator, such as his or her age or infirmity or role in 
the commission of the crime371. Another difference relates to the fact that under 
paragraph (1)(c) of article 53 the Statute requires that, upon consideration of the 
relevant circumstances, there are “substantial reasons to believe that an investigation 
would not serve the interests of justice”. The same language is not reproduced 
verbatim in paragraph (2)(c). It may prove difficult to conclude, only based on this 
																																																								
366 See W. A. SCHABAS, The International Criminal Court: A Commentary on the Rome Statute, cit., 
836 and K. AMBOS, Treatise on International Criminal Law, Vol. III, International Criminal 
Procedure, cit., 387-391. 
367 On the policy aspects of the interests of justice see M. VARAKI, Revisiting the ‘Interests of Justice’ 
Policy Paper, in Journal of International Criminal Justice, vol. 15, issue 3, 2017, 462-465. 
368 See for instance the language of article 53(2)(c): “A prosecution is not in the interests of justice, 
taking into account all the circumstances, including . . . ” (emphasis added), followed by a list of four 
relevant criteria. On the non-exhaustive nature of the factors listed in these provisions see M. 
DELMAS-MARTY, Interactions between National and International Criminal Law in the Preliminary 
Phase of Trial at the ICC, in Journal of International Criminal Justice, vol. 4, issue 1, 2006, 9. 
369 This syntagm describes legal provisions that incorporate certain evaluative standards, characterised 
by a variable degree of generality and vagueness. This kind of provisions, which are abundant in both 
national and international law, function as ‘safety valves’ for the functioning of a given legal order, 
allowing a certain margin of interpretive discretion and empowering judges—and other institutional 
actors such as prosecutors—to give consideration to eminently policy-based considerations of 
fairness, reasonableness, appropriateness, proportionality, opportunity, etc. in the construction and 
application of legal texts. For a sophisticated analysis of the concepts of vagueness and uncertainty in 
international law see J. KAMMERHOFER, Uncertainty in International Law. A Kelsenian perspective, 
New York, 2011, 118-125. 
370 Compare article 53(1)(c) with article 53(2)(c) of the Statute. On these textual differences see also 
M. VARAKI, op. cit., 458-460. 
371 See Article 53(2)(c) of the Statute. These criteria can be considered in addition to those already 
mentioned, namely the gravity of the crime and the interests of victims. In particular, the reference to 
age or infirmity allows room for humanitarian considerations that may induce the OTP to decline to 
prosecute certain individuals. 
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wording, that the threshold for resorting to the interests of justice in order to justify a 
no-action decision is higher at the situational stage than at the case stage. 
Nevertheless, from the point of view of distributive justice this textual discrepancy 
may be appreciated on grounds that a decision not to open an investigation of an 
entire situation precludes—unless the OTP later changes its position372—any chance 
of ascertaining criminal responsibility of potential perpetrators at the ICC; hence the 
need that such decision be based on a particularly thorough assessment of the 
relevant circumstances373. To the contrary, if a decision not to prosecute a specific 
individual is based on the interests of justice, this choice is made in the context of a 
situation that has already been the object of investigation and that is likely to give 
rise (or has already given rise) to other individual cases. The different degree of 
‘generality/preliminarity’ at which these decisions are made and the different 
downstream consequences they produce on the Court’s jurisdictional reach may 
therefore call for partially different standards in the assessment and application of the 
interests of justice clause, in order to justify a no-action decision under article 
53(1)(c) and (2)(c) of the Statute. 
As already pointed out in this work, the current practice of the Court has not 
yet substantively contributed to a more precise understanding of the content of this 
clause—which is the object of some elaboration in a dedicated prosecutorial policy 
paper374—for the plain reason that the OTP has never made recourse to it as a 
justification for not opening an investigation or starting a prosecution 375 . 
Nevertheless, at least with regard to the scope of the clause in the limited context of 
preliminary examinations, a PTC has ruled that “discretion expresses itself only in 
																																																								
372 The decision not to start an investigation can always be subject to reconsideration based on new 
facts, pursuant to article 53(4) of the Statute. 
373 In particular, the consideration of the interests of victims in seeing justice done may play a 
significant role in the OTP’s assessment. On this point see ICC-OTP, Policy Paper on the Interests of 
Justice, September 2007, 5-6. 
374 ICC-OTP, Policy Paper on the Interests of Justice, September 2007. 
375 To the present day, the OTP has denied the opening of an investigation based on failure to meet 
jurisdictional criteria (such as the situation of the Republic of Korea, see ICC-OTP, Article 5 Report, 
Situation in the Republic of Korea, 23 June 2014, par. 57, 70, 81-82; the situation of Honduras, see 
ICC-OTP, Article 5 Report, Situation in Honduras, 28 October 2015, 141-143 and most recently in 
the Situation in the Gabonese Republic) or failure to meet the required gravity threshold (such as in 
the situation regarding the conduct of UK troops in Iraq, see ICC-OTP, Letter to the Senders, 
Situation in Iraq/UK, 9 February 2006, p. 8-10 and in the situation emerging from the Flottilla 
incident, see ICC-OTP, Article 53(1) Report, Situation on the Registered Vessels of the Comoros, 
Greece and Cambodia, 6 November 2014, par. 148-150). 
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paragraph (c), i.e. in the Prosecutor’s evaluation of whether the opening of an 
investigation would not serve the interests of justice”376. While this finding is still 
isolated—and has not been further elaborated by the AC on the merits377—it seems 
highly problematic to construe article 53 in a way that limits prosecutorial discretion 
in such stringent terms, with the risk of mandating an investigation in any situation 
of gravity comparable to that of the Flottilla incident378. 
Notwithstanding the apparently appealing nature of the interests of justice 
clause in terms of discretionary empowerment for the OTP, there are valid pragmatic 
reasons for its extremely narrow understanding from the point of view of the 
Prosecutor379 and for her refusal to resort to this clause in practice so far. As it will be 
seen in greater detail dealing with judicial review of prosecutorial discretion, the 
Rome Statute introduces with regard to no-action decisions based solely on the 
interests of justice a form of ex officio judicial review that endows the PTC with the 
power to confirm or not to confirm the OTP’s decision, thereby mandating the 
opening of an investigation or prosecution in case of disagreement380. As VARAKI 
convincingly points out  
It is difficult to understand why a Prosecutor would ever invoke the ‘interests 
of justice’, knowing that this would empower the PTC to review prosecutorial 
decisions not to investigate/prosecute and to order that 
investigations/prosecutions are actually carried out381. 
	
																																																								
376 ICC, Decision on the request of the Union of the Comoros to review the Prosecutor’s decision not 
to initiate an investigation, Situation on the Registered Vessels of the Comoros, Greece and 
Cambodia, ICC-01/13-34, PTC I, 16 July 2015, par. 14 (emphasis added). 
377 ICC, Decision on the admissibility of the Prosecutor’s appeal against the ‘Decision on the request 
of the Union of the Comoros to review the Prosecutor’s decision not to initiate an investigation’, 
Situation on Registered Vessels of Comoros, Greece and Cambodia, ICC-01/13-51, AC, 6 November 
2015. The AC declared inadmissible the OTP’s appeal against the review decision of the PTC, 
reasoning that the decision could not be impugned as one “with respect to admissibility” (ibidem, par. 
60). The inadmissibility of the appeal relieved the AC from entering into an in-depth analysis of the 
PTC’s decision, including the aspects concerning gravity. Nevertheless, the AC clarified that the 
scope of the Chamber’s review under article 53(3)(a) is limited to the possibility of asking the OTP to 
reconsider her previous decision. In other words, in this scenario the final (discretional) word on the 
opening of an investigation or initiation of a prosecution lies exclusively with the Prosecutor (ibidem, 
par. 58). 
378 See, supra, footnote 353, for references to doctrinal critiques to the PTC’s decision. 
379 ICC-OTP, Policy Paper on the Interests of Justice, September 2007, 2-4. On this restrictive 
approach see, critically, M. VARAKI, op. cit., 467-470. 
380 See the language of article 53(3)(b) of the Statute. 
381 M. VARAKI, op. cit., 466. 
THE LEGAL BASIS FOR PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION AT THE ICC 
 103 
 In other words, “whit great power there must also come great 
responsibility”382: the wider the discretionary power allowed to the Prosecutor, the 
more careful its exercise needs to be and the more intrusive the judicial review of the 
concerned decision can be 383. 
 
4. The influence of procedural rules on the exercise of discretion 
In the previous paragraphs the enabling clauses for the exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion have been analysed adopting as a focus the provisions of the 
Statute, the primary source among the ICC’s legal texts384 . Nevertheless, due 
consideration given to the eminently procedural dimension of the rights and 
obligations concerning the exercise of prosecutorial discretion at the pre-
investigation and pre-trial stage, attention must also be given to the relevant 
procedural rules mainly contained in the RPE, Regulations of the Court and 
Regulations of the OTP. The content and function of the most significant of said 
provisions, as well as their interaction with the Statute, are analysed in the present 
paragraph, with a view to completing the systematic study of the principles and rules 
governing the ICC’s system of prosecutorial discretion. 
The main function of the pertinent procedural rules contained in the RPE and 
Regulations is to establish in greater detail the concrete modes of exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion, with particular regard to the procedural obligations of the 
OTP in respect to—inter alia—certain duties in the conduct of preliminary 
examinations; the duty to give notice and to communicate its decisions to the 
interested subjects; the formal and substantive requirements of such decisions; and 
the OTP’s relations with the PTC in the context of judicial review of the Prosecutor’s 
discretionary choices. 
																																																								
382 The exact attribution of this famous saying and variations thereof is uncertain, the most recent and 
popular reference being a caption from a 1962 issue of the Marvel comic Spiderman (see S. LEE, S. 
DITKO, “Spider-Man!”, in Amazing Fantasy 15#, New York, 1962). 
383 This principle will be referred to, in the following part of this work, as the principle of 
proportionality between prosecutorial discretion and judicial oversight (see, infra, Part Three, Chapter 
One, par. 3). 
384 See article 21(1)(a) of the Statute, listing the Statute first among the primary sources of the ICC 
legal regime, before the Elements of Crimes and Rules of Procedure and Evidence. 
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Before entering a summary and thematic analysis of these provisions, it must 
be recalled that the RPE explicitly recognise to the OTP’s a self-regulative power 
with regard to the adoption of regulations that must “govern the operation of the 
Office”385, thereby giving substance to the statutory recognition of the OTP’s 
administrative independence enshrined in article 42(2) of the Statute386. As it will be 
seen, various provisions of the Regulations of the OTP deal with the exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion, with particular regard to the ‘proceduralisation’ of 
preliminary examinations. 
 A first set of procedural rules deserving consideration comprises those 
provisions that impose on the OTP a duty to give notice of its discretionary decisions 
at the pre-trial stage—especially the negative ones—and to communicate them to 
other interested subjects such as victims, providing reasons in support of said 
decisions. Examples of this kind of provisions are Rules 49(1) and 50(1) of the RPE 
concerning the duty to give notice of decisions adopted under article 15 of the 
Statute, respectively in the case of the OTP’s decision not to seek an authorisation to 
investigate pursuant to article 15(6) of the Statute and in the case of request for 
authorisation pursuant to paragraph 3 of the same article387. The latter provision is 
specifically concerned with the legal position of victims, in the attempt to balance 
their right to be informed of the OTP’s decision and the potentially competing needs 
of confidentiality, integrity of the investigation and security and well-being of both 
victims and witnesses388. An analogous duty of notification is imposed on the OTP 
with regard to the decision not to open an investigation under article 53(1) of the 
Statute389, or not to initiate a prosecution under article 53(2) of the Statute390. In such 
cases, the addressees of the notification may be either the referring entity (state or 
UNSC) or the information providers in case of proprio motu followed by a decision 
																																																								
385 See Rule 9 of the RPE. 
386 See article 42(2) of the Statute: “The Prosecutor shall have full authority over the management and 
administration of the Office”. 
387 See Rules 49(1) and 50(1) of the RPE. According to Reg. 102 of the Regulations of the Registry, 
when the OTP has a duty to inform victims, he or she may request the assistance of the Registry in 
order to communicate such information. 
388 See Rule 50(1) of the RPE. In particular, this provision establishes that the OTP, in performing 
these informative functions that may touch upon the interests and rights of victims, may seek the 
assistance of the VWU.  
389 See Rule 105 of the RPE. 
390 See Rule 106 of the RPE. 
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not to seek authorisation to investigate391. The same rules impose on the OTP—
although under partially different conditions—the additional duty to inform the 
competent PTC of its negative decision392. According to the Regulations of the Court 
the OTP is also under the duty to inform the Presidency of the Court of its intention 
to submit a request for authorisation under 15(3) of the Statute, in order to allow for 
the timely formation of the competent PTC393.  
A second group of provisions deals with the formal and substantive 
requirements for the OTP’s decisions concerning the exercise of discretion. 
Examples of this kind are Rule 50(2) of the RPE, providing that a request for 
authorisation under article 15(3) of the Statute must be made in writing394, and 
Regulation 49 of the Regulations of the Court establishing in detail the required 
content of such a request395. One very significant aspect these provisions, as well as 
of those concerning the prosecutorial duties of information, is their explicit reference 
to the OTP’s obligation to provide reasons for its discretionary decisions396. 
A third group of provisions, mainly contained in the Reg. of the OTP, relate 
to the rules governing the conduct of preliminary examinations and the concrete 
steps leading to decisions under article 53 of the Statute. These provisions reflect a 
																																																								
391 Rule 105(2) of the RPE refers to the already examined Rule 49 with regard to the duty to give 
notice to the information providers in case of proprio motu. 
392 According to Rule 105(4) the OTP must inform the PTC of the decision not to open an 
investigation only when he or she decides to do so solely on the basis of the interests of justice. To the 
contrary, when the OTP decides that there is not a sufficient basis to proceed with a prosecution he or 
she shall always inform in writing the competent PTC (see Rule 106(1) of the RPE).  
393 See Regulation 45 of the Regulations of the Court and Regulation 28(3) of the Regulations of the 
OTP. For instance, in November 2017, on the basis of these provisions the OTP, has communicated to 
the Presidency its intention to submit a request for authorisation to investigate in the situation 
concerning the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, which has long been under preliminary examination. 
See ICC-OTP, Statement of ICC Prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, regarding her decision to request 
judicial authorisation to commence an investigation into the Situation in the Islamic Republic of 
Afghanistan, 3 November 2017 and ICC, Decision assigning the situation in the Islamic Republic of 
Afghanistan, Situation in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, ICC-01/17-1, Presidency, 3 November 
2017 (and in particular the Annex I, reproducing the OTP’s notice to the Presidency under Regulation 
45 of the Regulations of the Court). The request concerning the situation in Afghanistan was later 
made known to the public as ICC-OTP, Public redacted version of “Request for authorisation of an 
investigation pursuant to article 15”, 20 November 2017, ICC-02/17-7-Conf-Exp, Situation in the 
Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, ICC-02/17-7-Red, 20 November 2017. 
394 The same holds true for the decisions under article 53 of the Statute, as explicitly established by 
Rule 105(1) and (4) and 106(1) of the RPE. 
395 See Regulation 49 of the Regulations of the Court. 
396 See Rules 49(1), 105(1) and (5), 106(2) of the RPE as well as Regulation 49(1)(b) of the 
Regulations of the Court. It is evident that the duty to provide reasons in support of the OTP’s 
discretionary decisions is a necessary logical premise for the possibility to ask their judicial review by 
the PTC, in the cases and within the limits provided for under the Statute and applicable rules. 
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tendency to the proceduralisation of preliminary examinations, in line with the 
OTP’s policy documents397. Examples of this kind are Reg. 27-31 of the Regulations 
of the OTP, dealing inter alia with the initial filtering of information at the beginning 
of preliminary examinations 398 ; the publicity (and the connected issues of 
confidentiality) of the OTP’s activities under article 15399; the reaching of a decision 
on the opening of an investigation and starting of a prosecution400 and the decision 
not to proceed based on the interests of justice401. On these last two crucial issues, the 
Regulations of the OTP stipulate that the Office shall decide on the basis of an 
internal report prepared by the competent divisions in which the OTP is articulated402, 
providing hints on how the administrative and organisational self-regulation of the 
Office influences the decision-making process at the preliminary stage403. 
A fourth and last group of provisions relates to the mechanisms leading to the 
judicial review of the OTP’s discretionary decisions, dealing with the OTP-PTC 
relations for the purposes of the exercise of the Court’s supervision. These provisions 
impose on the OTP certain duties to inform the judges of its decisions, in particular 
when the Prosecutor decides not to proceed with an investigation based solely on the 
																																																								
397 See, in particular the ICC-OTP, Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, November 2013, par. 
72-92. 
398 Reg. 27 of the Regulations of the OTP. This regulation stipulates that the OTP, in the examination 
of the information received, shall distinguish between: a) those relating to matters that are manifestly 
outside of the jurisdiction of the Court; b) those relating to ongoing activities situation and that are 
already under examination or already form the basis of a prosecution; c) those information that do not 
present the characteristics sub a) and b), and that therefore warrant further examination pursuant to 
Rule 48 of the RPE. 
399 See Reg. 28 of the Regulations of the OTP. The provision does nothing more than restating the 
OTP’s duties of information and notification to the interested subjects, already established under the 
pertinent Rules, but it articulates in greater detail the OTP’s duty to strike a balance between the needs 
of publicity and transparency on the one side, and those of confidentiality and safety on the other (see, 
in particular par. 1 and 2 of the Regulation). 
400 See Reg. 29 of the Regulations of the OTP. Sub-Reg. 1-4, dealing with the decision on the opening 
of an investigation, apply mutatis mutandis also to the decision on prosecutions, as per sub-Reg. 5. 
401 See Reg. 31 of the Regulations of the OTP. 
402 See Reg. 29, sub-reg. 1-2 on the content on such report and sub-reg. 3 on the relevance of the 
report for the determination on the reasonable basis to proceed with an investigation. Reg. 31, dealing 
with decisions not to proceed based on the interests of justice, additionally establishes that the internal 
report must be submitted to, and approved by, the Executive Committee (ExCom), an organ 
composed of the Prosecutor and the Heads of the three divisions of the Office, namely the 
Jurisdiction, Complementarity and Cooperation Division; the Investigation Division and the 
Prosecution Division (see Reg. 4 and 7-9 of the Regulations). On the internal structure of the OTP, see 
I. STEGMILLER, The Pre- Investigation Stage of the ICC, cit., 50-55. 
403 This administrative articulation and division of labour within the Office is premised on the 
administrative autonomy recognised to the Prosecutor by the Statute and RPE as a fundamental 
component of the OTP’s independence (see article 42(2) of the Statute and 9 of the RPE). 
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interests of justice404 or when, after having investigated, he or she decides that there 
is not a sufficient basis for a prosecution405. They also provide a more detailed 
procedure for the exercise of judicial review of such decisions406. 
Interestingly, one crucial aspect that is almost completely neglected by the 
Rules and Regulations concerns the timing (and more importantly the time limits) of 
preliminary examinations, and more generally of the pre-investigation and pre-trial 
phases. The applicable rules do not establish any time limit for the duration of 
preliminary examinations or of the investigation, thereby giving to the OTP a 
‘discretionary weapon’ based on the modulation of the time and manner of 
conducting these pre-trial activities. In this sense it must be recalled that from the 
silence of the legal texts on the issue, the OTP insists on inferring that preliminary 
examinations—as well as investigations—cannot be subject to specified time 
limits407. The only procedural rule that touches upon the OTP’s discretional use of 
time is the one dealing with the PTC’s decision—in the exercise of its power of 
judicial oversight—to request the reconsideration of a prosecutorial decision not to 
proceed under article 53 of the Statute. In such a case, the Rules stipulate that the 
OTP “shall reconsider that decision as soon as possible”408. Nevertheless, the 
indication of a time constraint—albeit not precisely determined—with regard to the 
OTP’s reconsideration is not assisted by appropriate remedies in case of 
prosecutorial failure to act promptly409. The only instance of practice on the point 
reveals that the OTP did not consider itself compelled to act within a reasonably 
short period of time upon the PTC’s request for reconsideration concerning the 
Flottilla incident410. As a matter of fact, the OTP rendered its “final decision” on the 
Flottilla incident only in late 2017, by confirming its previous assessment and the 
																																																								
404 See Rule 105(4) of the RPE. 
405 See Rule 106(1) of the RPE. 
406 See Rules 107-110 of the RPE. 
407 On this issue see, supra, par. 3.2, footnotes 273-277. 
408 See Rule 108(2) of the RPE (emphasis added). 
409 The Rules do not provide the subjects who asked the judicial review of a no-action decision with 
any instrument to ‘force’—or at least incentivise—the OTP to put forward, irrespective of its 
outcome, a prompt reconsideration of its previous decision. It can be doubted that the undue 
procrastination of such reconsideration is in any case compatible with the OTP’s general duty to act 
bona fide vis-à-vis the Chambers. 
410 The decision of the PTC was issued on 16 July 2015, while the AC declared the OTP’s appeal 
against it inadmissible on 6 November 2015. The OTP did not adopt a final decision until the end of 
2017, over two years after the AC’s decision, a behaviour hardly reconcilable with the duty to 
reconsider its decision “as soon as possible” (see, infra, next footnote). 
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decision not to open an investigation, manifesting its stark disagreement with the 
PTC’s request for reconsideration, especially on the methodology and standard of 
review under article 53(3)(a) of the Statute as applied by the preliminary judges411. 
 
5. An overall evaluation of the statutory and regulatory framework: Intermediate 
conclusions 
After having examined the relevant statutory and regulatory provisions that, 
from the point of view of the OTP, enable and regulate the exercise of prosecutorial 
discretion at the pre-investigation and pre-trial stage, a few preliminary conclusions 
can be drawn in order to summarise the main features of the static dimension of the 
ICC legal regime on the issue. 
a) The Rome Statute, based on the composite outcomes of the intense debates 
concerning the role and functions of the Prosecutor and his or her discretionary 
powers, provides the original source of legitimacy of the OTP’s selection powers, 
through both enunciations of principle (mainly contained in the Preamble)412 and 
structural provisions establishing and regulating the Prosecutor’s proprio motu 
powers and his or her ability—irrespective of the triggering mechanism—to adopt 
discretionary decisions413. Nevertheless, the pertinent statutory provisions—due to 
their general lack of precision—leave significant leeway to the OTP as regards many 
crucial aspects of the exercise of discretion, subject to rather vague (and generally 
low) evidentiary standards at the pre-investigation and investigation stage, and to a 
limited degree of judicial review of the selection decisions414. 
b) Secondary legal sources such as the RPE and applicable Regulations 
provide a slightly more detailed framework for the concrete exercise of discretion, 
establishing certain duties on the OTP as regards the conduct of preliminary 
examinations and the process leading to decisions on the opening of investigations 
																																																								
411See ICC-OTP, Final decision of the Prosecution concerning the “Article 53(1) Report” (ICC-01/13-
6-AnxA), dated 6 November 2014, Situation on the Registered Vessels of the Comoros, Greece and 
Cambodia, ICC-01/13-57-Anx1, 30 November 2017. 
412 See, supra, par. 3.1 of this Chapter. 
413 See, supra, par. 3.2 and 3.4 of this Chapter. 
414 See, supra, par. 3.2.1 of this Chapter and, infra, Chapter Three of this Part concerning the role of 
judges in the judicial review of prosecutorial discretionary choices. 
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and/or the starting of prosecutions415. It must be recalled that these procedural rules 
differ internally as to their legal status within the Rome legal regime416. While both 
the RPE and all the Regulations must always be consistent with the Statute417, the 
following hierarchical order of precedence can be established among the various sets 
of procedural rules: i) Rules of Procedure and Evidence; ii) Regulations of the 
Court418; iii) Regulations of the OTP and Regulations of the Registry419 (on equal 
footing). The actual capacity of these rules to shape the concrete exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion, by integrating or developing the provisions of the Statute, 
can only be assessed based on an accurate survey of their practical interpretation and 
application on the part of the interested actors. 
c) From the above points derives that the space left to the confirmative, 
integrative and/or transformative practice of the OTP and Chambers (with particular 
regard to the supervisory role that may be exercised on negative decisions by the 
PTC either ex parte or ex officio) 420 is significant and reflects the drafters’ intention 
to provide a sufficient degree of flexibility in the exercise of discretion and judicial 
review thereof. While the legal texts clearly reserve to the OTP a pivotal role in the 
adoption of discretionary decisions at the pre-trial stage, the concrete outcomes of 
the institutional interplay between the referring entities, the OTP and the Chambers 
are not easily predictable based on a purely normativistic and static analysis of the 
pertinent provisions. In particular, the potentially dialectical relations between the 
																																																								
415 See, supra, par. 4 of this Chapter. 
416 See, G. BITTI, op. cit., 414-422. 
417 See article 51(4) and (5) of the Statute, respectively establishing that the RPE “shall be consistent 
with [the] Statute” and that in the event of conflict between the two sources “the Statute shall prevail”. 
See also the Explanatory Note accompanying the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, stating that “The 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence are an instrument for the application of the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court, to which they are subordinate in all cases” and that “In all cases, the 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence should be read in conjunction with and subject to the provisions of 
the Statute” (emphasis added). The subordination of Regulations to the Statute is explicitly established 
by Reg. 1, sub-reg. 1, of the Regulations of the Court; Reg. 1, sub-reg. 2 of the Regulations of the 
OTP and Reg. 1, sub-reg. 1 of the Regulations of the Registry. 
418 The subordination of the Regulations of the Court to both the Statute and the RPE is established 
under Reg. 1, sub-reg. 1, of the Regulations of the Court: “These Regulations . . . shall be read subject 
to the Statute and the Rules” (emphasis added). 
419 The subordination of the Regulations of the OTP and Registry to both the RPE and the Regulations 
of the Court is clearly postulated under Reg. 1, sub-reg. 1 of the Regulations of the Registry and Reg. 
1, sub-reg. 2 of the Regulations of the OTP. The latter adds that the Regulations of the OTP shall be 
read “in conjunction with the Regulations of the Registry” (emphasis added), somehow recognising 
that the two documents enjoy the same hierarchical position among the legal sources of the ICC 
regime. 
420 See Article 53(3)(a)-(b) of the Rome Statute. 
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OTP and PTC in the different contexts of exercise of prosecutorial discretion may 
give rise to practices capable of strategically orienting the functioning of the checks 
and balances mechanism with regard to prosecutorial discretion. In any event, these 
institutional relations will necessarily take time to stabilise and to reach a reasonable 
balance between the need for consistency and flexibility. 
d) The role of the OTP as the primary engine of the Court’s selection 
decisions is not limited to its formal statutory and regulatory attributions (and 
limitations thereof) as a fundamental organ of the Court and as a party to the 
proceedings, but extends also to the OTP’s own ‘informal’—and non legally 
binding—definition of a general prosecutorial strategy and to the Office’s policies 
that touch upon various aspects of exercise of selection powers. These documents, 
irrespective of their (debatable) aptitude to inform the OTP’s actual discretionary 
choices, must be carefully considered as manifestations of the Office’s self-
understanding with regard to its institutional role and may additionally be used as 
performance indicators to test the consistency of the OTP’s prosecutorial practice421.
																																																								
421  See, infra, the next Chapter. On the evaluation of the OTP’s performances according to 
performance indicators see, recently, B. KOTECHA, The ICC’s Office of the Prosecutor and the Limits 
of Performance Indicators, in Journal of International Criminal Justice, vol. 15, issue 3, 2017, 543-
565. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
BEYOND THE TEXT AND TOWARDS (SELF-REGULATORY) 
PRACTICE: THE ROLE OF THE OTP 
 
1. Introduction 
The static analysis of the sources and procedures for the exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion conducted in the previous chapter allowed to draw the 
preliminary conclusion that the OTP—within the statutory and regulatory legal 
framework—plays a decisive role in shaping the strategic lines guiding discretionary 
choices 422 . Attention must therefore be turned on how—and through which 
instruments—the Office has interpreted in practice its priority-setting responsibilities 
in recent years. 
The necessity to establish—and to update on periodic basis—both the broad 
lines of the prosecutorial strategy and the OTP’s position on specific substantive and 
procedural issues had already emerged in the early years of the Court’s institutional 
experience423. The first documents dealing with these issues were adopted during the 
tenure of Luis Moreno Ocampo, and have later been significantly and continuously 
expanded, modified and increased in number during the tenure of the incumbent 
Prosecutor, also as part of the OTP’s general effort to provide greater transparency 
with regard to its working methods and decision-making processes424. 
The practice of the Office on this point has gradually consolidated, resulting 
in the periodic adoption and renewal of the so-called Prosecutorial Strategy (or more 
recently Strategic Plan), a broad and detailed document covering a three-year period, 
and of a number of single-topic policy documents referred to as Policy Papers. This 
																																																								
422 In this vein see K. AMBOS, Treatise on International Criminal Law, Vol. III, International 
Criminal Procedure, cit., 131-132. 
423 See for instance ICC-OTP, Paper on some policy issues before the Office of the Prosecution, 
September 2003 (including the Annex) and ICC-OTP, Report on Prosecutorial Strategy, 14 September 
2006, which are the first examples of such documents. 
424 At the beginning these documents were relatively limited in scope and rather concise, to become 
more complex and detailed through the years. In particular the last two Strategic Plans (respectively 
for 2012-2015 and 2016-2018) are much longer and analytical when compared to the earlier ones. 
Obviously, this is also due to the increased number of situations and cases to deal with, and to the 
necessity to adapt and enrich the strategy in order to better reflect the various challenges emerged in 
the OTP’s practice. 
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practice has later been institutionalised and legitimised through the adoption of 
Regulation 14 of the Regulations of the OTP, which mandates the Office to “make 
public its Prosecutorial Strategy” and, as appropriate, “policy papers that reflect the 
key principles and criteria of the Prosecutorial Strategy”425.  
The necessity to adapt to changing institutional circumstances and to learn 
from on-going practices (and mistakes)—such as situations revealing a degree of 
friction between the OTP and judges—made it also appropriate to integrate these 
strategy and policy documents with administrative or regulatory measures, in 
particular in the form of Codes of Conduct or Guidelines426.  
Moreover, the obvious institutional, organisational and financial 
consequences of OTP’s priority-setting efforts, made it necessary to put forward a 
detailed analysis of what would be the optimal size and appropriate funding to allow 
the Office to effectively—and efficiently—meet its strategic objectives. This effort 
resulted in the elaboration of the concept of “Basic Size” of the OTP, which is the 
object of a report presented to the ASP in 2015 in order to “ensure that the Office has 
the requisite resources to fully meet its mandate under the Rome Statute; and . . . to 
offer States Parties a reasonably stable basis for budgetary planning”427. 
These documents need to be briefly analysed in order to provide a better 
understanding of their justification, legal nature and effects (both in the domain of 
the OTP’s activities and vis-à-vis the other organs of the Court), as well as of their 
																																																								
425 See, respectively Regulation 14, Sub-regulation 1 and 2 of the Regulations of the OTP. The 
Regulations entered into force on 23 April 2009, well after the first strategy and policy papers had 
been adopted by the OTP, thereby recognising the role of the previous practice of the Office on the 
point. 
426 See, e.g., the ICC-OTP, Code of Conduct for the Office of the Prosecutor, entered into force on 5 
September 2013. An example of confrontation between the OTP and judges leading to the adoption of 
a set of guidelines relates to the use of intermediaries in the conduct of investigations. In the Lubanga 
trial the questionable manner in which the OTP dealt with intermediaries came under scrutiny of the 
Court, leading to the subsequent adoption of the Court’s Guidelines Governing the Relations between 
the Court and Intermediaries for the Organs and Units of the Court and Counsel working with 
intermediaries, of March 2014. This document, although particularly relevant for the work of the 
OTP, contains provisions that apply mutatis mutandis to the other organs of the Court and to Counsels 
for the victims and Defence. See, infra, par. 4. 
427 See ICC-ASP/14/21*, Report of the Court on the Basic Size of the Office of the Prosecution, 17 
September 2015, 7. The report was prepared by the OTP and transmitted to the Committee on Budget 
and Finance of the ASP, which had originally requested it. The overall consequences of the model 
have later been the object of further discussion at the 15th session of the ASP, held in The Hague on 
16-24 November 2016 (see, ICC-ASP/15/33, Interim Report of the Court on the Court-wide Impact of 
“OTP Basic-Size”, 14 November 2016). 
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function as potential instruments for an ex post empirical scrutiny of the Office’s 
prosecutorial performances428.  
 
2. Prosecutorial Strategies and Plans 
In the absence of a ‘heteronomous’ determination of the overall criminal 
policy objectives and prosecutorial priorities, it was certainly the responsibility of the 
OTP to elaborate on them, translating the general indications contained in the Statute 
into practice-oriented directives for the fulfilment of its mandate429. The source of 
this responsibility can be traced back both to the administrative and operative 
independence of the OTP enshrined in article 42(2) of the Statute and, more 
generally, to the inherent role of the Prosecution in the selection of situations and 
cases. 
The idea to set up a document detailing the broad lines of the prosecutorial 
strategy over a three-year period was put forward in 2006, when the first version of 
such strategy was adopted by the OTP, based on the previous three years of 
institutional experience (and early case law) of the Court430. Since then, the Office 
has renewed and updated the strategy on other three occasions, always for the same 
temporal horizon431. It should be emphasised that there is no requirement that the 
strategy paper be adopted or amended periodically or at fixed terms, being the three-
year timeframe used by the OTP purely a matter of conventional practice of the 
Office. It is particularly instructive to look at how the prosecutorial strategy has 
changed over time—based on the assessment of previous practice and the judicial 
																																																								
428 For an in-depth discussion and critical review of these documents see the articles published in the 
Special Issue: The International Criminal Court’s Policies and Strategies, in Journal of International 
Criminal Justice, vol. 15, issue 3, 2017, 407-640. 
429 Contrary to certain national criminal systems, where the setting of priorities for the exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion is co-determined by an external body (such as the legislature), in the context 
of the ICC the ASP, the Court’s political governing body, enjoys no specific power or attribution in 
this area (see article 112 of the Statute). Nevertheless, the ASP can indirectly influence prosecutorial 
strategies through the leverage provided by its power to consider and approve the Court’s budget 
pursuant to article 112(2)(d) of the Statute. 
430 See ICC-OTP, Report on Prosecutorial Strategy, 14 September 2006. Certain priority-setting issues 
had already been envisaged by the ICC-OTP, Paper on some policy issues before the Office of the 
Prosecution of September 2003. 
431 See ICC-OTP, Prosecutorial Strategy 2009-2012, 1 February 2010; ICC-OTP, Strategic Plan 2012-
2015, 11 October 2013; ICC-OTP, Strategic Plan 2016-2018, 16 November 2015. 
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developments of the various situations and cases—by retaining, refining, amending, 
reframing or sometimes rejecting certain criteria and objectives. 
The 2006-2009 Strategy formulated three Strategic Goals and five Strategic 
Objectives for the three subsequent years, including a forecast on the number of on-
going trials to be completed and of the new investigations to be launched during the 
relevant term432. In addition, the OTP set the three fundamental principles guiding the 
prosecutorial strategy, namely (positive) complementarity, “focused investigations 
and prosecutions”, and the maximization of the impact of the OTP’s activities. From 
the point of view of the exercise of prosecutorial discretion the most interesting of 
these principles relates to the OTP’s elaboration of the concept of “focused 
investigations and prosecutions”. The Office pointed out that its activity focuses on 
“the most serious crimes and on those who bear the greatest responsibility”. This is 
to be achieved through a “sequenced approach” to selection choices, whereby cases 
within a given situation are selected one after the other according to their gravity 
(assessed on the basis of scale, nature, manner of commission and impact of the 
alleged crimes)433. The number of incidents to be investigated must be limited but at 
the same sufficient to “provide a sample that is reflective of the gravest incidents and 
the main types of victimisation” 434. Only in this way the OTP could carry out short 
investigations and expeditious trials, including through the request of warrants of 
arrest or summons to appear “only when a case is nearly trial-ready”435. 
These principles were later substantially confirmed—and partially refined—
by the Prosecutorial Strategy for 2009-2012, despite the difficulties in meeting the 
objectives envisaged in the previous document436. Concerning the policy of focused 
investigations the OTP clarified that its selection decisions should point to “those 
																																																								
432 ICC-OTP, Report on Prosecutorial Strategy, 14 September 2006, 4 (particularly the summary 
contained in Table 1), 6-9. As regards the number of trials the OTP had envisaged to complete two 
trials by the end of the period and to launch at least 4-6 new investigations. The first objective proved 
to be way too optimistic and was clearly missed by the Office. The first judgment of the Court in the 
Lubanga trial was rendered only in 2012. 
433 Ibidem, 5. These criteria have later been reproduced in Regulation 29(2) of the Regulation of the 
OTP as well as in the Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations (see, infra, next paragraph). 
434 Ibidem, 5-6.  
435 Ibidem, 6. 
436  See ICC-OTP, Prosecutorial Strategy 2009-2012, 1 February 2010, 4-7. Nevertheless, the 
sequenced approach was not explicitly mentioned in the new strategy. As recalled by K. AMBOS, 
Treatise on International Criminal Law, Vol. III, International Criminal Procedure, cit., 134, in the 
Kenyan situation the OTP did not follow this approach and instead carried out simultaneous 
investigations and more than one prosecution at a time. 
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situated at the highest echelons of responsibility, including those who ordered, 
financed, or otherwise organised the alleged crimes”437. 
The Strategic Plan for 2012-2015 marked a relevant policy shift from the 
concept of “focused investigations” to that of “in-depth, open-ended investigation, 
while maintaining focus”438. Based on the experience—and given the evidentiary 
standards progressively imposed by the Chambers439—the new policy allowed for 
greater flexibility through the formulation of “multiple case hypotheses” (open-
ended character) and renounced to a purely top-down approach, subscribing to a 
strategy that builds upwards from mid to high-level perpetrators, without ignoring 
even low-level perpetrators, where their conduct has been particularly grave440. 
Together with this shift in the selection strategy, the OTP integrated in its document 
a more pragmatic approach towards the collection of evidence and the subsequent 
decisions on prosecution. In particular, the document stated that the OTP shall make 
applications for a warrant of arrest or summons to appear only when there are 
reasonable prospects of collecting additional evidence, and shall present cases at the 
confirmation stage that are as trial-ready as possible (in-depth character)441. Other 
aspects of the Plan deal with issues of resources, organisation and cooperation442. 
The most recent Strategic Plan, the one covering the 2016-2018 period, builds 
on the previous and confirms its approach to selection strategies, which according to 
the figures provided by the OTP have increased the efficacy and efficiency of 
																																																								
437 ICC-OTP, Prosecutorial Strategy 2009-2012, 1 February 2010, 6. This last strategic directive to 
concentrate on the highest echelons may have contributed to the partial conflation between the 
concept of “those who bear the greatest responsibility” and the category of senior leaders. The Court 
has in any case clarified that any such confusion must be avoided, confirming that medium and low-
level perpetrators are perfectly legitimate targets for prosecution (see ICC, Judgment on the 
Prosecutor’s Appeal against the Decision of the Pre-Trial Chamber I Entitled: “Decision on the 
Prosecutor’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest, Article 58”, Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Situation in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, ICC-01/04-169, AC, 13 July 2006, par. 73-75, 78-79). PTC I, in 
the Court’s first review decision pursuant to article 53 of the Statute, has criticised the OTP’s 
approach in deciding not to open an investigation precisely based on this conflation (see ICC, 
Decision on the request of the Union of the Comoros to review the Prosecutor’s decision not to 
initiate an investigation, Situation on the Registered Vessels of the Comoros, Greece and Cambodia, 
ICC-01/13-34, PTC I, 16 July 2015, par. 23-24). 
438 ICC-OTP, Strategic Plan 2012-2015, 11 October 2013, par. 4, 23. 
439 Ibidem, par. 22. 
440 Ibidem, par. 23. 
441 Ibidem. 
442 Ibidem, par. 24-26, 27-31, 64-65 respectively. 
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prosecutorial action, especially at the confirmation of charges stage443. The Plan also 
focuses on the relations between the overall strategy and certain specific policies as 
elaborated in various policy papers, and additionally refers to the implementation of 
the Basic Size Model444. Among the objectives for the subsequent three years, the 
document focuses on the improvement of the quality and efficiency of preliminary 
examinations (in what the OTP calls a “holistic approach”)445. In this regard, it is 
important to take note of the OTP’s focus on the transparency and publicity of the 
information on preliminary examinations and to the issue of their timely 
completion446. 
Notwithstanding the importance of these strategies from the point of view of 
transparency and justification of prosecutorial choices, it is doubtful whether they 
can alone determine a reasonable degree of foreseeability of the OTP’s discretionary 
decisions, for at least two reasons. On the one hand, they clearly lack any binding 
character and cannot per se be enforced upon the OTP447; on the other, they are 
independently adopted and amended by the same subject that is supposed to follow 
their programmatic provisions. The periodic changes to some of the core principles 
of these strategies in the absence of an overarching long-term or permanent strategy 
give the impression that the OTP is simply adapting to the circumstances in order to 
accommodate the practicalities (and difficulties) encountered in discharging its 
mandate448. It must nevertheless be recognised that striking a balance between 
flexibility and predictability is an extremely complex exercise and it is only in the 
practice of the Office—in its interaction with the Chambers—that a reasonable and 
pragmatic outcome can be reached. From the point of view of outreach and 
																																																								
443 ICC-OTP, Strategic Plan 2016-2018, 16 November 2016, par. 1, 2, 15-18, 35-36 (see also Annex I 
for the detailed analysis of improvements in the confirmation of charges). In particular, the OTP 
focuses on the performance increase in the confirmation of charges (23% increase on the number of 
charges confirmed, 28% increase when considering the confirmation rate per accused). 
444 Ibidem, par. 38-39 and 67-77. 
445 Ibidem, par. 55 on the objectives for the improvement of preliminary examinations. 
446 Ibidem, number 3 and 5. However, on the issue of duration of preliminary examinations, the OTP 
confirmed its position that their conduct cannot be subject to specified time limits. The Strategic Plan 
merely states that the Office shall ensure that they are conducted “without undue delays” and 
completed “as soon as all relevant sources of information have been explored”. 
447 Of course, if the Strategy were to envisage criteria or objectives in conflict with the duties and 
responsibilities of the Prosecutor as set out in the Statute and RPE (or stemming from the case law of 
the Court), a subsequent and indirect judicial control over the strategy could be the exercised by the 
judges in deciding specific contentious issues, both at the preliminary and trial stage. 
448 On the desirability of a general long-term strategy see K. AMBOS, Treatise on International 
Criminal Law, Vol. III, International Criminal Procedure, cit., 135. 
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communication, these strategies (as well as the policy papers) are double-edged 
swords: while trying to meet the stakeholders’ demand for transparency and 
accountability they increase the degree of scrutiny over prosecutorial choices, 
thereby exposing the Office to critique when its choices do not appear to be in line 
with the stated strategy or policy. 
 
3. Policy Papers 
While prosecutorial strategies are meant to establish the general principles, 
priorities and objectives that should guide the action of the OTP, the so-called Policy 
Papers deal with discrete issues relevant to the implementation of such strategies. 
Similarly to prosecutorial strategies, these documents where initially elaborated in 
the practice of the Office and received subsequent formal recognition under 
Regulation 14 of the Regulations of the OTP449. The OTP has so far adopted a 
number of separate policy papers dealing with various substantive and procedural 
issues, some of them being relevant to the present discussion concerning the scope 
and limits of prosecutorial discretion at the ICC450. In providing an overview of the 
function and scope of these documents it is useful to distinguish between policies 
that relate to specific substantive criminal policy topics, and those relating to 
crosscutting procedural and institutional topics. 
The first group comprises, in particular, the Policy Paper on Sexual and 
Gender-Based Crimes and the Policy on Children. Through their elaboration the OTP 
sought to integrate in its prosecutorial policy specific considerations relating to 
certain categories of crimes or groups of victims. Pressures from international civil 
society in order to recognise the specificity of sexual and gender-based crimes or 
crimes involving children—crimes that have been historically underrepresented in 
																																																								
449 Sub-regulation 2 establishes that “As appropriate, the Office shall make public policy papers that 
reflect the key principles and criteria of the Prosecutorial Strategy”.  
450 The policy paper adopted so far are the following, in chronological order: ICC-OTP, Paper on 
some policy issues before the Office of the Prosecutor, September 2003; ICC-OTP, Policy Paper on 
the Interest of Justice, September 2007; ICC-OTP, Policy Paper on Victims’ Participation, April 2010; 
ICC-OTP, Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, November 2013; ICC-OTP, Policy Paper on 
Sexual and Gender-Based Crimes, June 2014; ICC-OTP, Policy Paper on Case Selection and 
Prioritisation, 15 September 2016; ICC-OTP, Policy on Children, 15 November 2016. Some of these 
papers have already been referred to in other parts of the present work. In this paragraph attention has 
been devoted to their systematic and practical relevance for the purposes of understanding the OTP’s 
role in designing the prosecutorial policy. 
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international prosecutions—made it necessary for the OTP to express its position on 
these topics. The OTP has therefore integrated sex/gender-sensitive and child-
oriented approaches into its pre-existing prosecutorial policies451. The OTP has 
clarified its commitment to the investigation and prosecution of these crimes both in 
terms of case selection and policy on charges 452 , institutional and procedural 
measures necessary to minimise safety risks and (re)traumatisation of the victims453, 
as well as maximisation of the significance of reparations454. One common element of 
these policies is the recognition of the role of experts in assisting the OTP to deal 
with victims of such crimes at the various stages of proceedings and the recognition 
of the necessity to recruit or contract specialised personnel for that purpose455. These 
documents surely represent a laudable effort to recognise and accommodate the 
specificities of certain categories of crimes and victims, but do not always provide a 
solid justification for prioritising them over other equally grave crimes456. To a 
certain extent they may be perceived more as a response to the criticism that 
surrounded the first selection choices of the OTP than as a principled elaboration of 
criteria for prioritising situations or cases457. 
																																																								
451 See ICC-OTP, Policy Paper on Sexual and Gender-Based Crimes, June 2014, par. 6, 7, 20 and 
ICC-OTP, Policy on Children, 15 November 2016, par. 9, 15, 17, 22-23. 
452 Ibidem, respectively, par. 40-45, 71-74 and 39-52, 58, 62, 64, 84-88. The OTP underlines the 
crimes that are more frequently characterised by sex or gender profiles or that are likely to affect 
children. It also deals with charging practices, such as the possibility to charge certain conducts as 
discrete or individual crimes when this can better reflect the social stigma of such conducts, or to 
proceed to cumulative charges when necessary to increase the prospects of conviction. 
453 Ibidem, respectively, par. 22, 51, 60-61, 64, 70, 85-90 and 21, 28-30, 71-77, 81-82, 93-95 where 
the documents focus on the special measures needed to guarantee the safety and well being of the 
victims and witnesses at the investigation and trial stage. With regard to children a reference is made 
to the principle of the “best interest of the child” enshrined in the UN Convention on the Rights of the 
Child. 
454 Ibidem, respectively, par. 102 and 105-107. 
455 Ibidem, respectively, par. 21, 113, 115, 118-119 and 69, 71, 73, 77, 78-79. It should be reminded 
that the OTP has appointed special advisers both for gender and children issues based on article 42(9) 
of the Statute and has created a dedicated Gender and Children Unit under Regulation 12 of the 
Regulations of the OTP. 
456 In this sense see K. AMBOS, Treatise on International Criminal Law, Vol. III, International 
Criminal Procedure, cit., 134-135. 
457 Good reasons may obviously be put forward for prioritising sexual or gender-based crimes or 
children-related crimes, but it is hard to find such an elaboration in the respective policy papers, at 
least besides general enunciations of principle (see, e.g., ICC-OTP, Policy Paper on Sexual and 
Gender-Based Crimes, June 2014, par. 44-45 which tautologically state that sexual and gender-based 
crimes are amongst the gravest under the Statue, without elaborating on the rationale behind their 
prioritisation). In the case of the policy paper on sexual and gender-based crime, the OTP—under the 
tenure of Fatou Bensouda—evidently sought to show its renewed commitment to prosecute these 
crimes, after the severe criticism of the first Prosecutor’s decision to completely exclude sexual 
crimes from the charges in the Lubanga trial. 
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The second group of papers comprises the Policy Paper on the Interest of 
Justice and, most importantly, the Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations and the 
Policy Paper on Case Selection and Prioritisation. These documents stand at the core 
of the OTP’s understanding of its own institutional role in the exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion and provide a more precise definition of the principles and 
criteria that should guide selection decisions, within the general framework 
contained in the Strategic Plan. 
The OTP’s extremely narrow construction of the interests of justice has 
already been the object of reflection in previous chapters of this work, with particular 
regard to the Prosecutor’s discretionary powers under article 53 of the Statute458. The 
OTP has so far avoided delving into the normative content of this undefined general 
discretionary clause, maintaining that its should be resorted to only under exceptional 
circumstances459. Therefore, this policy paper only contributes to shape prosecutorial 
discretionary practices in a ‘negative’ sense, given the OTP’s self-restraint in 
interpreting the scope of the Statute’s provision, especially through the distinction 
between the semantic field of the interests of justice and that of international peace 
and security (considering the latter outside the OTP’s institutional mandate)460. 
The Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations is more relevant for the 
present discussion. A draft of this document was first circulated in 2010, and the 
final version was adopted only in 2013461. As the timing of its adoption suggests, this 
document builds on the previous informal—and not overly transparent—preliminary 
examination practice of the Office, drawing lessons from both relevant case law and 
scholarly reflection on central legal issues such as jurisdiction and admissibility (sub 
specie complementarity and gravity).  The first part of the paper is dedicated to the 
general principles that must guide prosecutorial action at the preliminary 
examination stage, namely independence, impartiality and objectivity462. It then goes 
on to analyse the criteria that need to be considered during preliminary examination 
																																																								
458 See Chapter One, par. 3.4.2 of this Part. 
459 ICC-OTP, Policy Paper on the Interest of Justice, September 2007, 1, 3-4. 
460 Ibidem, 8-9. For a recent critical appraisal of this paper see M. VARAKI, op. cit., 467-470. 
461 See ICC-OTP, Draft Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, 4 October 2010 and ICC-OTP, 
Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, November 2013. It is important to note that, to promote 
transparency and inclusiveness, this policy paper and the one on case selection and prioritisation were 
publicly circulated and discussed in their draft form, before the OTP adopted their final version. 
462 Ibidem, par. 25-33. 
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for the purposes of a decision on the investigation under article 53 of the Statute463. 
This section is not particularly original and largely builds on statutory analysis 
through the prism of the Court’s pertinent case law464. From the point of view of the 
‘creative’ role of prosecutorial practices, the most relevant parts of the paper relate to 
the conduct of preliminary examinations (part V) and policy objectives (part VI). 
In part V of the Paper the OTP sheds some light on the way in which it 
processes the enormous amount of information it receives and that may disclose the 
potential commission of crimes within the Court’s jurisdiction. In particular, the OTP 
explains how the process of evaluation begins (depending on the nature of the 
information provider and/or the triggering mechanism) 465 , the way in which 
information is filtered out466 and, most importantly, the four sequential phases of the 
assessment that may ultimately lead to the opening of an investigation467. Of 
particular interest is the possibility—already used in practice—to issue interim 
reports during the course of the assessment with regard to the statutory requirements 
pertinent to each of these phases, as well as to adopt a final report containing the 
OTP’s determination on whether or not to open an investigation pursuant to article 
53 of the Statute 468 . The OTP also refers to the termination of preliminary 
examinations and their possible outcomes, including the possibility of judicial review 
of nolle prosequi decisions469. In part VI, the OTP formulates the policy objectives of 
transparency, promotion of positive complementarity and prevention470. In particular, 
as regards transparency, the OTP generally confirms its reporting practice, through 
both annual comprehensive reports on the whole of preliminary examination 
																																																								
463 Ibidem, par. 34-35, 36-41 (jurisdiction); 42-45 (admissibility in general); 46-58 (complementarity); 
59-66 (gravity); 67-71 (interests of justice). 
464 Among these statutory criteria, gravity is the one probably receiving the greatest deal of attention 
and elaboration, with particular regard to the factors to be considered in its assessment.  
465 ICC-OTP, Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, November 2013, par. 72-76. 
466 Ibidem, par. 78-79. 
467 Ibidem, par. 78-83. 
468 Ibidem, par. 84. 
469 Ibidem, par 89-92. With regard to judicial review it should be recalled that after the first PTC’s 
review decision in the Comoros situation the OTP has recently decided—upon reconsideration—to 
confirm its previous article 53 decision not to open an investigation. See ICC-OTP, Final decision of 
the Prosecution concerning the “Article 53(1) Report” (ICC-01/13-6-AnxA), dated 6 November 2014, 
Situation on the Registered Vessels of the Comoros, Greece and Cambodia, ICC-01/13-57-Anx1, 30 
November 2017. 
470 ICC-OTP, Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, November 2013, par. 93-106. 
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activities and situation-specific reports471. Moreover, the OTP establishes that its 
decision on the opening (or not opening) of an investigation under article 53 of the 
Statute shall be made public and state the reasons for the decision472. It is undeniable 
that the more structured and ‘proceduralised’ approach provided for in these two 
parts of the document is a significant improvement when compared to the previous 
working methods of the Office. Nevertheless, this policy—if consistently followed 
by the Office—demands a greater effort on the part of the OTP and may expose its 
decisions to deeper public scrutiny. 
More recently the OTP has complemented its policy paper on preliminary 
examinations with the long-awaited Policy Paper on Case Selection and 
Prioritisation473. The elaboration of a public document detailing the OTP’s approach 
on case selection and prioritisation had been the object of extensive debate, with 
many scholars and civil society insisting on the necessity of introducing more precise 
criteria to guide discretionary decisions474. Quite predictably—given the OTP’s 
interest in preserving a good measure of flexibility—the document does not elaborate 
a set of binding (or particularly stringent) criteria for the exercise of prosecutorial 
discretion at the case stage475. The document preliminarily confirms the general 
principles governing the Office’s action476, as well as the legal criteria concerning 
jurisdiction, admissibility and the interests of justice already elaborated in the paper 
on preliminary examinations, adding that these shall apply mutatis mutandis at the 
case stage477. The paper then importantly introduces the “Case Selection Document”, 
a confidential document of dynamic nature—i.e. continuously subject to update and 
review—that shall be compiled by the Office to gradually collect all potential cases 
(and case hypotheses) to form the basis for subsequent selection decisions across the 
																																																								
471 Ibidem, par. 94-97. 
472 Ibidem, par. 97. The duty to provide reasons for negative decisions stems from Rules 105(3) and 
106(2) of the RPE. 
473 A draft was first circulated in February 2016 (ICC-OTP, Draft Policy Paper on Case Selection and 
Prioritisation, 29 February 2016), while the final document was made public on 15 September 2016. 
474 See, for instance, the in-depth analysis contained in the volume edited by M. BERGSMO, op. cit., 
with contributions from both academics and representatives of civil society, such as NGOs. 
475 ICC-OTP, Policy Paper on Case Selection and Prioritisation, 15 September 2016, par. 2-3, 52. 
476 Ibidem, par. par. 16-23 (independence, impartiality, objectivity). 
477 Ibidem, par. 24-25, 26-28 (jurisdiction), 29-32 (admissibility), 33 (interest of justice). The paper 
explains that the proprium of the case stage is the more focused and individualised nature of the 
assessment of these legal criteria, which are here considered in relation to identified incidents, persons 
and conducts. 
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various situations478. The policy paper mentions as criteria for case selection the 
gravity of crimes, the degree of responsibility of the alleged perpetrators and the 
potential charges479.  
With regard to gravity, the OTP clarifies that while its assessment for the 
purpose of case selection is conducted “similarly to [that of] gravity as a factor for 
admissibility”, in light of the high number of cases potentially admissible, the Office 
may apply a stricter test for the purposes of case selection than the one legally 
required for the purposes of the admissibility of situations480. This simply means that 
not all potentially admissible cases shall be invariably selected for prosecution. 
With regard to the degree of responsibility of the alleged perpetrators, the 
OTP recalls the approach taken by the last two Strategic Plans (in-depth and open-
ended investigations through a building-upwards strategy) and goes on to elaborate 
on its understanding of the notion of “most responsible ones”. The document—in 
line with the Court’s case law—clarifies that the notion “does not necessarily equate 
with the de jure hierarchical status of an individual within a structure, but will be 
assessed on a case-by-case basis depending on the evidence”481. The degree of 
responsibility shall also be taken into account in defining the most appropriate mode 
of liability for charging purposes, also considering “the deterrent and expressive 
effects that each mode of liability may entail”482. 
																																																								
478 Ibidem, par. 10-15. The OTP mentions the influence of the resources and capacity constraints on 
the selection and prioritisation policies and the role of the Case Selection Document in monitoring the 
appropriate allocation of time and resources across the different situations and in “manag[ing] the 
overall workload of the Office”. As regards the OTP’s disengagement from a situation the OTP 
announces that this topic shall be the object of a separate policy paper. 
479 Ibidem, par. 34. 
480 Ibidem, par. 36. 
481 Ibidem, par. 43. See, supra, footnote 437 for the Court’s case law clarifying this distinction.  
482 Ibidem, par. 44 (emphasis added). It is interesting to note that the OTP specifically mentions 
command responsibility under article 28 of the Statute as “a key form of liability”. On this point, the 
influence of the Bemba case—where the PTC somehow ‘forced’ the OTP to amend the charges as 
regards the mode of liability from co-perpetration to command responsibility—cannot be 
underestimated. See, ICC, Decision Adjourning the Hearing pursuant to Article 61(7)(c)(ii) of the 
Rome Statute, Prosecutor v. Bemba, Situation in the Central African Republic, ICC-01/05-01/08-388, 
PTC III, 3 March 2009, par. 19-20, 38-39, 46, 49 and ICC, Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and 
(b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor Against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, 
Prosecutor v. Bemba, Situation in the Central African Republic, ICC-01/05-01/08-424, PTC II, 15 
June 2009, par. 344, 369, 372, 402-403, 444. See also K. AMBOS, Critical Issues in the Bemba 
Confirmation Decision, in Leiden Journal of International Law, vol. 22, issue 4, 2009, 724-726. For 
an in-depth analysis of the role played by the PTC’s decisions on the confirmation of charges in the 
judicial supervision over the OTP’s charging choices see, infra, par. 2.4, Chapter Three, of this Part. 
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Lastly, with regard to charges, the OTP elaborates on the concept of 
representativity, namely the idea that charging decisions should be able to provide a 
representative sample of the main types of victimisation in the affected 
communities483. Additionally, the OTP confirms its commitment to the selection of 
traditionally under-prosecuted offences, such as sexual and gender-based crimes, 
crimes involving children and—interestingly—crimes against religious, historical 
and cultural property and crimes against humanitarian personnel and peacekeepers484. 
With regard to the issue of prioritisation, the OTP clarifies that while it aims 
at prosecuting all crimes that have been selected according to the already examined 
criteria, it is necessary to prioritise certain cases over others, due to the “practical 
realities” of the Office’s work (including the availability of information and 
evidence, and the available resources)485. It then goes on to establish five strategic 
and four operational criteria for prioritisation486. None of these criteria seems to be 
particularly stringent, reflecting the pragmatic and flexible approach adopted by the 
OTP in order to prioritise those cases that present the best prospects of conviction 
within a reasonable period of time. This flexibility is reinforced by the provision that 
the criteria “stand in no hierarchical order” and that “The specific weight to be given 
																																																								
483 ICC-OTP, Policy Paper on Case Selection and Prioritisation, 15 September 2016, par. 45. This is in 
line with both the Strategic Plan and the policy papers on sexual and gender-based crimes and 
children. 
484 Ibidem, par. 46. This last reference has a clear connection to some of the most recent developments 
in the Court’s case law, such as the first conviction for the war crime under article 8(2)(e)(iv) of the 
Statute (attack against protected objects) in the Al-Mahdi case. Attacks against peacekeepers and their 
potential qualification as war crimes have been the object of a public statement of the OTP (see ICC-
OTP, Statement of the Prosecutor, Attacks against peacekeepers may constitute war crimes, 19 July 
2013).  
485 Ibidem, par. 47-49. 
486 Ibidem, respectively par. 50 and 51. The five strategic prioritisation criteria are: a) a comparative 
assessment across the selected cases, based on the same factors that guide the case selection; b) 
whether a person, or members of the same group, have already been subject to investigation or 
prosecution either by the Office or by a State for another serious crime; c) the impact of investigations 
and prosecutions on the victims of the crimes and affected communities; d) the impact of 
investigations and prosecutions on ongoing criminality and/or their contribution to the prevention of 
crimes; and e) the impact and the ability of the Office to pursue cases involving opposing parties to a 
conflict in parallel or on a sequential basis. The four operational criteria are: a) the quantity and 
quality of the incriminating and exonerating evidence already in the possession of the Office, as well 
as the availability of additional evidence and any risks to its degradation;  b) international cooperation 
and judicial assistance to support the Office’s activities; c) the Office’s capacity to effectively conduct 
the necessary investigations within a reasonable period of time, including the security situation in the 
area where the Office is planning to operate or where persons cooperating with the Office reside, and 
the Court’s ability to protect persons from risks that might arise from their interaction with the Office; 
and d) the potential to secure the appearance of suspects before the Court, either by arrest and 
surrender or pursuant to a summons. 
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to each individual criterion will depend on the circumstances of each case”487. 
According to the concrete developments of the case the Office can also decide to 
deprioritise or postpone the investigation or prosecution of a case (or set of cases) as 
well as to seek the amendment or withdrawal of charges, or approach the Trial 
Chamber for the legal re-characterisation of the facts or modes of liability pursuant 
to Regulation 55 of the Regulations of the Court488. 
Those who advocated for the adoption of an exhaustive list of clear selection 
and prioritisation criteria might be disappointed by the rather vague content of this 
policy paper. It must nevertheless be recognised that the realities of international 
criminal justice—considering in particular the OTP’s necessary reliance on state 
cooperation—probably militate against too rigid and formalistic criteria for the 
exercise of prosecutorial discretionary choices489. Nevertheless, an overall evaluation 
of the policy documents as a whole reveals a rather fragmented, overlapping and 
repetitive set of principles and guidelines that do not always seem to be premised on 
solid criminal policy objectives. 
 
4. Codes of Conduct and Guidelines: Relevant to the exercise of prosecutorial 
discretion? 
The strategy and policy papers analysed in the previous paragraph do not 
exhaust the list of internal documents that may touch upon—albeit indirectly—the 
exercise of prosecutorial selection choices. Mention must be made of a different 
category of documents that stands at the intersection between procedural law and 
professional ethics such as Codes of Conduct and Guidelines490. Although their 
effectiveness is largely dependent on the spontaneous compliance—and potential 
enforcement via disciplinary action—by the Court and OTP personnel, their 
																																																								
487 Ibidem, par. 52. 
488 Ibidem, par. 53. 
489 In this vein see, F. MÉGRET, Accountability and Ethics, cit., 418; M. M. DEGUZMAN, Choosing to 
Prosecute: Expressive Selection at the International Criminal Court, cit., 297; J. A. GOLDSTON, op. 
cit., 386-387; W. A. SCHABAS, Selecting Situations and Cases, cit., 380-381. 
490 See Code of Conduct for Investigators, ICC/AI/2008/005, 10 September 2008 (unclassified on 22 
November 2012); Code of Conduct for Staff Members, ICC/AI/2011/002, 4 April 2011(unclassified 
on 22 November 2012); Code of Conduct for the Office of the Prosecutor, 5 September 2013; Code of 
Conduct for Intermediaries, March 2014; Guidelines Governing the Relations between the Court and 
Intermediaries for the Organs and Units of the Court and Counsel working with intermediaries, March 
2014. 
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provisions may contribute to provide greater clarity on the outer boundaries of 
prosecutorial discretion as regards specific procedural issues and, more generally, the 
discharge of the OTP’s functions. 
The judicial practice of the Court in certain trial proceedings revealed the 
necessity to integrate existing statutory and regulatory provisions regarding the 
duties and responsibilities of the Prosecutor with more specific and detailed rules491. 
In this sense, the long-awaited Code of Conduct for the Office of the Prosecutor—
although not particularly original its formulation492—is a step forward both in the 
definition of the general ethical principles that should guide the OTP’s action and of 
the prosecutorial duties of impartiality; confidentiality; objective truth-seeking; 
effective investigation and prosecution; disclosure and regarding the relations with 
other organs of the Court, defence and victims493. Obviously, the purpose of any such 
code is not—and cannot be—to deprive prosecutors of their discretion in the conduct 
of proceedings, but its adoption can nevertheless be helpful to avoid situations that 
risk to undermine the mutual trust between organs of the Court, with detrimental 
consequences for the integrity of judicial proceedings and fair trial rights494. The 
																																																								
491 On the opportunity of the adoption of such a code see M. MARKOVIC, The ICC Prosecutor's 
Missing Code of Conduct, in Texas International Law Journal, vol. 47, issue 1, 2011, 201-236. For a 
succinct analysis of the content of the Code see L. PACEWICZ, Introductory Note to International 
Criminal Court Code of Conduct for the Office of the Prosecutor, in International Legal Materials, 
vol. 53, no. 2, 2014, 397-412. 
492 Some have considered that the Code is largely a repetition of what is already envisaged by the 
Statute and Staff Rules and Regulations, and does not live up to the standards of a standalone code of 
conduct for prosecutorial action. See, e.g., A. HEINZE, International Criminal Procedure and 
Disclosure: An Attempt to Better Understand and Regulate Disclosure and Communication at the ICC 
on the Basis of a Comprehensive and Comparative Theory of Criminal Procedure, Berlin, 2014, 471 
and A. ORIOLO, The ‘Inherent Power’ of Judges: An Ethical Yardstick to Assess Prosecutorial 
Conduct at the ICC, in International Criminal Law Review, vol. 16, issue 2, 2016, 304.  
493 See Code of Conduct for the Office of the Prosecutor, 5 September 2013, Rules 7-8 (General 
principles); 15-20 (General standards of professional conduct); 21-24 (Independence); 29-31 
(Impartiality); 32-36 (Confidentiality); 49-50 (Objective truth-seeking); 51 (Effective investigation 
and prosecution); 52-54 (Disclosure), 62-65 (Relations with other organs of the Court), 66-68 
(Relations with victims and witnesses), 69 (Relations with persons under investigation and accused 
persons), 70 (Relations with counsel). See also K. AMBOS, Treatise on International Criminal Law, 
Vol. III, International Criminal Procedure, cit., 135-137. 
494 In particular, the OTP’s behaviour with regard to issues such as the disclosure of evidence obtained 
under confidentiality agreements and its refusal to comply with the Chamber’s orders of disclosure 
sparked controversy and led to harsh disagreements between the Office and judges in the Lubanga 
case, with two stays of proceedings imposed by the relevant TC. For an example of these 
disagreements see, e.g., ICC, Decision on the consequences of non-disclosure of exculpatory 
materials covered by Article 54(3)(e) agreements and the application to stay the prosecution of the 
accused, together with certain other issues raised at the Status Conference on 10 June 2008, 
Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, ICC-01/04-01/06-1401, 
TC I, 13 June 2008. On the OTP’s approach towards disclosure obligations and its assessment by the 
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Codes may also play a role in the administration of disciplinary measures, as a result 
of a failure to comply with its provisions495.  
At the same time, given the OTP’s necessity to rely on external personnel in 
order to discharge some of its activities at the stage of investigations, Guidelines 
have been put in place as regards the Office’s relations with these subjects, generally 
referred to as “intermediaries”496. Again, practice has shown how delicate the 
relationship between the OTP and these external subjects can be, and how an 
inappropriate management of such forms of collaboration can undermine court 
proceedings and even the very integrity of the evidence used at trial. The Guidelines 
Governing the Relations between the Court and Intermediaries try to address some of 
these issues, building on the case law that has on previous occasions strongly 
criticised the OTP’s discretionary use of intermediaries497. A separate Code of 
Conduct for Intermediaries has also been adopted498.  
In terms of legal nature these documents are different from the strategy and 
policy papers in that they are mainly regulatory/administrative in character and they 
do not share the same predominantly internal and policy-setting function. Their main 
role is to integrate the primary legal texts governing the Court as regards the day-by-
day management of the relations between its organs and with external relevant 
subjects499. 
																																																																																																																																																													
Lubanga TC see, K. AMBOS, The First Judgment of the International Criminal Court (Prosecutor v. 
Lubanga): A Comprehensive Analysis of the Legal Issues, in International Criminal Law Review, vol. 
12, no. 2, 2012, 124-128.  
495 Code of Conduct for the Office of the Prosecutor, 5 September 2013, Rule 75. 
496 See Guidelines Governing the Relations between the Court and Intermediaries for the Organs and 
Units of the Court and Counsel working with intermediaries, March 2014. 
497 On the issue of the use of intermediaries see C. BUISMAN, Delegating Investigations, Lessons to be 
Learned from the Lubanga Judgment, in Northwestern Journal of International Human Rights, vol. 
11, issue, 3, 2013, 30-82. See also the very critical position taken by the Lubanga TC in ICC, 
Redacted Decision on the Prosecution’s Urgent Request for Variation of Time-Limit to Disclose the 
Identity of Intermediary 143 or Alternatively to Stay Proceedings Pending Further Consultations with 
the VWU, Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, ICC-01/04-
01/06-2517-Red, TC I, 8 July 2010 and ICC, Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, 
Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, ICC-01/04-01/06-2842, 
TC I, 14 March 2012, par. 10, 124, 482: “The Chamber is of the view that the prosecution should not 
have delegated its investigative responsibilities to the intermediaries in the way set out above, 
notwithstanding the extensive security difficulties it faced . . . The prosecution’s negligence in failing 
to verify and scrutinise this material sufficiently before it was introduced led to significant 
expenditure on the part of the Court. An additional consequence of the lack of proper oversight of the 
intermediaries is that they were potentially able to take advantage of the witnesses they contacted”. 
498 See Code of Conduct for Intermediaries, March 2014. 
499 This seems clear when one reads Code of Conduct for the Office of the Prosecutor, 5 September 
2013, rules 9 and 10 on the relations with other normative materials. 
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5. The “Basic Size” of the OTP and the relationship between resources and 
prosecutorial discretion 
The OTP is an extremely complex structure from the point of view of the 
administration, allocation and management of its material and human resources. It is 
of outmost evidence that running in an effective and efficient manner such a complex 
institutional machinery—which is in charge of the most sensitive choices for the 
functioning of the Court—requires certainty on the availability of the financial 
resources necessary to its functioning. Most importantly it is necessary that these 
resources are commensurate to the strategy and policy objectives set out by the OTP. 
In this sense the effort made by the Office to estimate its “Basic Size”, i.e. the 
scale of the necessary human and material resources needed to deliver its proposed 
policy goals—both in quantitative and qualitative terms—is to appreciate. The 2015 
Report on the Basic Size goes into great detail in defining the methodology to 
calculate the nature and amount of these resources, and is particularly interesting in 
that it breaks down complex prosecutorial activities in their individual constituent 
tasks, revealing their future projection in terms of resources’ allocation500. This 
analysis also sheds light on the working methods of the office, particularly on its 
planning decisions across the spectrum of the various procedural stages of 
proceedings at the ICC501. 
The OTP has come to the conclusion that a significant increase in the amount 
of resources—both human and financial—allocated to it by the ASP is necessary in 
order to meet its strategic objectives502. While this request may be considered as a 
																																																								
500 See ICC-ASP/14/21*, Report of the Court on the Basic Size of the Office of the Prosecution, 17 
September 2015, par. 6-7 of the executive summary, as well as par. 13, 15, 18-19, 21, 27 and 30-34 of 
the main text of the Report. Annex I to the Report, based on the methodology identified in its main 
text, goes on to extrapolate data from previous experience, breaking down prosecutorial tasks 
according to the different procedural phases, namely preliminary examinations (par. 4-7); 
investigations (8-16); management of hibernated investigations (17-21); pre-trial phase (22-24); 
prosecutions (25-26) and appeals (27-29). Annex II then seeks to exactly determine and justify the 
demand for increased human and financial resources, based on the same phase-based approach. The 
many tables that integrate the analysis are particularly helpful to visualise the ‘procedural algorithm’ 
followed by the OTP in the conduct of its activities. Annex III deals with support, technical, 
administrative and ancillary activities carried out by the OTP. 
501 Ibidem. 
502 Ibidem, par. 10, 14 of the executive summary and 4 of the main text. As regards human resources 
the OTP envisages a 33,3% increase (from 405 to 540 staff members), while the yearly budget would 
require a 43,6% increase (from 44,2 to 60,6 million euros). Both figures are based on the human and 
financial resources allocated for the year 2015. 
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common dialectic between organs of an international organisation—one of which is 
endowed with budgetary powers—it shows the inevitable connection between the 
level of financing and the concrete perimeter of exercise of discretion on the part of 
the OTP. The role of the ASP, a political body, must therefore be considered as part 
of the equation of prosecutorial discretion, in connection with the external and 
indirect influence of budgetary allocation decisions. In this sense, the OTP is trying 
to show the provisional results—in terms of efficiency—of its current strategies, in 
the effort to persuade the ASP to provide the requested resources503. In conclusion, 
documents such as the Report on the Basic Size are not strictly legal in nature and 
rather reflect a ‘managerial’ and technical approach in structuring prosecutorial 
activities. 
 
6. An overall evaluation of the OTP’s documents 
In concluding this brief survey of the heterogeneous group of documents 
adopted by the OTP in recent years, a few general observations may be formulated 
both as regards the legal significance of these materials and their practical relevance 
in orienting prosecutorial discretionary practice. 
In the first place, it must be observed that these documents lack any formal 
bindingness504. This is particularly true for the Strategies and Policy Papers, which 
clearly stipulate that they must be considered as internal documents that “[do] not 
give rise to legal rights”505, which are subject to continuous adaptation and review 
based on experience and that are made public only for transparency purposes506. 
Nevertheless, the fact that they do not give rise to legal rights—and to corresponding 
obligations on the part of the OTP—does not mean that they are devoid of any legal 
																																																								
503 Ibidem, 4-8. 
504  On the concept of bindingness in international law see J. D’ASPREMONT, Bindingness, in 
Amsterdam Law School Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2015-19, 2015, 1-18. 
505 See ICC-OTP, Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, November 2013, par. 20; ICC-OTP, 
Policy Paper on Case Selection and Prioritisation, 15 September 2016, par. 2; ICC-OTP, Policy Paper 
on the Interest of Justice, September 2007, par. 1; ICC-OTP, Policy Paper on Sexual and Gender-
Based Crimes, June 2014, par. 11; ICC-OTP, Policy on Children, 15 November 2016, par. 12 and 
ICC-OTP, Policy Paper on Victims’ Participation, April 2010, par. 2. 
506 See, e.g., the references to transparency in ICC-OTP, Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, 
November 2013, par. 21, 94-95; ICC-OTP, Policy Paper on Case Selection and Prioritisation, 15 
September 2016, par. 3; ICC-OTP, Policy Paper on Sexual and Gender-Based Crimes, June 2014, par. 
12. 
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significance. When the OTP adopts discretionary decisions purportedly based on 
these strategies or policies—which reflect a certain understanding of the pertinent 
statutory and regulatory norms—these decisions may eventually come under the 
judicial review of the Chambers, which can therefore indirectly rule on the 
underlying legality and reasonableness of the criteria contained in the policies507. The 
same holds true for Codes of Conduct and Guidelines which largely share with 
strategy and policy papers the lack of bindingness, although in some circumstances 
they confirm or specify the content of primary legal texts such as the Statute, RPE or 
Regulations and may therefore play a role in the interpretation of such norms. They 
nevertheless differ from strategy and policy papers in that they are mainly adopted 
for administrative purposes, in order to establish standards of conduct for certain 
organs of the Court or other subjects that may otherwise come in contact with the 
ICC. In connection with strategies and policies, the Report on the Basic Size of the 
OTP adds an operative, administrative and management-oriented dimension, dealing 
with issues of intra-institutional relations between the OTP and the ASP, particularly 
as regards the resources needed to meet the policy objectives. It seems reasonable to 
conclude that notwithstanding the different scopes and functions of these materials, 
their legal nature can be traced back to the general—and highly debated—concept of 
soft law508. Their contribution to the development of prosecutorial discretionary 
practices—as well as their general compatibility with primary sources—is therefore 
an eminently empirical issue, which can only be studied through careful comparison 
																																																								
507 For instance, the PTC in the Comoros review decision questioned the way in which the OTP had 
applied the criteria—object of elaboration in the Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations—for the 
assessment of sufficient gravity as regards the Mavi Marmara incident. Judges disagreed in particular 
with the OTP’s approach as regards the scale, nature, manner of commission and impact of the alleged 
crimes. See, ICC, Decision on the request of the Union of the Comoros to review the Prosecutor’s 
decision not to initiate an investigation, Situation on the Registered Vessels of the Comoros, Greece 
and Cambodia, ICC-01/13-34, PTC I, 16 July 2015, par. 23-24, 26, 28-30, 34-36, 38, 41, 43-45, 47-
49. 
508 Discussions on the role, relevance and flaws of the concept of soft law in the realm of international 
law have been extensive in the recent past. See, e.g., the contributions in D. SHELTON (ed.) 
Commitment and Compliance: The Role of Non-binding Norms in the International Legal System, 
Oxford, 2000 and J. PAUWELYN, R. A. WESSEL, J. WOUTERS (eds.), Informal International 
Lawmaking, Oxford, 2012. See also the seminal papers of P. WEIL, Towards Relative Normativity in 
International Law?, in  American Journal of International Law, vol. 77, issue 3, 1983, 413-442; J. 
KLABBERS, The Redundancy of Soft Law, in Nordic Journal of International Law, vol. 65, issue 2, 
1996, 167-182 and the various contributions edited by J. D’ASPREMONT, T. AALBERTS, Symposium on 
Soft Law, in Leiden Journal of International Law, vol. 25, issue 2, 2012, 309-378. 
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between the text and context of these documents and the actual practice of the 
relevant actors. 
In the second place, it must be observed that there is great merit in the 
elaboration, public discussion and adoption of these documents and more generally 
in the OTP’s effort to progressively incorporate in them new instruments and 
objectives, including through a revision or abandonment of previous approaches 
when considered ineffective or counterproductive. Nevertheless, the perception is 
that these documents—and particularly those containing strategies and policies—
lack a sufficient degree of internal consistency, are excessively vague and 
characterised by a piecemeal approach to the most important issues surrounding the 
exercise of prosecutorial discretion. It can be argued that a more integrated and 
forward-looking approach would be beneficial both in terms of consistency of the 
OTP’s choices and for the purposes of an external assessment of the Offices’ 
performances, without renouncing to the necessary periodical adaptation and fine-
tuning of both strategies and policies509. 
In the third and last place, these documents may play a role in the ex post 
evaluation of the OTP’s performances. In other words, despite the lack of binding 
force, the public nature of these documents allows to check the concrete 
prosecutorial choices against the strategy and policy background self-elaborated by 
the OTP. The same can be done as regards Codes and Guidelines, through a 
comparison between the standards of conduct and the actual behaviour of the OTP 
across the different proceedings. In this sense the choice in favour of greater 
transparency on the prosecutorial policy objectives—given their lack of sufficient 
consistency—may expose the Office to an additional level of public scrutiny, making 
the onus to provide reasons for discretionary choices more difficult to satisfy. 
In sum, the documents analysed in this chapter provide an example of how 
prosecutorial self-regulatory practices may result in the adoption of acts that—
despite the lack of bindingness and their primary administrative character—
contribute to inform the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, thereby complementing 
																																																								
509 In this sense see K. AMBOS, Treatise on International Criminal Law, Vol. III, International 
Criminal Procedure, cit., 135, who argues in favour of “prosecutorial strategy in one master document 
serving as overall guidance”, while recognising that “there are also arguments against one master 
document”, including the “dynamics of international crimes, investigations, and jurisdictional 
triggers” and the “volatility of the Court’s situations and caseload”. 
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the legal parameters derived from the statutory and regulatory provisions analysed in 
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CHAPTER THREE 
LIMITS OF AND REMEDIES AGAINST THE OTP’S 
DISCRETIONARY DECISIONS: THE ROLE OF JUDGES 
 (IN PARTICULAR OF PRELIMINARY JUDGES) 
	
1. Introduction 
The substantive outcomes of a criminal justice system premised on a wide 
margin of prosecutorial discretion depend on the institutional interplay between the 
organ in charge of selection choices and those in charge of judicial oversight of such 
choices, against the backdrop of the statutory and regulatory principles and rules—as 
integrated by non legally-binding standards, guidelines, etc.—applicable in that 
system. 
In the previous chapters the analysis focused on the prosecutor’s side of this 
‘institutional equation’, with particular regard to the legal sources of prosecutorial 
discretion and to the practices that contribute to give them substance. In the present 
chapter the attention has been turned to the other side of the equation, namely to the 
institutional role of judges in the exercise of judicial review (or other forms of 
judicial supervision) with respect to prosecutorial selection choices. The purpose of 
the following paragraphs is to elaborate on the legal nature and purpose of the 
different instruments and procedures through which judges exercise such supervisory 
power, with a view to better understand the dialectic relations among these actors. 
Considering that this study generally limits the observation of the Court’s 
institutional practice to the preliminary examination and pre-trial phase, the judicial 
formation whose role is paramount in shaping the limits of the OTP’s discretion is 
undoubtedly the Pre-Trial Chamber. 
The adoption of the subjective institutional point of view of judges and the 
focus on the constraining rules and remedies mainly administered by the PTC 
completes the static analysis of the OTP-Judges relations and will constitute firm 
ground for analysing more closely the prosecutorial and judicial practices in Part 
Three of the work, in order to attempt an explanation of the regularities and 
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discontinuities of such practices at the current state of development of the ICC’s 
prosecutorial and judicial experience. 
 
2. The role of the Pre-Trial Chamber at the pre-investigation and investigation phases 
in general 
The PTC performs a number of functions in the framework of the Statute and 
constitutes one of the most distinctive institutional features of the ICC legal regime 
when compared with other international or internationalised criminal tribunals, and 
has rightly been described as a “building block in the bridging of different legal 
traditions” 510 . The Rome Statute—together with the RPE and applicable 
Regulations—provides an enumerated list of functions and procedures centred on the 
role of either a three-judge or a single-judge formation that interrelate with the 
exercise of prosecutorial discretion by the OTP511. Nevertheless, most of these 
provisions relate to the investigation stage of proceedings proper and are the 
necessary counterbalance to the powers and duties of the OTP in respect to 
investigations512. Relatively little is said about the PTC’s powers at the preliminary 
examination stage of proceedings, considering the limited prosecutorial powers at 
that early procedural juncture513. A preliminary distinction can therefore be traced 
between the supervisory role of the PTC at these two different procedural phases. 
																																																								
510 See H. FRIMAN, The Rules of Procedure and Evidence in the Investigative Stage, in H. FISCHER, C. 
KRESS, S. R. LÜDER (eds.), International and National Prosecution of Crimes under International 
Law: Current Developments, Berlin, 2001, 191-192. On the powers and attributions of the PTC see 
the commentaries of F. GUARIGLIA, G. HOCHMAYR, Article 57, Functions and Powers of the Pre-Trial 
Chamber, in O. TRIFFTERER, K. AMBOS (eds.), op. cit., 1421-1436; O. FOURMY, Powers of the Pre-
Trial Chamber, in A. CASSESE, P. GAETA, J. R. W. D. JONES (eds.), op. cit., 1207-1230, and in the 
same volume, M. MARCHESIELLO, Proceedings before the Pre-Trial Chamber, 1231-1246. 
511 See, e.g., article 15 of the Statute on the authorisation procedure in case of proprio motu; articles 
18 and 19 of the Statute on the PTC’s rulings concerning admissibility and jurisdiction; article 53 of 
the Statute on the supervisory role of the PTC as regards the OTP’s nolle prosequi decisions; articles 
56 and 57 of the Statute, respectively dealing with the powers of the PTC in relation to the so-called 
“unique investigative opportunities” and to its functions at the investigation stage of proceedings. See 
also article 58 on the procedure for the issuance of a warrant of arrest or summons to appear, and 
article 61 on the hearing for the confirmation of charges. The RPE and Regulations of the Court 
provide a more detailed set of provisions for each of these procedures, setting the formal and 
substantive requirements for the involvement of the PTC and its powers in relation with the other 
procedural actors (OTP, Defence, victims). 
512 See article 54 of the Statute, enumerating the powers and duties of the OTP during investigations. 
513 See, infra, footnote 515. 
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Further distinctions relate to the nature of the PTC’s involvement and the effects and 
consequences of the exercise of its powers and duties vis-à-vis the OTP. 
With regard to the preliminary examination phase, the involvement of the 
PTC is extremely limited both in terms of general supervision on prosecutorial early 
selection choices and of remedies against decisions not to proceed with a preliminary 
examination upon the receipt of information (either from private individuals or 
organisations or by means of a referral). In particular, before the conclusion of a 
preliminary examination and a request for authorisation to open an investigation by 
the OTP, little is the influence that judges can exercise on the discretionary conduct 
of the pre-investigation phase by the OTP514.  While this lack of ‘supervisory grip’ of 
the PTC could be justified on grounds that at the preliminary examination stage the 
OTP “has limited powers which cannot be compared to those provided in article 54 
of the Statute at the investigative stage” 515, it cannot be denied that there is a 
significant grey area where prosecutorial discretionary choices—bearing decisive 
consequences on the subsequent development of proceedings—are substantially 
immune from any judicial supervision516. Therefore there is a clear asymmetry 
between the latitude of prosecutorial discretion at the pre-investigation stage—that 
																																																								
514 For instance, at least one PTC attempted to use its pre-trial management powers as a proactive 
measure to incentivise the OTP to provide information about the status of a preliminary examination. 
See, supra, footnotes 275 and 276 and infra, next paragraph. 
515 In this sense see ICC, Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of 
an Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Situation in the Republic of Kenya, ICC-
01/09-19-Corr, PTC II, 31 March 2010, par. 27. 
516 For instance, when the OTP decides not to open a preliminary examination of a situation based on 
an ‘individual communication’, the information providers do not have any remedy against the 
Prosecutor’s negative decision. The same holds true for private information providers (i.e. those that 
unlike states and the UNSC cannot formally qualify as referring entities), who cannot challenge the 
OTP’s decision not to proceed with an investigation under article 53 of the Statute (or not to ask a 
judicial authorisation to investigate under article 15). On this issue see, supra, Part. One, Chapter 
Two, par. 5 (especially footnote 216). Given the sheer number of these communications in the 
practice of the Office, the drafters’ choice not to entrust the senders with an individual right to 
challenge the OTP’s determination—especially at such an early stage as the preliminary 
examination—may be considered wise. Nevertheless, especially as regards nolle prosequi decisions 
under article 15(6) and 53(1) of the Statute, the lack of any remedy for subjects such as the alleged 
victims—who have a vested interest in the continuation of proceedings—seems particularly striking. 
According to A. SCHÜLLER, C. MELONI, Quality Control in the Preliminary Examination of Civil 
Society Submissions, in M. BERGSMO, C. STAHN (eds.), Quality Control in Preliminary Examinations: 
Vol. 2, Brussels, 2018, 549: “The fact that, under the Rome Statute, there is no review mechanism that 
can be triggered in such circumstances by those who provided the information deserves strong 
criticism”. Along the same lines, see S. WILLIAMS, Civil Society Participation in Preliminary 
Examinations, in M. BERGSMO, C. STAHN (eds.), Quality Control in Preliminary Examinations: Vol. 
2, cit., 569-571 and F. FOKA TAFFO, Le pouvoir discrétionnaire du Procureur de la Cour pénale 
internationale, Baden-Baden, 2018, 81-82. 
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must be kept conceptually distinct from the specific investigative powers—and the 
(lack of) opportunities for judicial supervision of the respective discretionary 
choices.  
As proceedings approach the investigation stage, with the OTP enjoying 
greater powers, the role of the PTC becomes significantly more visible. The degree 
and scope of the PTC’s involvement at this juncture and beyond nevertheless differs 
according to the specific procedures or acts under consideration, and have different 
rationales. At a first approximation it is possible to concur with one commentator 
who describes the tripartite role of the PTC as “filtering, safeguarding and pushing 
ahead”517. The following paragraphs seek to introduce a few additional distinctions 
that may prove useful in understanding and classifying the different roles played by 
the PTC at the investigation stage vis-à-vis the Prosecutor, according to their 
rationale and the outcomes of the PTC’s intervention. 
 
2.1 Pre-trial management measures and the power to request additional information 
As it has been stressed on multiple occasions, the conduct of preliminary 
examinations is largely left to prosecutorial discretion, on the premise that this phase 
is not concerned with the exercise of investigative powers and merely serves the 
purpose of building the requisite factual and legal knowledge necessary to further 
determinations on the possibility and opportunity of opening an investigation. More 
generally, the pre-trial phase (including the investigation phase) is mainly focused on 
the discretionary choices of the OTP, although it may involve preliminary judges for 
the performance of certain crucial supervisory tasks.  
Nevertheless, besides the enumerated specific powers entrusted to 
preliminary judges that will be more closely examined in the next paragraphs, the 
Pre-Trial Chamber may use—and has in the past used—certain general and 
‘functional’ powers to indirectly influence the conduct of preliminary examinations 
and the OTP’s decisions as regards investigations. Examples of this kind are the 
																																																								
517 See M. MARCHESIELLO, op. cit., 1238. On the role of the PTCs and their jurisprudence see also J. 
COURTNEY, C. KAOUTZANIS, Proactive Gatekeepers: The Jurisprudence of the ICC’s Pre-Trial 
Chambers, in Chicago Journal of International Law, vol. 15, no. 2, 2015, 518-558. 
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Chamber’s powers to convene status conferences518 and to request the OTP to 
provide “specific or additional information or documents” that the PTC deems 
necessary to exercise its functions and responsibilities according to the pertinent 
statutory provisions519. The ‘functional’ character of these procedural powers consists 
in that they are instrumental to the exercise of the other enumerated powers—such as 
the power to issue a warrant of arrest or summons to appear—allowing the PTC to 
gather all the relevant information and to rule on parties’ requests in a timely and 
efficient manner. In practice, the powers to convene a status conference and to 
request additional information or documents have been often used in a cumulative 
way in the same procedural context. 
With regard to the Chambers’ power to convene status conferences, the PTC 
has made recourse to it on some occasions, allegedly in connection with the necessity 
to “provide for the protection and privacy of victims and witnesses, the preservation 
of evidence, the protection of persons who have been arrested or appeared in 
response to a summons”520. In one instance, the OTP criticised as “unauthorised” (in 
law) and “unwarranted” (in fact) the decision of the PTC, which later confirmed it 
denying a leave to appeal the decision521. This power has also been exercised in the 
																																																								
518 See Rules 121(2)(b) of the RPE and Regulation 30 of the Regulations of the Court. See also the 
ICC, Pre-Trial Practice Manual, September 2015, 8: “Pre-Trial Chambers should make full use of the 
possibility to hold status conferences with the parties. Oral orders and clarifications in relation to the 
conduct of the proceedings can be provided to the parties during such status conferences, increasing 
efficiency and eliminating the need for cumbersome written decisions. Parties’ procedural requests 
can also be received, debated and decided at status conferences”. On the use of the power to convene 
status conferences in the early practice of the Court see M. MIRAGLIA, The First Decision of the ICC 
Pre-Trial Chamber, in Journal of International Criminal Justice, vol. 4, issue 1, 188, 193. 
519 See Regulation 48(1) of the Regulations of the Court. An analogous power can be exercised by the 
PTC in the context of article 15 authorisation procedures, pursuant to Rule 50(4) of the RPE. 
Additionally, the PTC may avail itself of the power to ask any participant to the proceedings to 
“clarify or to provide additional details on any document” or to “address specific issues”, pursuant to 
Regulation 28(1) and (2) of the Regulations of the Court. 
520 See article 57(3)(c) of the Statute. This, together with Regulation 30 of the Regulations of the 
Court, is the legal basis relied on by the PTC in ICC, Decision to convene a Status Conference, 
Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, ICC-01/04-9, PTC I, 17 February 2005, 2. 
521 See ICC-OTP, Prosecutor’s Position on Pre-Trial Chamber I’s 17 February 2005 Decision to 
Convene a Status Conference, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, ICC-01/04-12-Anx, 
8 March 2005, par. 3-4, 12-19, 25-27. The OTP insisted on the line of separation between the 
“independence and autonomy of the Prosecutor in conducting investigations” and “the specific 
supervisory powers of the Pre-Trial Chamber”, clarifying that in his view the system “includes a 
closed number of provisions empowering the Pre-Trial Chamber to engage in specific instances of 
judicial supervision of the Prosecution’s investigative powers” (ibidem, par. 3, emphasis added). The 
OTP also lamented the likely violation of the audiatur et altera pars principle on the ground that it 
had not been invited to make submissions on the Chamber’s authority to convene a status conference 
at the investigation stage (ibidem, par. 8-9), and the risk of undermining the PTC’s appearance of 
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Ugandan situation, in the face of the OTP’s apparently unjustified delay in taking a 
decision on prosecution pursuant to article 53 of the Statute, well after the warrants 
of arrest against certain suspects had been issued522. More recently a request by the 
defence for Laurent Gbagbo to convene a status conference—ahead of a hearing for 
the confirmation of charges—has been rejected by a PTC523.   
With regard to the Chamber’s power to ask the OTP to provide additional 
information or documents, it should be recalled that a PTC has once made recourse 
to it with the aim of encouraging the OTP to take a decision on the outcome of a 
preliminary examination which had been on-going for a prolonged period of time524. 
As already recalled elsewhere in this work525, the OTP has strongly objected to what 
it deemed an unwarranted judicial interference in the discretional conduct of 
preliminary examinations, allegedly contrary to the legislative choice made by the 
drafters526. While in the end the OTP did provide at least some of the requested 
information, it clarified that this did not amount to accepting the PTC’s proactive 
posture527.  More frequently this power has been used during the investigation 
phase—particularly pending the issuance of a warrant of arrest or in preparation of a 
																																																																																																																																																													
impartiality through the interference with investigative activities (ibidem, par. 20-24). Nevertheless, 
the PTC declined in limine to consider the OTP’s requests for procedural reasons (see ICC, Decision 
on the Prosecutor's Position on Pre-Trial Chamber I's 17 February 2005 Decision to Convene a Status 
Conference, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, ICC-01/04-11, PTC I, 9 March 2005, 
2-4) and later rejected the OTP’s request for leave to appeal this decision (see ICC, Decision on the 
Prosecutor's Application for Leave to Appeal, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
ICC-01/04-14, PTC I, 14 March 2005, 2-4). 
522 See ICC, Decision to Convene a Status Conference on the Investigation in the Situation in Uganda 
in Relation to the Application of Article 53, Prosecutor v. Ongwen, Situation in Uganda, ICC-02/04-
01/05-68, PTC II, 2 December 2005. This decision was preceded by the PTC’s request to the OTP to 
“promptly inform the Chamber in writing of any decision concluding that “there is not a sufficient 
basis for prosecution under article 53, paragraph 2” of the Statute, and the reasons for this conclusion, 
in view of the Chamber's powers under article 53, paragraph 3 (b), of the Statute” (see ICC, Decision 
on the Prosecutor's Application for Unsealing of the Warrant of Arrest, Prosecutor v. Kony et al., 
Situation in Uganda, ICC-02/04-01/05-52, PTC II, 13 October 2005, par. 32). 
523 See ICC, Decision on a Defence request for a status conference, Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo, 
Situation in the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire, ICC-02/11-01/11-604, PTC I, 5 February 2014. 
524 See ICC, Decision Requesting Information on the Status of the Preliminary Examination of the 
Situation in the Central African Republic, Situation in the Central African Republic, ICC-01/05-6, 
PTC III, 30 November 2006, 4. 
525 See, supra, Part One, Chapter Two, par. 5. 
526 See ICC-OTP, Prosecution’s Report Pursuant to Pre-Trial Chamber III’s 30 November 2006 
Decision Requesting Information on the Status of the Preliminary Examination of the Situation in the 
Central African Republic, Situation in the Central African Republic, ICC-01/05-7, 15 December 2006, 
par. 10. 
527 Ibidem, par. 11: “doing so, the OTP is neither accepting the existence of a legal obligation to 
submit this type of information absent any decision under Article 53 being made, nor adopting a 
precedent that it may follow in future cases”. 
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hearing for the confirmation of charges528. Similarly, the PTC has availed itself of the 
power to order the OTP to provide additional information or documents for the 
purpose of ruling on the Prosecutor’s request for authorisation pursuant to article 15 
of the Statute, based on Rule 50(4) of the RPE529. 
 Overall, these procedural powers—as interpreted and used by some PTCs 
especially in the early days of the Court’s activity—while potentially being useful as 
pre-trial management tools to influence the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, did 
not alter the ‘balance of power’ between the OTP and the PTC as regards the conduct 
of preliminary examinations and investigations; a balance clearly leaning towards the 
Prosecutor’s discretion, and where judicial supervision is limited to the specific 
instances provided for in the Statute, RPE and applicable regulations530. As correctly 
pointed out by some scholars—a position largely shared by more recent case law—it 
is accepted that in the ICC procedural system the PTC does not generally act as an 
“investigative Chamber” or exercise shared investigative powers together with the 
OTP531. 
																																																								
528 See, e.g., ICC, Decision Requesting Additional Information and Supporting Materials, Situation in 
Darfur, Sudan, ICC-02/05-166, PTC I, 9 December 2008, 3-4; ICC, Order to the Prosecutor for the 
Submission of Additional Information on the Status of the Execution of the Warrants of Arrest in the 
Situation in Uganda, Prosecutor v. Kony et al., Situation in Uganda, ICC-02/04-01/05-131, PTC II, 
30 November 2006, 3-5; ICC, Public Redacted Version of the Order for the Provision of Additional 
Information Relating to the Prosecutor’s Application for Unsealing of Warrants of Arrest Issued on 8 
July 2005, and Other Related Relief, Prosecutor v. Kony et al., Situation in Uganda, ICC-02/04-
01/05-137, PTC II, 21 September 2005, 3-10. 
529 See, e.g., ICC, Decision Requesting Clarification and Additional Information, Situation in the 
Republic of Kenya, ICC-01/09-15, PTC II, 18 February 2010, par. 8-9, 13-14. See, more recently, 
ICC, Public Redacted Version of “Order to the Prosecutor to Provide Additional Information”, ICC-
01/17-X-6-US-Exp, 15 September 2017, Situation in the Republic of Burundi, ICC-01/17-6-Red, PTC 
III, 9 November 2017. Two similar orders have been issued by the PTC in relation to the OTP’s 
request for authorisation to open an investigation pursuant to article 15 of the Statute in the situation 
of Afghanistan (ICC-OTP, Public redacted version of “Request for authorisation of an investigation 
pursuant to article 15”, 20 November 2017, ICC-02/17-7-Conf-Exp, Situation in the Islamic Republic 
of Afghanistan, ICC-02/17-7-Red, 20 November 2017). See ICC, Order to the Prosecutor to Provide 
Additional Information, Situation in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, ICC-02/17-8, PTC III, 5 
December 2017 and ICC, Second Order to the Prosecutor to Provide Additional Information, 
Situation in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, ICC-02/17-23, PTC III, 5 February 2018, par. 4. 
This last order curiously requests the OTP to provide, inter alia, documents that are—in the own 
words of the PTC—“publicly available”. It is not entirely clear why the Court couldn’t acquire such 
public documents autonomously without resorting to its power under Rule 50(4) of the RPE. 
530 In this sense K. AMBOS, Treatise on International Criminal Law, Vol. III, International Criminal 
Procedure, cit., 384-385. See also F. GUARIGLIA, G. HOCHMAYR, Article 57, Functions and Powers of 
the Pre-Trial Chamber, cit., 1424 on the OTP-PTC contrasts as regards the interpretation of article 
57(3)(c) of the Statute and the possible expansion of the PTC’s supervisory and ‘directive’ powers. 
531 Ibidem, 1423 (particularly footnote 8). Contra, on the opportunity of a formal involvement of the 
PTC in the conduct of investigations see J. DE HEMPTINNE, The Creation of Investigating Chambers at 
the International Criminal Court. An Option Worth Pursuing?, in Journal of International Criminal 
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2.2 Authorisation powers 
Despite the OTP’s functional autonomy in the conduct of preliminary 
examinations and investigations, there are certain acts or decisions that the Office 
cannot adopt alone. In these cases the relationship between the OTP and PTC, with 
particular regard to the latter’s supervision on the discretionary choices of the 
former, is based on a ‘request-and-authorisation’ scheme. In other words, in order to 
put in place these actions, the OTP must apply in the prescribed form to the 
competent PTC and acquire its authorisation. The resulting prosecutorial action can 
therefore be described as a ‘complex act’, the product of the institutional interplay 
between the Prosecutor’s discretion and judicial authorisation powers. There are 
various examples of this kind of OTP-PTC relation in the Statute, the most visible 
ones being the authorisation mechanism envisaged by article 15 in case of proprio 
motu532 and the issuance of warrants and orders requested by the OTP for the 
purposes of an investigation533. It can be argued that also the Prosecutor’s requests to 
the PTC for the issuance of a warrant of arrest or summons to appear belong to this 
procedural scheme534. 
It is important to reflect on the reasons for the involvement of a PTC for 
adopting or completing—by means of a judicial authorisation—specific prosecutorial 
acts. Most of these hypotheses have in common the fact that states’ interests might 
be impinged on by the Prosecutor’s discretional action or otherwise presuppose the 
conduct of certain activities on their territories, even in the absence of their 
consent 535 . Therefore, the PTC’s judicial authorisation serves the purpose of 
																																																																																																																																																													
Justice, vol. 5, issue 2, 2007, 402-418 and, more recently and with detailed proposals, G. S. GORDON, 
Reconceptualizing the Birth of the International Criminal Case: Creating an Office of the Examining 
Magistrate, in M. BERGSMO, C. STAHN (eds.), Quality Control in Preliminary Examinations: Vol. 2, 
cit., 296-301, 303-317. 
532 See article 15(3) and (4) of the Statute. Other relevant examples are the OTP’s request of an 
authorisation to investigate despite a state’s request for deferral to national authorities pursuant to 
article 18(2) of the Statute; the OTP’s request made “on exceptional basis” pursuant to article 18(6) of 
the Statute—pending a PTC’s ruling on admissibility or when the OTP has deferred to national 
authorities—to take investigative steps for the preservation of evidence, and the OTP’s request to be 
authorised to conduct on-site investigation without the consent of the state concerned pursuant to 
article 57(3)(d) of the Statute. 
533 See article 57(3)(a) of the Statute. 
534 See article 58 of the Statute. 
535 By the same token, the request for authorisation pursuant to article 15 of the Statute presupposes, 
inter alia, the OTP’s negative assessment on the state’s ability and willingness to genuinely 
investigate and prosecute the crimes allegedly committed on its territory or by its nationals. 
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validating and putting into practical effect, upon a legal assessment based on the 
prescribed evidentiary standards or enabling circumstances 536 , the Prosecutor’s 
discretional choice and of conferring him or her the concrete authority—which only 
exists in potentiality—to entertain certain intrusive actions vis-à-vis the State 
Parties537. By contrast, with regard to the issuance of a warrant of arrest or summons 
to appear, the involvement of the PTC is functional to the protection of the suspected 
persons’ right to personal freedom (or freedom of movement), on the assumption that 
such fundamental rights can be restricted for the purposes of exercising criminal 
jurisdiction only upon the intervention of a judicial authority538. 
It must be clarified that this legal configuration of the OTP-PTC relations 
does not mean that the PTC is ‘acting together’ with the OTP, directly or indirectly 
participating to the prosecutorial conduct of investigative or prosecutorial tasks. Its 
role is in fact generally confined to the authorisation (or denial of authorisation) of 
specified actions—or to the issuance of certain orders or judicial measures—based 
																																																								
536 See, e.g., article 15(3) and (4) of the Statute introducing the “reasonable basis to proceed” 
evidentiary standard. See also article 18(6) of the Statute establishing that an authorisation to the OTP 
to take steps for the preservation of evidence pending a ruling on admissibility can be entertained only 
“on an exceptional basis” and provided that the OTP demonstrates a periculum in mora (“a significant 
risk that such evidence may not be subsequently available”). With regard to the authorisation of 
investigative steps within the territory of a State Party without its consent, article 57(3)(d) of the 
Statute establishes that the PTC must be satisfied that “the State is clearly unable to execute a request 
for cooperation due to the unavailability of any authority or any component of its judicial system 
competent to execute the request for cooperation” (emphasis added). These conditions set a very high 
threshold for the OTP in order to persuade the preliminary judges to authorise such actions. 
537  For instance, the drafting history of article 57(3)(d) clearly shows that the ‘request-and-
authorisation’ scheme to enable the conduct of on-site investigations against the will of the State 
Party, based on the PTC’s assessment of particularly stringent factual and legal requirements, 
constituted a pragmatic mediation among the differing views of the delegations represented at the 
Preparatory Committee. See, F. GUARIGLIA, G. HOCHMAYR, Article 57, Functions and Powers of the 
Pre-Trial Chamber, cit., 1433-1434. 
538 It should be borne in mind that article 21(3) of the Statute establishes that the interpretation and 
application of the sources of law outlined in paragraphs 1 and 2 of the same article “must be 
consistent with internationally recognized human rights”. It is undeniable that internationally 
recognised human rights standards include the right to personal liberty and freedom from arbitrary 
detention (see, e.g., article 9 of the ICCPR, whose paragraph 3 also clarifies that “it shall not be the 
general rule that persons awaiting trial shall be detained in custody”). For a reference to article 21(3) 
of the Statute and to the international human rights standards in ruling on the necessity to issue a 
warrant of arrest see ICC, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest against 
Jean‐Pierre Bemba Gombo, Prosecutor v. Bemba, Situation in the Central African Republic, ICC-
01/05-01/08-14-tENG, PTC III, 10 June 2008, par. 24 (footnotes 30-32), 90 (footnote 139). 
Preliminary judges have derived guidance from the relevant provisions of the ECHR and the ACHR—
as interpreted by the human rights courts in Strasbourg and San José—both as regards the evidentiary 
standard for the issuance of a warrant of arrest (referring to the “reasonable suspicion” test contained 
in article 5(1)(c) of the ECHR) and the fundamental right to liberty (referring to article 7 of the 
ACHR). 
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on a request which is the sole (discretional) responsibility of the OTP to put forward; 
one that is based on the Prosecutor’s autonomous assessment of the legal and factual 
circumstances, as well as of the opportunity and necessity of the request. In 
particular, the OTP bears the burden of convincing the PTC that the required 
evidentiary standards or the legal and factual circumstances enabling the adoption of 
the specified investigative steps are met in relation to each request for authorisation. 
For these reasons, the actual degree of judicial supervision embedded in such a 
‘request-and-authorisation’ procedural scheme depends on the PTC’s approach—
either more liberal or more rigorous—to the construction of the evidentiary standard 
and/or enabling circumstances.  
In conclusion, it must be observed that the PTC, with regard to these 
authorisation procedures, is not in the position to exercise a significant judicial 
discretion—besides the inherent margin of appreciation in interpreting the pertinent 
legal texts—for two fundamental reasons. First, the PTC is merely ‘reacting’ to the 
OTP’s request and must generally confine its legal assessment (and the scope of its 
authorisation) to the specific measure or action requested by the Prosecutor, based on 
the information and evidence provided in support by the OTP539. Failing a request to 
that effect, the PTC cannot overcome the OTP’s inaction and engage directly in 
investigative or quasi-investigative tasks540. Second, when the evidentiary standards 
or the circumstances enabling the concession of an authorisation are met, the PTC 
cannot deny an authorisation or the issuance of the requested measure (such as a 




539 For instance, it must be excluded that the PTC can issue a warrant of arrest on its own motion, 
failing a request of the OTP to that effect. See C. K. HALL, C. RYNGAERT, Article 58, Issuance by the 
Pre-Trial Chamber of a warrant of arrest or a summons to appear, in O. TRIFFTERER, K. AMBOS 
(eds.), op. cit., 1444. As regards the evidence and information necessary to grant the authorisation or 
the issuance of another measure, the Authors, while recognising that the PTC’s assessment shall 
generally be based only on the information provided by the OTP and contained in the request, 
underline that a certain margin of discretion may be exercised by the preliminary judges based on 
their authority with respect to a “unique investigative opportunity” (article 56 of the Statute, on which 
see, infra, par. 2.5 of this chapter). In addition, they correctly point out that no provision explicitly 
precludes the PTC from considering information presented by other relevant actors such as victims 
(ibidem, footnote 26). 
540 Ibidem.  
541 Ibidem. 
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2.3 Judicial review of negative decisions: ‘Persuasive’ and ‘corrective’ powers 
In other circumstances, depending on the interests at stake at the different 
procedural junctures, the supervisory role of the PTC is based on a different legal 
scheme, namely on the subsequent and potential judicial control over a prosecutorial 
discretionary choice. In these cases, the Prosecutor does not need the previous 
authorisation of the preliminary judges in order to adopt a discretional decision or to 
put in place a specific investigative action. Only once such decision or action is 
adopted according to the applicable legal standards—and ritually communicated to 
the other procedural subjects—there is an opportunity for certain qualified actors—or 
the PTC itself—to provoke the judicial review of the OTP’s act or decision. This 
judicial review may either be premised on an ex parte request or, in at least one 
hypothesis, be based on the PTC’s ex officio powers542. 
This procedural scheme of ‘subsequent control’ is the one provided for under 
article 53 of the Statute for the judicial review of the OTP’s decision not to proceed 
with an investigation or to start a prosecution. A closer look to the legal nature and 
limits of this judicial review is warranted, bearing in mind that the OTP’s negative 
decisions under article 53 are among the most notable manifestations of prosecutorial 
discretion at the pre-trial stage in the ICC procedural system. The judicial review of 
nolle prosequi decisions is build around a ‘double-track’ mechanism that 
distinguishes the procedure—in particular its triggering—and the legal consequences 
of judicial supervision based on the criteria and reasons adduced by the OTP for 
justifying its decision not to open an investigation or prosecution. Such 
differentiation can be schematised as follows:  
a) If the decision not to open an investigation or start a prosecution is based 
on one of the factors listed under article 53(1)(a)-(b) and 53(2)(a)-(b) of the 
Statute—or in any case not solely on letter c) regarding the interests of justice—the 
judicial review can only be triggered by a request of the referring entity. The PTC, 
upon review, “may request the Prosecutor to reconsider [his or her] decision”543.  
b) If the decision not to open an investigation or start a prosecution is based 
solely on the interests of justice pursuant to article 53, par. 1 and 2, letter c), the PTC 
																																																								
542 See articles 53(3)(a) and (b) of the Statute. 
543 See article 53(3)(a) of the Statute. 
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may on its motion review such decision, which “shall be effective only if 
confirmed”544 by the PTC. 
In the first place it must be noted that the PTC’s power of judicial review of 
the OTP’s negative decisions is framed in discretionary terms, as the expression 
“may review” clearly suggests545. Therefore the PTC is not under an obligation to 
conduct such review, at least in the case of ex parte proceedings546. Nevertheless, it 
can be argued that as regards the ex officio review, the PTC’s discretion is 
(implicitly) excluded because of the need to avoid the “potential paralysis of the 
Court”547, provided that the Prosecutor’s decision can only become effective if 
confirmed by the Chamber. In any event, the PTC’s discretion in entertaining these 
requests extends to the concrete individuation of the criteria to be considered for the 
purposes of the review—which are not clearly established in the Statute and 
RPE548—and involves the possibility to request additional information to the OTP or 
the applicant according to rule 107 of the RPE and Regulation 48 of the Regulations 
of the Court549. 
In the second place, the legal nature and scope of this judicial review deserves 
to be more closely scrutinised. It could be asked whether the judicial control 
																																																								
544 See article 53(3)(b) of the Statute. 
545 In this sense see M. BERGSMO, P. KRUGER, O. BEKOU, Article 53, Initiation of an Investigation, in 
O. TRIFFTERER, K. AMBOS (eds.), op. cit., 1377. 
546 Ibidem. In the case of review pursuant to article 53(3)(a) of the Statute, failing an initiative from 
the referring entity the PTC has no autonomous authority in reviewing the OTP’s decision. See, infra, 
footnote 551. 
547 Ibidem, 1379. The Authors correctly point out that, notwithstanding the fact that the PTC’s power 
to review is framed in discretional terms (“may on its own initiative”, emphasis added), “were the Pre-
Trial Chamber to refrain from reviewing such decision” the result would be a complete procedural 
deadlock. The OTP’s decision not to proceed would remain without effects in the absence of any 
other remedy to push forward the procedure, either by closing it or forcing the Prosecutor to open an 
investigation or start a prosecution. 
548 Ibidem, 1378-1379. Nevertheless, at a first approximation it can be concluded that the PTC shall 
first and foremost apply, in reviewing the OTP’ decision, the same criteria that the Prosecutor must 
take into consideration in reaching the decision under review (listed in article 53(1)(a)-(c) and 
53(2)(a)-(c) of the Statute). 
549 See Rule 107(2) of the PRE, which enables the PTC to request the OTP the presentation of 
information and documents, or summaries thereof, that it considers necessary for the purposes of the 
review, as well as Regulation 48(1) of the Regulations of the Court, which establishes the same power 
with specific reference to the ex officio review. It must be recalled that such power to require 
additional information or documents stems from the fact that, especially at the pre-investigation stage, 
the PTC has had no access to the OTP’s ‘situation file’ containing the information on the basis of 
which the OTP reached its negative decision, except for the limited information referred to in the 
OTP’s decision not to open an investigation or start a prosecution. Since no judicial review can be 
carried out in a legal and factual vacuum, the exercise of this power may prove necessary to allow a 
meaningful supervision of prosecutorial choices, irrespective of the correct stance on the legal 
character of the review and the scope of the PTC’s powers to that effect. 
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exercised by the PTC is one of merit—i.e. an autonomous de novo legal and factual 
(re)assessment of the reasons adduced by the OTP for a nolle prosequi decision—or 
a formal/procedural one—i.e. limited to an external control on the legality, and to a 
certain extent the reasonableness, of the inferences and conclusions reached by the 
OTP in its negative decision550. It could also be asked whether the PTC’s review 
should be exclusively confined to the arguments raised by the parties to the 
procedure or if judges can introduce additional grounds of review, even beyond the 
parties’ allegations551. The already examined bipartite nature of the review procedure 
carries important consequences on both issues. It can reasonably be argued that in the 
ex parte procedure pursuant to article 53(3)(a) of the Statute the scope of judicial 
review is limited to an external control on the legality and overall reasonableness of 
the decision not to proceed or prosecute, limitedly to the grounds for review raised 
by the applicants (referring state or UNSC)552. In particular, the PTC’s should be 
allowed to verify whether the OTP’s conclusions are affected by error with regard to 
the application of the criteria that must be considered in order to reach a decision 
under article 53 of the Statute, based on the information available at the relevant 
stage of proceedings553. Nevertheless, it is not entirely clear against which evidentiary 
standard the PTC is required to conduct such review, also considering that the OTP 
																																																								
550 See M. BERGSMO, P. KRUGER, O. BEKOU, op. cit., 1378. 
551 Ibidem, in the sense that, at least in the context of ex parte review, the Court must confine its 
analysis to the arguments raised by the parties. In its first and only decision pursuant to article 
53(3)(a) of the Statute the PTC confirmed that the review must respect the ne ultra petita principle 
(see ICC, Decision on the request of the Union of the Comoros to review the Prosecutor’s decision not 
to initiate an investigation, Situation on the Registered Vessels of the Comoros, Greece and 
Cambodia, ICC-01/13-34, PTC I, 16 July 2015, par. 10: “the scope of review is limited to the issues 
that are raised in the request for review and have a bearing on the Prosecutor’s conclusion not to 
investigate”). This approach has been later confirmed by the Appeals Chamber, see ICC, Decision on 
the admissibility of the Prosecutor’s appeal against the “Decision on the request of the Union of the 
Comoros to review the Prosecutor’s decision not to initiate an investigation”, Situation on the 
Registered Vessels of the Comoros, Greece and Cambodia, ICC-01/13-51, AC, 6 November 2015, 
par. 56: “In the absence of such a request [for judicial review], the Pre-Trial Chamber has no power to 
enter into a review of the Prosecutor’s decision not to proceed with an investigation on its own 
motion, irrespective of how erroneous it may consider the Prosecutor’s admissibility determination to 
be” (emphasis added). 
552 This approach to judicial review in ex parte procedures has been, at least in the abstract, shared by 
the PTC. See, ICC, Decision on the request of the Union of the Comoros to review the Prosecutor’s 
decision not to initiate an investigation, Situation on the Registered Vessels of the Comoros, Greece 
and Cambodia, ICC-01/13-34, PTC I, 16 July 2015, par. 9-10 and 12: “Upon review, the Chamber 
must request the Prosecutor to reconsider her decision not to investigate if it concludes that the 
validity of the decision is materially affected by an error, whether it is an error of procedure, an error 
of law, or an error of fact”. 
553 Ibidem. 
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is not under an obligation—unless otherwise requested to do so—to provide the 
Chamber with all the information on which the article 53 decision to be reviewed is 
based554. Therefore, in the absence of further indications in the legal texts, the 
distinction between a de novo review and an error-based review is not—in 
practice—clear-cut555. To the contrary, when the review is triggered ex officio 
pursuant to article 53(3)(b) of the Statute—as regards a nolle prosequi decision based 
solely on the interests of justice—it seems fair to conclude that both the language and 
scope of the provision allow for a more penetrant review of the Chamber. 
Considering the legally evanescent character of the interests of justice clause—which 
can at least in theory translate into a highly discretional assessment by the OTP—the 
PTC’s review would necessarily enter into a substantive analysis of the opportunity 
of the Prosecutor’s negative decision, as well as on the very normative content of the 
interests of justice clause556. 
In the third and last place, the legal consequences of judicial review pursuant 
to article 53 significantly differ in the cases of ex parte and ex officio review. In the 
																																																								
554 See M. BERGSMO, P. KRUGER, O. BEKOU, op. cit., 1378. 
555 In the Comoros review decision the PTC, while stating that it was not tasked to carry out a de novo 
assessment of the criteria for reaching a decision not to investigate, has in practice conducted an in-
depth substantive control of certain logical inferences contained in the Decision not to Open an 
Investigation (as pointed out by one dissenting judge, see Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Péter 
Kovács, Situation on the Registered Vessels of the Comoros, Greece and Cambodia, ICC-01/13-34-
Anx-Corr, par. 2, 7-8). In this regard the OTP, in its final decision upon reconsideration, emphasised 
the distinction between the two types of judicial review and manifested its adamant disagreement on 
the methodology and standard of review applied by the PTC (see, ICC-OTP, Final decision of the 
Prosecution concerning the “Article 53(1) Report” (ICC-01/13-6-AnxA), dated 6 November 2014, 
Situation on the Registered Vessels of the Comoros, Greece and Cambodia, ICC-01/13-57-Anx1, 30 
November 2017, par. 41-44, 48-51, 57). The OTP lamented the PTC had applied in practice a de novo 
review, despite apparently subscribing to an error-based review (ibidem, par. 52). In so doing, the 
PTC would have acted beyond the statutory scope of the judicial review procedure, failing to accord 
the required deference to the primary fact-finder (ibidem, par. 58-65). 
556 This is precisely the reason why although the interests of justice clause potentially provides the 
OTP with a great deal of discretionary power, the recourse to such criterion to justify a negative 
decision is not particularly appealing. On the distinction between the two forms of review and the 
correlative standards for its conduct see ICC, Decision on the admissibility of the Prosecutor’s appeal 
against the “Decision on the request of the Union of the Comoros to review the Prosecutor’s decision 
not to initiate an investigation”, Situation on the Registered Vessels of the Comoros, Greece and 
Cambodia, ICC-01/13-51, AC, 6 November 2015, par. 58-59 and ICC-OTP, Final decision of the 
Prosecution concerning the “Article 53(1) Report” (ICC-01/13-6-AnxA), dated 6 November 2014, 
Situation on the Registered Vessels of the Comoros, Greece and Cambodia, ICC-01/13-57-Anx1, 30 
November 2017, par. 48. The OTP seems to imply that even the review based on article 53(3)(b) of 
the Statute is not necessarily based on a de novo assessment of the PTC. More generally, the main 
issue with the interests of justice clause is certainly the difficulty to objectify its content, something 
that both the OTP and the Chambers have carefully avoided to do so far. As colourfully written by F. 
FOKA TAFFO, op. cit., 135, the issue of the interests of justice is a “patate chaude juridique”, that 
neither the Office nor the PTC seem particularly keen on holding. 
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first case, if the PTC disagrees with the OTP’s legal assessment or finds it affected 
by errors, it can merely ask the Prosecutor to reconsider his or her previous 
decision557. The OTP is surely under a legal duty to reconsider that decision, taking 
into account the PTC’s reasoning, but it is by no means required to modify or reverse 
it as per the Chamber’s request558. This is clearly an obligation of means (or process), 
not of result559. In other words, only the Prosecutor has the final say on whether to 
open or not an investigation or start a prosecution. Therefore, the PTC’s role in this 
kind of review procedure is of ‘persuasive’ character560. To the contrary, in case of ex 
officio review, if the PTC disagrees with the Prosecutor’s reasoning on the interests 
of justice, the decision not to proceed with an investigation or prosecution shall 
remain without effects and, more importantly, the preliminary judges will have the 
																																																								
557 See article 53(3)(a) of the Statute and Rule 108(2)-(3) of the RPE. This feature of the ex parte 
review is uncontroversial. See ICC, Decision on the request of the Union of the Comoros to review 
the Prosecutor’s decision not to initiate an investigation, Situation on the Registered Vessels of the 
Comoros, Greece and Cambodia, ICC-01/13-34, PTC I, 16 July 2015, par. 50; ICC, Decision on the 
admissibility of the Prosecutor’s appeal against the “Decision on the request of the Union of the 
Comoros to review the Prosecutor’s decision not to initiate an investigation”, Situation on the 
Registered Vessels of the Comoros, Greece and Cambodia, ICC-01/13-51, AC, 6 November 2015, 
par. 56; ICC-OTP, Final decision of the Prosecution concerning the “Article 53(1) Report” (ICC-
01/13-6-AnxA), dated 6 November 2014, Situation on the Registered Vessels of the Comoros, Greece 
and Cambodia, ICC-01/13-57-Anx1, 30 November 2017, par. 48, 50. 
558 Ibidem. 
559 ICC-OTP, Final decision of the Prosecution concerning the “Article 53(1) Report” (ICC-01/13-6-
AnxA), dated 6 November 2014, Situation on the Registered Vessels of the Comoros, Greece and 
Cambodia, ICC-01/13-57-Anx1, 30 November 2017, par. 3. 
560 Obviously, one needs to look at the concrete content of the PTC’s review decision in order to 
determine what are the margins for an autonomous reconsideration on the part of the OTP. In the 
Comoros situation the conclusions reached and the assertive language used by the Chamber seemed to 
leave very narrow margins to the OTP in reconsidering its previous decision. The PTC pushed for a 
reconsideration whose outcomes were largely predetermined by the review decision itself. See, ICC, 
Decision on the request of the Union of the Comoros to review the Prosecutor’s decision not to 
initiate an investigation, Situation on the Registered Vessels of the Comoros, Greece and Cambodia, 
ICC-01/13-34, PTC I, 16 July 2015, par. 49 and 51: “the Chamber cannot overlook the discrepancy 
between, on the one hand, the Prosecutor’s conclusion that the identified crimes were so evidently not 
grave enough to justify action by the Court . . . and, on the other hand, the attention and concern that 
these events attracted from the parties involved, also leading to several fact-finding efforts on behalf 
of States and the United Nations in order to shed light on the events. The Chamber is confident that, 
when reconsidering her decision, the Prosecutor will fully uphold her mandate under the Statute” 
(emphasis added). In other words the PTC has at a minimum ‘strongly suggested’ the OTP to reverse 
its previous decision not to open an investigation, implying that the original conclusion may have 
been the result of the OTP’s failure to uphold its mandate. Nevertheless, in the situation at hand this 
persuasive stance of the PTC did not succeed, since the OTP confirmed its previous decision, refusing 
to reverse or modify it. 
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power to force the OTP to open an investigation or start a prosecution. This kind of 
review may therefore be described as having a ‘corrective/confirmative’ character561. 
In any event, as it will be seen in greater detail in the following part of this 
work, since the Court’s practice of judicial review pursuant to article 53 of the 
Statute is limited to just one instance, any generalisation or conclusive argument 
should be carefully avoided at the present stage of the evolution of the OTP-PTC 
relations in this field. 
 
2.4 ‘Confirmative’ powers 
Another scheme of interaction between the OTP and PTC concerns the 
judicial oversight of discretionary decisions made as a result of an investigation and 
leading to the selection of individual defendants and the formulation of the charges. 
The ICC’s institutional and procedural architecture envisages at this crucial stage—
which marks the transition from the pre-trial to the trial phase—the indispensable 
intervention of the PTC in order to perform a filtering of the charges, for the 
purposes of “[protecting] the rights of the Defence against wrongful and wholly 
unfounded charges”562—in the interest of fairness and judicial economy563—and of 
“[delineating] the factual scope of the case to be discussed at trial”564. The drafters of 
the Rome Statute summarised this crucial supervisory role and procedural passage 
through the expression “confirmation of charges”, which takes place at a dedicated 
hearing according to article 61 of the Statute. It has been correctly pointed out that 
this power of preliminary judges in the ICC’s legal regime “is an important example 
																																																								
561 See M. BERGSMO, P. KRUGER, O. BEKOU, op. cit., 1379. For the position of the Court see, supra, 
the references in footnote 557. On the confirmative structure of the judicial review and legal 
consequences of the ex officio procedure pursuant to article 53(3)(b) of the Statute, see also ICC-OTP, 
Final decision of the Prosecution concerning the “Article 53(1) Report” (ICC-01/13-6-AnxA), dated 6 
November 2014, Situation on the Registered Vessels of the Comoros, Greece and Cambodia, ICC-
01/13-57-Anx1, 30 November 2017, par. 45-48. 
562 For the first enunciation of this fair trial function of the confirmation of charges procedure see ICC, 
Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Situation in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, ICC-01/04-01/06-803-tEN, PTC I, 29 January 2007, par. 37. This position was 
subsequently confirmed in virtually all confirmation decisions. 
563 As regards judicial economy, the function of the confirmation procedure is that of filtering the 
cases and charges brought by the OTP, sending to trial exclusively the ones that—based on the 
“sufficient evidence to establish substantial grounds to believe” evidentiary standard—“deserve to be 
discussed at trial”, as written by W. A. SCHABAS, E. CHAITIDOU, M. EL-ZEIDY, Article 61, 
Confirmation of the charges before trial, in O. TRIFFTERER, K. AMBOS (eds.), op. cit., 1488. 
564 Ibidem, 1488-1489.  
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of the increased judicial control by the judiciary over the Prosecutor that sets the ICC 
apart from other international criminal justice institutions”565. 
It could be asked whether the power to scrutinise the OTP’s charging 
decision—contained in the so-called “Document Containing the Charges”566—by 
confirming in whole or in part (or non confirming the totality of) the charges, 
structurally differs from the already examined power to authorise the opening of an 
investigation pursuant to article 15 of the Statute or to review ex officio the OTP’s 
decision pursuant to article 53(1)(c) and (2)(c) of the Statute567 . Despite the different 
contexts, all the three situations have in common the fact that the procedure can 
move on if and only the OTP and the PTC substantially agree on the legal and 
factual assessment that forms the basis for the action or decision concerned568. 
Nevertheless, the procedural scheme of the confirmation of charges differs from the 
other two examples on the one hand for the intensity of judicial oversight (which is 
based on a significantly more demanding evidentiary standard) 569 and, on the other 
hand, because of the PTC’s incisive power to determine with binding effects the 
material scope of the subsequent (trial) proceedings (including by persuading the 
OTP to amend the charges and/or or to modify the legal characterisation of the facts 
or modes of responsibility) 570. In other words both the quantity and the quality of this 
form of judicial supervision, as well as its multifunctional legal character, set this 
procedure apart from other similar schemes of OTP-PTC interaction. 
As regards the intensity of judicial oversight of—or interference with—
prosecutorial charging choices at the stage of confirmation, it must be recalled that 
the PTC has on some occasions took a proactive stance by persuading the OTP to 
																																																								
565 Ibidem, 1487. 
566 See article 61(3)(a) of the Rome Statute and, for the required content of this document, Regulation 
52 of the Regulations of the Court. The Document Containing the Charges (DCC), despite the 
different nomen juris, is the functional equivalent of the indictment in the procedural nomenclature of 
the ad hoc tribunals. 
567 An analogy between these procedures is suggested by the OTP in ICC-OTP, Final decision of the 
Prosecution concerning the “Article 53(1) Report” (ICC-01/13-6-AnxA), dated 6 November 2014, 
Situation on the Registered Vessels of the Comoros, Greece and Cambodia, ICC-01/13-57-Anx1, 30 
November 2017, par. 45-46. 
568 Ibidem. 
569 See article 61(7) of the Statute. 
570  For instance, in Bemba and Laurent Gbagbo the PTC has adjourned the hearing for the 
confirmation of charges requesting the OTP, respectively, to consider an amendment to the charges as 
originally formulated in the DCC with particular regard to the possible re-characterisation of the mode 
of liability, and to provide additional evidence to substantiate the charges for the purposes of 
confirmation. See, infra, next footnote. 
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amend the charges in order to fix a case theory that might have led to non-
confirmation of part or the totality of the original charges. The procedural instrument 
used by the PTC for these purposes has been the power to adjourn the hearing, 
thereby requesting the OTP to consider the possibility to provide additional evidence 
or conduct further investigations, and/or of amending the original charges in order to 
accommodate a (potentially) different legal characterisation of the facts (including 
the modes of liability)571. In these circumstances the contribution of the PTC in 
shaping the factual scope of the trial becomes particularly evident. Preliminary 
judges in these occasions have not been the passive recipients of the OTP’s requests 
but have somehow contributed to the formulation of a viable case theory for trial, 
effectively ‘nudging’ the OTP towards certain investigative and charging decisions 
among a range of possibilities, under the potential threat of non-confirmation of the 
charges572.  
With regard to the request to consider an amendment of the charges pursuant 
to article 61(7)(c)(ii) the PTC has clarified that it is the “Prosecutor’s responsibility 
to build and shape the case”573 and that by adjourning the hearing “it does not purport 
to impinge upon the Prosecutor's functions as regards the formulation of the 
appropriate charges or to advise the Prosecutor on how best to prepare the [DCC]”574. 
The language used by the PTC in its request to the OTP to consider providing 
additional evidence has been more forceful, also based on a severe critique 
																																																								
571 The two possible grounds for the adjournment of the hearing are contemplated by article 
61(7)(c)(i)-(ii) of the Statute. See also Rule 127 of the RPE. The power to adjourn the hearing has 
been used by the PTC on both grounds, see ICC, Decision Adjourning the Hearing pursuant to Article 
61(7)(c)(ii) of the Rome Statute, Prosecutor v. Bemba, Situation in the Central African Republic, 
ICC-01/05-01/08-388, PTC III, 3 March 2009, par. 17-20, 26, 38-39, 42, 46, 48-49 where the PTC 
considered that the evidence presented at the hearing appeared to establish a “different crime”, sub 
specie mode of liability; and ICC, Decision Adjourning the Hearing pursuant to Article 61(7)(c)(i) of 
the Rome Statute, Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo, Situation in the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire, ICC-
02/11-01/11-432, PTC I, 3 June 2013, par. 14-15, 18, 28-29, 35, 37, 44-47 where the PTC requested 
the OTP to consider carrying out further investigations and providing additional evidence to sustain 
the charges. 
572 Reference can be made to the ‘nudge theory’ as it emerged in recent behavioural studies, 
particularly the field of economics. On the subject see the seminal book of R. H. THALER, C. R. 
SUNSTEIN, Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth, and Happiness, New Haven, 2008. 
573 ICC, Decision Adjourning the Hearing pursuant to Article 61(7)(c)(ii) of the Rome Statute, 
Prosecutor v. Bemba, Situation in the Central African Republic, ICC-01/05-01/08-388, PTC III, 3 
March 2009, par. 39. 
574 Ibidem. 
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concerning the quality of certain pieces of evidence presented at the hearing575. In 
any event, in both cases the PTC seemed inclined to give the OTP an additional 
opportunity to ‘set matters right’ with the evidence and DCC—either by integrating 
the originally insufficient evidence or by correcting the legal characterisation of the 
facts (including the modes of liability)—instead of plainly refusing to confirm the 
charges576. From the point of view of the OTP-PTC relations and institutional balance 
of power, the PTC’s ability to intervene on the OTP’s (defective) case-theory and 
evidentiary materials through the adjournment of the confirmation hearing combines 
its corrective-persuasive and confirmation powers, and involves a degree of judicial 
scrutiny no less than the one contained in a decision not to confirm, in whole or in 
part, the charges. 
	
2.5 ‘Protective’ powers relating to evidence and persons participating at trial 
One last category of supervisory powers of the PTC vis-à-vis the OTP at the 
pre-trial stage deals with a set of heterogeneous situations in which the intervention 
of the Chamber may become necessary in order to protect the integrity of the 
proceedings or of the evidence as well as the safety of certain parties or participants 
to the proceedings. 
																																																								
575 ICC, Decision Adjourning the Hearing pursuant to Article 61(7)(c)(i) of the Rome Statute, 
Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo, Situation in the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire, ICC-02/11-01/11-432, PTC 
I, 3 June 2013, par. 29-30, 34-35, 44-45. The PTC criticised the OTP’s excessive reliance on NGOs’ 
reports and press articles, pieces of evidence that according to preliminary judges “cannot in any way 
be presented as the fruits of a full and proper investigation by the Prosecutor in accordance with 
article 54(l)(a) of the Statute” (ibidem, par. 35). 
576 In both cases the OTP has accepted the ‘suggestions’ of the PTC and as a result the charges were 
later confirmed after the adjournment and the additional activities performed by the OTP. See, ICC-
OTP, Public Redacted Version of the Amended Document containing the charges filed on 30 March 
2009, Prosecutor v. Bemba, Situation in the Central African Republic, ICC-01/05-01/08-395-Anx3, 
OTP, 30 March 2009 and ICC, Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on 
the Charges of the Prosecutor Against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Prosecutor v. Bemba, Situation in 
the Central African Republic, ICC-01/05-01/08-424, PTC II, 15 June 2009. It should be noted that in 
this last case the PTC declined to confirm all charges of crimes against humanity and war crimes 
based on the mode liability originally envisaged by the OTP under article 25(3)(a) of the Statute and 
only confirmed the charges of war crimes based on superior responsibility pursuant to article 28(a) of 
the Statute, a mode of liability that wasn’t originally included in the DCC and that was only added by 
the OTP in its amended version as a result of the PTC’s decision to adjourn the hearing. In other 
words, the PTC wouldn’t have sent Bemba to trial based on the original charges. See also ICC, 
Decision on the confirmation of charges against Laurent Gbagbo, Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo, 
Situation in the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire, ICC-02/11-01/11-656-Red, PTC I, 12 June 2014, par. 11 
making reference to the confidential documents submitted by the OTP in compliance with the PTC’s 
request to provide additional evidence for the purposes of confirmation. 
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With regard to the preservation of the integrity of proceedings and of 
evidence, examples of this kind of protective powers are the PTC’s involvement in 
relation to a “unique investigative opportunity” (either based on a request of the OTP 
or ex officio)577 and the PTC’s ability to adopt “protective measures for the purposes 
of forfeiture”578. The first situation is particularly interesting from the point of view 
of the OTP-PTC relations, since the PTC can adopt protective measures to ensure the 
availability and preservation of evidence ahead of trial either upon the request of the 
OTP or on its own initiative—after consultation with the OTP579—if the preliminary 
judges consider that the OTP’s failure to act is “unjustified” and may be detrimental 
to the defence580. This power to indicate measures for the preservation of evidence 
without a specific request from the Prosecutor reveals the drafters’ intention to 
provide a residual avenue for the protection of the integrity of proceedings and, as far 
as exonerating evidence is concerned, the rights of the defence581. The consultation 
between the OTP and PTC—a prerequisite for the adoption of ex officio protective 
measures—is an example of a procedural mechanism designed to avoid any direct 
confrontation between the two organs and to promote a dialogue that may incentivise 
the OTP to act, instead of accepting to be trumped by preliminary judges with regard 
to measures pertaining to the preservation of evidence. In any event, being the 
judges’ ex officio intervention an exception to the overall control enjoyed by the OTP 
on the conduct of investigations, such power is not only subject to the procedural 
condition of consultations, but also to the substantive condition of the “unjustified” 
nature of the OTP’s failure to request a protective measure. Additionally, in order to 
protect the OTP’s discretionary attributions against unwarranted interventionism 
																																																								
577 See article 56 of the Statute. 
578 See article 57(3)(e) of the Statute. 
579 Paragraph 1, letters (a)-(c) of article 56 of the Statute deal with the procedure for securing a unique 
investigative opportunity based on a request of the OTP. Paragraph 2 of the same article contains a 
non-exhaustive list of measures that the PTC may adopt to this end. Paragraph 3, on the other hand, 
deals with the PTC’s authority to adopt such measures even in the absence of a request from the OTP, 
following a consultation between the Prosecutor and the Chamber. 
580 Ibidem, par. 3, letter (a). 
581 See F. GUARIGLIA, G. HOCHMAYR, Article 56, Role of the Pre-Trial Chamber in relation to a 
unique investigative opportunity, in O. TRIFFTERER, K. AMBOS (eds.), op. cit., 1418-1419. 
LIMITS OF AND REMEDIES AGAINST THE OTP’S DISCRETIONARY DECISIONS: THE ROLE OF JUDGES 
(IN PARTICULAR OF PRELIMINARY JUDGES) 
 153 
from the PTC, the measures adopted ex officio by the PTC can be appealed by the 
Prosecutor and the appeal heard on expedited basis582. 
In other words, the mechanism under consideration allows preliminary 
judges—under the strict parameters set out in the relevant provisions—to exercise ex 
officio an active role in the investigative process, although limited to measures 
necessary to preserve the evidence. While this can be considered a concession to a 
more inquisitorial approach to the role of judges at the pre-trial stage of proceedings, 
the degree of judicial intervention allowed by the Statute has nothing to do with the 
idea of a judicial investigation583.  
The PTC’s protective powers, in particular with regard to the rights of 
persons participating at the pre-trial stage can also be traced back to the residual 
clause of article 57(3)(c) of the Statute, which enables the preliminary judges to 
“provide for the protection and privacy of victims and witnesses, the preservation of 
evidence, the protection of persons who have been arrested or appeared in response 
to a summons, and the protection of national security information”584. The last part of 
this provision adds an additional dimension to the protective powers of the PTC, one 
that does not relate to evidence or persons participating at trial but to the preservation 
of states’ interests, in order to ensure the confidentiality of information that may have 
a bearing on their national security585. 
The attitude of these protective powers to interfere with the prosecutor-
centred conduct of investigations and pre-trial procedures is obviously dependent on 
																																																								
582 See article 56(3)(b) of the Statute. On the reasons behind this legislative choice see F. GUARIGLIA, 
G. HOCHMAYR, Article 56, Role of the Pre-Trial Chamber in relation to a unique investigative 
opportunity, cit., 1419-1420. 
583Ibidem, 1419. According to the Authors the provision allows the Chamber to “impose conditions on 
the modalities of taking evidence” but does not “empower the PTC to take evidence itself”. However, 
in practice such distinction might not be clear-cut and other authors are of the view that article 56 
“entrusts the Pre-Trial Chamber with a subsidiary proprio motu role as an investigative body” (see, 
e.g., C. KRESS, The Procedural Law of the International Criminal Court in Outline: Anatomy of a 
Unique Compromise, cit., 607).  
584 On the functions of this provision see, supra, par. 2 and 2.1 of this chapter. It is clear that this 
provision refers to other specific provisions concerning the protection of victims and witnesses (article 
68 of the Statute), the preservation of evidence (in particular article 56 of the Statute) and the 
protection of information related to national security (article 72 of the Statute). It is debated whether it 
also introduces a “sub-provision broadening the scope of Pre-Trial Chambers’ supervisory powers” 
(see F. GUARIGLIA, G. HOCHMAYR, Article 57, Functions and Powers of the Pre-Trial Chamber, cit., 
1424). 
585 Further normative references on this issue are article 72 of the Statute and Regulation 21(8) of the 
Regulations of the Court (concerning the exception to publicity and broadcasting of information 
“likely to be prejudicial to national security interests”). 
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the OTP’s approach towards the collection of evidence, the specific circumstances of 
each situation and the corresponding need to protect the involved actors. 
	
3. Preliminary conclusions 
At the end of this review on the institutional role of preliminary judges vis-à-
vis the OTP in the exercise of prosecutorial discretion at the pre-trial stage, the 
following summary preliminary observations can be made. 
a) The institutional role of the PTC in the judicial supervision over 
prosecutorial discretionary choices is not premised on a ‘monolithic’ general power 
of judicial review of the OTP’s decisions. To the contrary, the Chamber is endowed 
with supervisory powers that are procedure-specific in relation to the different kinds 
of prosecutorial actions or decisions considered, and objective-driven with regard to 
the potentially countervailing interests that judicial review is called upon to protect. 
In the context of these ‘variable geometry’ in the OTP-PTC relationships, the judges’ 
institutional role may therefore consist, according to the circumstances, in the power 
to adopt pre-trial management measures; the power to authorise or not certain 
prosecutorial requests; the power to review negative decisions with ‘persuasive’ or 
‘confirmative/corrective’ effects; the power to confirm, not to confirm or in other 
ways orient OTP’s (charging) decisions; and the power to issue measures designed to 
protect evidence, persons, national interests, and goods that may form the object of 
forfeiture. 
b) The PTC’s supervisory powers are generally of a reactive nature. In other 
words, the PTC’s ability to exercise them is predominantly premised on a request of 
the subjects interested to a certain procedural outcome (e.g. the OTP’s desire to 
proceed or not to proceed with an investigation; the referring entity’s desire to have a 
nolle prosequi decision reviewed; etc.) and confined to the specific grounds of 
review presented by the applicant. Nevertheless, on certain enumerated 
circumstances and under strict procedural and substantive conditions, the PTC can 
exercise supervisory powers ex officio, thereby influencing in a more direct and 
substantial manner the direction or the potential outcomes of specific prosecutorial 
activities at the pre-trial stage. 
LIMITS OF AND REMEDIES AGAINST THE OTP’S DISCRETIONARY DECISIONS: THE ROLE OF JUDGES 
(IN PARTICULAR OF PRELIMINARY JUDGES) 
 155 
c) The possibility to activate the different powers of judicial oversight is 
strictly limited, both subjectively and objectively, by the statutory and regulatory 
framework governing the ICC legal regime. Only qualified actors can invoke the 
PTC’s intervention, with the complete exclusion of entire categories of participants, 
such as victims, from the ability to challenge—at least directly—some of the most 
relevant prosecutorial discretionary choices. 
d) The ‘balance of powers’ among the relevant actors at the pre-trial stage of 
the proceedings clearly leans towards the OTP, consistent with a normative and 
regulatory framework that entrusts the Office with the task of adopting and carrying 
out the most relevant pre-investigation and investigation decisions (including the 
framing of the overall strategy and theme-specific policies relevant to its activity). 
Nevertheless, the judges’ role is not always confined to a merely external and formal 
control over prosecutorial choices. The PTC may indirectly—and substantially—
influence prosecutorial choices even when its powers and supervisory decisions are 
devoid of direct and binding effects. The ‘legal suasion’—which goes well beyond a 
formalistic and legalistic understanding of the OTP-PTC relationships—connected to 
certain PTC’s decisions must be carefully considered with a view to determine the 
concrete effects of pre-trial decisions on the formulation of prosecutorial case-
hypotheses and other discretionary decisions. 
e) As it will be seen in greater detail in the next part of this work, the legal 
consequences of this complex and multifaceted procedural and institutional 
framework may alternatively reveal prosecutorial and judicial patterns of conflict or 
agreement between the OTP and PTC with regard to the nature and limits of specific 
discretionary acts, powers, decisions. In some cases, also considering the relative 
paucity of pertinent practice, there will be no identifiable pattern of behaviour or 
trend in the OTP-PTC relations, but only individual cases that do not allow for 
excessive or unwarranted generalisations. It will be necessary to assess the reasons 
for the existence of areas of interpretive agreement or disagreement between the 
involved actors, in order to appreciate their consequences on the overall effectiveness 
and legitimacy of the work of the Court.
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CONCEPTUAL TOOLS FOR THE ANALYSIS OF 
PROSECUTORIAL AND JUDICIAL PRACTICE AT THE PRE-
TRIAL STAGE OF THE ICC PROCEDURE 
	
1. Introduction 
The theoretical foundations and the static legal dimension of prosecutorial 
discretion and its judicial oversight at the pre-investigation and pre-trial phase of the 
ICC have been the object of extensive analysis in the first two parts of the present 
work. This preliminary normative assessment needs now to be tested against the 
actual prosecutorial and judicial practice at the current stage of development of the 
work of the Court, with a view to compare the law in the books and the law in action. 
The main reason for carrying out the proposed practice-based analysis is to 
provide a more realistic and empirically supported understanding of the dynamics of 
prosecutorial discretion and judicial review at the ICC and, consequently, of the 
current trends in the OTP-PTC institutional relationships. To that end, the present 
chapter introduces the conceptual tools that have guided the selection, analysis and 
systematisation of the relevant prosecutorial and judicial practice. In the first place 
the concept of ‘prosecutorial practice’ is more clearly defined for the purposes of 
justifying the choices concerning the selection, analysis and systematisation of the 
cases (par. 2). Then, the concept of ‘proportionality’ between the degree of discretion 
and the depth of judicial review is illustrated as the general principle that forms the 
basis of the ICC’s system of checks and balances for the exercise of prosecutorial 
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discretion and its supervision (par. 3). Moreover, a model based on the binary 
opposition ‘open clash v. smooth relationship’ is introduced as a tool for the 
schematisation of the relevant instances of practice and leitmotiv in the description of 
the OTP-PTC underlying institutional relationships (par. 4). Finally, we shall 
formulate the hypothesis that there is at the current stage of development of the 
Court’s work a certain degree of ‘dissociation of formants’ (i.e. discrepancy between 
the statutory/regulatory framework and the actual practice of the relevant actors) 
with regard to the overall outcomes of the exercise of prosecutorial discretion and 
judicial review thereof (par. 5). Such hypotheses will then be tested against the 
concrete patterns of behaviour and prosecutorial/judicial trends at the pre-
investigation and investigation junctures as recollected in Chapter Two of this Part, 
in order to validate (or disprove) these propositions, and to attempt to measure by 
appropriate standards—qualitative and to a lesser extent quantitative—said 
phenomena, as well as their potential explanations and institutional consequences. 
  
2. The concept of ‘prosecutorial practice’ in the context of the present study 
References to the concept of prosecutorial and/or judicial practice have been 
frequent throughout this study, included in the context of the static analysis carried 
out in the first two parts. As the work approaches the institutional dynamics of the 
OTP-PTC relations with regard to the practical outcomes of the exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion and judicial review thereof, a more precise definition—and 
delimitation—of the concept of practice for the purposes of the case-based analysis is 
warranted. In particular, this seems necessary due to the normative specificity of 
ICL, an institutional project based on an inevitable—and potentially creative—
semantic and normative tension between the legal domains of the ‘international’ and 
the ‘criminal’586. More specifically, it should always be borne in mind that this study 
focuses its attention on the principles and rules—and most importantly on the 
concrete acts and decisions based on such principles and rules—that concern the 
organs of an independent international judicial organisation. In other words, the 
																																																								
586 On the complex and amphibious normative structure of international criminal law and the inherent 
dialectical—sometimes contradictory—relation between its ‘international’ and ‘criminal’ components, 
see M. COSTI, E. FRONZA, Il diritto penale internazionale: nascita ed evoluzione, in E. AMATI, M. 
COSTI, E. FRONZA, P. LOBBA, E. MACULAN, A. VALLINI, op. cit., 19. 
CONCEPTUAL TOOLS FOR THE ANALYSIS OF PROSECUTORIAL AND JUDICIAL PRACTICE AT THE PRE-
TRIAL STAGE OF THE ICC PROCEDURE 
 159 
practice under consideration does not generally flow from the behaviour of states—
as a purely internationalist understanding of the term would imply—but from that of 
the OTP (through its internal hierarchical structure and the people endowed with the 
power to express the position of the Office) and of the Chambers (through the 
various articulations in which ICC judges can exercise their judicial functions). 
Nevertheless, the actual manifestations of states’ behaviour are not irrelevant, since 
they may indirectly play a role in determining the outcomes of the OTP-PTC 
institutional interplay with regard to the exercise of discretion and its judicial 
oversight587. 
Having cleared the field from any potential confusion or conflation between 
the traditional concept of state practice in international law on the one hand and, on 
the other, the concept of prosecutorial/judicial practice for the purposes of the 
present work, it is necessary to provide a more precise definition of what counts as 
practice, with a view to establish which behaviours of the relevant actors pertain to 
its domain, subject to the delimitations of the field of analysis of the present study.  
With regard to the prosecutorial side of the concept, ‘practice’ means any 
identifiable act, decision, motion, request—irrespective of its formal legal 
denomination—through which the OTP exercises the discretionary powers entrusted 
to that organ for the purposes of carrying out its mandate at the pre-investigation and 
pre-trial phase of the proceedings, in accordance with the Statute, RPE and other 
regulatory texts (strictly legal dimension of prosecutorial practice). The term also 
encompasses any document or public statement relating to the strategies, policies, 
and positions of the OTP—both general and situation or case-specific—with regard 
to the discharge of its discretionary mandate (policy dimension of prosecutorial 
practice). 
With regard to the judicial side of the concept, ‘practice’ refers to any judicial 
decision or part of decision—irrespective of its formal legal denomination—adopted 
in particular by the PTC (and in case of appeal by the AC) in the exercise of the 
different supervisory powers entrusted to the judges at the pre-investigation and pre-
																																																								
587 For instance, states that have referred a situation to the Prosecutor pursuant to article 13(a) of the 
Statute have the power to challenge the OTP’s decision not to proceed with an investigation or 
prosecution pursuant to article 53 of the Statute, thereby triggering the ex parte procedure for the 
judicial review of that decision. 
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trial phase, according to both the ex parte and ex officio review procedures provided 
for under the applicable statutory and regulatory texts. The term encompasses not 
only those decisions that grant or reject—in whole or in part—the requests of the 
OTP and of the other parties and participants in relation to the exercise of 
prosecutorial discretionary powers, but also those that may otherwise indirectly 
influence the outcomes of the OTP’s discretionary decision-making. 
As already articulated elsewhere, in particular in formulating the research 
questions that form the basis of this study, the analysis of ‘practice’ in the 
aforementioned sense is limited to the preliminary examination and pre-trial phases 
of the proceedings at the ICC588. The rationale behind this delimitation of the study—
and therefore of the pertinent practice under consideration—is at the same time 
logical-chronological and normative. In order to carry out an up-to-date review of 
prosecutorial practice and judicial supervision thereof it seems convenient to start 
from the earliest forms of involvement of the relevant actors (at the preliminary 
examination and pre-trial phase). The decisions taken at these procedural junctures 
contribute in a decisive way to shape the subsequent development of proceedings, 
determining inter alia the (factual) scope of investigation and trial. It should also be 
borne in mind that these fundamental choices take place in a context of ‘normative 
rarefaction’—i.e. in the absence of a clear set of principles and rules to guide the 
exercise of discretion—and in which the opportunities for judicial review, when 
available, are subjectively and objectively limited. These considerations make it 
appropriate to assess in the first place the concrete outcomes of the OTP-PTC 
institutional interplay at the pre-trial stage, without denying that the dynamics of 
prosecutorial discretion and its judicial supervision have important manifestations 
also at other procedural stages589. 
Based on this understanding of the concept of practice—and subject to the 
delimitation of its application—what can be expected from the case-based analysis 
																																																								
588 See, supra, Introduction.  
589 It is obvious that highly discretionary choices and judicial supervision thereof also take place at the 
trial stage, in the context of appeal proceedings (including the interlocutory ones), in cooperation 
proceedings or later on, in proceedings pertaining to the execution of sentences and their monitoring, 
or in the hypothesis of revision procedures. All these subsequent potential manifestations of 
prosecutorial discretion and judicial supervision, that take place in a more ‘normatively dense’ 
environment, are nevertheless influenced—and somehow predetermined—by decisions adopted at the 
earlier stages of proceedings, which are the focus of the present work. See, infra, Chapter Two, par. 4 
of this Part. 
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and systematisation of said practice? What role does practice play in concrete terms?  
It is alleged that the empirical manifestations of practice perform a twofold function 
in the context of the ICC legal framework: on the one hand a descriptive function, 
and on the other hand a creative function.  
As to the descriptive function, it is submitted that through the lens of the 
definitional parameters provided above, the concept of practice and its concrete 
determinations enable the observer to keep track of the behaviours of the relevant 
actors and to fit them within the underlying scheme(s) of interplay defined by the 
normative texts. By looking at how concretely the relevant actors interpret their 
institutional role it is possible to provide a clearer description of the system of checks 
and balances that governs the exercise of prosecutorial discretion at the ICC. 
As to the creative function, it is submitted that the concept of practice allows 
the observer to recognise and assess the transformative potential of the concrete 
behaviours adopted by the relevant actors, i.e. their real capacity to confirm, 
complement, and/or contradict the static legal framework, giving substance to the 
abstract boundaries of prosecutorial discretion and judicial oversight. The inherent 
creativity of these choices, made possible—and sometimes necessary—by the 
peculiar normative environment of the ICC, is a distinctive feature of various other 
substantive and procedural aspects of international criminal justice590. 
A concluding methodological consideration seems appropriate with regard to 
the approach towards the analysis of practice and, in particular, to the role of scholars 
in relation to the empirical manifestations of said practice. It should be made clear 
that the systematic work of analysis of the relevant practice carried out in this study 
is in no way premised on a purely descriptive approach and on a passive 
understanding of the role of scholars vis-à-vis the decisions adopted by the relevant 
organs of the ICC. To consider ICL scholars and commentators as the mere passive 
recipients of this practice, only called to record the outcomes of the OTP-Judges 
interactions, would utterly negate the very purpose of a critical case-based analysis 
of prosecutorial discretion and judicial review at the ICC. Such purpose is to 
																																																								
590 For an in-depth analysis of the creative contribution of international criminal tribunals on the 
development of international criminal law and of some of its foundational categories see the 
contributions in S. DARCY, J. POWDERLY (eds.), Judicial Creativity at the International Criminal 
Tribunals, Oxford, 2010. 
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encourage a more realistic understanding of the institutional dynamics of 
prosecutorial discretion, through the critical assessment of their concrete law in 
action outcomes, and consequently of the overall performances of the ICC in terms 
of distributive criminal and procedural justice. 
	
3. The principle of proportionality between the degree of discretion and the degree of 
judicial oversight 
The static analysis carried out in the previous parts has already shown that in 
the legal framework of the ICC there is no single model of exercise of prosecutorial 
discretion and of its judicial review or supervision. To the contrary, both the latitude 
of prosecutorial discretion and of judicial supervision follow different ‘modal’ 
procedural and institutional paths, depending—inter alia—on the stage of 
proceedings; the evidentiary standards required for the adoption of a certain act, 
request or decision; and the necessity to strike a balance between competing 
subjective interests at stake the context of the OTP-PTC relations591. It could be 
asked whether these different legal configurations of discretion-and-control 
mechanisms—and consequently of the OTP-PTC relations—can be traced back to a 
common normative principle, or if they are merely the result of context-specific 
legislative choices devoid of a coherent institutional and normative design. It is 
alleged that such a common normative principle does exist in the statutory and 
regulatory framework of the ICC, and that it can be synthetically described as the 
principle of (relative) direct proportionality between the degree of discretion of 
prosecutorial choices and the degree of judicial oversight of said choices. In other 
words, the greater the ‘discretionary potential’ of the prosecutorial decision under 
consideration, the greater the ‘supervisory potential’ entrusted to the judges with 
regard to such decisions. The relative discretionary and supervisory potential of 
specific categories of prosecutorial and judicial decisions can be estimated according 
to qualitative standards and indicators, such as the concrete consequences of the 
decision on the continuation (or discontinuance) of proceedings at a given procedural 
stage; their impact on the rights of the suspect/accused person, victims and/or the 
																																																								
591 See, supra, Part Two, Chapter Three, par. 2.1 to 2.5 for an in-depth analysis of the different 
schemes of interplay between the OTP and PTC. 
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involved states; their impact on the determination of the material, personal and 
territorial scope of investigations, prosecutions and the eventual trial; etc.  
The existence of this proportionality principle can be illustrated through 
various examples. For instance, in the context of prosecutorial negative decisions 
under article 53 of the Statute, the PTC’s power of review—both as regards the 
modes of its triggering and its consequences—increases proportionally to the degree 
of discretion exercised by the OTP in reaching the concerned decision. More 
precisely, when such decisions are based on purportedly “exacting legal 
requirements”592 (namely those integrating jurisdiction and admissibility, including 
gravity) the PTC’s supervisory powers are limited to an ex parte review, which can 
only lead to a request for reconsideration593. To the contrary, if the negative decision 
is premised solely on the largely discretional parameter of the interests of justice, the 
PTC’s supervisory powers include the possibility of an ex officio review, and the 
OTP’s decision only takes effect if confirmed by the competent PTC594. Another 
example is the request and authorisation procedure in case of proprio motu, whereby 
the OTP’s discretion to single out a situation for investigation—in the absence of a 
state or UNSC referral—is counterbalanced by the necessary judicial authorisation of 
the PTC. Lastly, reference can be made to the procedure for the issuance of a warrant 
of arrest or summons to appear or the procedure for the confirmation of charges. In 
both circumstances, given that the OTP is requesting either a restriction of the 
suspect’s right to liberty or freedom of movement, or that the accused be sent to trial 
for the specific crimes charged—based on a discretional assessment and selection of 
the information and evidence acquired during investigations—the PTC’s role is not 
limited to a superficial supervision on the formalities of OTP’s request, but is framed 
in terms of request-and-confirmation on the basis of the “sufficient evidence to 
establish substantial grounds to believe” evidentiary standard595. 
																																																								
592 These are the words used by the preliminary judges to describe the nature of the criteria listed 
under article 53(1)(a)-(b) of the Statute. See ICC, Decision on the request of the Union of the 
Comoros to review the Prosecutor’s decision not to initiate an investigation, Situation on the 
Registered Vessels of the Comoros, Greece and Cambodia, ICC-01/13-34, PTC I, 16 July 2015, par. 
14. That no discretion whatsoever is exercised by the OTP in assessing the admissibility of potential 
cases, especially sub specie gravity, is nevertheless highly questionable. 
593 See article 53(3)(a) of the Statute.  
594 See article 53(3)(b) of the Statute. 
595 See article 61(7) of the Statute. 
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Notwithstanding the general validity—and the textual and empirical 
substance—of the above considerations, it must be clarified that this principle of 
proportionality does not generally take the form of a rigid rule governing all aspects 
of the exercise of discretion and control in the context of the OTP-PTC relations596. 
For instance, it can be argued that at the very early stage of proceedings (i.e. at the 
stage of pre-preliminary screening and preliminary examinations), while the 
Prosecutor’s discretion on the course of action to adopt and the elements to consider 
is relatively wide, the judges’ ability to interfere with or supervise such discretion is 
relatively limited (if not excluded). It could also be observed that the degree of 
supervision exercised at the stage of authorisation in case of proprio motu has 
been—in practice—relatively limited. In other words, while the proportionality-
based model seems to faithfully describe the choices of legal and institutional design 
of the Statute, there may be variations on—or deviations from—such general 
principle, introducing a degree of asymmetry between the scope of discretion and the 
scope of judicial supervision597. 
	
4. ‘Open clash’ v. ‘Smooth relationship’: The explicative power of oppositions 
The concrete outcomes of the interpretation of principles and rules governing 
the exercise of prosecutorial discretion and its judicial oversight at the ICC—whose 
symmetrical institutional projection are the OTP-PTC relations—may give rise, 
depending on the circumstances, to patterns of interpretive agreement or interpretive 
disagreement among the relevant actors598. Such agreements or disagreements may 
concern—inter alia—the interpretation of the legal clauses that enable and delimit 
the exercise of prosecutorial discretionary powers (as well as the latitude and degree 
of judicial supervision thereof); the legal character and intensity of the evidentiary 
																																																								
596 On the conceptual and operational distinction between principles and rules see R. DWORKIN, op. 
cit., 24, 26 and R. ALEXY, op. cit., 57. 
597 One example of such asymmetry is the fact that certain procedural subjects—such as victims—
cannot challenge the OTP’s negative decisions or that the OTP’s decision not to open a preliminary 
examination cannot be challenged. 
598 The problem of disagreements among lawyers has become a locus classicus of contemporary 
philosophy of law. On the subject in general see J. WALDRON, Law and Disagreement, Oxford, 2009 
and L. S. PAU, G. B. RATTI (eds.), Acordes y desacuerdos. Cómo y por qué los juristas discrepan, 
Madrid, 2012. On the concept of interpretive disagreements in particular, see V. VILLA, Deep 
Interpretive Disagreements and Theory of Legal Interpretation, in A. CAPONE, F. POGGI (eds.), 
Pragmatics and Law. Perspectives in Pragmatics, Cham, 2016, 89-119. 
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standards that must be satisfied in order to adopt certain acts or decisions; the 
consequences of the failure to comply with the required principles or rules, in 
particular when ascertained upon judicial review of prosecutorial action; the 
necessity to strike a balance between the needs of prosecutorial efficiency, judicial 
economy and the protection of the rights of other procedural actors (such as the 
Accused and victims); etc. 
From a methodological point of view, it should not be assumed that areas of 
agreement among the OTP and judges on specific issues do necessarily reflect a 
situation of physiologic functioning of the checks and balances mechanism, whereas 
areas of (sometimes deep) disagreement necessarily reflect a situation of pathologic 
functioning of such institutional machinery. To the contrary, a well-functioning 
mechanism of checks and balances must contemplate—and sometimes even require 
–a certain degree of interpretive conflict and prosecutors-judges dialectic 599 . 
Nevertheless, when such conflicts become systemic they may reflect shortcomings of 
the underlying normative standards as well as an increasing discrepancy between the 
‘legislative formant’ and the ‘judicial formant’ (including prosecutorial action 
subject to judicial review) as it results from the practice of the relevant actors. An 
excessive level of this discrepancy may result in the reduced coherence and 
effectiveness of the legal system under consideration600. In this sense, the analysis of 
practice as defined in the previous paragraphs will make it possible to assess the 
existence and degree of this potential dissociation of formants at the ICC. 
While a precise quantitative estimate of the relative degree of agreement or 
disagreement on specific issues pertaining to the exercise of prosecutorial discretion 
seems particularly hard to produce, carrying out a qualitative analysis of the main 
areas of agreement/disagreement—and of the reasons that may explain them—is 
certainly feasible, but requires the elaboration of an appropriate explanatory model. 
																																																								
599 For instance, an excessive judicial deference towards prosecutorial requests—such as in the 
issuance of warrants of arrest or other restrictive measures or an excessively liberal practice in the 
confirmation of charges—may be the sign of an unbalanced system of checks and balances, one where 
judges act as a mere rubber stamp to unfettered discretionary choices, possibly to the detriment of the 
fairness of proceedings and the rights of the accused. 
600  On the concept of ‘dissociation’ and the potential consequences of a significant level of 
discrepancy between the static normative framework and the concrete practice of the relevant actors 
see, infra, next paragraph. 
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The explanatory model adopted in the present work—both to categorise and 
evaluate the relevant practice—is built around the contrastive dichotomy ‘open 
clash’ v. ‘smooth relationship’ between the OTP and judges. The expression open 
clash denotes those situations in which the Prosecutor and judges adopt clearly 
conflicting interpretations of the principles and rules applicable to a certain 
procedural choice involving the exercise of discretion and/or judicial supervision 
thereof. These disagreements, as they result from the relevant acts, documents and 
decisions, may or may not lead to the lack of cooperation between the OTP and 
judges, or to the incomplete compliance with the judges’ decisions, as a result of the 
OTP’s assertion of its discretionary prerogatives. The expression smooth 
relationship, to the contrary, denotes those situations where there is a clear 
agreement between the OTP and judges, resulting in the substantial conformity of the 
interpretation of the pertinent principles and rules applicable to specific prosecutorial 
choices and to their judicial supervision. These patterns of agreement may be—but 
are not necessarily—the consequence of a judicial approach inspired by a substantial 
deference towards the Prosecutor’s discretionary powers.  
It is alleged that the proposed dichotomy allows for an efficient screening of 
the relevant practice and serves as an effective tool to schematise the results of the 
enquiry into the OTP-PTC institutional relationships. Nevertheless, it must be 
observed that the model of analysis proposed here, like any explanation based on 
binary oppositions, presents inevitable epistemological limits and risks of 
oversimplification of the phenomena under consideration. In particular, it may prove 
hard to fit into the proposed binary opposition those situations or instances of 
practice that do not present a clear-cut character, such as those where elements of 
interpretive agreement and disagreement are entangled in the same choice or 
decision of the relevant actors. In any event, a careful distinction—even within the 
same act or decision—between profiles of agreement and disagreement, together 
with a phase-based and thematic approach towards the analysis of prosecutorial and 
judicial practice is deemed sufficient to minimise the risk of exaggerating the 
importance (or over interpreting) the current trends in the OTP-judges relations. 
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5. The ‘dissociation of formants hypothesis’: Attempting to measure the discrepancy 
between the law in the books and the law in action 
In the previous paragraph the proposition has been made that prosecutorial 
and judicial practices may give rise to interpretive disagreements and even to harsh 
institutional dialectics among the relevant actors. These instances or patterns of 
institutional and interpretive subjective discrepancy—i.e. conflicting interpretations 
or positions put forward by the OTP and/or judges—may be the sign of a deeper 
phenomenon of dissociation of formants of the ICC legal system. With the 
expression “dissociation of formants”—borrowed from the language of comparative 
law 601 —we hereby indicate a noticeable and to a certain extent measurable 
divergence or disharmony between the various normative mechanisms (the legal 
formants) that give rise to the operational rules applicable in the legal system under 
consideration, as they result from an empirical analysis of the practice of the relevant 
actors602. 
In particular, it is alleged that with regard to the exercise of prosecutorial 
discretion and judicial review thereof, in the context of the ICC and of the OTP-
judges relations, there are areas in which it is possible to identify a variable degree of 
discrepancy between the statutory and regulatory formant on the one hand, and on 
the other, the prosecutorial/judicial formant. It will be necessary to put to test this 
hypothesis through a closer analysis of the dynamic dimension of prosecutorial and 
judicial practice and its comparison with the static framework studied in the previous 
parts of this work. 
From a methodological point of view it must be clarified that the 
‘dissociation hypothesis’ is not premised on the simplistic idea that every discernible 
discrepancy or disharmony among formants—and/or among the relevant institutional 
actors—is necessarily the consequence of a failure to abide by the obligations 
stemming from written statutory or regulatory texts. To the contrary, such 
discrepancy or dissociation may be the result of legitimate competing normative 
																																																								
601 See, supra, Introduction. The reference is to the works of R. SACCO, Legal Formants: A Dynamic 
Approach to Comparative Law (Instalment I of II), cit., 24, 26-27, 30-34 and Legal Formants: A 
Dynamic Approach to Comparative Law (Instalment II of II), cit., 343-344. As already explained in 
the Introduction, reference to this concept is made exclusively for explicative purposes and not in 
order to uncritically transpose comparative law analysis to the realm of ICL. 
602 On the concept of ‘operational rule’ and its relations with general formulas see, ibidem, 378-379. 
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claims and interpretations put forward by the concerned subjects, or the product of 
their transformative/integrative practices, especially when the indeterminacy of the 
applicable principles and rules leaves a significant leeway to the creative force of 
such practices. In other cases this dissociation may present itself in the form of a 
discrepancy between the externally manifested justification (i.e. the reasons) for the 
adoption of a certain interpretive solution, and the substantive content (and 
consequences) of the concrete operational rule applied603. 
The recognition that any legal system, even the most internally coherent, can 
show—at an empirical and historical review—a certain degree of dissociation among 
its formants may seem unacceptable under the principle of non-contradiction, “the 
fetish of municipal lawyers”604, but should not come as a surprise to international 
criminal lawyers, used as they are to deal with the multi-layered, normatively open, 
culturally fuzzy and plural system that is ICL605. Starting from the assumption that a 
certain degree of dissociation or discrepancy may be considered physiologic, a more 
practically relevant endeavour would be to evaluate the concrete extent and degree of 
this dissociation, by developing criteria that may help assessing its root causes and its 
potential consequences on the overall functioning of the legal system considered. In 
other words, is it possible to ‘measure’—according to qualitative and quantitative 
standards—this inevitable dissociation, and to determine whether it is within 
acceptable physiologic limits or, to the contrary, it pushes the coherence of the legal 
system to its breaking point? The question must be answered in the affirmative, with 
a few caveats. 
As far as quantitative analysis is concerned, it is alleged that a careful 
evaluation of the number of cases where a discernible degree of dissociation and/or 
interpretive disagreement exist can be carried out through an appropriate screening 
of the relevant practice. Given the inevitable limitations of such a quantitative 
approach, it is necessary to complement it with an appropriate qualitative analysis. 
																																																								
603 For instance, as already noted supra (see particularly footnote 555), the Comoros reviewing Pre-
Trial Chamber, while declaring its intention to carry out an error-based review of the OTP’s decision 
not to open an investigation, has in practice conducted an in-depth substantive review of that decision 
more akin to a de novo review, showing a clear example of disharmony between the stated standard of 
review and the operational rule concretely applied by the judges. 
604 See, R. SACCO, Legal Formants: A Dynamic Approach to Comparative Law (Instalment I of II), 
cit., 24. 
605 In this sense see M. COSTI, E. FRONZA, op. cit., 18-23. 
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To that end, it has been useful to collect and categorise these instances of practice 
according to a context-specific and phase-based scheme of interpretation, in order to 
reflect the potentially greater or lesser prevalence of harmony or disharmony among 
formants in relation to specific acts, decisions, and procedures. Obviously, due 
consideration has been given to the fact that the practice of the OTP and judges in 
certain fields is very limited—and sometimes confined to a few or even a single 
instance—in order to avoid excessive or unwarranted generalisations.
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE OTP’S DISCRETIONARY PRACTICE  
AND ITS JUDICIAL REVIEW: A CASE-BASED ANALYSIS 
	
1. Introduction 
In this chapter, building on the conceptual framework introduced in the 
previous one and bearing in mind the static analysis carried out in the first two Parts 
of the work, we shall conduct a case-based analysis of the relevant discretionary 
practice of the OTP and—when available—of the corresponding supervisory practice 
of judges. The aim of this enquiry is first and foremost that of identifying and 
describing the trends in the OTP-judges relations as regards the use of discretionary 
powers and control thereof in the conduct of preliminary examinations and pre-trial 
activities. Provided that an analysis of the totality of such practice would be virtually 
impossible, the chapter proceeds to the selection of patterns of relevant practice, 
based on predetermined criteria, in order to minimise the risk of arbitrary or non-
representative choices. 
In particular, the relevant practice has been selected, analysed and organised 
according to a phase-based and thematic approach. In other words, we shall proceed 
logically and chronologically following the ‘flow’ of the ICC procedural schemes of 
the pre-investigation and pre-trial phases, starting from the early manifestations of 
the exercise prosecutorial discretion (i.e. the opening and the conduct of preliminary 
examinations), to proceed with the decision to open or not to open an investigation 
(or, in case of proprio motu, to seek the judges’ authorisation to investigate) and the 
potential involvement of judicial supervision at those later stages. It is alleged that 
proceeding in this way allows for a more realistic representation of the different 
schemes of interplay between the Prosecutor and judges (and the potential 
interpretive disagreements thereof), and will make it possible to better discern—if 
any—the degree of dissociation of formants across the different procedural stages, 
having regard to the typical acts or decisions adopted in each of these phases. 
With regard to the selection of the practice under review, the following 
criteria have guided the process: a) The type of act, decision or choice in relation to 
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the procedural phase in which it is adopted, and the subject adopting it; b) The 
frequency of interpretive agreement/disagreement at the considered procedural 
stages; c) The creative/innovative character of the practice (act, decision, etc.) 
considered, compared to a static analysis of the relevant statutory and regulatory 
provisions; d) The intensity of the disagreement between the relevant actors and/or of 
the discrepancy among formants; e) The institutional consequences of the 
interpretive agreements/disagreements, in particular whether a certain choice or 
decision generates a subsequent ‘adaptive’ or ‘reactive’ practice606. 
This work of screening and categorisation of prosecutorial practice will then 
form the object of the overall normative and institutional assessment to be carried out 
in Part Four, with a view to identify the possible explanations for the current trends 
of prosecutorial discretion and judicial review at the ICC, and more generally in the 
OTP-PTC relationships. 
 
2. Prosecutorial (and judicial) practice as to preliminary examinations 
In this paragraph the most relevant lines of development as regards the 
conduct of preliminary examination on the part of the OTP—as well as the practice 
resulting from the very limited judicial intervention at this stage—are analysed. In 
particular, attention has been focused on the creative role of the OTP in the 
‘proceduralisation’ of preliminary examinations (par. 2.1), and the practice relating 
to the decision to open (or not to open) a preliminary examination, pursuant to the 
assessment of the information received by the Office (par. 2.2). The issues of timing 
in the conduct of preliminary examinations and the OTP’s use of time as a 
procedural tool to foster complementarity have been considered (par. 2.3), as well as 
the OTP’s established reporting practice on the preliminary examination activities 
(par. 2.4).  
Considering the fact that at the preliminary examination stage there is still no 
judicial procedure proper and the involvement of judges is extremely limited, most 
of the practice considered concerns the activity of the OTP. Nevertheless, instances 
																																																								
606 See, infra, Part Four for a systematisation of the data collected based on these criteria.  
THE OTP’S DISCRETIONARY PRACTICE AND ITS JUDICIAL REVIEW: A CASE-BASED ANALYSIS 
 173 
of judicial intervention are discussed when available and significant in relation to the 
concrete functioning of the OTP-judges institutional relations. 
 
2.1 The ‘proceduralisation’ of preliminary examinations 
The concrete articulation of the conduct of preliminary examinations—in the 
absence of a detailed statutory framework to that effect—has been largely a creation 
of the OTP’s institutional, administrative and self-regulatory practices, through a 
process of gradual refinement. In particular, while the Statute and the RPE envisage 
preliminary examinations as a prerequisite for subsequent determinations on the 
opening of an investigation607, nothing is said as to their conduct and logistical 
deployment, which is therefore left for determination to the OTP in the exercise of its 
administrative and organisational independence and discretion608. 
As seen in the analysis of the so-called policy papers, the OTP has put 
forward a document detailing its approach toward the conduct of preliminary 
examinations, which largely builds on the already established practice elaborated by 
the Office in the early years of the work of the Court609. This document and the 
consequent practice of the Office have contributed to a decisive ‘proceduralisation’ 
of the conduct of preliminary examinations, providing a more structured approach 
towards the exercise of discretion at this stage. The most distinctive features of this 
proceduralisation must be more closely analysed with a view to assessing the 
creative function performed by the OTP’s practice in this area. 
The first feature to consider is the quadripartite structure of the conduct of 
preliminary examinations established by the practice of the OTP610. The Office 
articulates its activities at the preliminary examinations stage in four consecutive 
phases or procedural steps, namely: 
- Phase 1, which “consists of an initial assessment of all information on 
alleged crimes received under article 15”, whose “purpose is to analyse and verify 
the seriousness of information received, filter out information on crimes that are 
																																																								
607 See article 15(6) of the Statute (referring to paragraphs 1 and 2 of the same article), as well as 
article 53(1) of the Statute. See also Rule 104 of the RPE. 
608 See article 42(1) and (2) of the Statute. 
609 See, supra, Part Two, Chapter Two, par. 3. 
610 See ICC-OTP, Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, November 2013, par. 77-84. 
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outside the jurisdiction of the Court and identify those that appear to fall within the 
jurisdiction of the Court”611. This first phase aims at screening the sheer number of 
communications, coming from multiple sources, that the OTP receives every year, in 
order to gradually select those deserving further analysis, in which case the 
communication shall form the object of a “dedicated analytical report”, for the 
purposes of deciding whether or not to proceed to the subsequent phases of the 
preliminary examination612. 
- Phase 2, “represents the formal commencement of a preliminary 
examination of a given situation, [and] focuses on whether the preconditions to the 
exercise of jurisdiction . . . are satisfied and whether there is a reasonable basis to 
believe that the alleged crimes fall within the subject-matter jurisdiction of the 
Court”613. The OTP further clarifies that “Phase 2 analysis entails a thorough factual 
and legal assessment of the crimes allegedly committed in the situation at hand with 
a view to identifying the potential cases falling within the jurisdiction of the Court . . . 
The Office may further gather information on relevant national proceedings if such 
information is available at this stage”614. In addition, “Phase 2 leads to the submission 
of an ‘Article 5 report’ to the Prosecutor, in reference to the material jurisdiction of 
the Court as defined in article 5 of the Statute”615. 
- Phase 3, which “focusses on the admissibility of potential cases in terms of 
complementarity and gravity pursuant to article 17. In this phase, the Office will also 
continue to collect information on subject-matter jurisdiction, in particular when new 
or ongoing crimes are alleged to have been committed within the situation. Phase 3 
leads to the submission of an ‘Article 17 report’ to the Prosecutor, in reference to the 
admissibility issues as defined in article 17 of the Statute”616. 
- Phase 4, which “examines the interests of justice. It results in the production 
of an ‘Article 53(1) report,’ which provides the basis for the Prosecutor to determine 
whether to initiate an investigation in accordance with article 53(1)”617. With regard 
to this report, the OTP states that “On the basis of the available information, and 
																																																								
611 Ibidem, par. 78. This is reflected in Regulation 27 of the Regulations of the OTP. 
612 Ibidem, par. 79. 
613 Ibidem, par. 80. 
614 Ibidem, par. 81. 
615 Ibidem. 
616 Ibidem, par. 82. 
617 Ibidem, par. 83. 
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without prejudice to other possible crimes which may be identified in the course of 
an investigation, the ‘Article 53(1) report’ will indicate an initial legal 
characterisation of the alleged crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court. It will also 
contain a statement of facts indicating, at a minimum, the places of the alleged 
commission of the crimes; the time or time period of the alleged commission of the 
crimes, and the persons involved (if identified), or a description of the persons or 
groups of persons involved. This identification of facts is preliminary in nature, 
bearing in mind the specific purpose of the procedure at this stage. It is not binding 
for the purpose of future investigations, and may change at a later stage, depending 
on the development of the evidentiary trail and future case hypotheses”618. 
In the intentions of the OTP, this quadripartite structure is designed to mimic 
the logical and chronological sequence of procedural steps envisaged by the Rome 
Statute for the purposes of determining jurisdiction on and admissibility of situations 
and cases at the ICC619. Nevertheless, within each phase—and in particular with 
regard to the crucial Phase 3—the OTP’s considerations might not always follow the 
order of priority stated in the Policy Paper (and the Statute)620. A clear example of the 
flexibility of the OTP’s approach, is the ‘Article 53 Report’ on the Comoros 
situation, where the Prosecutor considered the matter first under the heading of 
gravity, only to declare that any assessment of the complementarity prong of the 
admissibility test was unnecessary, given the negative conclusion reached on 
gravity621. 
The second feature of this mechanism for the conduct of preliminary 
examinations, which flows from its structure, is the incremental (or sequential) 
character of the examination. The mechanism is designed as a sort of ‘procedural 
lock’, where it is only possible to proceed to the subsequent phase when the legal and 
factual conclusions—based on the analysis of the information available to the 
Office—satisfy the statutory requisites of the preceding one, whose closure is 
																																																								
618 Ibidem, par. 84. 
619 Ibidem, par. 34-71, 77. 
620 The OTP, following the Statute’s enumeration in article 53, seems to establish that, for instance, 
the complementarity assessment should precede the gravity assessment, see ibidem, par. 46-58 and 
59-66. As mentioned, the OTP’s practice did not follow this order in the preliminary examination of 
the Comoros situation. 
621 See ICC-OTP, Article 53(1) Report, Situation on the Registered Vessels of the Comoros, Greece 
and Cambodia, ICC-01/13-6-AnxA, 6 November 2014, par. 133-134, 148. 
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generally marked by the issuance of a public report containing the OTP’s 
intermediate conclusions relative to that phase622. Nevertheless, the OTP declares in 
the policy paper that the consideration of the available information—which is in 
principle directed to the assessment of requisites that are specific to each of the four 
phases—should not be based on a rigidly compartmentalised approach, but should 
instead follow a “holistic approach throughout the preliminary examination 
process”623. This means that notwithstanding the overall phase-based approach the 
analysis of the relevant legal criteria is carried out jointly and in an integrated 
manner, also considering that much of the work at this stage is carried out by the 
same internal structure, namely the OTP’s Jurisdiction Complementarity and 
Cooperation Division (JCCD). 
The third feature consists in that the conclusions reached by the OTP as 
regards each of the four phases—even when negative and preclusive of the transition 
to the following phase—are not final in character, i.e. they are open to a subsequent 
review based on new information or facts that may contribute to change the initial 
OTP’s determination. In other words, the negative decisions of the Office (in 
particular in the transition from Phase 3 to Phase 4 and from Phase 4 to the opening 
of an investigation), in no way preclude the possibility for the OTP’s to reconsider its 
decision and to reopen or ‘revitalise’ a closed preliminary examination, based on a 
significant change of the factual or legal circumstances present at the time of the 
original decision624. For instance, if the OTP decides not to open an investigation 
based on complementarity (because there is the appearance of genuine national 
proceedings), it could always decide to reopen the preliminary examination and 
reach a different conclusion on admissibility for the purposes of opening an 
investigation, when national proceedings eventually fail to satisfy the 
willingness/ability to genuinely prosecute test625. The same holds true for a decision 
based on the assessment of (insufficient) gravity. Therefore, an effect of estoppel in 
																																																								
622 See ICC-OTP, Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, November 2013, par. 77-84. 
623 Ibidem, par. 77. 
624 Ibidem, par. 91 according to which a negative conclusion “does not preclude the Office from 
considering further information submitted to him or her regarding the same situation in the light of 
new facts or evidence”. 
625 See article 17(1), (2)(a)-(c) and (3) of the Statute. For an extensive analysis of the different 
components of the admissibility test, with ample reference to the most relevant case law of the Court 
see the commentary by W. A. SCHABAS, M. EL-ZEIDY, Article 17, Issues of Admissibility, in O. 
TRIFFTERER, K. AMBOS (eds.), op. cit., 781-831. 
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connection to such (negative) determinations cannot be derived from the Statute or 
the regulatory texts, which to the contrary—and consistent with the non-judicial 
character of the procedure under consideration—provide for the reviewability of 
these decisions based on new circumstances or facts626. 
A fourth distinctive feature of the proceduralised preliminary examination is 
the fact that during its conduct the OTP—while lacking actual investigative powers627 
—collects information and knowledge from diverse sources, not limited to the 
original providers or senders, and may engage in contacts and dialogue with states, 
including the one(s) that might have jurisdiction on the facts under preliminary 
examination628. In this sense, the attitude of the OTP vis-à-vis states during this 
phase, whose duration may be significant, puts to test the possibility to virtuously 
promote complementarity. This can be done by appropriately modulating the 
preliminary examination activities and by monitoring (and if necessary encouraging) 
the unfolding of genuine national proceedings629. A clear example of this attitude is 
the OTP’s handling of the preliminary examination activities in Colombia, a situation 
that has been under examination since 2004, without yet giving rise to an 
investigation630.  Despite the absence of truly investigative powers at the preliminary 
stage, the OTP has put forward a broad interpretation of Rule 104(2) of the RPE to 
the effect of including the possibility “to undertake field missions to the territory 
																																																								
626 See article 15(6) and 53(4) of the Statute. 
627 See ICC-OTP, Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, November 2013, par. 85. This does not 
mean that the OTP lacks any power to ascertain the facts or gather additional information on the 
matter under preliminary examination. See, infra, next footnote. 
628 See Rule 104(2) of the RPE, establishing that the OTP “may seek additional information from 
States, organs of the United Nations, intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations, or other 
reliable sources that he or she deems appropriate, and may receive written or oral testimony at the seat 
of the Court”. 
629 The reporting activity of the OTP, which shall be more closely analysed in a dedicated paragraph, 
is replete of references to the activities performed by the OTP in order to engage in a constructive 
dialogue with national authorities and foster genuine national investigations and prosecutions in line 
with the principle of complementarity. 
630 The OTP’s annual reports on preliminary examination activities provide details on the continued 
dialogue and cooperation between the OTP and the Colombian authorities, against the background of 
the tortuous path towards pacification and stabilisation of the country. See, e.g., ICC-OTP, Report on 
Preliminary Examination activities 2017, 4 December 2017, par. 121-155. In 2012 the OTP produced 
an intermediate report on the Colombian situation, see ICC-OTP, Interim Report on the Situation in 
Colombia, November 2012. In this sense, M. AKSENOVA, The ICC Involvement in Colombia: Walking 
the Fine Line Between Peace and Justice, in M. BERGSMO, C. STAHN (eds.), Quality Control in 
Preliminary Examinations: Vol. 1, Brussels, 2018, 263-270 aptly speaks of a “dialogical model of the 
ICC involvement in Colombia”. See also, ibidem, 270-273 for a helpful timeline concerning the 
OTP’s engagement with regard to the Colombian situation. 
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concerned in order to consult with the competent national authorities, the affected 
communities and other relevant stakeholders, such as civil society organisations”631. 
The Office, especially in recent years, conducted a number of these ‘preliminary 
missions’ to various states whose situation was undergoing preliminary examination, 
or to other states that might otherwise have a connection with facts forming the 
object of such examination632. This OTP’s proactive attitude is much less evident in 
case of UNSC referrals, where practice has shown a very limited possibility to 
engage in constructive cooperation between the Court and the concerned state, 
resulting in extremely short preliminary examinations633. Nevertheless, the fluidity of 
the political—and not infrequently military—situations on the field may result in a 
changing approach both in the conduct of preliminary examinations and, 
subsequently, of investigations, which may be justified by the need to promote 
complementarity634. 
																																																								
631 ICC-OTP, Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, November 2013, par. 85. 
632 A reference to the various on-site mission carried out by the OTP at the preliminary examination 
stage is made both in the annual reports on preliminary examinations of the OTP and the annual 
Report of the International Criminal Court to the UN General Assembly, based on article 6 of 
Relationship Agreement between the UN and the ICC. To date the OTP has visited the following 
states, in some instances multiple times, during preliminary examinations: Georgia (see the ICC 
Reports to the UNGA A/65/313, par. 75-76; A/68/314, par. 91; A/69/321, par. 8; A/70/350, par. 12; 
A/71/342, par. 12); Russian Federation in relation to the situation in Georgia (see the ICC Reports to 
the UNGA A/65/313, par. 75-76; A/66/309, par. 75; A/69/321, par. 8); Guinea (see ICC Reports to the 
UNGA A/65/313, par. 80; A/66/309, par. 78; A/67/308, par. 79; A/68/314, par. 92; A/69/321, par. 8; 
A/70/350, par. 14; A/71/342, par. 16; A/72/349*, par. 13); Colombia (see ICC Reports to the UNGA 
A/68/314, par. 90; A/69/321, par. 7; A/70/350, par. 9); Honduras (see ICC Reports to the UNGA 
A/69/321, par. 10; A/71/342, par. 18); Central African Republic with the regard to the situation in 
CAR II (see ICC Report to the UNGA A/69/321, par. 14); State of Palestine and Israel in relation to 
the situation in Palestine (see ICC Report to the UNGA A/72/349*, par. 19); United Kingdom in 
relation to the situation in Iraq (see ICC Reports to the UNGA A/69/321, par. 15; A/72/349*, par. 15); 
Ukraine (see ICC Reports to the UNGA A/70/350, par. 26; A/72/349*, par. 20); Nigeria (see ICC 
Reports to the UNGA A/71/342, par. 22; A/72/349*, par. 17); Gabon (see ICC Report to the UNGA 
A/72/349*, par. 11). 
633 In the two cases of UNSC referrals, namely Sudan-Darfur and Libya, the OTP announced the 
opening of an investigation shortly after the referral, carrying out its preliminary examination 
activities in a very limited period of time. In particular, the investigation in the situation of Sudan-
Darfur was announced on 6 June 2005, a couple of months after the UNSC’s referral to the Court by 
means of UNSC Resolution 1593(2005), S/Res/1593, 31 March 2005, while the investigation in the 
Libyan situation was announced on 3 March 2011, just a few days after the Council’s referral by 
means of UNSC’s Resolution 1970(2011), S/Res/1970, 26 February 2011. 
634 In this sense the situation of Sudan-Darfur and Libya differ significantly. While in the former state 
cooperation has been close to zero from the early involvement of the Court, in the latter the 
appearance of stabilisation occurred after the violent deposition of Qaddafi in 2012 seemed to open 
the space for a functional division of labour between the ICC and the new Libyan authorities. This 
resulted, for instance, in the decisions of inadmissibility in Al-Senussi, premised on the Court’s 
positive prognosis—shared by the OTP—on the ability and willingness of national judicial institutions 
to genuinely carry out the trial at the domestic level. Unfortunately, the subsequent instability in the 
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With regard to the involvement of judges, it should be noted that the OTP’s 
self-imposed proceduralisation of preliminary examinations—in line with the 
statutory and regulatory framework—does not envisage any significant supervisory 
role of the PTC, with the exclusion of the PTC’s potential intervention were the OTP 
to request the possibility of taking testimony at the seat of the Court, based on Rules 
47(2) and 104(2) of the RPE. The PTC’s supervisory role only becomes apparent at 
the end of preliminary examination activities, in case of proprio motu with regard to 
the power to authorise the OTP to open an investigation and in all other cases with 
regard to the power to review the OTP’s negative decision pursuant to article 53 of 
the Statute. 
To conclude on the topic of the proceduralisation of preliminary 
examinations, it could be observed that the OTP’s activities in this field show a clear 
attitude to innovate, through both integrative and creative practices, the concrete 
procedural landscape of this preliminary phase. The development of the four-phased 
approach was the result of the pragmatic considerations of the Office and resulted in 
the introduction of an informal model of conduct of preliminary examinations. This 
model is certainly inspired by the normative indications found in the statutory and 
regulatory sources, but is characterised by a significant degree of flexibility both as 
to its general structure (which may be subject to revision in the future) and concrete 
application across the different situations. Therefore, this practice does not seem to 
give rise, strictly speaking, to normative effects. It nevertheless serves the purpose of 
rationalising the conduct of prosecutorial activities in the interest of ‘prosecutorial 
economy’ and in furtherance of the OTP’s administrative discretion. 
 
2.2 Opening (or not opening) a preliminary examination 
In the previous paragraph we have seen how the proceduralisation of 
preliminary examinations—and particularly the four-phased approach adopted by the 
OTP—influences the decision-making process, helping the Office with the upward 
selection necessary under the complementarity regime. It is precisely in the transition 
																																																																																																																																																													
country made this early progress very insecure, to the point that the OTP considered the possibility to 
apply to the judges to ‘reclaim’ the case at the ICC, due to the fundamental change of circumstances at 
the national level. For a reference to the Court’s decisions in this case see, supra, footnotes 326 and 
329. 
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between Phase 1 and Phase 2 as construed by the OTP in its policy paper and 
practice, that preliminary prosecutorial selection powers are concretely exercised, 
predetermining and influencing the very possibility of subsequent procedural 
developments at the ICC. Having regard to the policies and the actual practice of the 
Office—as attested by the OTP’s annual reports on preliminary activities—it 
immediately becomes evident that the rigorous initial screening of the 
communications and information received by the Office is an essential component of 
the early manifestations of the OTP’s responsibilities in selecting the situations that 
deserve further analysis. The number of ‘Article 15 communications’—i.e. the 
means through which individuals, groups or organizations may bring a notitia 
criminis to the attention of the OTP—has gradually increased in the early years of 
activity of the Court—with an ‘explosion’ connected to the situation in South Ossetia 
(Georgia)635—and is now relatively stable at around five hundred communications 
per year636. 
The screening process conducted in Phase 1 of the preliminary examination 
aims at immediately filtering out the communications that are either manifestly 
outside of the Court’s jurisdiction, relate to a situation already under preliminary 
examination or to a situation already forming the object of an investigation or 
prosecution637. Only communications that do not fall in one of these categories are 
considered for further analysis. A quantitative analysis of the OTP’s practice in 
relation to these screening procedures, based on the data provided by the Office in its 
																																																								
635 The OTP started to regularly report on the preliminary examination activities only in 2011, after 
having issued a report on the activities performed in the first three years (2003-2006), data from the 
previous years can nevertheless be found in the Court’s reports to the UNGA. In the first report issued 
in 2006 the OTP quantified in 1,918 the communications received between the establishment of the 
Court and the date of issuance of said report (see ICC-OTP, Report on the Activities performed during 
the first three years (June 2003 - June 2006), 12 September 2006, par. 6). For the huge spike in the 
number of communications in the period 2008-2009 (4,870 in just one year) see Report of the ICC to 
UNGA, A/64/356, par. 44. Most of these communications (3,823 out of the total) related to the 
situation in Georgia and the vast majority of them (3,817) had been transmitted by the Prosecutor 
General of Moscow (ibidem, par. 48). Thereafter, the number returned to the average of 500 
communications per year. 
636 The OTP in its annual reports on preliminary examinations updates the data concerning the number 
of such communications. The ICC-OTP, Report on Preliminary Examination activities 2017, 4 
December 2017, par. 18, certifies that since 2002 the Office has received 12,590 communications. 
637 ICC-OTP, Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, November 2013, par. 78. On the filtering 
function of Phase 1 in the overall economy of preliminary examinations and the various steps of 
“internal review” of the relevant information see A. KHOJASTEH, The Pre-Preliminary Examination 
Stage: Theory and Practice of the OTP’s Phase 1 Activities, in M. BERGSMO, C. STAHN (eds.), Quality 
Control in Preliminary Examinations: Vol. 1, cit., 227-229. 
THE OTP’S DISCRETIONARY PRACTICE AND ITS JUDICIAL REVIEW: A CASE-BASED ANALYSIS 
 181 
annual reports, reveals that almost 90% of the communications are dismissed as 
manifestly falling outside the jurisdiction of the Court; 13.8% are linked to a 
situation already under preliminary examination and 8% are linked to a situation 
already forming the object of an investigation or prosecution. Only 8.7% of the total 
number of communications warrants further analysis. This data, and particularly the 
percentage of communications that are dismissed prima facie as manifestly outside 
the Court’s jurisdiction, clearly show that there is an asymmetry between the national 
and international public perception of the ICC’s role and the actual perimeter of its 
jurisdiction. 
The following charts show the trends in the number of communications per 
year received by the Office and those relating to the screening procedure, showing 
the clear disproportion between the total number of communications and those that 
meet the requirements of the filtering test of Phase 1 of the preliminary examination. 













Number of Art. 15 Communications 
Note:	* Data for the period 2002-2005 are cumulative due to the lack of annual reporting 
practice in the early years of activity of the Court. Data up to 2011 are mainly based on the 
ICC annual Reports to the UNGA. Data after 2011 are based on the OTP annual report on 
preliminary examination activities (the reporting period varies slightly from year to year). 	
** Of the 4,870 communications in the reported period, 3,823 (78.5%) relate to the situation 
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Once the communications, or in case of state or UNSC referral the documents 
or information accompanying the act of referral638, pass the early screening described 
above, thereby entering Phase 2 of the preliminary examination, the Office makes 
public the decision to open a preliminary examination, in line with the OTP’s efforts 
to promote transparency 639. From that moment on, the OTP will continue its 
assessment based on the other phases envisaged by the Policy Paper, and will 
regularly report on the activities performed with regard to the situation640. Up do date 
the OTP has opened a preliminary examination on 28 situations. On 11 occasions the 
preliminary examination activities resulted in the opening of an investigation, 
namely in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Uganda, Darfur-Sudan, Central 
African Republic (I and II), Kenya, Libya, Côte d'Ivoire, Mali, Georgia, Burundi641. 
On 7 occasions the OTP concluded the preliminary examination with a decision not 
to open an investigation, namely in the situation of Venezuela, Iraq/UK, Palestine, 
Honduras, Republic of Korea, the Registered Vessels of the Comoros, Greece and 
the Kingdom of Cambodia, and lastly Gabon642. Other 10 situations are currently 
under preliminary examination (although at different stages) and may in the future 
result in the opening of investigations, namely Venezuela 643 , Afghanistan 644 , 
																																																								
638 Ibidem, par. 80. 
639 Ibidem, par. 95. With regard to the risks connected to a premature publicity of preliminary 
examination activities during Phase 1 and the necessity to strike a balance between transparency and 
confidentiality, see KHOJASTEH A., op. cit., 241-242. 
640 Ibidem, par. 95-97. 
641 In the situation of Burundi, the OTP had filed—for the first time under seal—a request for 
authorisation to open an investigation, shortly before the withdrawal from the Statute of Burundi 
became effective pursuant to article 127(1) of the Statute. The competent PTC went on to authorise 
the investigation just a few days before the expiry of the one-year term marking the state’s departure 
from the ICC’s founding document (see, ICC, Public Redacted version of the “Decision Pursuant to 
Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an Investigation into the Situation in the 
Republic of Burundi”, ICC-01/17-X-9-US-Exp, 25 October 2017, Situation in the Republic of 
Burundi, ICC-01/17-9-Red, PTC III, 9 November 2017). 
642 A preliminary examination on the situation in Venezuela was opened following a certain number 
of Article 15 communications relating to alleged episodes of violence against the political opponents 
of the Venezuelan Government, occurred since July 2002 (date of entry into force of the Statute). On 
9 February 2006 the OTP made public its decision to close this preliminary examination with a 
decision not to open an investigation. See, ICC-OTP, Response to communications received 
concerning Venezuela, 9 February 2006. The preliminary examination of the situation in the 
Gabonese Republic was closed with a decision not to investigate on 21 September 2018, see ICC-
OTP, Article 5 Report, Situation in the Gabonese Republic, 21 September 2018. 
643 A second preliminary examination—unrelated to the one previously closed—was opened with 
regard to Venezuela on 8 February 2018, in relation to the crimes allegedly committed since at least 
April 2017 in the context of demonstrations and political unrest in the country. 
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Colombia, Guinea, Iraq/UK645, Nigeria, Palestine646, Philippines647, Ukraine648 and the 
one relating to the alleged deportation of Rohingya people from Myanmar to 
Bangladesh. 
																																																																																																																																																													
644 In this situation, stemming from a proprio motu of the OTP, the Office has completed the 
preliminary examination and has forwarded a request of authorisation to open an investigation to the 
competent PTC, which is currently under consideration. 
645 The preliminary examination relating to the conduct of British military personnel in Iraq during the 
occupation of that country between 2003 and 2008 had originally been terminated on 9 February 2006 
(see ICC-OTP, Response to communications received concerning Iraq, 9 February 2006) but has 
subsequently been reopened based on new information on 13 May 2014. It should be noted that in 
recent years various fact-finding activities have been carried out in the United Kingdom with regard to 
conducts that may form the object of an investigation at the ICC and that might be relevant for the 
purposes of complementarity, as recalled by A. T. CAYLEY, Constraints and Quality Control in 
Preliminary Examination: Critical Lessons Learned from the ICTY, the ICC, the ECCC and the 
United Kingdom, in M. BERGSMO, C. STAHN (eds.), Quality Control in Preliminary Examinations: 
Vol. 1, cit. 50-61. 
646 It should be noted that the State of Palestine, notwithstanding the proprio motu preliminary 
examination on the situation that has been on-going since 16 January 2015, has formally referred the 
situation in Palestine since 13 June 2014 onwards to the OTP on 15 May 2018. See Referral by the 
State of Palestine Pursuant to Articles 13(a) and 14 of the Rome Statute, Ref: PAL-180515-Ref, 15 
May 2018. This decision has probably been prompted, on the one hand, by the perception on the 
Palestinian side that the OTP’s preliminary examination is proceeding at a slow pace, and on the 
other, by the upsurge of violence occurred in connection to the Gaza border protests since the end of 
March 2018, which resulted in the death and wounding of hundreds as a consequence of the use of 
force by the Israeli Defence Forces. The OTP took notice of the referral in a dedicated statement (see 
ICC-OTP, Statement by ICC Prosecutor, Mrs Fatou Bensouda, on the referral submitted by Palestine, 
22 May 2018, available at: https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=180522-otp-stat, last 
accessed 6 November 2018). The OTP had earlier issued another statement where it reminded that the 
situation at the Gaza border did fall under the temporal and material scope of the preliminary 
examination of the overall Palestinian situation, and that conducts contrary to the Statute in 
connection with the border protests are eligible for investigation and prosecution at the ICC (see, ICC-
OTP, Statement of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Fatou Bensouda, regarding the 
worsening situation in Gaza, 8 April 2018, available at: https://www.icc-
cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=180408-otp-stat, last accessed 6 November 2018). 
647 The Philippines, similarly to Burundi, have exercised their right to withdraw from the Statute on 17 
March 2018 (see the Depositary Notification C.N.138.2018.TREATIES-XVIII.10), which shall take 
effect, if not revoked, after a period of one year. Nevertheless, the OTP had already opened a 
preliminary examination on the situation in the country on 8 February 2018 and, based on the PTC’s 
decision regarding the situation in Burundi, the Prosecutor made clear that the act of withdrawal does 
not impair the Office’s ability to carry on the preliminary examination activities nor deprive the Court 
of its jurisdiction over crimes that have been committed during the time in which the withdrawing 
state was party to the Statute, even if such jurisdiction is exercised after the withdrawal takes effect 
(see ICC-OTP, Statement on the Philippines’ withdrawal: State participation in Rome Statute system 
essential to international rule of law, 20 March 2018, available at: https://www.icc-
cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=pr1371, last accessed 6 November 2018). It remains to be seen whether 
the OTP, following the Burundian precedent, will ask for authorisation to investigate before the 
withdrawal takes effect, given the fact that the preliminary examination is at a very early stage. 
648 In this situation the OTP had originally opened its preliminary examination on 24 April 2014, 
based on Ukraine’s first declaration of acceptance of the Court’s jurisdiction pursuant to article 12(3) 
of the Statute made on 17 April 2014. This declaration limited the temporal framework of the 
acceptance to crimes allegedly committed between 21 November 2013 and 22 February 2014. 
Ukraine subsequently lodged a second declaration of acceptance on 8 September 2015, this time 
indicating as dies a quo the date of 20 February 2014 with no end date. The OTP, accordingly, 
announced that the temporal scope of preliminary examination on the situation was extended so to 
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With regard to the OTP’s decision to open (or not to open) a preliminary 
examination—rectius to consider a situation for further analysis and the formal 
starting of Phase 2 of the preliminary examination or to dismiss in limine the 
communications—it must be noted that there is no legal avenue to challenge such 
decision either for those who have sent the communication or provided the 
information, or for the state(s) whose territory or nationals are subject to the 
preliminary examination activities. The same holds true for the decisions that mark 
the transition to the subsequent phases of the preliminary examination. This is the 
plain consequence of the non-jurisdictional and non-investigative character of the 
procedure, but on the one side it makes it more difficult to correct any mistakes in 
the screening procedure and, on the other, it introduces a clear—but probably 
justified—asymmetry between the legal position of individuals or groups who made 
a communication and the states interested by preliminary examination activities. The 
former, in case of early dismissal of their communication (or, later on, in case of 
decision not to open an investigation at the conclusion of preliminary examination), 
have no formal possibility to persuade the Office of the necessity or opportunity of 
further analysis of their communication and can only rely on the non-preclusive 
character of the OTP’s determination, which leaves the possibility open for the 
Office to change its mind based on new facts or information649. States, to the 
contrary, in case of opening of a preliminary examination have the opportunity to 
engage in a dialogue with the OTP during its conduct, with a view to convincing the 
Office that they are willing and able to investigate and prosecute the alleged crimes 
domestically, or that the situation is otherwise inadmissible based, for instance, on 
the insufficient gravity of the potential cases that might arise from an investigation. 
In other words, even if they enjoy no power to challenge per se the OTP’s 
determination to open a preliminary examination, whose function is also to assess the 
existence and adequacy of national proceedings, they are still in the position to 
influence its conduct and outcomes. 
																																																																																																																																																													
include any crime allegedly committed in the territory of Ukraine from 20 February 2014 onwards 
(see ICC-OTP, Press release, ICC Prosecutor extends preliminary examination of the situation in 
Ukraine following second article 12(3) declaration, ICC-OTP-20150929-PR1156, 29 September 
2015). 
649 See, supra, footnote 626. 
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From the point of view of the supervision of prosecutorial decisions, the 
abovementioned framework results in the general exclusion of an explicit 
involvement of the Court for the solution of controversies at the preliminary 
examination stage. Nevertheless, in the practice of the Court there has been at least 
one occasion in which the senders of a communication have tried—without 
success—to challenge the OTP’s decision not to open a preliminary examination on 
the basis of their ‘private’ communication. The rather peculiar situation, which took 
place in 2014, relates to the attempt of former Egyptian President Morsi and his 
political supporters to submit a declaration of acceptance of the Court’s jurisdiction 
under article 12(3) of the Statute650. In that regard, the Prosecutor issued a decision 
on the request on 23 April 2014651 and a subsequent press release on 8 May 2014652 
alleging, inter alia, that the senders of the declaration did not possess “full powers” 
and as a consequence they could not act on behalf of the Egyptian state. For this 
reason the Office decided that the submission (together with the accompanying 
documents) had to be treated as a ‘private’ communication pursuant to article 15 of 
the Statute, and went on to conclude that no further action could be taken because the 
allegations fell outside the territorial and personal jurisdiction of the Court653. The 
lawyers for the senders then sought to challenge such decision first resorting to 
Regulation 46(2) and later to Regulation 46(3) of the Regulations of the Court654. The 
matter was assigned to PTC II and the judges dismissed in limine the application 
confirming that only a referring entity—state or UNSC—can challenge the 
																																																								
650 On this case see the critical analysis of H. ELDEEB, An Attempt to Prosecute: The Muslim 
Brotherhood’s Communication to the International Criminal Court Relating to the Alleged Crimes in 
Egypt, in International Criminal Law Review, vol. 15, issue 4, 2015, 733-762. The Author underlines, 
in particular, the politically motivated character of the initiative of Morsi and his supporters and that it 
was the right path for the Court to avoid embarking itself in these domestic political skirmishes. 
651 See ICC-OTP, Prosecutor’s Decision on the ‘Declaration under Article 12(3) and Complaint 
regarding International Crimes Committed in Egypt’, OTP-CR-460/13, 23 April 2014. 
652 ICC-OTP, Press release, The determination of the Office of the Prosecutor on the communication 
received in relation to Egypt, ICC-OTP-20140508-PR1003, 8 May 2014. 
653 Ibidem. 
654 These provisions relate, respectively, to the administrative functions of the President of the Court 
with regard to the formation of, and the assignment of situations to, the Pre-Trial Chambers (sub-rule 
2), and to those of the President of the Pre-Trial Division, with regard to situations not yet assigned to 
a Pre-Trial Chamber (sub-rule 3). For the submissions on behalf of President Morsi see the document 
addressed to the President of the Pre-Trial Division, Re-filing before the President of the Pre-Trial 
Division of the ‘Request for review of the Prosecutor’s decision of 23 April 2014 not to open a 
Preliminary Examination concerning alleged crimes committed in the Arab Republic of Egypt, and 
the Registrar’s Decision of 25 April 2014’, Request under Regulation 46(3) of the Regulations of the 
Court, ICC-RoC46(3)-01/14-2, 1 September 2014, par. 1, 16, 18, 20. 
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Prosecutor’s decision not to proceed with an investigation under article 53(1)(a) and 
(b). Similarly, in the case of proprio motu, the failure to open a preliminary 
examination and/or to seek an authorization under article 15 of the Statute cannot be 
challenged by those who had provided the information to the OTP, given the fact that 
Rule 48 of the RPE directs the OTP to consider for that purpose the same elements 
set out in article 53(1)(a)-(c) of the Statute655. The same PTC II did not grant a 
request for reconsideration or leave to appeal against its previous decision656, thereby 
leaving no doubts on the exclusion of any judicial remedy for ‘private’ 
communication senders in order to have the decision not to open a preliminary 
examination reviewed by the judges, after the OTP’s dismissal as a result of the 
initial screening that takes place in Phase 1. 
To conclude the analysis on the OTP’s discretion on the opening (or not 
opening) of preliminary examinations, reference must be made to a recent instance of 
practice in which the Prosecutor, faced with an exceptional situation of legal 
uncertainty on the prospective exercise of the Court’s jurisdiction, has approached 
the President of the Pre-Trial Division pursuant to Regulation 46(3) of the 
Regulations of the Court, in order to ask the formation of a PTC and seek from it a 
‘preliminary ruling’ on jurisdiction pursuant to article 19(3) of the Statute, prior to 
the formal opening of a preliminary examination657. The situation originates from the 
substantiated allegations concerning the deportation of Rohingya people from 
Myanmar (a state which is not a party to the Rome Statute) to Bangladesh (a state 
																																																								
655 See, ICC, Decision on the ‘Request for review of the Prosecutor’s decision of 23 April 2014 not to 
open a Preliminary Examination concerning alleged crimes committed in the Arab Republic of Egypt, 
and the Registrar’s Decision of 25 April 2014’, Request under Regulation 46(3) of the Regulation of 
the Court, ICC-RoC46(3)-01/14, PTC II, 12 September 2014, par. 6-7, 9. 
656 See ICC, Decision on a Request for Reconsideration or Leave to Appeal the "Decision on the 
'Request for review of the Prosecutor's decision of 23 April 2014 not to open a Preliminary 
Examination concerning alleged crimes committed in the Arab Republic of Egypt, and the Registrar's 
Decision of 25 April 2014'", Request under Regulation 46(3) of the Regulation of the Court, ICC-
RoC46(3)-01/14-5, PTC II, 22 September 2014, par. 5-8. 
657 See ICC-OTP, Prosecution’s Request for a Ruling on Jurisdiction under Article 19(3) of the 
Statute, Application under Regulation 46(3) of the Regulations of the Court, ICC-RoC46(3)-01/18-1, 
9 April 2018. It should be reminded that article 19(3) of the Statute refers to the Prosecutor’s power to 
seek a ruling “regarding a question of jurisdiction or admissibility”. In this particular case, since the 
OTP was asking a ruling before even opening a preliminary examination, it is not inappropriate to 
describe the request and the eventual ruling as preliminary or even ‘pre-preliminary’ in nature. 
Nevertheless, it is necessary to avoid any confusion with the entirely different procedure envisaged by 
article 18, which concerns “preliminary rulings regarding admissibility”.  
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which is a party to the Statute) 658. The OTP in its request maintained that the Court is 
permitted to exercise jurisdiction on the alleged crime of deportation, arguing that an 
essential legal element of the crime, namely the crossing of an international border, 
occurred on the territory of a State Party (Bangladesh)659. Besides the interesting 
issues of substantive criminal law that concern the elements of the crime of 
deportation660, the OTP’s request is extremely relevant from the procedural and 
institutional point of view, because the Prosecutor was in essence seeking—based on 
the assertion of its discretionary power661—a preliminary clarification on the Court’s 
future possibility to exercise jurisdiction, in order “to assist [her in] further 
deliberations concerning any preliminary examination she may independently 
undertake, including in the event an ICC State Party decides to refer the matter to the 
Court under articles 13(a) and 14”662. In her judgement, such clarification would 
“[promote] judicial economy—and, particularly, the apt use of the limited resources 
allocated to the Prosecutor—by allowing judicial consideration of certain 
fundamental questions, if the Prosecutor thinks appropriate, before embarking on a 
course of action which might be contentious”663. The main issue is whether it is in the 
Prosecutor’s discretion to ask the PTC’s intervention based on article 19(3) of the 
Statue even before a preliminary examination—let alone an investigation or 
prosecution—has been opened, and whether the President of the Pre-Trial Division is 
required to assign the matter to a PTC664. On the first of these two contentious points, 
the OTP’s reasoning—rooted in a thorough textual, contextual and purposive 
																																																								
658 Ibidem, par. 7-11, particularly footnotes 5-23. The OTP makes extensive reference to the reliable 
sources of information on the alleged crimes against the Rohingya coming from both UN or UN-
related bodies and NGOs. 
659 Ibidem, par. 2, 4. 
660 Ibidem, par. 13-14, 15-27, 28-42, 45-49 where issues of substantive law are discussed.  
661 Ibidem, par. 3, 6, 55, 56. The OTP emphasises that: “This course of action is justified by the 
exceptional circumstances at hand and it has been decided by the Prosecutor based on the discretion 
and independence vested in her by article 42 of the Statute. Indeed, when reading articles 19(3) and 42 
together, it is clear that there is no mechanism by which the Prosecution can be obliged to bring an 
article 19(3) request, nor can any other person or body bring such a request, with a view to influencing 
the conduct of a preliminary examination or investigation. The Prosecutor will exercise her discretion 
concerning the use of article 19(3) guided only by the particular circumstances and the nature of the 
issue in question” (par. 55, emphasis added). 
662 Ibidem, par. 3. 
663 Ibidem, par. 54 (emphasis in the original text). 
664 Ibidem, par. 52-56, 57-60. The second issue has been positively resolved and the request has been 
assigned by the President of the Pre-Trial Division to PTC I for decision. See ICC, Decision assigning 
the “Prosecution’s Request for a Ruling on Jurisdiction under Article 19(3) of the Statute” to Pre-Trial 
Chamber I, Application under Regulation 46(3) of the Regulations of the Court, ICC-RoC46(3)-
01/18-2, President of the Pre-Trial Division, 11 April 2018. 
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interpretation of the provision at hand—seems convincing665. In particular, the OTP’s 
argument on the promotion of judicial economy and her reliance on the well-
established flexible approach adopted by the Court on the contextual meaning of the 
word “case” provide solid ground for the request666. The PTC held a status conference 
on the matter at the presence of the Prosecutor only, but later considered the views of 
various subjects based either on article 19(3), 68(3) or Rule 103 of the RPE, 
including a public statement made by the Government of Myanmar, which had 
already refused to formally take part in the proceedings667. On 6 September 2018, 
																																																								
665 ICC-OTP, Prosecution’s Request for a Ruling on Jurisdiction under Article 19(3) of the Statute, 
Application under Regulation 46(3) of the Regulations of the Court, ICC-RoC46(3)-01/18-1, 9 April 
2018, par. 52-56. 
666 Ibidem, par. 53. On this point, see the commentary by C. K. HALL, D. D. NTANDA NSEREKO, M. J. 
VENTURA, Article 19, Challenges to the jurisdiction of the Court or the admissibility of a case, in O. 
TRIFFTERER, K. AMBOS (eds.), op. cit., 874-877. The Authors argue that it would be possible for the 
OTP to seek a ruling on jurisdiction or admissibility “at any stage” and also with regard to “an entire 
situation”, but do not clarify whether it is allowed to do so even before the opening of, at least, a 
preliminary examination. Nevertheless, the emphasis put on arguments of judicial economy seems to 
militate in favour of this solution. Contra, see C. SAFFERLING, International Criminal Procedure, 
Oxford, 2012, 209, who denies that a ruling under article 19(3) of the Statute might be requested by 
the OTP and rendered by the PTC before the existence of an individual case. 
667 PTC I issued an order to convene a status conference to discuss the OTP’s request (ICC, Order 
Convening a Status Conference, Application under Regulation 46(3) of the Court, ICC-RoC46(3)-
01/18-4, PTC I, 11 May 2018). Strangely, the preliminary judges have ordered that the status 
conference be held in closed session and only at the presence of the Prosecutor (ibidem, par. 4). While 
it may be argued that because there is still no formal situation in place in the procedure at hand and 
consequently other qualified (potential) participants such as states or groups of victims do not have a 
statutory right to be heard, the OTP itself had envisaged in its submissions this possibility based on 
the principle audiatur et altera pars (see ICC-OTP, Prosecution’s Request for a Ruling on Jurisdiction 
under Article 19(3) of the Statute, Application under Regulation 46(3) of the Regulations of the Court, 
ICC-RoC46(3)-01/18-1, 9 April 2018, par. 61). More importantly, while it is in the Chamber’s 
discretion to order that a hearing be held in closed session, Regulation 20(2) of the Regulations of the 
Court stipulates that the Chamber “shall make public the reason for such an order”. Unfortunately, the 
PTC I’s order does not contain any justification for this choice, or at least one that is publicly 
available (the order comes with a confidential annex which is exclusively available to the OTP). 
Nevertheless, both alleged victims and interested states were given the opportunity to present their 
views, and various organisations participated as amicus curiae. See, e.g., Global Rights Compliance, 
Submission on Behalf of the Victims Pursuant to Article 19(3) of the Statute, Application under 
Regulation 46(3) of the Regulations of the Court, ICC-RoC46(3)-01/18-9, 31 May 2018; Observations 
of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh Pursuant to Rule 103(1) of the Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence on the “Prosecution’s Request for a Ruling on Jurisdiction under Article 19(3) of the 
Statute”, Application under Regulation 46(3) of the Regulations of the Court, ICC-RoC46(3)-01/18-
14-Conf, 11 June 2018; ICC, Decision on the “Request for leave to submit an Amicus Curiae brief 
pursuant to Rule 103(1) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence on the ‘Prosecution’s Request for a 
Ruling on Jurisdiction under Article 19(3) of the Statute’”, Application under Regulation 46(3) of the 
Regulations of the Court, ICC-RoC46(3)-01/18-8, PTC I, 29 May 2018. The Government of 
Myanmar was invited to submit observations pursuant to Rule 103(1) of the RPE, but the competent 
diplomatic authorities in Belgium refused to accept the delivery of these requests (see ICC-Registry, 
Report on the Implementation of the Decision Inviting the Competent Authorities of the Republic of 
the Union of Myanmar to Submit Observations pursuant to Rule 103(1) of the Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence on the “Prosecution’s Request for a Ruling on Jurisdiction under Article 19(3) of the 
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PTC I acting by majority—Judge de Brichambaut dissenting—accepted to rule on 
the request and affirmed that the Court could potentially exercise jurisdiction on the 
alleged crimes of deportation (as well as on other related conducts), largely sharing 
the OTP’s interpretive approach on the constituent elements of the crime of 
deportation668.  
The decision at hand deserves a few additional remarks concerning the 
relations between the OTP and the PTC. In the first place it should be noted that the 
Majority—completely disregarding the submissions of the OTP—avoided any 
discussion on the applicability of article 19(3) of the Statute at this early stage of the 
proceedings, and based its decision on article 119(1) of the Statute, which gives the 
ICC the power to settle “Any dispute concerning the judicial functions of the Court”, 
and on the general principle of Kompetenz-Kompetenz669. In the second place, the 
Chamber shared the OTP’s view that the main contentious issue to decide was a 
“pure question of law”670. Therefore, leaving aside any further factual determination, 
the Chamber confined its decision to an assessment of whether the Court would be 
permitted to exercise its territorial jurisdiction when only certain elements of an 
alleged crime are committed on the territory of a State Party. The Court concluded in 
the affirmative, holding that it may assert jurisdiction “if at least one element of a 
crime within the jurisdiction of the Court or part of such a crime is committed on the 
territory of a State Party to the Statute” 671. The Majority went on to generalise the 
																																																																																																																																																													
Statute”, Application under Regulation 46(3) of the Regulations of the Court, ICC-RoC46(3)-01/18-
31, 5 July 2018). They nevertheless put forward a public statement on the matter, of which the OTP 
gave notice on 17 August 2018 (see ICC-OTP, Notice of the Public Statement Issued by the 
Government of Myanmar, Application under Regulation 46(3) of the Regulations of the Court, ICC-
RoC46(3)-01/18-36, 17 August 2018, 3-4). 
668 See ICC, Decision on the “Prosecution’s Request for a Ruling on Jurisdiction under Article 19(3) 
of the Statute”, Application under Regulation 46(3) of the Regulations of the Court, ICC-RoC46(3)-
01/18-37, PTC I, 6 September 2018. See also the Partially Dissenting Opinion of Judge’s Marc Perrin 
de Brichambaut, Application under Regulation 46(3) of the Regulations of the Court, ICC-RoC46(3)-
01/18-37-Anx, 6 September 2018. 
669 Ibidem, par. 26-33. Both legal bases for the decision were introduced proprio motu by the Majority 
as aptly recalled by the dissenting judge (see Partially Dissenting Opinion of Judge’s Marc Perrin de 
Brichambaut, Application under Regulation 46(3) of the Regulations of the Court, ICC-RoC46(3)-
01/18-37-Anx, 6 September 2018, par. 14). It is interesting to note the Chamber’s extensive recourse 
to judicial citations of other international tribunals with regard to the principle of compétence de la 
compétence (see ICC, Decision on the “Prosecution’s Request for a Ruling on Jurisdiction under 
Article 19(3) of the Statute”, Application under Regulation 46(3) of the Regulations of the Court, 
ICC-RoC46(3)-01/18-37, PTC I, 6 September 2018, par. 30-31). 
670 Ibidem, par. 50. 
671 Ibidem, par. 72-73 (emphasis added). It should be noted that the Chamber limited the effects of its 
decision, in particular excluding any effect of res judicata, holding that its conclusion “is without 
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scope of the principle, holding that it may apply to crimes other than deportation (or 
as in the situation at hand, allegedly committed in connection with deportation), 
citing as examples the crime of persecution and of other inhumane acts672. In this 
manner the Chamber has informally ‘suggested’ to the OTP the possibility to expand 
the scope of a prospective examination or request for authorisation to investigate, so 
as to include other alleged crimes. In addition, the Court disagreed with the Office on 
the pre-preliminary nature of the procedure, stressing the fact that the OTP—
irrespective of the lack of its formal opening—had already carried out activities that 
should normally form the object of a full-fledged PE673. In that connection, the 
Chamber took the occasion to remind the Office that any future decision should be 
made “without delay” and in full compliance with internationally recognised 
standards, in particular with a view to safeguard the right of victims to truth, justice 
and reparation674. It remains to be seen whether the proceedings relating to this 
situation will now move forward, on the basis of a proprio motu formal opening of a 
preliminary examination (announced by the OTP shortly after the issuance of the 
Chamber’s decision) and of a request for authorisation under article 15(3) of the 
Statute or, alternatively, based on a state referral. 
 
2.3 The length and ‘tempo’ of preliminary examinations 
The crucial importance of the time factor with regard to the initiation and 
conduct of preliminary examination has already been the object of static analysis 
elsewhere in the present work, particularly in connection with the OTP’s firm stance 
on the purported inexistence of time limits for the conduct of preliminary 
																																																																																																																																																													
prejudice to subsequent findings on jurisdiction at a later stage of the proceedings”. In this sense the 
Court’s decision is in line with the views expressed by some commentators. See, e.g., J. P. PIERINI, Le 
contestazioni della giurisdizione della Corte e dell’ammissibilità del caso, in G. LATTANZI, V. 
MONETTI (eds.), La Corte Penale Internazionale. Organi, competenza, reati, processo, Milano, 2006, 
165-166. 
672 ICC, Decision on the “Prosecution’s Request for a Ruling on Jurisdiction under Article 19(3) of the 
Statute”, Application under Regulation 46(3) of the Regulations of the Court, ICC-RoC46(3)-01/18-
37, PTC I, 6 September 2018, par. 75-77, 79. 
673 Ibidem, par. 82. 
674 Ibidem, par. 84-88. The Chamber recalled some of its own precedents on the reasonable duration of 
preliminary examinations and investigations, as well as decisions of international human rights courts, 
in particular with regard to victims’ rights. 
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examination activities675 and the extremely narrow leverage enjoyed by preliminary 
judges in order to influence the timing of the examination676. In the context of the 
practice-based analysis carried out in this part of the work, the time factor is 
empirically approached in relation to the following aspects: a) The trends in the 
length of preliminary examinations and, if any, the correlation between its duration 
and the different triggering mechanisms; b) The trends regarding the length of the 
different phases of preliminary examinations; c) The degree of temporal proximity of 
preliminary examination to the facts and circumstances forming the object of such 
activities, and the importance of this factor for the unfolding of subsequent 
proceedings. 
With regard to the first of these aspects, namely the trends in the overall 
duration of preliminary examinations, the practice of the OTP reveals significant 
differences across the situations, which might depend on factors such as the different 
complexity of the situations at hand; the availability of documents and information 
on the crimes allegedly committed; the degree of cooperation of the state(s) 
concerned and, last but not least, the triggering mechanism used in each 
circumstance. Obviously, in order to measure the length of preliminary examinations 
it is necessary to define a starting and an ending point. Unfortunately, sometimes the 
exact starting point is not easily identifiable, due to the practice of the OTP to make 
the opening of a preliminary examination public after—sometimes long after—the 
actual beginning of the Office’s examination or not to reveal the exact date of its 
formal opening 677 . In addition to that, a distinction must be made between 
preliminary examinations based on their final outcome.  For PE that are closed with a 
decision to open an investigation (or to seek authorisation to open one) the length 
spans from the date of commencement (or the date in which the OTP has publicly 
announced the opening of PE) and the date of the decision to open an investigation 
(in case of UNSC or state referral), or the date of the request of a judicial 
																																																								
675 See, supra, Part Two, Chapter One, par. 3.2 (particularly footnotes 275-277).  
676 Ibidem. See also, supra, Part Two, Chapter Three, par. 2.1 (particularly footnotes 518-523). 
677 For instance, with regard to the preliminary examination of the situations in Iraq/UK and 
Venezuela, both closed on 9 February 2006, there is no indication on the exact point in time in which 
the OTP opened the PE. With regard to the situation in Afghanistan, the OTP made public the opening 
of a PE in 2007, but declared that the situation had been under preliminary examination since 2006. 
See ICC-OTP, Report on Preliminary Examination activities 2001, 13 December 2011, par. 20. Based 
on this paragraph it can be estimated that the PE was opened around June 2006, given that the OTP 
reports the receipt of 56 communication in the period spanning from 1 June 2006 to 1 June 2011. 
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authorisation to the PTC (in case of proprio motu). For PEs that are closed with a 
decision not to open an investigation, the length spans from the commencement date 
to the date in which the OTP announces the closing of the preliminary examination. 
The following four tables summarise the available data on the length of 
preliminary examinations as per the above indicators, distinguishing for the sake of 
clarity between those that ended with the opening of an investigation in the 
hypotheses of referral (state or UNSC) and proprio motu; preliminary examinations 
that were closed with a decision not to open an investigation; and those that are 
currently on-going. All data are retrieved from the OTP annual reports or other 
public statements made by the Prosecutor. 
 
Preliminary Examinations resulting in an investigation (state and UNSC 
Referral) 





Republic of the 
Congo 
3 March 2004 
(State self-ref.) 
1 July 2002 





made public 29 
January 2004) 
1 July 2002 







1 July 2002 
onwards 22 May 2007 882 
Mali 18 July 2012 (State self-ref.) 
January 2012 




30 May 2014 
(State self-ref.) 
1 August 2012 
onwards 24 September 2014 118 
Sudan-Darfur 31 March 2005 (UNSC ref.) 
1 July 2002 





15 February 2011 
onwards 3 March 2011 6  
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Note: * The calculation, in the absence of more precise information, assumes the date of 
referral as the starting date and the date of announcement of the opening of the investigation 
as end date of PE. 
 
Preliminary Examinations resulting in an investigation (Proprio motu) 











Kenya 5 February 2008 
26 November 




2003 23 June 2011 3 October 2011 103 days 2,823  
Georgia 14 August 2008 
13 October 
2015 27 January 2016 107 days 2,617  
Burundi 25 April 2016 
5 September 
2017 (filed ex 
parte) 
25 October 2017 
(public 9 
November 2017) 




(June 2006)  
20 November 
2017 pending pending ≃ 4,191 
 
 
Preliminary Examinations closed with a decision not to open an investigation 









Phase of PE 






























































for lack of 































On-going Preliminary Examinations 




Colombia Proprio motu June 2004 Phase 3 
Guinea Proprio motu 14 October 2009 Phase 3 





















Philippines Proprio motu 8 February 2018 Phase 2 
Situation Relating to 
the Deportation of 















Proprio motu  













Proprio motu  
(+ joint state referral by Argentina, Canada, 
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A few observations on the above data seem necessary in order to underline 
the current trends in the opening and conduct of PE on the part of the OTP. 
In the fist place, the data show the significant variability in the length of PE 
across the situations that have to date formed the object of the OTP’s assessment 
activities, ranging from the mere six days of the Libyan situation to the fourteen 
years (and counting) of the Colombian situation. Having regard to the PE that led to 
the opening of an investigation, the trend seems to show that a correlation exists 
between the triggering mechanism used and the length of PE678. In particular, 
UNSC’s referral correlates to a significantly shorter length of PE when compared to 
instances of state referral and proprio motu. This might be explained on grounds of 
the high degree of authoritativeness of the UNSC’s decision to refer a situation to the 
Court and, having regard to the two situations at hand, to the overwhelming amount 
of credible information on the commission of the alleged crimes679, making the 
																																																								
678 The same conclusion is reached by A. PUES, op. cit., 437. 
679 For instance, in the situation of Sudan-Darfur the OTP could rely on the extensive work carried out 
by the Commission of Inquiry on Darfur presided over by Professor Antonio Cassese and established 
pursuant to the UNSC Resolution 1564 (2004), S/Res/1564, 18 September 2004. See, Report of the 







Data on the 'Trigger' of Preliminary 
Examinations  
Proprio Motu Art. 15 
State Party Referral 
UNSC Referral 
Declaration of 
Acceptance + Proprio 
Motu 
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OTP’s inferences on the opening of an investigation relatively unproblematic680. 
Nevertheless, given the UNSC’s self-restraint in activating the Court’s jurisdiction 
and the consequently limited practice thereof, it might be excessive to draw 
definitive conclusions on the correlation between the Council’s intervention and the 
OTP’s incentive to proceed with extreme urgency with a decision on the opening of 
an investigation. State (self-)referrals and proprio motu procedures, to the contrary, 
seem to correlate to sometimes significantly longer PE. In most cases and with few 
notable exceptions, the PE in case of state referral lasted less than a year681. On the 
average, proprio motu procedures last significantly longer compared to other 
triggering mechanism, but there are instances in which the OTP completed the 
examination and forwarded to the PTC a request for authorisation to investigate in a 
relatively short period of time. Sometimes, as it will be seen in greater detail in the 
next paragraphs, the necessity to proceed swiftly may have been based on the need to 
circumvent potential procedural complications, such as in the situation of Burundi, 
where the OTP accelerated the PE activities in order to file a request of authorisation 
before the taking of effects of the state’s act of withdrawal from the Statute. To the 
contrary, the record-setting length of the Colombian PE can be explained on grounds 
of the very complex domestic situation in the framework of pacification efforts in the 
country and the necessity for the OTP to closely monitor the process, including by 
scrutinising the judicial application of the various transitional mechanisms created in 
recent years682. In any event, this extreme variability makes a calculation of the 
average length of preliminary examinations unnecessary and possibly misleading. 
Such a statistical elaboration wouldn’t appropriately take into account the 
																																																								
680 See, e.g., ICC-OTP, Report on Preliminary Examination activities 2011, 13 December 2011, par. 
118. 
681 For instance in the situation of Central African Republic I the preliminary examination lasted 882 
days and in the situation of the Gabonese Republic lasted approximately two years. For the exact 
figures see, supra, the tables of page 193-195. 
682 On the legal aspects of the Colombian peace process and its relations with the complementarity 
regime of the ICC see the in-depth study of K. AMBOS, The Colombian Peace Process and the 
Principle of Complementarity of the International Criminal Court: An Inductive, Situation-based 
Approach, Berlin/Heidelberg, 2010. On the most recent developments concerning the peace deal and 
with regard to the recently instituted Special Jurisdiction for Peace, see H. OLÁSOLO, J. M. F. 
RAMIREZ MENDOZA, The Colombian Integrated System of Truth, Justice, Reparation and Non-
Repetition, in Journal of International Criminal Justice, vol. 15, issue 5, 2017, 1011-1047 and R. 
URUEÑA, Prosecutorial Politics: The ICC's Influence in Colombian Peace Processes, 2003–2017, in 
American Journal of International Law, vol. 111, issue 1, 2017, 104-125. 
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specificities of each situation and the circumstances that may have influenced the 
choices of the OTP. 
In the second place, with regard to PEs concluded with a decision not to 
proceed with an investigation (or to ask the authorisation to open one) it can be 
observed that—on the average and with the possible exclusion of the Comoros 
situation—the time needed to reach a negative conclusion has in general been quite 
extended, notwithstanding the fact that most of these PEs did not pass the 
jurisdictional test of Phase 2, particularly due to the OTP’s negative conclusions on 
jurisdiction ratione materiae. In some of these occasions it is debatable whether to 
reach these conclusions such an extended period of time was at all justified, also 
taking into account the early practice—under the tenure of Prosecutor Moreno 
Ocampo—to provide very thin publicly available reasoning for the decision not to 
proceed683. In this sense, the three years and two months it took the Office to 
conclude that the uncertainty on the statehood of Palestine made it impossible to 
proceed on the basis of the declaration of acceptance of 2009 seem hardly justified, 
and some have even argued that such conclusion was legally untenable684. The same 
holds true for the closing of PE in the situations of Honduras and Korea.  
																																																								
683 The letters to the information senders through which the OTP decided to close the PE in the 
Iraq/UK, Venezuelan and Palestinian situations are extremely succinct and lack any detailed 
reasoning. See ICC-OTP, Response to communications received concerning Iraq, 9 February 2006; 
ICC-OTP, Response to communications received concerning Venezuela, 9 February 2006; ICC-OTP, 
Update on the Situation in Palestine, 3 April 2012. To the contrary, the OTP’s Article 53 Report on 
the Comoros situation is extensive and contains a very detailed analysis of the reasons for reaching the 
conclusion not to open an investigation. 
684 The OTP had received the submissions of prominent international law scholars for the purposes of 
a determination on the consequences of Palestine’s 2009 declaration of acceptance. One of such 
opinions, pointing to the conclusion that the declaration was valid and could effectively form the basis 
for the OTP’s examination and was capable of engaging the Court’s jurisdiction, had been submitted 
to the Court by Alain Pellet on 8 May 2010, and was co-signed by many authorities (such as, among 
the others, M. C. Bassiouni, L. Condorelli, B. Conforti, J. Dugard, W. A. Schabas). The opinion has 
been later published as part of a volume dedicated to Palestine’s access to international jurisdictions. 
See A. PELLET, The Effects of Palestine’s Recognition of the International Criminal Court’s 
Jurisdiction, in C. MELONI, G. TOGNONI (eds), Is There a Court for Gaza?—A Test Bench for 
International Justice, The Hague, 2012, 409-428. In this sense see also J. DUGARD, Palestine and the 
International Criminal Court: Institutional Failure or Bias?, in Journal of International Criminal 
Justice, vol. 11, issue 3, 2013, 563-570 and the punctual critique of the OTP’s reasoning by M. M. EL 
ZEIDY, Ad Hoc Declarations of Acceptance of Jurisdiction: The Palestinian Situation Under Scrutiny, 
in C. STAHN (ed.), The Law and Practice of the International Criminal Court, cit., 184-190. Contra, 
critically on the retroactive effects of Palestine’s declaration of acceptance pursuant to article 12(3) of 
the Statute, see C. ZIMMERMANN, Palestine and the International Criminal Court Quo Vadis? Reach 
and Limits of Declarations under Article 12(3), in Journal of International Criminal Justice, vol. 11, 
issue 3, 2013, 309-320. 
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In the third place, it is interesting to note that the practice of the OTP shows 
at least one example of application of the rules concerning the possibility to reopen a 
preliminary examination that had previously been closed, based on new facts or 
information. This situation must nevertheless be distinguished from those in which a 
PE in a certain country was closed and a new one, having a different temporal and 
material scope, was later opened with regard to different crimes allegedly committed 
in the same country685. With regard to time, the situation in Iraq/UK, originally 
closed in 2006 after at least two or three years of PE686, was reopened roughly eight 
years later in 2014 based on new information687. 
The second aspect worth elaborating is the length of the different phases of 
PE across the situations, with a view to determine whether there is any identifiable 
trend in the practice of the Office pointing to the conclusion that the different 
parameters to be considered at each phase (jurisdiction in Phase 2; admissibility in 
Phase 3; interests of justice in Phase 4) correlate to a different duration. This might 
shed some light on the comparative complexity of these assessments688. This analysis 
is made relatively straightforward by the fact that the OTP, consistently with its 
‘minimalistic’ approach towards the interests of justice689, has never gone through an 
in-depth assessment of this criterion, an ascertainment that is carried out in Phase 4 
																																																								
685 Such are the two ‘new’ situations in Venezuela and Palestine. In both circumstances the temporal 
framework and the material scope of the preliminary examination are entirely different from those 
forming the object of the two earlier decisions not to proceed. 
686 The exact date of commencement of the Iraq/UK preliminary examination is not known (see, 
supra, footnote 677). It should nevertheless be considered that the Statute entered into force for the 
UK on 1 July 2002, based on the state’s instrument of ratification deposited on 4 October 2001. 
687 See ICC-OTP, Statement, Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Fatou Bensouda, re-
opens the preliminary examination of the situation in Iraq, 13 May 2014 (available at https://www.icc-
cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=otp-statement-iraq-13-05-2014, last accessed 6 November 2018). 
688 With regard to Phase 1 of the PE, where communications undergo the first screening and where 
those manifestly falling outside the Court’s jurisdiction are dismissed, the OTP estimates that its 
average duration should be anything in the range between 6 months and a full year, based on the 
approximately 500 communications per year received by the Office (see ICC-ASP/14/21*, Report of 
the Court on the Basic Size of the Office of the Prosecution, 17 September 2015, 37). Concerning the 
amount of work required to perform these activities the Office estimates that the initial screening 
should ideally take 5 days of work per month by the dedicated team (approximately 60 days of work 
per year in total), whereas the analytical reports on the communications deserving further analysis 
should take 30 days of work per report (270 days in total based on the prospect of 9 communications 
per year passing the initial screening). Ibidem, 42. 
689 See ICC-OTP, Policy Paper on the Interests of Justice, September 2007, 3-4. In particular the OTP 
maintains that there is a relative presumption that the opening an investigation is, generally, in the 
interest of justice. Therefore, an in-depth assessment of the interests of justice would only play a role 
as the basis for a decision not to proceed with an investigation (or to request the authorisation to do 
so). So far the Office has never made recourse to the interests of justice for the purpose of closing a 
PE. 
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of the preliminary examination690. Therefore, most of the time is spent in the analysis 
of jurisdiction and admissibility. On this point it should be noted that the OTP, 
through the Report on the Basic Size of the Office, has estimated that the average 
duration of Phase 2 should be contained in a one-year period, while it considered 
impossible to predetermine a definite average length of Phase 3 activities, due to the 
complexity of this assessment and its variability across the different situations691. By 
comparing the OTP’s performance goals with the concrete data extrapolated from the 
annual reports on preliminary examinations it is possible to formulate the following 
observations. 
Firstly, with the general exclusion of the situations referred by the UNSC and 
of most of those referred by State Parties692, data show that the length of Phase 2, 
dedicated to the assessment of subject-matter jurisdiction, has almost always 
exceeded the period of two years, with peaks of five and seven years on some 
occasions693. Only in few circumstances has the Office complied with the goal to 
contain such activities within one year, although this goal was only formalised in 
2015 through the Report on the Basic Size and may not be used retroactively as a 
benchmark to judge the OTP’s performances. In any event, the significant 
differences in the time needed to reach a conclusion on subject-matter jurisdiction 
cannot be explained exclusively on grounds of the different degree of complexity of 
the legal and factual circumstances of each situation. The OTP’s formal and informal 
policies, as well as other pragmatic considerations, seem to play a decisive role in 
																																																								
690 The OTP estimates that the activities to carry out in Phase 4 should generally be completed over a 
period of approximately six months (see ICC-ASP/14/21*, Report of the Court on the Basic Size of 
the Office of the Prosecution, 17 September 2015, 37). 
691 Ibidem. 
692 The tables of pages 193-195 show that the overall duration of the preliminary examination 
activities in these situations, with the exclusion of those concerning CAR I and the Gabonese 
Republic, has been contained in a relatively short period of time (on the average between four and six 
months). Consequently, as regards the majority of referred situations, the length of Phase 2 of PE has 
been well within the one-year period envisaged by the OTP Report on the Basic Size. 
693 Based on the OTP annual reports, the length of Phase 2 analysis across the situations for which 
sufficiently precise dates are available is as follows. Guinea: ≃ 2 years; Gabon: ≃ 2 years; Iraq/UK: 3 
years; Nigeria: 2 years; Palestine (situation relative to the PE opened in 2015): 3 years; Ukraine: more 
than 4 years, on-going; Georgia: ≃ 2 years; Afghanistan: 7 years; Honduras: ≃ 4 years; Republic of 
Korea: 5 years. Besides those referred by State Parties and the UNSC, the only other situations in 
which Phase 2 lasted less than two years are those concerning the Comoros (less than one year); 
Kenya (less than 2 years for the completion of the whole PE) and Burundi (6-7 months). Exact dates 
regarding the duration of Phase 2 are not available for the situations of Côte d'Ivoire and Colombia, 
due to the lack of precise reporting in the early years of the Court’s activity, particularly between 2006 
and 2011. 
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prioritising the pace of certain preliminary examination over others that seem less 
promising in terms of investigation and prospective trial developments694. 
Secondly, notwithstanding the variability across the spectrum of the various 
situations, the trend suggests that the assessment of admissibility carried out in Phase 
3—on average and with few exceptions—generally requires more time than the 
assessment of jurisdiction. In particular, situations in which the PE was maintained in 
Phase 3 for an extended period of time were characterised by a complex analysis of 
complementarity issues, whereby the OTP engaged in a prolonged dialogue with 
national authorities with a view to monitor the existence, adequacy, credibility and 
genuineness of national proceedings in order to reach a decision on the opening of an 
investigation695. 
The third and last relevant dimension of the timing of preliminary 
examinations deals with the temporal proximity between the commencement of PE 
and the facts forming the object of the OTP’s examination and, potentially, of 
investigation and prosecution. It is common knowledge, corroborated by both 
national and international practice, that the passing of time makes every aspect of 
investigation and prosecution more challenging, impractical and uncertain, for 
instance diminishing the availability and ‘freshness’ of the evidence, or making it 
difficult or impossible to secure the presence at trial of the alleged perpetrators696. In 
the case of the ICC, this proximity is dependent on additional contingent factors that 
do not generally hamper the prosecution of crimes at the national level. Such are, for 
instance, the variable geometry of the territorial and temporal scope of the Court’s 
																																																								
694 In this sense see A. PUES, op. cit., 436-437, 449-450. The Author criticises the current practice of 
the Office as regards the extreme variability in the length of preliminary examinations, which in her 
view is not linked to principled and transparent policy considerations, resulting in a practice that “may 
overstep the boundary of prosecutorial discretion at the preliminary examination stage”. 
695 Again, excluding the situations in which the whole PE was completed in a short period of time, an 
analysis of the practice shows that the length of Phase 3 generally surpasses—sometimes 
significantly—that of Phase 2. Data extrapolated from the annual reports the duration of Phase 3 
across the different situations are as follows. Guinea: over 7 years, on-going; Nigeria: over 6 years, 
on-going; Georgia: ≃ 4 years; Afghanistan: 4 years; Colombia: exact dates uncertain, but already on 
Phase 3 as per the 2011 annual Report, at least 7 years. The situations of Iraq/UK (1 year); the 
Comoros (less than a year); Kenya and Burundi (10 months) are examples of shorter lengths of Phase 
3 analysis. On the complexities of the complementarity assessment as a possible explanation of the 
length of certain PE see A. PUES, op. cit., 440-442. 
696  As far as international(ised) practice is concerned, a clear example of the sometimes 
insurmountable difficulties of investigating and trying crimes many years after their commission is the 
experience of the ECCC, whose institutional goal is to ascertain criminal responsibility for crimes 
committed between 1975 and 1979, more than thirty five years after the facts. 
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jurisdiction (depending on the status of ratifications, acceptance of jurisdiction or 
UNSC referral); the almost complete dependency of the OTP on state cooperation for 
the conduct of the most relevant PE, investigations and prosecution activities; and 
the practical difficulties in collecting information and securing evidence with regard 
to episodes of massive criminality that frequently involve a high number of 
perpetrators and victims. A closer look to the reports and statements of the OTP has 
provided useful insights on the ‘responsiveness’ of the Office to the alleged 
commission of international crimes and in activating the procedural machinery of the 
ICC through preliminary examinations. 
In the practice of the OTP the commencement of preliminary examinations 
has been, in general, relatively close to the alleged episodes of criminality, with 
timeframes ranging from a few days or weeks to a few months697. It should be noted 
that this proximity, especially in the case of state or UNSC’s referral, does not 
depend exclusively on the OTP’s responsiveness but is also heavily influenced by the 
readiness of the referring entity to trigger the Court’s jurisdiction. In the case of 
proprio motu, the Office mostly relies on private communications regarding the 
commission of alleged crimes that come from multiple sources, but mainly from 
private senders (individuals, groups of victims, NGOs, etc.) that are on the ground 
and have a direct knowledge of the factual context in which the alleged crimes took 
place. The fact that these communications are forwarded directly to the Court, 
without the need for a determination by a political body such as the state or UNSC in 
the event of referral, can positively contribute to their timeliness. The following table 
shows the available data concerning the lapse of time between the initiation of OTP’s 
PE activities (pursuant to referral or motu proprio) and the facts covered by the 
Court’s jurisdiction ratione temporis698. 
 
																																																								
697 It should be noted that with regard to various situations the temporal jurisdiction of the Court 
extends from the date of the entry into force of the Statute (1 July 2002) onwards, particularly for the 
states that joined the Court before that date and by virtue of referrals that consider that date as dies a 
quo for the exercise of jurisdiction. Nevertheless, in order to understand the degree of responsiveness 
of the OTP in opening a preliminary examination, the focus must always be on the timeframe of the 
specific incidents and alleged crimes that come under the Office’s consideration or form the basis of a 
referral or of a declaration of acceptance of jurisdiction. 
698 It should be noted that the structures of the Court were only materially created between 2003 and 
2004, therefore no activities could in any way have been carried out before the institution of the OTP, 
Registry and Chambers. 
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Situation Referral and/or initiation of PE 
Jurisdiction ratione temporis 
and focus of PE/investigation 
Côte d’Ivoire 
1 October 2003 (after 1st 
declaration of acceptance) 
19 September 2002 onwards*, main 
focus on facts between 2010 and 
2011 
Uganda 16 December 2003 1 July 2002 onwards 
Democratic Republic of 
the Congo 
3 March 2004 1 July 2002 onwards 
Colombia June 2004 
1 July 2002 onwards (for crimes 




22 December 2004 
1 July 2002 onwards (focus on crimes 
between 2002-2003) 
Sudan-Darfur 31 March 2005 1 July 2002 onwards 
Afghanistan June 2006 
1 May 2003 onwards (exact end date 
subject to PTC approval) 
Kenya 5 February 2008 1 June 2005—26 November 2008 
Georgia 14 August 2008 1 July 2008—10 October 2008 
Guinea 14 October 2009 
1 October 2003, focus on facts of 28 
September 2009 onwards 
Honduras (closed) 18 November 2010 
1 September 2002 onwards, focus on 
facts between 28 June 2009—27 
January 2010 
Nigeria 18 November 2010 
1 July 2002 onwards, focus on facts 
from July 2009 onwards and April 
2011 onwards. 
Republic of Korea 
(closed) 
6 December 2010 
1 July 2002, focus on facts of 26 
March and 23 November 2010 
Libya 26 February 2011 15 February 2011 onwards 
Mali 18 July 2012 
1 July 2002 onwards, focus on facts 
since January 2012 
Comoros, Greece and 
Cambodia (closed) 
14 May 2013 
1 November 2006, focus on facts of 
31 May 2010 
Ukraine 24 April 2014 21 November 2013 onwards** 
Iraq/UK 14 May 2014 




30 May 2014 
1 July 2002, focus on facts from 1 
August 2012 onwards 
Palestine 16 January 2015 13 June 2014 onwards (based on 
PART THREE – CHAPTER TWO 
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(additional referral by 
Palestine on 15 May 2018) 
declaration of acceptance), 1 April 
2015 based on accession 
Burundi 25 April 2016 
1 December 2003, focus on facts 
between 26 April 2015—26 October 
2017*** 
Gabon 27 September 2016 
1 July 2002, focus on facts since May 
2016 onwards 
Philippines 8 February 2018 
11 November 2011, focus on facts 
since 1 July 2016**** 
Venezuela 
8 February 2018 
(additional referral by 
Argentina, Canada, Chile, 
Colombia, Paraguay, Peru  
on 25 September 2018) 
1 July 2002, focus on facts since at 
least April 2017 
(referral asks for extension to facts 
since 12 February 2014) 
Rohingya/Myanmar 18 September 2018 
 1 June 2010, focus on facts since 
August 2017 
Notes: * Based on declaration of acceptance of 18 April 2003, confirmed on 14 December 
2010 and 3 May 2011. PTC III originally authorised the investigation for facts since 28 
November 2010, and later extended temporal jurisdiction to include facts from 19 September 
2002 onwards. 
** Originally from 21 November 2013 to 22 February 2014 (based on the first declaration of 
acceptance). A second declaration of acceptance modified the temporal scope, conferring 
jurisdiction also on facts since 20 February 2014 onwards. 
*** The end date for the exercise of temporal jurisdiction depends on the taking of effects of 
Burundi’s withdrawal on 27 October 2017. 
**** The act of withdrawal of the Philippines has not yet taken effects, but may limit the 
temporal scope of a prospective PE and/or investigation. 
 
In any event, the timely opening of preliminary examinations does not 
guarantee, as the data on the overall duration of PE clearly show, that the future 
unfolding of the procedure will lead to investigation and prosecution in a short 
period of time. Nevertheless, there are significant advantages in fostering proximity 
between PE and the facts under consideration. In particular, this vicinity is helpful 
from the point of view of the collection of information, the gradual refinement of the 
OTP’s understanding of the factual, temporal and material scope of a potential 
investigation and the formulation of a prognosis on crucial issues of admissibility. 
Lastly, it should be borne in mind that in some situations the temporal scope 
of a preliminary examination is open-ended (i.e. it has a starting date but no specified 
end date), while in other instances it is limited to a precise segment of time. The 
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OTP’s activities in the first of these scenarios are more complicated, due to the 
potential extension of the examination to on-going crimes that might significantly 
extend the complexity and length of PE activities. In the second scenario, the OTP’s 
assessment is limited to a closed temporal framework without the necessity to focus 
on prospective crimes, although a subsequent extension of the temporal scope cannot 
be completely ruled out, for instance based on a modification of the terms of a 
declaration of acceptance of the Court’s jurisdiction. 
In conclusion, the practice shows that the OTP has certainly made use of the 
time factor as a discretional tool in the conduct of preliminary examination. The 
Office has developed the practice of ‘graduating’ the quantity and quality of its 
activities across the various situations in a manner that it considered compatible with 
the appropriate allocation of the human and financial resources of the Office and/or 
necessary in order to promote (positive) complementarity vis-à-vis the interested 
states. The use of time as a flexible discretionary tool at the preliminary examination 
phase might come under severe public scrutiny and even come in conflict with the 
requirements of efficacy, impartiality and reasonable duration of proceedings at the 
ICC699. Nevertheless, a solution de lege lata to the lack of any provision on the 
maximum duration of PE could only come from the OTP’s voluntary commitment to 
contain these activities within a reasonable and predetermined period of time, 
something which at present seems at odds with the Office’s position on the issue700.  
   
2.4 The importance of the reporting activity of the OTP and of its public statements 
Before entering an in-depth discussion of the OTP’s practice on the closing of 
preliminary examinations and their possible outcomes, a few observations on the 
reporting activity of the OTP seem warranted. The case-based elaboration of the 
present part of the work is made possible by the existence of a well-established 
reporting practice of the Office, which has acquired increasing importance in recent 
years in the context of the OTP’s efforts for the promotion of transparency. 
																																																								
699 In this vein see A. PUES, op. cit., 442-449. 
700 Ibidem, 450-453. The Author suggests, as a policy objective, that the OTP commits to a maximum 
length of three years for preliminary examinations, arguing that “Such policy commitment still 
provides the Prosecutor with flexibility, if the circumstances so demand. But it would require explicit 
justifications when the defined limit is exceeded, explaining why the different treatment of situations 
is justified”.  
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In the early years of the Court’s activity the OTP, under the tenure of the first 
Prosecutor, had not yet adopted a policy of reporting periodically on the preliminary 
examination activities. The Office published a first cumulative report covering the 
period 2003-2006 that not only made known to the public the activities performed in 
that period, but also anticipated some of the prosecutorial policies which were later 
formalised in the various policy papers and strategies. Additional insights on the 
OTP’s activities of that period can be retrieved via the ICC reports to the UN 
General Assembly. Overall, the information available on the early years of activity of 
the Office is relatively incomplete and does not live up to a reasonable standard of 
transparency and publicity as regards the commencement, conduct and progress of 
PE, and did not provide solid reasoning for certain prosecutorial choices, especially 
those not to proceed with an investigation. 
The Office inaugurated its policy of annual reports on PE activities only in 
2011 and has since then consistently delivered these reports, which are of paramount 
importance to follow the progress (or lack of progress) of preliminary examinations, 
and a useful tool to monitor the OTP’s performances and degree of adherence to its 
own policy and strategy objectives. Besides the annual reports, the OTP—
consistently with the Policy Paper on preliminary examinations—has made known to 
the public its decisions on specific situations by means of dedicated country 
reports701. The reporting activity is therefore an aspect of the already examined 
proceduralisation of PE, given that the transition between the different phases of the 
examination—as well as its positive or negative conclusion—is generally marked by 
the adoption of a report dealing with the corresponding factual and legal assessment 
(jurisdiction, admissibility, etc.). The importance of this practice is not limited to the 
promotion of transparency but can also be appreciated in connection with the OTP’s 
willingness to limit the judges’ attempts to interfere with the conduct of preliminary 
examinations702. Although no statutory provision requires the OTP to publicly report 
																																																								
701  A country-specific report can be adopted either in the form of an intermediate or final 
conclusion—positive or negative—on issues of jurisdiction (‘Art. 5 Report’) or at the end of PE in the 
form of an ‘Art. 53(1) Report’ containing the OTP’s decision to proceed or not to proceed with an 
investigation. On one occasion the OTP has put forward an interim report, with regard to a 
preliminary examinations that had been going on for a prolonged period of time (see, ICC-OTP, 
Interim Report, Situation in Colombia, November 2012). 
702 By making the status of each preliminary examination public and updating periodically on the 
progress and the activities performed the OTP can at least indirectly reply to criticism coming from 
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on these activities, the practice under consideration plays a significant role in the on-
going dialogue between the Office and stakeholders on one hand, and judges on the 
other. 
The trend in the reporting activity of the Office is towards progressively more 
complete, in-depth and analytical reports, although the degree of specificity and 
detail of these documents varies across the different situations, with a view to 
balancing the need for transparency and the need for the protection of 
confidentiality703. The increasingly more detailed character of the reports—especially 
those formalising decisions not to proceed—may have the consequence of exposing 
the OTP to sharp criticism for its early selection choices, as well as of providing 
increased opportunities for judicial review704. 
Besides the reports, another relevant aspect of the OTP’s practice at the 
preliminary stage has to do with the Prosecutor’s public statements. It is a well-
established practice of the Office to publicly take a stance with regard to episodes of 
violence that might come under consideration of the OTP in the context of a 
preliminary examination. Sometimes the Office makes ‘preventive’ statements, for 
instance warning that a certain situation might lead to the future involvement of the 
Court705. On other occasions the statements relate to situations already under PE 
																																																																																																																																																													
states, victims or NGOs on issues such as the length of preliminary examinations. It should also be 
noted that since the institutional conflict with the PTC in the CAR I situation with regard to the 
Chamber’s power to ask information on the status of PE at the request of the interested state, the OTP 
has dealt with subsequent referred situations in a relatively shorter period of time (although the 
Gabonese situation has been on PE for approximately 2 years before a final determination). 
703 To give an idea of this trend towards more precise and in-depth reports, a simple comparison 
between the 2011 and 2017 reports shows that the length of the document has almost tripled during 
the past six years. This is not only due to the increased number of situations to report on, but also to 
the more analytical style of more recent reports. On the limits to transparency that may be imposed 
based on the need to protect confidentiality and safety of the information providers, see Regulation 
28(2) of the Regulations of the OTP. 
704 The case of the Article 53(1) Report on the Comoros situation is an example of the more detailed 
and reasoned approach in adopting decisions at this stage. It is the very analytical character of this 
document that provided the leeway for the Comoros’ request for judicial review of the nolle prosequi 
decision, leading to the PTC’s request to reconsider the OTP’s previous decision. It has also been 
underlined by A. LUBIN, Politics, Power Dynamics, and the Limits of Existing Self-Regulation and 
Oversight in ICC Preliminary Examinations, in M. BERGSMO, C. STAHN (eds.), Quality Control in 
Preliminary Examinations: Vol. 2, cit., 106, that the reporting activity might serve as “a pressure 
relief valve, providing critics with proof that the OTP remains active. This is done by voluntarily 
providing information regarding both the factual and legal narratives as they emerge from the 
assessment, while keeping the situations parked at the preliminary examination stage”. 
705 See, e.g., ICC-OTP, Statement of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Fatou 
Bensouda, regarding the worsening situation in Gaza, 8 April 2018 (available at: https://www.icc-
cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=180408-otp-stat, last accessed 6 November 2018); ICC-OTP, 
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where the commission of crimes is on-going, and are designed to warn the parties on 
the potential legal consequences of any escalation of violence706. In some cases the 
OTP, commenting on specific episodes of violence, has taken a stance on general 
issues such as the possibility to deal with acts of terrorism or with crimes committed 
by or against peacekeepers707. An empirical analysis of the concrete effects of these 
statements on the conduct of the actors of a conflict and on the attitude of national 
jurisdiction towards investigation and prosecution of the alleged perpetrators is 
beyond the scope of this work, but would be particularly relevant in connection with 
the more general debate on the deterrent capacity of the ICC as a permanent criminal 
justice institution. 
	
3. The conclusion of preliminary examinations: The OTP’s decision on the opening 
or not opening of an investigation 
The preliminary examination activities must at some point be concluded by 
means of a discretional decision of the OTP to open an investigation (or to ask 
judicial authorisation to do so) or, if the conditions to proceed are not met in the 
OTP’s judgement, to close the PE without opening the investigation or requesting an 
authorisation to the competent PTC. In the first hypothesis the Office must have 
positively completed the assessment of all four phases of the preliminary 
examination and be satisfied that the criteria to proceed with an investigation (or 
request to open one) are met. In the second hypothesis, the Prosecutor—in light of 
the incremental and sequential order of the four phases—may terminate the 
																																																																																																																																																													
Statement of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Fatou Bensouda concerning the 
situation in the Republic of the Philippines, 13 October 2016 (available at: https://www.icc-
cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=161013-otp-stat-php, last accessed 6 November 2018). 
706 See, e.g., ICC-OTP, Statement of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Mrs Fatou 
Bensouda, regarding increased violence in CAR: “Crimes must stop!”, 23 May 2017 (available at: 
https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=170523-otp-stat, last accessed 6 November 2018); 
ICC-OTP, Statement of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Mrs Fatou Bensouda, 
regarding the situation in the Kasaï provinces, Democratic Republic of the Congo, 31 March 2017 
(available at: https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=170331-otp-stat, last accessed 6 
November 2018). 
707 See ICC-OTP, Statement, Attacks against peacekeepers may constitute war crimes, 19 July 2013 
(available at: https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=otp-statement-19-07-2013, last accessed 
6 November 2018); ICC-OTP, Statement of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Fatou 
Bensouda, on the alleged crimes committed by ISIS, 8 April 2015 (available at: https://www.icc-
cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=otp-stat-08-04-2015-1, last accessed 6 November 2018). 
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examination at the end of any of these phases, without the need to proceed to the 
subsequent ones, when the legal criteria of the previous are not met. The following 
paragraphs delve into the analysis of the OTP’s practice regarding both scenarios, 
starting from prosecutorial decisions not to proceed (par. 3.1), and concluding with 
decisions to proceed with an investigation or request authorisation to do so (par. 3.2). 
This overview of the OTP’s practice is based on the one hand on the reports (or 
communications) containing the Office’s reasoned decision to proceed or not to 
proceed and, on the other, particularly in instances of proprio motu, on the OTP’s 
requests of authorisation and the corresponding PTC’s decisions.  
	
3.1 Decisions not to proceed with an investigation pursuant to article 53(1) of the 
Statute 
So far the OTP has concluded the PE of a situation with a decision not to 
proceed with an investigation on seven occasions, at different stages of the 
examination and based on different reasons708. Up to date the Office has never relied 
on arguments of complementarity or on the interests of justice to justify a decision 
not to proceed. On some occasions the OTP’s decision was based on a negative 
conclusion regarding the existence of Court’s jurisdiction as regards the facts under 
examination (contained in an ‘Article 5 Report’ or communication to the senders); in 
other circumstances the decision was based on a negative conclusion regarding the 
admissibility of the potential cases likely to arise from an investigation, in particular 
on grounds of the alleged insufficient gravity of the crimes. On one occasion, the 
OTP considered that the preconditions for the exercise of the Court’s jurisdiction 
were not met and declined to continue with the PE activities, without entering into a 
more detailed analysis of the other relevant criteria709. Some of the most relevant 
legal issues pertaining to each of these situations are considered in the following 
paragraphs, breaking up the analysis based on the stage and reasons for closing the 
examination. 
																																																								
708 The situations closed during preliminary examination are those regarding Palestine (based on the 
declaration of acceptance of 2009), Iraq/UK (closed in 2006 and later reopened in 2014), Venezuela, 
Honduras, Republic of Korea, the Registered Vessels of the Comoros, Greece and Cambodia, and 
Gabon. 
709 This is the case of the situation in Palestine based on the declaration of 2009. 
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3.1.1 Lack of the preconditions for the exercise of jurisdiction 
Preliminary examinations are mostly concerned with the assessment of the 
reasonable basis to proceed standard based on a positive conclusion on the three 
fundamental requirements of jurisdiction, admissibility (gravity and 
complementarity), and non contrariety to the interests of justice. Nevertheless, a 
logical prerequisite to any such determination is that the Court’s jurisdiction had 
been properly triggered and/or validly accepted by a state that is not a Party to the 
Rome Statute710. If the situation is referred by a State Party, the OTP only needs to 
verify that the referral comes from the competent authority of a State Party and that it 
has been duly communicated to the Court as per the applicable rules711. With regard 
to a UNSC’s referral, the onus on the OTP to verify the precondition for the exercise 
of jurisdiction is even less demanding, given that the Security Council can only refer 
a situation based on a Chapter VII resolution, and that it is very unlikely that doubts 
may arise as regards its validity. A more uncertain situation may arise in the case of 
acceptance of jurisdiction by a third state based on article 12(3) of the Statute, in 
which case the OTP must be cumulatively satisfied that the entity accepting 
jurisdiction qualifies as a state for the purposes of accepting such jurisdiction and 
that the declaration comes form the authority competent to express the state’s 
consent to that end712. It should be reminded that a declaration of acceptance does not 
per se trigger the Court’s jurisdiction713, but the lack of one of the abovementioned 
																																																								
710 See article 12 of the Statute, whose title is “Preconditions to the exercise of jurisdiction”. 
711 See article 13(a), 14(1)-(2) of the Statute and Rule 45 of the RPE, requiring that the referral be 
made in writing. 
712  See ICC, Corrigendum to “Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the 
Authorisation of an Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Côte d'Ivoire”, Situation in the 
Republic of Côte d’Ivoire, ICC-02/11-14-Corr, PTC III, 15 November 2011, par. 14. 
713 See W. A. SCHABAS, G. PECORELLA, Article 12, Preconditions to the exercise of jurisdiction, in O. 
TRIFFTERER, K. AMBOS (eds.), op. cit., 686. This position is shared by the Court. See ICC, Decision 
on the “Corrigendum of the challenge to the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court on the 
basis of articles 12(3), 19(2), 21(3), 55 and 59 of the Rome Statute filed by the Defence for President 
Gbagbo (ICC- 02/11-01/11-129)”, Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo, Situation in the Republic of Côte 
d’Ivoire, ICC-02/11-01/11-212, PTC I, 15 August 2012, par. 57; confirmed by ICC, Judgment on the 
appeal of Mr Laurent Koudou Gbagbo against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I on jurisdiction and 
stay of the proceedings, Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo, Situation in the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire, 
ICC-02/11-01/11-321, AC, 12 December 2012, par. 58. Also the OTP subscribes to this position, see 
ICC-OTP, Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, November 2013, footnote 25: “It should be 
noted that article 12(3) is a jurisdictional provision, not a trigger mechanism. As such, declarations of 
the sort should not be equated with referrals, but will require a separate triggering by the Prosecutor 
proprio motu or by a State Party”. 
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requirements may prevent the OTP from entering a preliminary examination on the 
merits of the situation.  
The Office has closed a preliminary examination in limine for the alleged lack 
of the preconditions for the exercise of jurisdiction in only one circumstance, with 
regard to the situation linked to the Palestinian declaration of acceptance of 2009. 
The case is well known and has attracted the OTP much criticism both for the time 
needed to reach a decision and the reasons provided by the Office for closing the 
PE714. It is beyond the scope of this work to enter an in-depth discussion on the 
formal and substantive conditions of the validity of an article 12(3) declaration of 
acceptance or on the statehood of Palestine; suffices here to analyse the OTP’s 
behaviour in examining these issues as part of the PE activities and the reasons for 
the decision to terminate it without any examination on the merits of the incidents 
temporally covered by the declaration of acceptance. 
The declaration of acceptance was lodged on behalf of Palestinian National 
Authority (PNA) by Mr Ali Khashan, acting as Minister of Justice, on 21 January 
2009 to the effect of recognising the Court’s jurisdiction for crimes committed since 
1 July 2002715, although the facts prompting this act mainly related to Operation Cast 
Lead, conducted on Gaza by the IDF between December 2008 and January 2009. 
Upon receipt of said declaration the OTP begun its legal consideration and invited 
the representatives of the PNA, NGOs and various experts to file submissions, inter 
alia, on the validity and temporal scope of the declaration 716 . Consideration 
continued, based on this information, in 2011717. On 3 April 2012 the OTP made 
known to the public its decision to close the preliminary examination, considering 
that the preconditions to the exercise of jurisdiction had not been met718. 
The argument of the OTP revolved around the uncertainty—at least at the 
time of the assessment—on the statehood of Palestine and on whether the entity 
																																																								
714 See, e.g., the critical assessment of the OTP’s reasoning by M. M. EL ZEIDY, Ad Hoc Declarations 
of Acceptance of Jurisdiction: The Palestinian Situation Under Scrutiny, cit., 184-190. 
715 See Palestinian National Authority, Declaration recognizing the Jurisdiction of the International 
Criminal Court, 21 January 2009. 
716 For a summary of these submissions see ICC-OTP, Summary of submissions on whether the 
declaration lodged by the Palestinian National Authority meets statutory requirements, 3 May 2010 
(available at https://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/553F5F08-2A84-43E9-8197-
6211B5636FEA/282852/PALESTINEFINAL201010272.pdf, last accessed 6 November 2018). 
717 ICC-OTP, Report on Preliminary Examination activities 2011, 13 December 2011, par. 16-19. 
718 ICC-OTP, Update on the Situation in Palestine, 3 April 2012.  
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accepting the Court’s jurisdiction could qualify as a “State” for the purposes of 
article 12(3) of the Statute. The OTP, in its succinct three-page document, somehow 
decided not to decide on the issue. The Office recognised itself incompetent to make 
a determination on whether the declaration could be considered valid and effective, 
deferring to UN bodies in order to eliminate the uncertainties on the statehood of 
Palestine and its qualification as a “State” for the purposes of the Statute719. This line 
of reasoning has been aptly criticised, among the others, by EL ZEIDY, as “suffer[ing] 
from inconsistencies and a number of legal errors”720. From the point of view of 
timing, considering that the OTP had already acquired all the relevant information 
and submissions by May 2010, it is difficult to justify the two additional years that it 
took the Office to reach its laconic conclusion. With regard to the merits of the 
decision, it has been correctly pointed out that both the Statute and case law of the 
Court make it clear that the OTP, when acting proprio motu, is always required to 
reach a final determination pursuant to article 15(3) or 15(6) of the Statute based on 
the criteria listed in article 53(1)721. In other words, the Office should not be allowed 
to avoid an explicit decision on the existence of a reasonable basis to proceed on 
grounds that the uncertainty on the preconditions to the exercise of jurisdiction—in 
this case on the validity of Palestine’s declaration of acceptance—precludes in 
essence any such determination722. The OTP, as an organ of an international judicial 
institution premised on the compétence de la compétence principle723, was certainly 
in the position to enter an autonomous legal and factual determination on the quality 
of “State” of the accepting entity, at least for the limited purposes of the applicability 
																																																								
719 Ibidem, par. 4-6, 8. 
720 See M. M. EL ZEIDY, Ad Hoc Declarations of Acceptance of Jurisdiction: The Palestinian 
Situation Under Scrutiny, cit., 184. 
721 Ibidem, 186-190. See Rule 48 of the RPE, establishing that the assessment leading to a decision 
under article 15 shall be based on the criteria listed under article 53(1)(a)-(c) of the Statute. 
722 Ibidem. 
723 This general principle is clearly enshrined in article 19(1) of the Statute and reinforced by the 
provisions of article 119 of the Statute. As regards the origins and content of this principle in the more 
general framework of international adjudication, see C. TOMUSCHAT, Article 36, in A. ZIMMERMANN, 
K. OELLERS-FRHAM, C. TOMUSCHAT, C. J. TAMS (eds.), The Statute of the International Court of 
Justice: A Commentary, Oxford, 2012, 694, and R. KOLB, The International Court of Justice, 
Oxford/Portland, 2013, 601-606.  Recently, on the scope of this principle in the context of the Rome 
Statute, see ICC, Decision on the “Prosecution’s Request for a Ruling on Jurisdiction under Article 
19(3) of the Statute”, Application under Regulation 46(3) of the Regulations of the Court, ICC-
RoC46(3)-01/18-37, PTC I, 6 September 2018, 26-33. 
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of the Statute’s jurisdictional regime and subject to an eventual judicial 
determination of the Court724.  
Besides the fragility of its legal reasoning and approaching it from the point 
of view of prosecutorial discretion, this decision manifests the OTP’s intention not to 
embark the Office on a highly controversial and politically charged international 
issue, leaving it to political bodies (UN and states) to provide the clarifications 
necessary for a future reconsideration of the matter725. In any event, and leaving aside 
the allegations of political pressures on the OTP to reach a negative decision726, the 
Prosecutor’s restrictive stance may have played a role in prompting the Palestinian 
authorities to intensify their efforts to gain international recognition, which have led 
to the upgrade of Palestine’s status at the UN and to its accession to a number of 
treaties and international organisations727. Based on these changed circumstances, 
Palestine lodged a second declaration of acceptance and subsequently acceded to the 
																																																								
724 In this sense see M. M. EL ZEIDY, Ad Hoc Declarations of Acceptance of Jurisdiction: The 
Palestinian Situation Under Scrutiny, cit., 190. 
725 See ICC-OTP, Update on the Situation in Palestine, 3 April 2012, par. 8, where the OTP states: 
“The Office could in the future consider allegations of crimes committed in Palestine, should 
competent organs of the United Nations or eventually the Assembly of States Parties resolve the legal 
issue relevant to an assessment of article 12 or should the Security Council, in accordance with article 
13(b), make a referral providing jurisdiction.” 
726 The OTP came under severe criticism both for its decision of 2012 and its subsequent nolle 
prosequi decision regarding the situation referred by the Comoros. See, e.g., the very critical article by 
Julian Borger, Hague Court under western pressure not to open Gaza war crimes inquiry, The 
Guardian, 18 August 2014 (available at: https://www.theguardian.com/law/2014/aug/18/hague-court-
western-pressure-gaza-inquiry, last accessed 6 November 2018), alleging political pressure from 
Israel and the US to refrain from opening an investigation. The OTP replied with a public statement, 
denying any allegation of political pressures and confirming that its decision was based exclusively on 
legal considerations (see ICC-OTP, Statement of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, 
Fatou Bensouda: “The Public Deserves to know the Truth about the ICC’s Jurisdiction over 
Palestine”, 2 September 2014, available at: https://www.icc-cpi.int//Pages/item.aspx?name=otp-st-14-
09-02, last accessed 6 November 2018). In the context of the political controversy on the OTP’s 
decision, it should be noted that the Israeli Minister for Foreign Affairs Mr Avigdor Lieberman has 
claimed that Israel had been diplomatically active in order to avoid the opening of an investigation 
(see PLO envoy: Palestine can join ICC, Ma’an News Agency, 10 April 2012, available at: 
http://www.maannews.net/eng/ViewDetails.aspx?ID=475280, last accessed 6 November 2018). On 
the role played by the Israeli press and media with regard to Palestine’s accession to the Statute and 
the OTP’s preliminary examination, see S. WEILL, The Situation of Palestine in Wonderland: An 
Investigation into the ICC’s Impact in Israel, in M. BERGSMO, C. STAHN (eds.), Quality Control in 
Preliminary Examinations: Vol. 1, cit., 504-507. 
727 See the UNGA resolution upgrading the status of Palestine from ‘Observer’ to ‘Non-Member 
Observer State’, A/Res/67/19, 29 November 2012. An up-to-date list of the rapidly increasing number 
of treaties that have been ratified or acceded to by the State of Palestine is available at: 
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/CNs.aspx?cnTab=tab2&clang=_en (last accessed 6 November 2018). 
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Rome Statute between December 2014 and January 2015728. The UN Secretary 
General—to whom the OTP’s decision made reference for the purpose of 
determining Palestine’s qualification as a “State”—accepted the instrument of 
accession in his quality of depositary of the treaty729. Consequently, the Rome Statute 
entered into force for Palestine on 1 April 2015730. A preliminary examination on the 
situation of Palestine was therefore launched by the OTP on 16 January 2015 and, 
based cumulatively on the second declaration of acceptance and the recent referral 
made by Palestine in 2018, is currently undergoing the analysis of admissibility 
(Phase 3)731. 
 
3.1.2 Failure to meet the jurisdictional criteria 
A preliminary examination can be terminated by the OTP with a decision not 
to proceed on grounds that the facts under consideration do not appear to fall within 
the parameters delimiting the jurisdiction of the Court. The assessment of jurisdiction 
ratione temporis, ratione loci and ratione personae is relatively straightforward and 
does not in general involve a very complicated factual and legal analysis. Therefore, 
much of the jurisdictional analysis revolves around the OTP’s assessment as to 
whether the facts under examination appear to fall ratione materiae under the 
jurisdiction of the Court, i.e. they constitute one of the crimes listed in article 5 of the 
Statute. In order to do so the Office must carry out, based on the information 
available at the preliminary examination stage, an analysis on both the statutorily 
required contextual elements for each category of crimes, and of the specific 
elements of the individual crimes allegedly committed. Such an analysis has 
sometimes required in practice a significant amount of time, in light of the scale of 
the incidents under examination and the specific circumstances of the situation that 
make a determination particularly difficult in “border-line” situations732. Up to date 
																																																								
728 The new declaration of acceptance is dated 31 December 2014 (see the text available at: 
https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/PIDS/press/Palestine_A_12-3.pdf, last accessed 6 November 2018); 
the next day Palestine acceded to the Statute (see, infra, footnote 730).  
729 See the depositary notification at: https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/CN/2015/CN.13.2015-
Eng.pdf (last accessed 6 November 2018). 
730 The act of accession to the Statute is dated 2 January 2015, and the day of entry into force for the 
State of Palestine is 1 April 2015 in conformity with the rule laid down in article 126(2) of the Statute. 
731 See ICC-OTP, Report on Preliminary Examination activities 2018, 5 December 2018, par. 276. 
732 See ICC-OTP, Art. 5 Report, Situation in Honduras, 28 October 2015, par. 30, 93. 
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the OTP has closed a preliminary examination based on the lack of subject-matter 
jurisdiction on five occasions, namely Venezuela, Iraq/UK, Honduras, the Republic 
of Korea and Gabon. The first two decisions were both made known to the public on 
9 February 2006, while the Office was still headed by Mr Luis Moreno-Ocampo, 
before the OTP had inaugurated a systematic reporting practice, and share a very 
succinct style and reasoning733. The other decisions not to proceed, to the contrary, 
clearly demonstrate the new course towards a more principled and transparent 
reporting practice of the Office734. A brief analysis of these decisions will allow 
drawing some preliminary conclusions on the OTP’s practice as regards the 
jurisdictional assessment during PE. 
The ‘twin decisions’ on the situation of Venezuela and Iraq/UK largely share 
the same structure, methodology of analysis and conclusions, and only differ on the 
specific alleged crimes under examination and, partly, on the articulation of the 
reasoning leading to the conclusion not to proceed735. In both situations the OTP 
adopted its decision by means of a short letter to the senders of individual 
communications, although it declared that in both situations the Office had 
“produced a crime analysis of all the available information, in accordance with [its] 
standard methodology and rules of source evaluation and measurement. The analysis 
included preparation of tables of allegations, pattern analysis and examination of 
incidents. In addition, [it] conducted legal research and analysis on the main 
doctrinal issues” 736 . Regrettably, almost none of this information has been 
reproduced in detail in the letters or otherwise made public. In the Venezuelan 
situation the Prosecutor considered that the information at his disposal, also due to its 
inconsistency and unreliability, did not support the conclusion that the alleged crimes 
could amount to crimes against humanity, because the contextual elements had not 
been satisfied737. There was therefore no need to consider whether the discrete 
																																																								
733 The Venezuelan and Iraqi decisions are, respectively, five and ten pages long. 
734 The two decision concerning the Republic of Korea and Honduras are, respectively, 24 and 49 
pages long, and share a much more detailed and reasoned drafting approach compared to the two 
earlier decisions. Along the same lines, the most recent decision on the Gabonese situation totals 58 
pages of legal and factual analysis.  
735 In particular, the Iraqi decision is partly based on the failure to meet the jurisdictional criteria and 
partly on the lack of sufficient gravity. 
736 See ICC-OTP, Response to communications received concerning Iraq, 9 February 2006, 2; ICC-
OTP, Response to communications received concerning Venezuela, 9 February 2006, 2. 
737 ICC-OTP, Response to communications received concerning Venezuela, 9 February 2006, 3-4. 
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alleged crimes did satisfy the specific elements of the definitions provided by the 
Statute. In the Iraqi situation, to the contrary, the OTP went slightly more in detail in 
its analysis. It initially disposed of any allegations concerning the legality of war 
(based on the de facto lack of subject-matter jurisdiction on the crime of aggression 
at the time), genocide and crimes against humanity, and later focused its assessment 
on war crimes738. The Prosecutor went on to conclude that, based on the available 
information, for some of the allegations there was no reasonable basis to believe that 
the facts constituted war crimes under the Statute, while for others (namely wilful 
killing and inhumane treatment) this threshold was satisfied739. Nevertheless, as 
regards these last conducts the OTP concluded that the admissibility requirement of 
gravity was not met, both with regard to the specific gravity requirement stipulated 
under article 8(1) of the Statute for war crimes, and to the “general gravity 
requirement under Article 53(1)(b)”740. In other words, the Iraqi decision not to 
proceed is not a purely ‘Phase 2’ jurisdiction-based decision. It is premised on a 
composite reasoning and disposes of the matter partly under the jurisdictional 
analysis and partly under a—rather superficial—admissibility analysis. 
The decisions not to proceed as regards the situation in the Republic of Korea 
and Honduras follow a clearly different, in-depth and analytical approach, resulting 
in concluding ‘Article 5 Reports’, which reflect the more recent trend towards the 
proceduralisation of PE based on the policy paper of 2013. Both documents contain 
references to the historical background of the facts under consideration and proceed 
with a detailed analysis concerning the subject-matter jurisdiction of the Court, both 
with regard to the contextual elements for the categories of crimes and the individual 
alleged crimes741. They both provide ample legal reasoning, references to the Court’s 
jurisprudence and doctrine to justify the conclusion that the alleged crimes did not 
meet the jurisdictional threshold ratione materiae. The main difference between the 
																																																								
738 ICC-OTP, Response to communications received concerning Iraq, 9 February 2006, 4-8. 
739 Ibidem, 7, 8.  
740 Ibidem, 8. 
741 See ICC-OTP, Art. 5 Report, Situation in Honduras, 28 October 2015, par. 42-73 (historical 
background); 74 (preconditions to the exercise of jurisdiction); 95-100, 102-104, 105-109, 116-126, 
132-140 (conclusions on the contextual elements for the various patterns of alleged crimes against 
humanity and the discrete alleged crimes) and ICC-OTP, Art. 5 Report, Situation in the Republic of 
Korea, 23 June 2014, par. 32-37 (historical background); 38-41 (preconditions to the exercise of 
jurisdiction); 42-46, 47-58, 59-65, 66-70, 71-81, 82-83 (conclusions on the lack of the contextual 
elements for the individual crimes). 
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two documents is dictated by the very different factual background, and particularly 
by the fact that the situation in Honduras covered a longer time span and a significant 
number of episodes of criminality742, while the Korean situation dealt with two single 
incidents of military operations at sea in the context of the international armed 
conflict between the Republic of Korea and the Democratic People’s Republic of 
Korea743. 
A comparison between the two earlier decisions declining to proceed with 
regard to Venezuela and Iraq/UK, and the more recent ones on Honduras, Korea and 
Gabon reveals a significant shift with regard to the format of these decisions (letters 
to senders of individual communications v. full-fledged public ‘Article 5 Reports’) as 
well as to their style, methodology of analysis and reasoning strategy. Considering 
the absence of a clear statutory or regulatory requirement, both formal and 
substantive, for the adoption of public and reasoned documents containing such 
negative decisions, the contribution of the OTP’s practice in shaping the procedural 
steps and the outcomes of preliminary examination becomes immediately evident. 
This practice can therefore be considered as a potentially positive effect of the 
exercise of institutional and administrative prosecutorial discretion at the preliminary 
examination phase, and is a clear example of practice-based integration of the 
normative texts. 
It should be reminded that various other situations are currently undergoing 
Phase 2 of the preliminary examination and might in the future result in other Article 
5 Reports containing a decision not to proceed based on jurisdictional considerations, 
which may either confirm or contradict the abovementioned trends in the practice of 
the Office. The most recent decision to close a preliminary examination without 
opening an investigation relates to the situation in the Gabonese Republic, self-
referred by the African state in September 2016. After a two-year PE, the OTP 
																																																								
742 In particular, the facts under consideration concerned the situation of violence in the country in the 
immediate aftermath of the coup of 28 June 2009, the post-electoral violence in the period between 27 
January 2010 and September 2014 and the alleged crimes committed in the Bajo Aguán region since 
the coup. 
743 The two episodes are the sinking of a South Korean warship, the Cheonan, on 26 March 2010 and 
the shelling of South Korea’s Yeonpyeong Island on 23 November 2010. For the analysis on the 
existence of an armed conflict between the two states in relation to these incidents, see ICC-OTP, Art. 
5 Report, Situation in the Republic of Korea, 23 June 2014, par. 46. 
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decided not to proceed based on the lack of jurisdiction ratione materiae, largely 
confirming the analytical approach adopted in the previous Article 5 Reports. 
 
3.1.3 Failure to meet the admissibility test, in particular gravity 
Phase 3 of the preliminary examination is devoted to the assessment of 
admissibility and may result in a decision not to proceed with an investigation based 
on a negative conclusion regarding one or both the two main prongs of the 
admissibility test, namely gravity and complementarity. Up to date the OTP has 
based a decision not to proceed on the lack of sufficient gravity on only two 
occasions. While in the Iraq/UK situation considerations of (insufficient) gravity 
have played a role only with reference to certain conducts under consideration744, 
they constituted the crux of the OTP’s decision not to proceed in the situation 
regarding the Registered Vessels of the Comoros, Cambodia and Greece, which 
therefore warrants further consideration. 
The Comoros situation has already been the object of attention with regard to 
the interpretation and application of article 53 of the Statute, in the context of a 
statutory-based analysis of the OTP-PTC relations concerning the exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion and of its judicial review 745. In the present paragraph 
attention is focused on the reasoning of the OTP’s decision not to proceed and, most 
importantly, on its institutional consequences in the dialectical relationship with the 
reviewing Pre-Trial Chamber. The case at hand represents a clear example of open 
clash between the Office and judges in the interpretation of the pertinent provisions, 
and reveals a conflicting understanding of the scope of prosecutorial discretion as 
well as of the standard for its judicial review. 
The situation relating to the registered vessels of the Comoros, Greece and 
Cambodia was referred to the OTP by the Government of the Union of the Comoros 
on 14 May 2013, “with respect to the 31 May 2010 Israeli raid on the Humanitarian 
Aid Flotilla bound for Gaza Strip”746. The incident is well known and has attracted 
																																																								
744 See, supra, preceding paragraph, especially footnotes 739-740. 
745 See, supra, Part Two, Chapter One, par. 3.4.1. 
746 See Referral of the Union of the Comoros under Articles 14 and 12(2)(a) of the Rome Statute 
arising from the 31 May 2010, Gaza Freedom Flotilla situation, 14 May 2013. 
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international condemnation747, and has also formed the object of various fact-finding 
activities both at the international and national level748. The same day of the receipt of 
the Comoros’ referral the OTP announced the opening of a preliminary examination 
of the situation. The Office closed the PE at the stage of the admissibility assessment 
(Phase 3), reaching the conclusion that while there was a “reasonable basis to believe 
that war crimes under the Court’s jurisdiction [had] been committed in the context of 
interception and takeover of the Mavi Marmara by IDF soldiers on 31 May 2010”749, 
the “potential case(s) that would likely arise from an investigation into the situation 
would not be of sufficient gravity to justify further action by the Court and would 
therefore be inadmissible pursuant to articles 17(1)(d) and 53(1)(b) of the Statute”750. 
This is not only the first time that the OTP declined to open an investigation pursuant 
to a state referral, but also the first time that it did so based on the alleged 
inadmissibility of the (potential) cases likely to arise from the situation for lack of 
sufficient gravity. 
From the methodological point of view the OTP’s ‘Article 53(1) Report’ of 
November 2014 perfectly fits in the new trend of in-depth and analytical decisions, 
as it considers in great detail both the contextual elements for the category of crimes 
referred and the constituent elements of each of the alleged individual crimes751. 
After having positively concluded on the existence of a reasonable basis to believe 
that crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court had been committed752, the OTP 
																																																								
747 See, e.g., UNSC Presidential Statement, S/PRST/2010/9, 1 June 2010. 
748 As to international reports, reference must be made to the fact-finding efforts of the Human Rights 
Council resulting in the Report of the International Fact-Finding mission to investigate violations of 
international law, including international humanitarian and human rights law, resulting from the 
Israeli attacks on the flotilla of ships carrying humanitarian assistance, A/HRC/15/21, 27 September 
2010 and to the Report of the Secretary-General’s Panel of Inquiry on the 31 May 2010 Flotilla 
Incident, September 2011 (‘Palmer-Uribe Report’). National inquiries were carried out both in Israel 
and in Turkey (the state of nationality of all the victims of the incident). With regard to Israel, see the 
Report of the Public Commission to Examine the Maritime Incident of 31 May 2010, Part I, 23 
January 2011 and Report of the Public Commission to Examine the Maritime Incident of 31 May 
2010, Part II, 6 February 2013. With regard to Turkey, see the Turkish National Commission’s of 
Inquiry Report on the Israeli Attack on the Humanitarian Aid Convoy to Gaza on 31 May 2010, 
February 2011. 
749 ICC-OTP, Article 53(1) Report, Situation on the Registered Vessels of the Comoros, Greece and 
Cambodia, 6 November 2014, par. 149. 
750 Ibidem, par. 150. 
751 Ibidem, par. 19-128. Most of the sixty-one pages of the report are devoted to this analysis. 
752 Ibidem, par. 132. This conclusion concerns the alleged war crimes of wilful killing pursuant to 
article 8(2)(a)(i) of the Statute; wilfully causing serious injury to body and health pursuant to article 
8(2)(a)(iii) of the Statute; and committing outrages upon personal dignity pursuant to article 
8(2)(b)(xxi) of the Statute. In addition, the OTP considered that if the naval blockade imposed by 
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proceeded to the assessment of admissibility, beginning with gravity. The gravity 
assessment was conducted based on the quantitative-qualitative approach endorsed in 
the Policy Paper on preliminary examinations, and was carried out considering the 
scale, nature, manner of commission and impact of the alleged crimes753. Contrary to 
the analysis of jurisdiction, the OTP’s assessment of gravity is not particularly 
detailed, and irrespective of the soundness of its conclusions, partly fails to provide 
adequate reasoning to support the OTP’s final determination. In particular, the OTP’s 
insistence on the comparison between the situation under consideration and others 
already forming the object of investigations, as well as the Office’s reliance on the 
allegedly limited impact of the incident to conclude that the gravity threshold had not 
been met, are not entirely persuasive754. Having negatively concluded on point of 
gravity, the OTP considered it unnecessary to make any determination on issues of 
complementarity755. As it could be expected, the referring state was not satisfied with 
the OTP’s negative decision and, for the first time ever, made recourse to the review 
procedure provided for under article 53(3)(a) of the Statute 756 , lamenting in 
particular: (i) The failure to take into account facts which did not occur on the three 
vessels over which the Court has territorial jurisdiction757; and (ii) the errors in 
addressing the factors relevant for the determination of gravity under article 17(1)(d) 
of the Statute758. Based on these arguments the Comoros asked the PTC to request the 
																																																																																																																																																													
Israel had to be considered unlawful, an issue on which the Office has not taken a position, there 
would also be a reasonable basis to believe that the IDF committed the crime of intentionally directing 
an attack against two civilian objects pursuant to article 8(2)(b)(ii) of the Statute, in relation of the 
forcible boarding of the Mavi Marmara and the Eleftheri Mesogios/Sofia. As regards the alleged 
crimes against humanity, the OTP concludes for the lack of the required contextual elements (ibidem, 
par. 130-131).  
753 Ibidem, respectively, par. 138, 139, 140, 141. 
754 Ibidem, par. 143-147. A severe critique of the OTP’s reasoning as regards the gravity assessment 
can be found in A. E. BOZBAYıNDıR, The Venture of the Comoros Referral at the Preliminary 
Examination Stage, in M. BERGSMO, C. STAHN (eds.), Quality Control in Preliminary Examinations: 
Vol. 1, cit., 631-650. Critically on the potentially unreasonable results of mere quantitative analysis—
for instance in comparing gravity across different situations based on the number of victims—see K. J. 
HELLER, Situational  Gravity Under The Rome Statute, cit., 239-244, 252. 
755 ICC-OTP, Article 53(1) Report, Situation on the Registered Vessels of the Comoros, Greece and 
Cambodia, 6 November 2014, par. 148. 
756 See Public Redacted Version of the Application for Review pursuant to Article 53(3)(a) of the 
Prosecutor’s Decision of 6 November 2014 not to initiate an investigation in the Situation, Situation 
on the Registered Vessels of the Comoros, Greece and Cambodia, ICC-01/13-3-Red, 29 January 
2015. 
757 Ibidem, par. 62-81. 
758 Ibidem, par. 82-135. 
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Prosecutor to reconsider her previous decision not open an investigation. The OTP 
filed its reply, defending the legality and reasonableness of its previous decision759. 
The PTC I, called for the first time to review a nolle prosequi decision 
pursuant to article 53(3)(a) of the Statute, adopted its decision by majority—Judge 
Péter Kovács partially dissenting—on 16 July 2015, granting for the most part the 
Comoros’ grounds for review and ordering the OTP to reconsider its previous 
decision760. The Majority, before discussing the applicant’s grounds for review, 
succinctly described the structure and function of the review procedure, clarifying its 
scope in the context of the OTP-PTC institutional relationship as regards the exercise 
of prosecutorial discretion. In particular, judges have underlined the ex parte nature 
of the review under article 53(3)(a) of the Statute, affirming that the Chamber is not 
tasked to put forward an autonomous assessment of the factual and legal elements 
that supersedes that of the OTP, but to carry out a control over the legality—i.e. the 
absence of errors either in fact, law or procedure—of the OTP’s decision, limitedly 
to the specific grounds for review formulated by the applicant761. Nevertheless, the 
Majority sought to preliminarily restrict the scope of the Prosecutor’s discretionary 
power to decline the opening of an investigation, stating that the text and purpose of 
article 53(1) of the Statute introduce a (rebuttable) presumption in favour of the 
opening of an investigation, whenever the information available at the preliminary 
stage supports “reasonable inferences that at least one crime within the jurisdiction 
of the Court has been committed and that the case would be admissible”762. In such 
cases the OTP shall open an investigation to ascertain the facts, this being the only 
way to provide clarity on facts that are difficult to establish or that form the object of 
conflicting accounts. In other words, the OTP’s assessment of the jurisdictional and 
admissibility requirements (among which gravity and complementarity) at the 
preliminary stage would be premised on the application of “exacting legal 
requirements”, and true prosecutorial discretion would only express itself in the 
																																																								
759 See ICC-OTP, Public Redacted Version of Prosecution Response to the Application for Review of 
its Determination under article 53(1)(b) of the Rome Statute”, Situation on the Registered Vessels of 
the Comoros, Greece and Cambodia, ICC-01/13-14-Red, 30 March 2015. 
760 See ICC, Decision on the request of the Union of the Comoros to review the Prosecutor’s decision 
not to initiate an investigation, Situation on the Registered Vessels of the Comoros, Greece and 
Cambodia, ICC-01/13-34, PTC I, 16 July 2015. 
761 Ibidem, par. 8-10, 12. 
762 Ibidem, par. 13 (emphasis added). 
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OTP’s considerations revolving around the interests of justice763. The Chamber then 
went on to analyse the Applicant’s grounds for review, and in particular the OTP’s 
interpretation and application of the criteria for the assessment of gravity. The 
Majority, recalling the Court’s case law on the concept of situational gravity764, then 
went on to criticise the OTP’s arguments, stating that the Office had failed to verify 
“whether the individuals or groups of persons that are likely to be the object of an 
investigation, include those who may bear the greatest responsibility for the alleged 
crimes” 765. By conflating the two categories of ‘most responsible ones’ and ‘senior 
leaders’, the OTP incurred in an error of law that radically affected the overall 
assessment of situational gravity766. The preliminary judges then went on to critically 
review the OTP’s conclusions based on the four criteria for the determination of 
gravity, which they considered unreasonable, premature or plainly wrong767. In 
conclusion the Majority, upon review, formally requested the Prosecutor to 
reconsider her previous decision768, closing its decision with a rather confrontational 
message to the OTP: “The Chamber is confident that, when reconsidering her 
decision, the Prosecutor will fully uphold her mandate under the Statute” 769. 
																																																								
763 Ibidem, par. 13-15. 
764 Ibidem, par. 22. The PTC recalls, in particular, the authorisation decisions pursuant to the OTP’s 
proprio motu in the Kenyan and Ivorian situations. 
765 Ibidem, par. 22 (recalling par. 135 of the OTP’s Article 53(1) Report). 
766 Ibidem, 23-24. 
767 Ibidem, respectively, par. 25-26 on the scale of the alleged crimes, the Majority underlined that the 
number of potential victims would be comparable and even superior to that of other situations where 
the OTP had already opened an investigation and/or prosecution; par. 27-30, as regards the nature of 
the alleged crimes, the Majority considered that the OTP had erred in excluding, without further 
analysis in the context of a full investigation, that the episodes of mistreatment of passengers of the 
Mavi Marmara did not amount to torture or inhuman treatment, but only amounted to “outrages upon 
personal dignity” pursuant to article 8(2)(b)(xxi) of the Statute; par. 31-45, as regards the manner of 
commission, the Majority considered that the Prosecutor had erred in evaluating the information 
concerning the opening of live fire by the IDF prior to the boarding of the Mavi Marmara;  she had 
unreasonably failed to consider that the alleged cruel and abusive treatment imposed on passengers 
once disembarked in Israel may have been the result of tacit acquiescence of the military superiors, 
and not the mere consequence of individual excesses of IDF soldiers; she had unreasonably failed to 
recognise that the circumstances surrounding the alleged crimes, including the attempts to conceal 
them, could be compatible with the hypothesis that the alleged crimes had been planned; par. 46-48, 
in relation to the impact of the alleged crimes, the Majority considered that the OTP had erred in 
concluding that, given the allegedly modest influence of the crimes on the general situation of Gaza 
and notwithstanding the personal prejudice suffered by the victims, the impact of the alleged crimes 
was insufficient to warrant the opening of an investigation. 
768 Ibidem, par. 50. 
769 Ibidem, par. 51. The Majority underlined the striking discrepancy between the international 
concern that the events have attracted and the OTP’s possibly premature conclusions on gravity. This 
final polemic paragraph of the decision seems to imply that the OTP’s negative conclusion on the 
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In his partially dissenting opinion, Judge Péter Kovács provided a different 
perspective on some the most relevant aspects of the Majority’s decision. In 
particular, he reasoned that the PTC’s power to supervise the OTP’s discretionary 
choices at the preliminary stage shouldn’t be construed as a sort of appeal on the 
merits against those decisions, but exclusively as an external control on their legality 
in order “to make sure that the Prosecutor has not abused her discretion”770. In other 
words, according to the Hungarian judge the Majority had extended the scope of 
judicial review well beyond what would have been permissible under the statutory 
regime, unduly interfering with the exercise of prosecutorial discretion; instead, the 
PTC should have followed a “a more deferential approach” towards the Prosecutor’s 
use of discretion771. As regards the review of the gravity assessment the dissenting 
judge argued that based on the information available at the preliminary stage the 
OTP’s conclusions could not be deemed unreasonable, also in the light of gravity’s 
function as a criterion for the selection of situations and crimes warranting the 
Court’s involvement772. 
In light of the restrictive stance of the PTC on the latitude of prosecutorial 
discretion at the preliminary examination stage and the in-depth judicial review 
conducted by the preliminary judges, the Office sought to appeal the Chamber’s 
decision773. Given that article 82 of the Statute does not provide for the direct 
impugnation of a PTC’s review decision rendered under article 53(3)774, the OTP 
reasoned in its Notice of Appeal that the Chamber’s decision amounted—in 
substance and despite its nomen juris—to a decision “with respect to admissibility”, 
since it affirmed that the potential cases likely to arise from the Comoros situation 
were admissible775. The Comoros asked the Appeals Chamber to dismiss the appeal 
																																																																																																																																																													
opening of an investigation had been the result of the Office’s failure to fully uphold its mandate 
under the Statute. 
770 See Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Péter Kovács, Situation on the Registered Vessels of the 
Comoros, Greece and Cambodia, ICC-01/13-34-Anx-Corr, 16 July 2015, par. 2, 7. 
771 Ibidem, par. 8. 
772 Ibidem, par. 14-23. 
773 See ICC-OTP, Notice of Appeal of ‘Decision on the request of the Union of the Comoros to review 
the Prosecutor’s decision not to initiate an investigation’ (ICC-01/13-34), Situation on the Registered 
Vessels of the Comoros, Greece and Cambodia, ICC-01/13-35, 27 July 2015. 
774 See article 82(1)(a) of the Statute. 
775 See ICC-OTP, Notice of Appeal of ‘Decision on the request of the Union of the Comoros to review 
the Prosecutor’s decision not to initiate an investigation’ (ICC-01/13-34), Situation on the Registered 
Vessels of the Comoros, Greece and Cambodia, ICC-01/13-35, 27 July 2015, par. 2, 8-10.  
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in limine for procedural reasons, arguing that the impugned decision could not 
qualify as one regarding admissibility776. The majority of the AC—Judges Silvia 
Fernández de Gurmendi e Christine Van den Wyngaert jointly dissenting777—shared 
this latter view, and dismissed the appeal declining to decide on the merits, having 
taken into consideration the Court’s pertinent precedents778, the statutory scheme of 
judicial review pursuant to article 53 of the Statute779 and the Statute’s negotiating 
history780. In particular, the AC’s reasoning on the statutory scheme for judicial 
review under article 53 provides a clear-cut explication of the differences between 
the ex parte review under paragraph (3)(a) and the ex officio review under paragraph 
(3)(b) of this provision. As already seen in the static analysis carried out in Part Two, 
in the first of these two scenarios—the one relevant to the situation at hand—the 
PTC can only request the OTP to reconsider its previous decision, while it cannot 
compel the Office to open an investigation781. In other words, the Prosecutor has the 
last word on the decision to open or not to open the investigation, but is certainly 
under an obligation to reconsider its previous decision (and to do so in a timely 
manner)782. 
The OTP’s reconsideration of the situation only came to an end in November 
2017, more than two years after the PTC’s decision had become final as a result of 
the AC’s decision on the inadmissibility of the appeal, and three years after the 
original decision contained in the Article 53(1) Report. The Office put forward a 
detailed and extremely analytical document explaining the reasons that had led the 
																																																								
776 See Application by the Government of the Comoros to dismiss in limine the Prosecution ‘Notice of 
Appeal of “Decision on the request of the Union of the Comoros to review the Prosecutor’s decision 
not to initiate an investigation” (ICC-01/13-34)’”, Situation on the Registered Vessels of the Comoros, 
Greece and Cambodia, ICC-01/13-39, 3 August 2015, par. 1, 3-4, 9-12, 15-18, 22. According to the 
Comoros the impugned decision couldn’t qualify as a decision with respect to admissibility on the one 
hand because it lacked the character of finality (in that it did not explicitly decide on the issue of 
admissibility), and on the other because it simply invited the OTP to reconsider its previous decision, 
without predetermining the outcome of such reconsideration or mandating the opening of the 
investigation. 
777 See Joint Dissenting Opinion of Judge Silvia Fernández De Gurmendi and Judge Christine Van 
Den Wyngaert”, Situation on the Registered Vessels of the Comoros, Greece and Cambodia, ICC-
01/13-51-Anx, 6 November 2015. 
778 See ICC, Decision on the admissibility of the Prosecutor’s appeal against the “Decision on the 
request of the Union of the Comoros to review the Prosecutor’s decision not to initiate an 
investigation”, Situation on the Registered Vessels of the Comoros, Greece and Cambodia, ICC-
01/13-51, AC, 6 November 2015, par. 41-52. 
779 Ibidem, par. 53-60. 
780 Ibidem, par. 61-65. 
781 Ibidem, par. 54-56, 59, 64. 
782 See Rule 108(2) of the RPE. 
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Prosecutor to confirm her previous decision, largely disagreeing with the PTC’s 
approach783. This document is of paramount importance in order to understand the 
OTP-judges relationships and the dynamics of prosecutorial discretion at the 
preliminary stage, as it reveals the existence of clearly conflicting interpretations of 
the relevant statutory provisions, in the purported absence of a judicial forum where 
such disagreement can be resolved784. It also stands out as a clear example of the 
OTP’s determination to safeguard in any possible manner its discretion vis-à-vis the 
PTC’s supervisory powers. 
The Office’s Final Decision articulates its analysis around three main issues, 
namely: i) whether the reasoning in the Request discloses a well founded basis to 
reach a different conclusion than that contained in the Report; ii) whether the 
Prosecution considers there is a well founded basis to reach a different conclusion, 
among other factors, on the arguments raised by the Comoros and the victims before 
the Pre-Trial Chamber; iii) whether there is a well founded basis to reach a different 
conclusion than that contained in the Report based on any new facts or information 
which have become available since its publication in November 2014785. The most 
relevant disagreements between the OTP and PTC are articulated in the Office’s 
submissions sub i). In this part of the decision the Prosecutor takes issue with the 
PTC’s request for reconsideration with regard to three main points.  
Firstly, the OTP disagrees with the Chamber as regards the interpretation of 
the “reasonable basis to believe” standard under article 53(1) of the Statute, 
considering that the PTC has interpreted it as a “screening standard” as opposed to 
the more appropriate construction as a “result standard”786. In other words, according 
to the Office the PTC oversimplified the nature of the article 53(1) assessment, 
requiring the OTP to “accept as true (for the purpose of a preliminary examination) 
any information or claim which is not ‘manifestly false’”787, thereby suggesting that 
“any contradictions or inconsistencies in the available information—which do not 
																																																								
783 See ICC-OTP, Final decision of the Prosecution concerning the “Article 53(1) Report” (ICC-
01/13-6-AnxA), dated 6 November 2014, Situation on the Registered Vessels of the Comoros, Greece 
and Cambodia, ICC-01/13-57-Anx1, 30 November 2017, par. 2-3. 
784 Ibidem, par. 14. The OTP alleges that in the absence of an obvious forum to reconcile these 
differences, the only option available to the Office is to transparently put forward “clearly reasoned 
submission” to explain its position, such as those contained in the final decision at hand. 
785 Ibidem, par. 8. 
786 Ibidem, par. 24. 
787 Ibidem. 
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rise to the level of making the information “manifestly false” but which prevent the 
result standard being met—likewise militate in favour of investigation”788. Based on 
these arguments the OTP regrets the impossibility to concur with the PTC’s request, 
stressing in particular the fact that the Chamber “confused the Prosecution’s 
assessment of the specific information concerning [each incident] with its 
assessment, in the context of all the other available information, of the conclusions 
which could reasonably be drawn from the totality of the available information”789. 
Secondly, the OTP disagrees on the standard of review concretely applied by 
the Chamber in its request for reconsideration790. According to the Prosecutor the 
Chamber, while in principle subscribing to an error-based review of the OTP’s 
decision, had in practice entered a de novo review791. In other words, the Chamber 
reached an alternative conclusion, overwriting its own assessment of the facts and 
inferences to be drawn from such facts to that of the Prosecutor792. In so doing the 
Chamber allegedly failed to recognise any measure of deference to the primary fact-
finder, thus risking to compromise the Prosecutor’s independence and giving the 
impression “that the Prosecution’s original decision-making was arbitrary— if the 
Prosecution is willing to alter its conclusions simply when asked, without a showing 
of error, this may imply that the Prosecution’s reasoning was not dictated by the law 
and the facts” 793. 
Thirdly, the OTP strongly disagrees on various points of the reasoning of the 
Chamber’s request for reconsideration794. In particular, the Office considers the 
Chamber’s reasoning insufficient to warrant the conclusions reached in its decision; 
that the preliminary judges had mistaken or mischaracterised the OTP’s position on a 
number of points; and that they failed to address certain fundamental aspects of the 
																																																								
788 Ibidem, par. 25 (emphasis in the original text). 
789 Ibidem, par. 34 (emphasis in the original text). 
790 Ibidem, par. 36-57. 
791 Ibidem, par. 52. On the distinction between the forms of review see, ibidem, par. 41-42. 
792 Ibidem, par. 51. 
793 Ibidem, par. 51 and par. 58, 62, 65 with regard to the appropriate degree of deference that should 
be recognised to the OTP. It should also be added that the Chamber, according to the OTP, entered 
such a de novo review without having before itself all the information on which the OTP had based its 
decision, since the Chamber had not requested them pursuant to Rule 107(2) of the RPE. For this 
reason, the OTP argues that “Disagreements concerning the evaluation of the available information 
can only be given very limited weight by the Prosecution when the reviewing body has not had 
opportunity to examine the available information itself” (Ibidem, par. 68). 
794 Ibidem, par. 69. 
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OTP’s Report, thereby “imped[ing] the Prosecution’s ability to understand why its 
reasoning may have been erroneous . . . giv[ing] no explanation for any such 
determination which would allow the Prosecution meaningfully to (re)consider such 
views on their merits”795. The Office considered that these profound disagreements 
with the PTC on key points of the Chamber’s request for reconsideration could have 
been sufficient to terminate the reconsideration and to confirm its previous 
decision796. Nevertheless, “mindful of the relative novelty of the article 53 procedure, 
and the importance of the issues at stake . . . in the exercise of its discretion under 
article 53(3)(a) and rule 108”, the Office decided to consider on its own motion 
whether the arguments put forward by the victims and the referring state797, as well as 
the alleged new facts and circumstances posterior to the adoption of the Article 53(1) 
Report, could lead the Office to change its previous conclusions798. The Office, after 
a detailed analysis, concluded in the negative on both points, thereby reconfirming in 
full its previous decision799.  
The Comoros have recently sought to challenge the OTP’s Final Decision 
notified to the parties pursuant to Rule 108(3) of the RPE, on the assumption that 
such document is a (second) autonomous decision pursuant to article 53(1) of the 
Statute, reviewable by the PTC upon request of the referring state800. The OTP asked 
the PTC to dismiss in limine the request for lack of jurisdiction arguing that the 
decision rendered upon reconsideration cannot be itself subject to further judicial 
review801. At the time of writing the case is still pending, but it seems unlikely that 
the Chamber will accept to decide on the merits of the second request for judicial 
																																																								
795 Ibidem, par. 71. A detailed analysis of the issues affected, according to the OTP, by insufficient 
reasoning is provided in par. 73-94. 
796 Ibidem, par. 95. 
797 Ibidem, par. 96-97. This analysis is carried out in detail in par. 99- 170 of the decision. 
798 Ibidem, par. 171-331. 
799 Ibidem, par. 123, 125, 131-132, 134, 138, 144-145, 147, 154, 158-159, 165, 170 and, ultimately, 
331-334. 
800 See Public Redacted Version of “Application for Judicial Review by the Government of the Union 
of the Comoros”, Situation on the Registered Vessels of the Comoros, Greece and Cambodia, ICC-
01/13-58-Red, 23 February 2018, par. 23-36. The Comoros also challenged the part of decision in 
which the OTP, based on a proprio motu analysis of allegedly “new facts”, concluded that even 
considering such new information there would be no ground for changing its previous decision 
(ibidem, par. 37-41). 
801  See ICC-OTP, Prosecution’s Response to the Government of the Union of the Comoros’ 
“Application for Judicial Review” (ICC-01/13-58) (Lack of Jurisdiction), Situation on the Registered 
Vessels of the Comoros, Greece and Cambodia, ICC-01/13-61, 13 March 2018, par. 4-8, 11-12, 19-
20. On the most recent developments of the situation see, infra, the Addendum to this work (347-351). 
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review, given the traditional formalism and self-restraint in granting leaves to appeal 
and other challenges to judicial decisions. 
The Comoros situation has been a serious test bench for the ICC’s 
mechanism of checks and balances with regard to the exercise of prosecutorial 
discretion. It showed a clear institutional tension between the OTP’s 
uncompromising defence of its discretionary powers and the judges’ attempt to 
influence the Office’s approach towards the assessment of gravity through the 
request for reconsideration. Such dialectic rests on incompatible interpretations on 
the very nature of article 53(1) and (3)(a) of the Statute, which at present—failing 
any other mechanism of solution—cannot be authoritatively settled by means of a 
judicial determination. Nevertheless, the drafters’ deliberate choice to give the OTP 
the final say on the investigation suggests that a certain degree of uncertainty and 
mutual disagreement may be tolerated by the system, subject two caveats. First, the 
OTP—irrespective of the non-binding nature of the request for reconsideration with 
respect to its results—must act in good faith when reconsidering its previous 
decision. She must carefully address the substance of the PTC’s findings and avoid 
reconfirming its decision based on a mere restatement of the original arguments. This 
duty of good faith includes the Office’s obligation under Rule 108(2) of the RPE to 
timely put forward its final decision, something that clearly did not happen in the 
Comoros situation. Second, as aptly suggested by the OTP, when the Prosecutor is 
resolved to confirm its previous decision and disagrees with the Chamber’s 
interpretation of the applicable standards, she must openly and transparently explain 
the reasons for not being able to concur with the Chamber’s request for 
reconsideration. It is only by promoting this institutional ‘dialogue’ that the inherent 
fuzziness connected to the exercise of prosecutorial discretion and its judicial review 
can somehow be rationalised, leading to more consistent results in the future. It 
should also be added that the Pre-Trial Chambers (and eventually the AC) could 
greatly contribute to this dialogue, providing greater clarity on the standards of 
article 53 and adopting a constructive and less confrontational attitude towards the 
Office in discharging their responsibilities of judicial review. 
In any event, it should be borne in mind that the Comoros situation is but the 
first example of practice as to the judicial review of article 53(1) negative decisions, 
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and that its outcomes might have been influenced by the peculiar underlying factual 
and legal circumstances. In other words, nothing precludes that in future situations 
the procedural posture of the OTP could be different and conveniently adapted to a 
different context, or that other PTCs could differ from the Comoros one in the 
exercise of judicial review. 
 
3.1.4 Closing a preliminary examination based on complementarity and the interests 
of justice 
So far the OTP has never closed a PE with a decision not to proceed based on 
complementarity or on the consideration that the opening of an investigation would 
run contrary to the interests of justice. Nevertheless, while the OTP’s practice as 
regards the latter is virtually inexistent802, the Office has been keeping on Phase 3 of 
the preliminary examination various situations, sometimes for extended periods of 
time, on grounds of complementarity. It did so in order to assess and monitor the 
national efforts to investigate and prosecute alleged crimes that could potentially 
form the object of the attention of the Court. This follow-up may play a role in 
promoting genuine national judicial proceedings, through a policy of proactive 
complementarity. The practice of the Office in this area is well established, as the 
situations of Colombia, Guinea and Nigeria clearly demonstrate 803 . In other 
situations, such as the one of Georgia, the OTP finally concluded that based on 
complementarity arguments an investigation was needed in order to overcome the 
																																																								
802 In practice, when the OTP decides to proceed with an investigation or to seek authority from the 
PTC to open one, it generally deals with the interests of justice in an extremely succinct way, by 
confirming in few words that according to the Office there is no risk that the opening of an 
investigation would run contrary to the interests of justice. See, e.g., ICC-OTP, Article 53(1) Report, 
Situation in the Republic of Mali, 16 January 2013, par. 171-172; ICC-OTP, Article 53(1) Report, 
Situation in Central African Republic II, 24 September 2014, par. 265-266; ICC-OTP, Request for 
authorisation of an investigation pursuant to article 15, Situation in Georgia, ICC-01/15-4, 13 October 
2015, par. 16, 43, 338, 343-344. 
803 For an idea of the activities performed by the OTP in the supervision of national proceedings with 
regard to these situation see Report on Preliminary Examination activities 2011, 13 December 2011, 
par. 74-87; ICC-OTP, Report on Preliminary Examination activities 2012, November 2012, par. 108-
119, 152-163; ICC-OTP, Report on Preliminary Examination activities 2013, November 2013, par. 
130-152, 191-200, 220-229; ICC-OTP, Report on Preliminary Examination activities 2014, 2 
December 2014, par. 111-131, 162-170, 182-189; ICC-OTP, Report on Preliminary Examination 
activities 2015, 12 November 2015, par. 146-167, 175-186, 194-224; ICC-OTP, Report on 
Preliminary Examination activities 2016, 14 November 2016, par. 240-263, 271-283, 298-307; ICC-
OTP, Report on Preliminary Examination activities 2017, 4 December 2017, par. 130-155, 163-171, 
215-229. 
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lack of progress of national proceedings as regards the alleged criminal conducts 
under examination804. 
It should be borne in mind that a decision not proceed based on 
complementarity involves a positive conclusion—albeit potentially revisable based 
on a change of the circumstances—on the willingness and ability of the national 
authorities to genuinely investigate and prosecute. It seems justified that the OTP 
will only defer to national proceedings when reasonably sure that they are 
representative of the main forms of criminality underlying the situation and cover 
substantially the same conducts that may have formed the object of investigation and 
prosecution at the ICC, in the context of procedures that are respectful of 
internationally recognised standards. This assessment, especially in countries in a 
situation of conflict, unrest, with unstable institutions or undergoing pacification 
efforts might take a long time, as the practice of the Office shows805. It could be 
asked whether the fact of keeping a situation on Phase 3 examination for a virtually 
indefinite period of time amounts to an implicit decision on complementarity, but the 
question must be answered in the negative. A preliminary examination can only be 
deemed concluded with an explicit prosecutorial decision either to proceed to an 
investigation or to close the PE. This is confirmed also in the light of the absence of 
any effective judicial remedy against the inaction or dilatory behaviour of the OTP in 
(not) taking a decision pursuant to article 53(1) of the Statute. In any event, also 
looking at the reporting practice of the Office, it seems difficult to deny that during 
the assessment of complementarity the OTP—notwithstanding the ‘mantra’ on the 
exclusively legal nature of such an assessment—must take into account the 
prospective institutional (and lato sensu political) effects of the preliminary 
examination on the national situation and its potential outcomes. This requires a 
good measure of caution and the use of various tools of ‘legal diplomacy’ on the part 
of the Office, which find their most evident expression in the dialogue with national 
authorities, in particular with the prosecutorial and judicial institutions of the 
interested states. To deny that practical considerations and reasons of institutional 
opportunity play a role—although subordinated to strictly legal considerations—in 
																																																								
804 See ICC-OTP, Request for authorisation of an investigation pursuant to article 15, Situation in 
Georgia, ICC-01/15-4, 13 October 2015, par. 6, 13, 14, 41, 42. 
805 See, supra, the table of page 194-195. 
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shaping the OTP’s behaviour at the preliminary examination stage of proceedings 
would simply run contrary to empirical evidence and defeat the purpose of a 
mechanism premised on the orderly exercise of prosecutorial discretion.  
With regard to the possibility to close a preliminary examination pursuant to a 
Phase 4 assessment on the contrariety of an investigation to the interests of justice, it 
has already been stressed that there are no instances of practice in this field, given 
that the OTP interprets this discretionary clause in the outmost restrictive terms. At 
present the Office does not seem intentioned to change its policy on the interests of 
justice and expose itself to the ex officio review of the PTC pursuant to article 
53(3)(b) of the Statute, particularly after the episode of stark disagreement with the 
Comoros PTC in the first instance of judicial review of an article 53(1) decision not 
to proceed. In terms of evaluation of the transformative role of prosecutorial practice 
it can preliminarily be concluded that the OTP’s strict position on the interests of 
justice—probably justified by the intention to stay away from exceedingly 
politically-sensitive decisions—has somehow ‘sterilised’ the discretionary potential 
of the clause as well as the Court’s potential contribution to peace and transitional 
justice, showing an example of discrepancy between the statutory model and its 
practical implementation on the part of the OTP and Chambers. 
 
3.2 Decisions to open an investigation of a situation pursuant to article 53(1) of the 
Statute 
The OTP has so far opened investigations—or obtained a judicial 
authorisation to open one—with regard to eleven country-situations806. Of these, five 
were opened pursuant to state referrals, two pursuant to UNSC referral and four 
pursuant to the OTP’s proprio motu followed by the authorisation of the competent 
PTC. 
Early in the practice of the Office, before the adoption of the Policy Paper on 
preliminary examinations in 2013, the OTP used to announce to the public the 
conclusion of the preliminary examination activities and the opening of an 
																																																								
806 The situations currently under investigation concern the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
Uganda, Darfur/Sudan, Central African Republic (I and II), Kenya, Libya, Côte d'Ivoire, Mali, 
Georgia and Burundi. A twelfth investigation might be launched in the near future were the PTC to 
authorise the OTP’s request to investigate in the situation in Afghanistan. 
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investigation (or the decision to request an authorisation to the PTC) by means of an 
official statement807, without producing a dedicated report stating the reasons for its 
decision and explaining in detail the activities performed during the preliminary 
examination808. Only in case of proprio motu additional information on the conduct 
of PE and the inferences that had led the Office to ask a judicial authorisation could 
be more thoroughly examined through the analysis of the request for authorisation 
itself. 
This practice was later superseded in favour of a more transparent decision-
making process where the Office not only continuously reports on the progress of the 
preliminary examination through the annual reports, but also puts forward a final in-
depth ‘Article 53(1) Report’ containing the factual and legal analysis sustaining the 
decision to open an investigation809. 
In the following paragraphs the practice of the Office (and the PTC in case of 
proprio motu) in the opening of investigations pursuant to an article 53(1) positive 
determination is analysed having regard to the distinction between the different 
triggering mechanisms and the supervisory role played by the PTC. As it will be 
seen, in this field the interpretive disagreements between the OTP and the referring 
entity on the one hand and, on the other, between the OTP and judges, seem to be 
relatively limited, in particular when considering the PTCs’ rather liberal practice as 
regards the authorisation of proprio motu investigations. 
 
3.2.1 Investigations opened in case of state and UNSC referrals 
As it is well known the first few situations to come to the attention of the 
OTP and of the Court were the result of state referrals, in the peculiar version—
initially contested by some—of self-referrals. Most of the situations self-referred by 
																																																								
807 See ICC-OTP, Press release, The Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court 
opens its first investigation, ICC-OTP-20040623-59, 23 June 2004; ICC-OTP, Press release, 
Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court opens an investigation into Northern Uganda, ICC-
OTP-20040729-65, 29 July 2004; ICC-OTP, Statement, Prosecutor opens investigation in the Central 
African Republic, 22 May 2007. 
808 The analytical documents or internal reports supporting the OTP’s conclusion are not publicly 
available and the press releases or announcements of the OTP only refer to the positive conclusion on 
the opening of the investigation and a summary of the reasons for such decision. 
809 Two examples of this new practice are the situation in Mali and CAR II. See, respectively, ICC-
OTP, Article 53(1) Report, Situation in the Republic of Mali, 16 January 2013 and ICC-OTP, Article 
53(1) Report, Situation in the Central African Republic II, 24 September 2014. 
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States Parties later resulted in the opening of an investigation, with the only 
exception of the situation concerning the Comoros and, recently, the Gabonese 
Republic810. In other words the success rate of a state referral in terms of prospective 
opening of an investigation by the OTP has been in the practice very high. An 
analogous trend can be observed with regard to the situations referred by the UNSC, 
both of which were characterised by extremely short PE followed by the opening of 
an investigation. In order to elucidate the connection between the triggering 
mechanism and the high success rate of preliminary examinations stemming from 
state or UNSC referrals, it is important to reflect on the reasons that have persuaded 
the OTP to conclude that an investigation was warranted in all those situations. 
With regard to the UNSC’s referrals, as it emerges also from the temporal 
analysis carried out earlier in this chapter, the OTP decided to open an investigation 
pursuant to a very short preliminary examination mainly on grounds of gravity and 
complementarity arguments. The situation of Darfur/Sudan had already been the 
object of extensive fact-finding activities revealing the magnitude, scale and nature 
of the alleged crimes, inducing the UNSC to refer the situation to the Court. In 
addition to that, given that the patterns of criminal conduct involved, among the 
others, various Sudanese state officials—including the sitting Head of State—the 
OTP considered that nothing could reasonably be expected in terms of genuine 
national proceedings with regard to the complementarity assessment811. As a result, 
the OTP’s determination that the criteria for the opening of an investigation had been 
met was relatively straightforward812. The Libyan situation, also stemming from a 
UNSC’s referral, shares some of these features as regards the OTP’s preliminary 
																																																								
810 To be more precise the Comoros’ referral was a self-referral only in respect of the alleged criminal 
conducts that took place on the Mavi Marmara, a vessel registered in the Union of the Comoros. The 
lawyers acting on behalf of the Comoros had nevertheless clarified that the referral encompassed also 
the conducts that took place on other vessels of the so-called Freedom Flottilla, registered 
respectively in the Hellenic Republic and the Kingdom of Cambodia, both of which are States Parties 
to the Statute. For that part, the Comoros’ referral is technically an inter-state referral, i.e. a state 
denouncing the commission of alleged crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court taking place in the 
territory of another State Party, or such as in this case, on a vessel registered in another State Party. 
811 See ICC-OTP, Statement of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court Mr. Luis Moreno 
Ocampo to the Security Council on 29 June 2005 pursuant to UNSCR 1593 (2005), 29 June 2005, 2-
3; ICC-OTP, First Report of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court to the UN Security 
Council pursuant to UNSCR 1593 (2005), 29 June 2005, 3-4. 
812 On the importance of considerations of gravity in the opening of an investigation pursuant to the 
UNSC’s referral in the Darfur-Sudan situation see, e.g., ICC-OTP, Report on the activities performed 
during the first three years (June 2003—June 2006), 12 September 2006, 7: “The situation in Darfur, 
the Sudan, referred to the Prosecutor by the Security Council, also clearly met the gravity standard”. 
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examination, except for the absence in this situation of any fact-finding activity 
ahead of the referral to the Court. Again, gravity and complementarity (at least 
initially and at the preliminary and situational stage) have played a major role in 
prompting the Office to open an investigation just a few days after the referral. 
Nevertheless, the individual cases prosecuted within the situation by the OTP gave 
rise to differing assessments of admissibility sub specie complementarity, which 
were likely influenced by the underlying political and institutional developments in 
Libya after the deposal of Qaddafi813. 
The assessment of gravity and complementarity was at the centre of the 
decisions to open investigations in cases of state self-referral, although the Office’s 
conclusions on the point were more categorical than analytical. With regard to the 
decisions to open an investigation in the DRC and Uganda, the OTP plainly 
considered that “After thorough analysis, the Office concluded that the situations in 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo (“DRC”) and Northern Uganda were the 
gravest admissible situations under the jurisdiction of the Court”814. With regard to 
complementarity, it should be reminded that both situations were characterised by 
the Prosecutor’s choice to encourage state self-referrals under the threat of proprio 
motu action815, in line with the idea expressed in one of the earliest OTP’s policy 
papers, according to which “There may be cases where inaction by States is the 
																																																								
813 Reference here is to the different treatment of the admissibility issue in the Qaddafi and Al-Senussi 
cases. See, supra, Part Two, Chapter One, par. 3.3, footnotes 322, 326-327.   
814 See ICC-OTP, Report on the activities performed during the first three years (June 2003—June 
2006), 12 September 2006, 6-7. While it cannot be doubted that this analysis had been “thorough”, the 
public did not have access to any prosecutorial document providing the reasons for such conclusion, 
together with the relevant supporting information. 
815 With regard to the DRC, see ICC-OTP, Report of the Prosecutor of the ICC, Mr Luis Moreno-
Ocampo to the Second Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court, 8 September 2003, 4: “If necessary, however, I stand ready to seek authorisation from a Pre-
Trial Chamber to start an investigation under my proprio motu powers. In this eventuality, and in light 
of the current circumstances in the field, the protection of witnesses, gathering of evidence and arrest 
of suspects will be extremely difficult without the strong support of national or international forces. If 
these forces are not available, the Office of the Prosecutor will need to investigate from outside and 
rely on international cooperation for the arrest and surrender of the alleged perpetrators. Our role 
could be facilitated by a referral or active support from the DRC. The Court and the territorial State 
may agree that a consensual division of labour could be an effective approach”. More generally on 
this practice of the first Prosecutor see S. M. H. NOUWEN, W. G. WERNER, Doing Justice to the 
Political: The International Criminal Court in Uganda and Sudan, in European Journal of 
International Law, vol. 21, no. 4, 2010, 947 and P. CLARK, Chasing cases: The ICC and the politics of 
state referral in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda, in C. STAHN, M. M. EL ZEIDY 
(eds.), The International Criminal Court and Complementarity: From Theory to Practice, Cambridge, 
2011, 1180. 
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appropriate course of action”816. Leaving aside the issue of the compatibility of 
territorial state self-referrals with the institutional architecture of complementarity817, 
suffices here to observe that the early practice of the Office of instigating such 
referrals significantly influenced the states’ attitude towards the Court as well as the 
Chambers’ acceptance of this problematic mechanism, with particular regard to the 
notion of “state inaction” for the purposes of the admissibility assessment818. In 
contrast, in the situation of Central African Republic I, the OTP carried out a 
significantly longer preliminary examination compared to the situations in the DRC 
and Uganda819, and heavily relied on the position expressed by national authorities to 
conclude on point of complementarity, with particular regard to the inability of 
domestic judicial institutions to genuinely investigate and prosecute the alleged 
crimes820. 
Only thanks to the recent developments in prosecutorial reporting practices 
can observers more thoroughly analyse the OTP’s reasoning as regards the opening 
of investigations in case of state referral. In the situation of Mali and CAR II, the 
Office provided the details of its admissibility assessment in dedicated sections of the 
concluding ‘Article 53(1) Report’. 
With regard to the Malian situation, the complementarity prong of the 
admissibility test has been quickly dealt with by the Office, on grounds of the 
inexistence of genuine national proceedings on the conducts forming the object of 
preliminary examination and prospective investigation. The lack of national 
																																																								
816 See ICC-OTP, Paper on some policy issues before the Office of the Prosecutor, September 2003, 5. 
817 See, supra, footnote 86. 
818 See, e.g., ICC, Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorisation of an 
Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Côte D’Ivoire, Situation in the Republic of Côte 
D’Ivoire, ICC-02/11-12, PTC III, 3 October 2011, par. 193; ICC, Judgment on the Appeal of Mr. 
Germain Katanga against the Oral Decision of Trial Chamber II of 12 June 2009 on the Admissibility 
of the Case, Prosecutor v. Katanga, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, ICC-01/04-
01/07-1497, AC, 25 September 2009, par. 78; ICC, Corrigendum to the Judgment on the appeal of Mr 
Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo against the decision of Trial Chamber III of 24 June 2010 entitled 
“Decision on the Admissibility and Abuse of Process Challenges”, Prosecutor v. Bemba, Situation in 
the Central African Republic, ICC-01/05-01/08-962-Corr, AC, 19 October 2010, par. 107-109. 
819 See, supra, the table of page 193. The PE of CAR I lasted 882 days, while the examination for the 
DRC and Uganda lasted, respectively, 111 and 226 days. 
820 In particular, the OTP relied on the fact that the Cour de Cassation of the Central African Republic 
had confirmed in April 2006 that the “national system was unable to carry out the complex criminal 
proceedings necessary to investigate and prosecute the alleged crimes.” See, ICC-OTP, Statement, 
Prosecutor opens investigation in the Central African Republic, 22 May 2007; Court of Cassation of 
the Central African Republic, Arrêt du 11 avril 2006 de la Chambre criminelle de la Cour de 
Cassation, CAR-OTP-0019-0258, EVD-P01327, 0260-0261. 
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proceedings due to the alleged inability to entertain judicial activities in the 
interested areas of the country had been confirmed by the state in providing 
information in support of its referral821. The assessment of gravity goes into greater 
detail, by discretely assessing each set of incidents under the usual criteria of scale, 
nature, manner of commission and impact of the alleged crimes, to conclude that the 
sufficient gravity threshold had been met822. 
With regard to the situation in Central African Republic II, notwithstanding 
the position expressed by the state in its referral and according to which “Les 
juridictions centrafricaines . . . ne sont pas en mesure de mener à bien les enquêtes et 
les poursuites nécessaires sur ces crimes”823, the Office thoroughly assessed the 
multiple efforts of domestic institutions to initiate proceedings against those who 
appeared to bear the greatest responsibility for the crimes allegedly committed in the 
situation824. Upon consideration, also based on the first-hand information gathered 
during a visit in Bangui, the Office concluded that “existing proceedings remain 
limited to the preliminary stage and . . . prosecutors and police generally lack the 
capacity and security to conduct investigations and apprehend and detain suspects” 
and that therefore the potential cases likely to arise from the situation would be 
admissible825. The Office’s conclusions on point of gravity are based on a rather 
cursory analysis of the incidents under examination based on the four non-exhaustive 
criteria listed under Regulation 29(2) of the Regulations of the OTP826.  
In all the situations stemming from state referrals, the OTP did not enter into 
a positive assessment regarding the interests of justice, plainly concluding that the 
opening of an investigation, having considered the relevant statutory factors, did not 
run contrary to such interests827. 
																																																								
821 See ICC-OTP, Article 53(1) Report, Situation in the Republic of Mali, 16 January 2013, par. 136-
141. 
822 Ibidem, par. 142-170. 
823 See Referral of the Central African Republic, annexed to the Decision Assigning the Situation in 
the Central African Republic II to Pre-Trial Chamber II, Situation in the Central African Republic II, 
ICC-01/14-1-Anx1, 18 June 2014. 
824 See ICC-OTP, Article 53(1) Report, Situation in the Central African Republic II, 24 September 
2014, par. 226-251. 
825 Ibidem, par. 250. 
826 Ibidem, par. 255-264.  
827 See, e.g., ICC-OTP, First Report of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Mr. Luis 
Moreno Ocampo, to the Security Council pursuant to UNSCR 1593 (2005), 29 June 2005, 4-5; ICC-
OTP, First Report of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court to the UNSC pursuant to 
UNSCR 1970 (2011), 4 May 2011, par. 21; ICC-OTP, Article 53(1) Report, Situation in the Republic 
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From the above analysis of the prosecutorial practice on the opening of 
investigation in case of state and UNSC referrals a few preliminary conclusions seem 
warranted. 
In the first place, it can be argued that the OTP has so far shown a certain 
measure of deference towards the referring entity, declining to open an investigation 
pursuant to a state referral only in the peculiar situation referred by the Comoros and 
in the Gabonese situation. In both instances of UNSC’s referral the Office swiftly 
proceeded to open the investigation. With regard to state referrals, this might be at 
least partially explained on grounds of the ‘negotiated character’ of some of the self-
referrals, whereby the OTP refrained from acting proprio motu after having actively 
engaged in consultations and ‘legal diplomacy’ with national authorities in order to 
convince the state of the opportunity of a self-referral. With regard to UNSC’s 
referrals, while it seems very unlikely to derive from the Statute an unconditional 
obligation to open an investigation in such situations828, it cannot be denied that the 
authority of the Security Council, coupled with the undisputed gravity of the referred 
situations, have so far led the Office to rapidly conclude in favour of the opening of 
investigations, cutting back on the average duration of PE829. 
In the second place, the OTP—in case of state self-referral—has strongly 
relied on the states’ self-proclaimed partial or complete inability to carry out 
investigations and prosecutions of the alleged crimes, for the purposes of the 
complementarity test. This dynamic contributed to simplify the admissibility 
assessment, although the state’s own judgement cannot relieve the Office from a 
concrete and specific analysis on the existence and genuineness of national 
proceedings. In case of UNSC’s referral, a negative assessment on the willingness 
and/or ability to genuinely investigate or prosecute was somehow implicit in the 
																																																																																																																																																													
of Mali, 16 January 2013, par. 171-172 and ICC-OTP, Article 53(1) Report, Situation in the Central 
African Republic II, 24 September 2014, par. 265-266. 
828 See, supra, footnote 208. The fact that the Office, as a matter of policy and practice, carries out a 
preliminary examination irrespective of the triggering mechanism clearly shows that the OTP does not 
consider itself bound to open an investigation in case of UNSC referral. See, ICC-OTP, Policy Paper 
on Preliminary Examinations, November 2003, par. 73, 76. 
829 See, supra, the table of page 193. 
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referring resolutions and was plainly endorsed by the Office, without the need for in-
depth decisions containing the reasoning on complementarity830. 
In the third place, it should be reminded that in terms of judicial supervision 
of article 53(1) positive decisions, the OTP’s preliminary assessment of ‘situational 
admissibility’ is not generally subject per se to judicial review, given the lack of any 
practical application of the procedure for preliminary rulings regarding admissibility 
under article 18 of the Statute. The OTP’s preliminary conclusion that the potential 
cases likely to arise from a situation are admissible can only be subject to judicial 
review at the more individualised stage of the case, in line with the procedure of 
article 19 of the Statute.  
A potential development in the direction of an early judicial supervision 
emerged from the OTP’s recent request for a pre-preliminary ruling on jurisdiction 
concerning the alleged crimes against the Rohingya across Myanmar and 
Bangladesh. The Majority of the competent PTC shared the Office’s reasoning on 
the Court’s power to entertain the request, although it based its decision on an 
entirely different legal basis than the one relied on by the Office and held that, in 
effect, the request did not properly pertain to a pre-preliminary phase, but rather to an 
‘informal’ preliminary examination whose formal opening had not been officially 
declared by the Office831. This recent decision might inaugurate a novel practice of 
early rulings on jurisdiction and/or admissibility whereby the OTP and preliminary 
judges interact in pre-emptively defining the scope of a preliminary examination 
																																																								
830 See, ICC-OTP, Report of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Mr. Luis Moreno 
Ocampo, to the Security Council pursuant to UNSCR 1593 (2005), 29 June 2005, 3-4; ICC-OTP, First 
Report of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court to the UNSC pursuant to UNSCR 1970 
(2011), 4 May 2011, par. 13-14. 
831 See, ICC, Decision on the “Prosecution’s Request for a Ruling on Jurisdiction under Article 19(3) 
of the Statute”, Application under Regulation 46(3) of the Regulations of the Court, ICC-RoC46(3)-
01/18-37, PTC I, 6 September 2018, 26-33. The Majority completely shifted ex proprio motu the 
analysis from article 19(3) of the Statute—on which the OTP’s request was based—and grounded its 
decision on the principle of Kompetenz-Kompetenz, primarily as incorporated by the Rome Statute 
under article 119(1) and, concurrently, as an established principle of international law to which the 
Court could resort under article 21(1)(b) of the Statute. At the same time the Majority criticised the 
OTP’s qualification of the procedural phase at hand as pre-preliminary, alleging that the activities 
already performed by the Office did in fact have the character of a preliminary examination (ibidem, 
par. 81-82). In any event the OTP, following the Chamber’s decision, has announced the opening of a 
full-fledged preliminary examination. See ICC-OTP, Statement of ICC Prosecutor, Mrs Fatou 
Bensouda, on opening a Preliminary Examination concerning the alleged deportation of the Rohingya 
people from Myanmar to Bangladesh, 18 September 2018 (available at: https://www.icc-
cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=180918-otp-stat-Rohingya, last accessed 6 November 2018). 
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ahead of its formal opening by the Office832. While this case concerns jurisdiction 
rather than admissibility, it cannot be excluded that in the future the Office might 
approach the PTC to obtain preliminary clarifications also on point of admissibility, 
essentially for purposes of judicial economy and to promote the efficient use of the 
OTP’s resources833. 
 
3.2.2 Prosecutorial and judicial practice in case of proprio motu 
The OTP refrained from actively exercising its proprio motu powers until late 
2009, when it first applied to the PTC for the authorisation to open an investigation 
on the 2007 post-electoral violence occurred in Kenya834. Since then the Office 
requested an authorisation on other four occasions, namely Côte d’Ivoire, Georgia, 
Burundi and Afghanistan835. It is therefore necessary to reflect on the prosecutorial 
and judicial trends concerning the ‘request-and-authorisation’ procedure under article 
15 of the Statute, which represent one of the most relevant test benches for the 
concrete functioning of the checks and balances mechanism as regards the exercise 
of prosecutorial discretion at the ICC. In particular we shall analyse, on the one hand, 
the OTP’s reasoning strategy to convince the PTCs of the necessity to authorise an 
investigation and, on the other hand, the PTCs’ approach towards the function and 
																																																								
832 This would be a significant example of institutional interplay between OTP-judges in the early 
setup of the jurisdictional and admissibility parameters of a situation for purposes of preliminary 
examination and investigation. It shall be necessary to wait the future practice of the Office and of the 
PTCs, and see whether it will lead to an interpretive agreement between the Prosecutor and judges or, 
to the contrary, it will produce instances of open clash between the two actors in other similar 
circumstances.  
833 Commentators of the Statute positively consider this possibility. See C. K. HALL, D. D. NTANDA 
NSEREKO, M. J. VENTURA, op. cit., 875: “in certain circumstances, the Prosecutor could attempt to 
seek a ruling that the Court has jurisdiction over an entire situation or that the situation was admissible 
. . . In other words, the Prosecutor could perhaps seek a prompt determination that . . . investigations and 
prosecutions were admissible in a situation where there is no doubt that the State’s judicial system 
was unable or unwilling to genuinely investigate or prosecute, thus conserving the Court’s resources 
so that these issues do not have to be relitigated case by case”. 
834 See ICC-OTP, Request for authorisation of an investigation pursuant to Article 15, Situation in the 
Republic of Kenya, ICC-01/09-3, 26 November 2009. 
835 See, respectively, ICC-OTP, Request for authorisation of an investigation pursuant to Article 15, 
Situation in the Republic of Côte d'Ivoire, ICC-02/11-3, 23 June 2011; ICC-OTP, Request for 
authorisation of an investigation pursuant to Article 15, Situation in Georgia, ICC-01/15-4, 13 
October 2015; ICC-OTP, Public redacted version of “Request for authorisation of an investigation 
pursuant to article 15”, 6 September 2017, ICC-01/17-5-US-Exp, Situation in the Republic of 
Burundi, ICC-01/17-5-Red, 15 November 2017; ICC-OTP, Public redacted version of “Request for 
authorisation of an investigation pursuant to article 15”, 20 November 2017, ICC-02/17-7-Conf-Exp, 
Situation in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, ICC-02/17-7-Red, 20 November 2017. 
PART THREE – CHAPTER TWO 
 240 
latitude of the judicial supervision implicit in the authorisation procedure. This will 
allow to draw some preliminary conclusions on the current status of the OTP-PTC 
interactions under article 15 as well as to underline the major points of interpretive 
agreement and—if any—of disagreement between the two institutional subjects, and 
the creative/transformative potential of their practices. 
It is convenient to focus first on the OTP’s practice concerning the requests 
for judicial authorisation pursuant to article 15(3) of the Statute, with a view to 
assess any recurring behaviours on the part of the Office, as well as any relevant 
evolutionary trend based on the dialogue with the competent PTCs. While 
differences in the content and reasoning among the five requests submitted so far to 
the PTC are obviously present, based on the specificities of each situation, the 
structure of these documents is relatively standardised836.  
The first request for authorisation concerning the Kenyan situation contained 
a relatively thorough summary of the information on which the OTP founded its 
assessment, with particular attention to both national and international sources, 
including the reports of various UN bodies and NGOs 837 . The discussion of 
jurisdiction—in particular ratione materiae—takes up most of the request, a trend 
that has been later generally confirmed in subsequent requests838. Being it the first 
time that the OTP made recourse to the article 15(3) procedure, the Office explored 
in greater detail key issues such as the scope of the “reasonable basis” standard and 
the legal nature of the article 15(3) authorisation procedure. The OTP argued in 
favour of the recognition of a low evidentiary standard to grant the authorisation, of a 
limited scope for the PTC’s judicial supervision and of the “expeditious and 
summary” character of the authorisation procedure839. With regard to the crucial 
																																																								
836 All the requests contain sections on the procedural background and the historical context; a 
summary of the information on which the request is based, presented according to their source; the 
analysis of the criteria to be taken into consideration pursuant to article 53(1) of the Statute—via the 
‘cross link’ contained in Rule 48 of the RPE—namely jurisdiction (temporal, personal, territorial and 
subject-matter), admissibility (complementarity and gravity), the interests of justice; and the 
conclusion on the “reasonable basis” standard accompanying the request of authorisation. In general, 
the most analytical part of the document concerns the analysis of jurisdiction ratione materiae, where 
the existence of both the contextual elements and the specific conducts relating to the alleged crimes 
is assessed against the applicable evidentiary standard.  
837 ICC-OTP, Request for authorisation of an investigation pursuant to Article 15, Situation in the 
Republic of Kenya, ICC-01/09-3, 26 November 2009, par. 25-44. 
838 Ibidem, par. 63-101. 
839 Ibidem, par. 103-104, 106-107, 109-111. 
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aspect of admissibility, the assessment of both complementarity and gravity is 
relatively ‘minimalistic’, and does not delve into a detailed in-depth analysis of the 
constituent elements of the two-pronged complementarity test840. Nevertheless, it 
should be noted that with regard to both jurisdiction and admissibility it is in the 
Kenya request that the OTP first introduced the concept that at the preliminary stage 
their assessment must be carried out with regard to the “potential cases” likely to 
arise from an investigation; a concept that has been fully endorsed by the PTC and is 
currently at the core of article 15(3) and (4) request and authorisation practices841. In 
this regard, on point of admissibility of the potential cases at the situation stage, the 
Kenya PTC established that such an assessment cannot be made in the abstract, and 
went on to introduce the criteria that define a “potential case”, namely:  (i) the groups 
of persons involved that are likely to be the focus of an investigation; and (ii) the 
crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court allegedly committed during the incidents 
that are likely to be the focus of an investigation. In other words the PTC required 
the Office to provide, together with the request and the accompanying information, a 
non-binding preliminary list of the crimes and of the potential perpetrators as a term 
of reference to carry out a meaningful judicial supervision842. The OTP, in all 
subsequent requests for authorisation, followed the PTC’s advice and provided the 
competent Chamber with dedicated annexes containing such confidential preliminary 
lists843. 
																																																								
840 Ibidem, par. 53-55, 56-59. 
841 Ibidem, par. 51, 107 (particularly footnote 101). For the judicial recognition of this concept see 
ICC, Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an Investigation 
into the Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Situation in the Republic of Kenya, ICC-01/09-19-Corr, 
PTC II, 31 March 2010, par. 48-51, 58-59, 64, 182, 197-200. 
842 Ibidem, par. 49, 50: “The Prosecutor's selection of the incidents or groups of persons that are likely 
to shape his future case(s) is preliminary in nature and is not binding for future admissibility 
assessments. This means that the Prosecutor's selection on the basis of these elements for the purposes 
of defining a potential "case" for this particular phase may change at a later stage, depending on the 
development of the investigation”. It should be added that this request of the Chamber could explicitly 
be based on Regulation 49(2) and (3) of the Regulations of the Court, which stipulate the formal 
requirements for the OTP’s request and the necessary accompanying documents. Nevertheless, the 
Chamber did not expressly recall these provisions. 
843 See ICC-OTP, Request for authorisation of an investigation pursuant to Article 15, Situation in the 
Republic of Côte d'Ivoire, ICC-02/11-3, 23 June 2011, par. 54-58; ICC-OTP, Request for 
authorisation of an investigation pursuant to Article 15, Situation in Georgia, ICC-01/15-4, 13 
October 2015, par. 276; ICC-OTP, Public redacted version of “Request for authorisation of an 
investigation pursuant to article 15”, 6 September 2017, ICC-01/17-5-US-Exp, Situation in the 
Republic of Burundi, ICC-01/17-5-Red, 15 November 2017, par. 145; ICC-OTP, Public redacted 
version of “Request for authorisation of an investigation pursuant to article 15”, 20 November 2017, 
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The second request for authorisation in the situation of Côte d’Ivoire 
substantially mimics the style and structure of the Kenyan request, building on the 
most relevant determination of the Kenya PTC as regards the evidentiary standard 
and the manner of assessing jurisdiction and admissibility. Consistently with the 
Kenya PTC’s indications, the OTP annexed to the request the two-abovementioned 
preliminary lists of crimes and potential perpetrators844. One interesting note on this 
request regards the proposed temporal framework of the request for authorisation, 
provided that based on the state’s declarations of acceptance the jurisdiction of the 
Court could potentially extend from 19 September 2002 onwards (well before the 
main temporal focus of the incidents under examination). The Office did not 
formally ask that the authorisation be extended to cover facts occurred before the 
2010 electoral violence, but suggested that the PTC “may . . . broaden the temporal 
scope of the investigations to events that occurred between 19 September 2002 (the 
date from which the Republic Côte d'Ivoire accepted the exercise of jurisdiction by 
the Court in accordance with article 12(3) of the Rome Statute) and 23 June 2011 
(the date of the filing of this Application)”845. With regard to the admissibility test, 
the Office relied on the Appeals Chamber’s case law regarding the concept of 
“inaction” as a preliminary step in the assessment of complementarity, whose 
existence relieves the OTP and the Court from entering an in-depth analysis of 
unwillingness or inability. It seems obvious that the allegation of inaction is 
particularly convenient for the OTP in that it greatly simplifies the burden of the 
proof, thereby raising a presumption of admissibility846. The Office also attached 
significant weight to the self-proclaimed inability of national authorities to 
effectively deal with the investigation and prosecution of the alleged crimes847. As 
regards the gravity assessment, the analysis is once again rather cursory and 
‘circular’848. 
																																																																																																																																																													
ICC-02/17-7-Conf-Exp, Situation in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, ICC-02/17-7-Red, 20 
November 2017, par. 264-266. 
844 Respectively Annex 1A (“Confidential List of incidents”) and Annex 1B (“Confidential list of 
Persons appearing to be the Most Responsible”) to the ICC-OTP, Request for authorisation of an 
investigation pursuant to Article 15, Situation in the Republic of Côte d'Ivoire, ICC-02/11-3, 23 June 
2011. 
845 Ibidem, par. 40-42. 
846 Ibidem, par. 47-48. 
847 Ibidem, par. 49. 
848 Ibidem, par. 54-58. 
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The OTP’s request concerning Georgia marks a shift from earlier practices in 
that the document is significantly longer than the previous ones and proceeds in a 
slightly different logical order, in particular placing the detailed analysis of 
jurisdiction ratione materiae—both as regards the contextual elements and the 
individual alleged crimes—before the assessment of admissibility and the interest of 
justice849. The most relevant aspect of the Georgia request is that most of the 
reasoning of the Office revolves around the assessment of admissibility, in particular 
of its complementarity prong 850 . It should be reminded that the preliminary 
examination of the Georgian situation lasted many years precisely for the need to 
follow the development of national proceedings in Georgia and in the Russian 
Federation. For this reason, the Office provides an in-depth analysis of these 
proceedings, coming to the conclusion that the lack of progress at the domestic level 
as regards most of the alleged crimes makes the potential cases likely to arise from 
an investigation admissible before the Court851. At the same time, the assessment of 
gravity is relatively more detailed than in the two previous requests, taking into 
consideration in discrete paragraphs the four non-exhaustive criteria that define 
gravity under the statutory framework852. The assessment of the interests of justice is 
also more analytical than in previous occasions. The OTP attaches great 
consideration to the strong demand for justice expressed by the victims both 
domestically and internationally, considering that the delicate situation in the 
Georgian-Russian international relations does not raise the concern that an 
investigation would run contrary to the interests of justice853. 
The Burundi request of late 2017 is particularly relevant for some 
unprecedented procedural features stemming from Burundi’s withdrawal from the 
Statute and the state’s efforts to hamper the effectiveness of the preliminary 
examination process. For the first time the OTP filed its request under seal and in the 
context of an ex parte procedure to which only the Prosecutor took part, pursuant to 
																																																								
849 See ICC-OTP, Request for authorisation of an investigation pursuant to Article 15, Situation in 
Georgia, ICC-01/15-4, 13 October 2015, 3-4 (table of contents of the request). 
850 Ibidem, 41-43. 
851 Ibidem, 279-303 (“National proceedings in Georgia”), 304-320 (“National proceedings in the 
Russian Federation”), 321-322 (“National proceedings in third States”). 
852 Ibidem, 329-333. 
853 Ibidem, 338-344. 
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Regulation 23bis of the Regulations of the Court854. The OTP acted in this fashion 
based on the “potential risks to the success and integrity of a future investigation, as 
well as on considerations concerning the safety and security of witnesses and victims 
of the alleged crimes”855. The Office then went on to ask the Chamber to release its 
decision, be it favourable or not to the prosecution, with the same level of 
confidentiality of the article 15(3) request856. In addition, the Prosecutor asked the 
Chamber—in the event of authorisation—to be exceptionally allowed a ten-day 
delay period to notify the States Parties of the opening of the investigation pursuant 
to article 18 of the Statute, in order to complete its planning and ensure adequate 
protection to victims and witnesses857. Another relevant procedural issue concerned 
the temporal scope of the request and prospective authorisation and in particular its 
end date, considering the then imminent taking of effects of Burundi’s withdrawal. 
The Office aptly argued that the outer limit of the Court’s temporal jurisdiction—
hence of the facts covered by the eventual authorisation—could extend up to the day 
before the taking of effects of withdrawal on 27 October 2017858. Besides these 
challenging procedural issues, the request follows the scheme of its Georgian 
counterpart, by analysing in turn jurisdiction, admissibility and the interests of 
justice. With regard to admissibility, the complementarity assessment is interesting in 
that while the Office concluded in part for the inactivity of domestic institutions and 
in part for the lack of genuineness of certain national proceedings, it nevertheless 
examined in detail the work of the three investigating commissions created in 
Burundi “Out of an abundance of caution, and to ensure completeness of its 
analysis”859. Similarly to the other requests the assessment of gravity is not overly 
analytical, such as that of the interests of justice860. 
																																																								
854 ICC-OTP, Public redacted version of “Request for authorisation of an investigation pursuant to 
article 15”, 6 September 2017, ICC-01/17-5-US-Exp, Situation in the Republic of Burundi, ICC-
01/17-5-Red, 15 November 2017, par. 9-10. 
855 Ibidem, par. 9, 10-11, 12. 
856 Ibidem, par. 13. 
857 Ibidem. 
858 Ibidem, par. 38-39. 
859 Ibidem, par. 153. In particular the Office observed that the three commissions “do not appear to 
have had full investigatory powers or conducted full criminal inquiries”. 
860 Ibidem, par. 186-195 and 196-199. 
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The request for authorisation concerning Afghanistan was also filed under 
seal and ex parte, based on the precedent concerning the situation in Burundi861. This 
request is particularly relevant for the very delicate nature of a prospective 
investigation, particularly of its ratione personae dimension, given that some of the 
potential suspects are likely to be citizens of a state which is not a party to the Statute 
(the United States of America), and more specifically members of the armed forces 
and intelligence services that the interested state has always sought to shield from the 
exercise of the Court’s jurisdiction862. At the beginning of the request the OTP 
explained the reasons for the significant length of the preliminary examination 
activities, referring to a number of material and legal difficulties that made it 
allegedly impossible to reach a determination in a shorter period of time863. It should 
be noted that the OTP, before entering a detailed discussion of the alleged conducts 
for the purposes of assessing jurisdiction ratione materiae, deals with the issue of 
personal jurisdiction in respect of nationals of states that are not parties to the 
Statute. The Office takes a firm position on this issue, underlining the unexceptional 
character of the Rome regime when it allows the exercise of criminal jurisdiction on 
citizens of non-consenting states (provided that a territorial link to a State Party, such 
as Afghanistan, is present)864. The OTP is also adamant in holding that the conclusion 
of agreements pursuant to article 98 of the Statute or of other agreements such as the 
so-called Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs), between Afghanistan and a sending 
state by which the former “ceded exclusive criminal jurisdiction to a sending State 
with respect to alleged crimes committed by that sending State’s nationals on Afghan 
soil does not affect the Court’s jurisdiction”. To the contrary, the conclusion of such 
agreements “might constitute a relevant ground for admissibility in view of the 
																																																								
861 ICC-OTP, Public redacted version of “Request for authorisation of an investigation pursuant to 
article 15”, 20 November 2017, ICC-02/17-7-Conf-Exp, Situation in the Islamic Republic of 
Afghanistan, ICC-02/17-7-Red, 20 November 2017, par. 7-9. 
862 On the complex relationship between the ICC and the American administration see, recently, L. N. 
SADAT, The United States and the International Criminal Court: A Complicated, Uneasy, Yet at 
Times Engaging Relationship, in Washington University in St. Louis Legal Studies Research Paper 
Series, 2016, 1-25. For an in-depth analysis of American opposition to the ICC see J. RALPH, 
Defending the Society of States: Why America Opposes the International Criminal Court and its 
Vision of World Society, New York, 2007 (particularly Chapter 5 titled “Understanding US 
Opposition to the ICC”). 
863 ICC-OTP, Public redacted version of “Request for authorisation of an investigation pursuant to 
article 15”, 20 November 2017, ICC-02/17-7-Conf-Exp, Situation in the Islamic Republic of 
Afghanistan, ICC-02/17-7-Red, 20 November 2017, par. 22-28, 30-38. 
864 Ibidem, par. 45. 
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resultant inaction, or otherwise unwillingness or inability, of the territorial State to 
exercise criminal jurisdiction with respect to a particular category of persons or 
groups” 865. Attention is also given to conducts that allegedly took place on the 
territory of other States Parties, such as Poland, Lithuania and Romania mainly in the 
context of the so-called extraordinary renditions. Such conducts might fall under the 
jurisdiction of the Court provided that they are associated with the armed conflict in 
Afghanistan and “sufficiently linked” to the parameters of the situation at hand866. 
Considering the OTP’s introductory remarks on the activities performed by the 
Office during preliminary examination, the assessment of admissibility is particularly 
thorough in the request. The OTP made clear that in principle “only national criminal 
investigations and/or prosecutions of a State . . . can trigger the application of article 
17(1)(a)-(c)”867. Notwithstanding the fact that most national proceedings did not 
possess a fully jurisdictional and criminal character, the Office “out of an abundance 
of caution, and to ensure completeness of its analysis, [considered] their findings . . . 
as national criminal investigations, even if on their face these initiatives would 
appear to fall outside the technical scope of the term”868. The request then goes on to 
assess the proceedings in Afghanistan concluding that both the potential cases 
against members of the Taliban and of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) 
would be admissible869. The Office reached the same conclusion as regards the 
potential cases relating to the conduct of US armed forces and CIA’s personnel870. 
Given the lack of cooperation of the US authorities in providing specific information 
on pertinent national proceedings, the OTP based its assessment on “publicly 
available information contained in open sources”871. The assessment of gravity deals 
separately with the alleged crimes of the Taliban, ANSF and American military and 
intelligence forces, according to the usual four-criteria scheme872. Similarly to the 
Georgian situation the assessment of the non-contrariety of an investigation to 
interests of justice is relatively more analytical than in other requests, taking into 
																																																								
865 Ibidem, par. 46 (emphasis added). 
866 Ibidem, par. 49. 
867 Ibidem, par. 268. 
868 Ibidem. 
869 Ibidem, par. 275, 288-289. 
870 Ibidem, par. 311, 312, 328. For the general conclusions on complementarity see par. 335. 
871 Ibidem, par. 290, 295-298. 
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particular consideration the active role played by victims in requesting that justice be 
done for the atrocities suffered, through instruments such as surveys and reports of 
national human rights bodies and NGOs873. 
Turning our attention to the authorisation practices of the various PTCs that 
have entertained the OTP’s request for authorisation it should preliminarily be 
reminded that up to date all such requests were granted by the Chambers, 
determining a hundred per cent success rate for the OTP’s proprio motu procedures 
in terms of authorisations obtained874. The most relevant findings of the Chambers in 
the four authorisation decisions adopted so far are briefly summarised—including 
references to the dissenting opinions—with a view to draw a comparison between the 
OTP’s and PTCs’ approaches towards the authorisation procedure and provide, in 
conclusion of the present paragraph, an overview of the main trends of the ICC’s 
practice on the point. 
In its first authorisation decision pursuant to the request concerning the 
situation in Kenya the PTC—Judge Hans Peter Kaul dissenting—clarified many key 
aspects of the procedure, in the light of a textual, contextual and teleological 
interpretation of the Statute875. In particular it concluded that: 
a) The statutory and regulatory regime institute a fundamental link between 
article 15 and article 53 of the Statute, introducing the same standard of evaluation in 
the respective procedures876. 
b) The PTC must apply to its judicial supervision the same evidentiary 
standard applied by the OTP in reaching its decision, namely the “reasonable basis to 
believe”, which is the lowest evidentiary standard among those envisaged by the ICC 
legal texts877. As a consequence the information provided by the OTP at this stage 
“certainly need not point towards only one conclusion”878. 
																																																								
873 Ibidem, par. 364-372. 
874  It should be reminded that at the time of writing the authorisation procedure concerning 
Afghanistan is still pending in front of the PTC. 
875 ICC, Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an Investigation 
into the Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Situation in the Republic of Kenya, ICC-01/09-19-Corr, 
PTC II, 31 March 2010. 
876 Ibidem, par. 21-22 
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c) The PTC’s supervisory function entails the assessment of the “necessary 
jurisdictional prerequisites under the Statute”879, as well as a positive determination 
on admissibility. With regard to jurisdiction ratione materiae the judges clarified that 
the OTP is not barred from modifying the exact focus on individual crimes and 
potential perpetrators in the course of the investigation, provided that they fall under 
the parameters of the authorised investigation880. The admissibility assessment must 
be carried out having regard to the “potential cases” in the context of a situation881. 
Such analysis cannot be carried out in the abstract and requires the OTP to present 
the Chamber with a preliminary list of incidents and potential perpetrators882. 
d) The assessment of complementarity must take into consideration what had 
already been established by the Court on point of inaction, unwillingness and 
inability of the interested state; whereas the assessment of gravity—also to be 
referred to the potential cases—must take into account both quantitative and 
qualitative factors such as those reflected in Rule 145 of the RPE883.  
e) The OTP is not required to positively show that an investigation is in the 
interests of justice and the Chamber shall only review this aspect of the request when 
the Office concludes that the investigation runs contrary to the interests of justice884. 
The Chamber then went on to apply these principles to the request under 
examination concluding that all the required statutory criteria had been met in terms 
of jurisdiction and admissibility, both sub specie complementarity (due to the 
inaction of national authorities) and gravity 885 . Lastly, the Chamber provided 
clarifications on the temporal and material scope of the authorisation. It established 
that the temporal scope extends to the lapse of time stretching from the entry into 
force of the Statute in respect to Kenya to the date of the OTP’s request for 
authorisation886. As regards the material scope, this is limited to the category of 
crimes for which the request had been presented by the OTP and authorised by the 
Chamber (i.e. crimes against humanity). A more permissive solution would have 
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resulted in the conferral of excessive discretion to the Prosecutor in determining the 
scope of the investigation, beyond the reach of judicial supervision887. 
The Chamber’s rather liberal approach to the authorisation was criticised by 
the dissenting judge H. P. Kaul, who disagreed both as regards the Majority’s 
conclusions on the authorisation and as to the methodological approach to judicial 
review endorsed by the PTC888. In particular, the dissenting judge, while agreeing on 
the low character of the applicable standard of review, argued that the PTC’s 
supervision could only be meaningful if it consisted in a “full, genuine and 
substantive determination of the Chamber whether there exists a reasonable basis to 
believe that crimes falling under the jurisdiction of the Court have been 
committed”889. He also argued in favour of a more rigorous examination of the 
Court’s jurisdiction ratione materiae, failing which the authorisation procedure 
would result in a merely administrative procedure, turning the PTC into “a mere 
rubber-stamping instance”890.  
In the Ivorian authorisation decision the competent PTC—Judge de 
Gurmendi partially dissenting—confirmed much of the reasoning of the Kenya 
PTC’s decision as regards the “reasonable basis to believe” standard and the 
functioning of the procedure under article 15 of the Statute891.  It also preliminarily 
added a few relevant considerations on the effect of the declarations of acceptance 
lodged by the state and on the relevance of information submitted by victims, which 
according to the Majority had to be approached in a “non-restrictive manner”892. The 
Majority nevertheless distanced itself form the Kenya PTC as regards the temporal 
scope of the authorised investigation, through a more liberal approach to the judicial 
framing of the starting and end date of the authorisation. Going beyond the request of 
the OTP as regards the starting date, the Chamber clarified that it was prepared to 
authorise the investigation also with regard to facts occurred between 2002 and 2010, 
																																																								
887 Ibidem, par. 208-209. 
888 Dissenting Opinion of Judge Hans Peter Kaul, attached to ICC, Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of 
the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Kenya, 
Situation in the Republic of Kenya, ICC-01/09-19-Corr, PTC II, 31 March 2010, par. 3, 8-9, 10, 148-
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889 Ibidem, par. 14-15. 
890 Ibidem, par. 18-19. 
891 ICC, Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an Investigation 
into the Situation in the Republic of Côte d'Ivoire, Situation in the Republic of Côte d'Ivoire, ICC-
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but in the lack of sufficient information relating to that period it directed the OTP to 
provide additional information pursuant to Rule 50(4) of the RPE893. The Office did 
so with a dedicated submission and the PTC consequently extended, in a separate 
decision, the temporal scope of the authorisation to cover those earlier conducts894. 
With regard to the end date for the authorisation, the Majority decided that the 
investigation could cover the “continuing crimes”, i.e. those committed after the date 
of the OTP’s request, “insofar as the contextual elements of the continuing crimes 
are the same as for those committed prior to 23 June 2011. They must, at least in a 
broad sense, involve the same actors and have been committed within the context of 
either the same attacks . . . or the same conflict”895. Another notable aspect of the 
decision is that the Chamber went beyond the request of the OTP also with regard to 
the analysis of the individual conducts, by extrapolating from the available 
information the potential commission of additional crimes which had not been 
discretely presented by the Office in the request896. The Chamber then considered that 
the potential cases likely to arise from the investigation would be admissible, in the 
light of the absence of national proceedings and of their sufficient gravity897. Lastly, 
the Chamber agreed with the OTP that an investigation would not run contrary to the 
interests of justice898. 
Judge de Gurmendi, while concurring with the Majority on the authorisation, 
appended a partially dissenting opinion, criticising the Majority’s methodological 
approach towards the judicial supervision procedure and the definition of the 
temporal scope of the authorised investigation. On the first issue, the partially 
dissenting judge stigmatised the Majority’s analysis of the OTP’s request, which had 
allegedly resulted in a “duplication of the preliminary examination conducted by the 
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Prosecutor” instead of limiting itself to “a review of the request and material 
presented by the Prosecutor [with the] underlying purpose of providing a judicial 
safeguard against frivolous or politically-motivated charges”899. Judge de Gurmendi 
also criticised the fact that the Majority autonomously extrapolated from the 
available information the potential commission of additional crimes, in the absence 
of a specific request of the OTP to that end900. In so doing, the Chamber would have 
impermissibly exercised quasi-investigative powers, contravening to the purpose of 
the procedure and exceeding its supervisory role, in a manner judged incompatible 
with the requirement of neutrality901. As regards the second issue, the dissenting 
judge considered that the Chamber had the authority to extend ex officio the 
authorisation to earlier crimes even in the absence of the supplementary information 
the Majority directed the OTP to provide902. Furthermore, she argued that the 
authorisation should have covered not only the “continuing crimes” but also any 
future crimes, provided that they are sufficiently linked to the situation of crisis 
under consideration903. This part of the dissent, aimed at extending the scope of the 
authorisation beyond what was originally requested by the OTP seems difficult to 
reconcile with the more restrictive approach advocated for in the first part of the 
dissent, based on the ne ultra petita principle. 
The PTC’s decision to authorise an investigation in the Georgian situation—
notwithstanding the extensive character of the OTP’s request—is the most concise of 
the four adopted so far by the competent Chamber904. In particular, the analysis of 
subject-matter jurisdiction is significantly more succinct than in previous decisions, 
and does not enter in an in-depth analysis of the contextual elements of the alleged 
war crimes and crimes against humanity, nor of the individual crimes referred to in 
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the OTP’s request. The Chamber—upon examination of the information provided by 
the OTP—swiftly considered that both the required evidentiary standard and the 
elements of the alleged crimes had been met905. Nevertheless the PTC took the 
occasion to criticise the OTP’s assessment of the available information with regard to 
certain incidents—namely the alleged indiscriminate or disproportionate attacks 
against the civilian population and sexual and gender-based violence—lamenting 
that the OTP “acted too restrictively and has imposed requirements on the material 
that cannot reasonably be met in the absence of an investigation, the initiation of 
which is precisely the issue at stake”906. However, the Chamber decided not to 
“rectify” the OTP’s assessment, given that the Prosecutor would in any case be 
permitted to extend the investigation to those incidents based on the PTC’s 
authorisation. By rectifying the OTP’s assessment the PTC would have exceeded its 
powers under article 15(4) of the Statute, going “beyond the submissions in the 
request in an attempt to correct any possible error on the part of the Prosecutor”, 
something the Chamber considered “unnecessary and inappropriate”907. Consistently 
with the OTP’s emphasis on the admissibility test, the Chamber analysed in detail the 
aspects of complementarity and gravity. With regard to the former, the Chamber 
considered that the situation in Georgia revealed the then current inaction of national 
authorities, certified by a letter of the Georgian authorities on the halt of domestic 
proceedings908. Concerning the proceedings in the Russian Federation, the Chamber 
considered that—with regard to certain incidents—it was unable conclude that 
national proceedings are inadequate under article 17(1)(b) of the Statute. 
Nevertheless, given that the domestic proceedings “only cover a portion of the 
potential cases arising out of the situation” and that there are other potential cases 
that would be admissible, the Chamber considered it unnecessary to reach a 
																																																								
905 Ibidem, par. 26, 27-29 and 30-31. 
906 Ibidem, par. 35. The Office in its request approached with great caution the information regarding 
these incidents, alleging that a determination on the point couldn’t be reached based on the limited 
amount of information and on the fact that it came from only one party, with the potential risk of bias. 
907 Ibidem. 
908 Ibidem, par. 41. The Chamber considered this letter as “dispositive of the matter”, certifying the 
inactivity and hence the admissibility of the potential cases likely to arise from an investigation. More 
generally, on the role of the two interested states, Georgia and the Russian Federation, and the 
external “political control” exercised vis-à-vis the activities performed by the OTP, see N. TSERETELI, 
Quality Control in the Preliminary Examination of the Georgia Situation, in M. BERGSMO, C. STAHN 
(eds.), Quality Control in Preliminary Examinations: Vol. 1, cit., 536-541. 
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conclusive determination on the overall adequacy of Russian national proceedings909. 
As regards the domestic proceedings concerning the alleged attacks on Russian 
peacekeepers, the Chamber concurred with the OTP in concluding that there exists 
neither unwillingness nor inability on the part of Russian authorities, and that 
consequently the corresponding potential cases could be inadmissible at the ICC910. 
The Chamber then positively concluded on point of gravity, following the usual 
quadripartite analysis (nature, scale, manner of commission and impact)911. Finally, 
the PTC considered it necessary to clarify the scope of the authorised investigation. It 
endorsed the position of the OTP—also expressed by judge de Gurmendi in its 
partial dissent in the Ivorian authorisation—on the material scope of the 
investigation, confirming that the Office is permitted to extend the investigation to 
any crimes other than those explicitly mentioned in the authorisation, provided that 
they are sufficiently linked to the parameters that define the situation and that they 
fall within the Court’s jurisdiction912. Limiting the material scope of the authorised 
investigation would not only be “illogical”—given that the authorisation procedure is 
structurally based on limited information—but also in “conflict with [the OTP’s] 
duty to investigate objectively, in order to establish the truth”913.  
Judge Péter Kovács appended a separate opinion, criticising the Majority’s 
approach toward the supervision procedure, on the same lines of judge Kaul’s dissent 
on the Kenyan authorisation914. In particular, he criticised the Majority’s conclusions 
on the “strictly limited” nature of the PTC’s supervision and the apparent departure 
from the in-depth character of the Kenya and Cote d’Ivoire decisions, arguing that 
the Chamber must reach its own conclusions in furtherance of an “independent 
judicial inquiry” entailing the “full and proper examination of the supporting 
material”915. The outcome of the PTC’s supervision should be a clear, well-reasoned 
																																																								
909 Ibidem, par. 42, 46. 
910 Ibidem, par. 47-50. 
911 Ibidem, par. 51-57. 
912 Ibidem, par. 62-64. 
913 Ibidem, par. 63. 
914 Separate Opinion of Judge Péter Kovács, ICC-01/15-12-Anx-Corr, 27 January 2016. On the 
disagreements between the Majority and the dissenting judge, particularly on the importance given by 
Judge Kovács to a “better understanding the local context”, see N. TSERETELI, op. cit., 548-550. 
915 Separate Opinion of Judge Péter Kovács, ICC-01/15-12-Anx-Corr, 27 January 2016, par. 3-4, 5-7, 
10. 
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and persuasive decision, something that the Majority allegedly did not deliver916. In 
addition, the dissenting judge considered that the Chamber’s determination lacked 
sufficient clarity in delineating the facts underpinning its conclusions on the alleged 
crimes. After clarifying that the Chamber is permitted to go ultra petita in reaching 
its determination, he then went on to present his own autonomous analysis of various 
potential crimes based on the available information, including some that were not 
presented in the OTP’s request917. Similarly, he took issue with the Chamber’s 
analysis of admissibility, reaching alternative conclusions on certain 
complementarity profiles918. 
 The PTC’s decision to authorise an investigation in the situation in 
Burundi—the first unanimous so far—is particularly interesting in its treatment of 
the procedural issues raised by the OTP as regards the confidentiality and ex parte 
nature of the authorisation procedure 919. The Chamber, while granting the OTP’s 
request for classification, established that the OTP’s assessment on the necessity to 
keep the procedure ex parte and under seal—without giving notice to the victims 
based on alleged threats to their well-being as well as to the integrity of the 
investigation—was only preliminary in character and must undergo the Chamber’s 
judicial scrutiny based on the concrete circumstances of the case920. At the same time, 
the PTC forcefully clarified—contrary to the arguments put forward by the OTP—
that meaningful measures for the protection of victims and witnesses can be adopted 
by the Office pursuant to article 68(1) of the Statute, prior to the Chamber’s 
authorisation to open an investigation921. Additionally, the preliminary judges granted 
to the OTP the required ten-day delay term to notify the states under article 18(1) of 
the Statute, considering the “exceptional circumstances” of the situation 922 . 
Considering the exceptional ex parte and under seal nature of the proceedings the 
Chamber, in order to guarantee the participatory rights of victims, “requested 
																																																								
916 Ibidem, par. 12. 
917 Ibidem, par. 18-22, 26-36.  
918 Ibidem, par. 37-67. 
919 See, supra, footnotes 854-858. 
920 ICC, Public Redacted version of the “Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the 
Authorization of an Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Burundi”, ICC-01/17-X-9-US-
Exp, 25 October 2017, Situation in the Republic of Burundi, ICC-01/17-9-Red, PTC III, 9 November 
2017, par. 9-11, 13-14. 
921 Ibidem, par. 15. 
922 Ibidem, par. 19. 
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additional information under rule 50(4) of the Rules to assess the views of the 
victims and deems it appropriate to consider such information for the purposes of its 
article 15(4) decision”923. Lastly, the PTC concurred with the Prosecutor on the 
temporal scope of the authorised investigation in relation to the effects of Burundi’s 
withdrawal from the Statute, deciding that “the Court retains jurisdiction over any 
crimes falling within its jurisdiction that may have been committed in Burundi or by 
nationals of Burundi up to and including 26 October 2017”924 and that, consequently, 
“any obligations on the part of Burundi arising out of the Chamber’s article 15(4) 
decision would survive Burundi’s withdrawal [because] the present decision is 
delivered prior to the entry into effect of Burundi’s withdrawal on 27 October 
2017”925. The PTC’s assessment of jurisdiction reverted back to the analytical 
approach adopted by the Kenyan and Ivorian decisions, instead of following the 
summary and somewhat perfunctory approach taken by the Georgia PTC 926 . 
Nevertheless, similarly to the Georgia PTC, the Chamber underlined that he OTP 
had acted too restrictively in considering the available information with particular 
regard to the potential commission of war crimes in the situation under examination. 
For this reason the Chamber expressed the view “that the Prosecutor will have to 
enquire during her investigation whether a non-international armed conflict existed 
in Burundi during the relevant period and whether war crimes were committed”927. 
For the purposes of the admissibility assessment the Chamber confirmed the 
importance of the preliminary lists of incidents and potential suspects to be provided 
by the OTP as the necessary term of reference for its judicial supervision928. With 
specific regard to the complementarity prong, the preliminary judges made reference 
to the Court’s case law on the “substantially the same conduct” test and took into 
consideration the work of three national commissions tasked of shedding light on 
																																																								
923 Ibidem, par. 20-21. The Chamber affirmed that “Accordingly, even though this procedure is 
exceptionally classified as under seal, ex parte, only available to the Prosecutor, the Chamber is 
additionally guided by the views expressed by the victims in the aforementioned documents. 
However, this exceptional procedure is not to be seen as replacing the procedural right accorded to 
victims under article 15(3) of the Statute”. 
924 Ibidem, par. 24. 
925 Ibidem, par. 26. 
926 Ibidem, par. 32-141. 
927 Ibidem, par. 141 (emphasis added). This approach seems more stringent than the one adopted by 
the Georgia PTC, where judges declared that it was unnecessary to rectify the OTP’s assessment (see, 
supra, footnote 907). 
928 Ibidem, par. 144. 
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certain episodes of violence under examination, mindful of the OTP’s doubts on their 
correct qualification as proper judicial proceedings929. Nevertheless, the Chamber 
clarified that “national investigation merely aimed at the gathering of evidence does 
not lead, in principle, to the inadmissibility of any cases before the Court, 
considering that, for the purposes of complementarity, an investigation must be 
carried out with a view to conducting criminal prosecutions”930. The assessment of 
gravity and of the interests of justice follows the well-established precedents of the 
other authorisation decisions. The Chamber followed the Georgia PTC in authorising 
the Office to investigate “any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court committed 
between 26 April 2015 and 26 October 2017”, including crimes committed before 
the staring date but sharing the same contextual elements, and the crimes of 
continuous nature whose commission continues after the end date931. 
Based on the preceding analysis of the available prosecutorial and judicial 
practice it is possible to formulate the following preliminary conclusions on the 
current trends concerning article 15 authorisation procedure. 
a) The practice of the Office emerging from the five requests for authorisation 
reveals the OTP’s intent to frame the evidentiary standards and the 
jurisdictional/admissibility requirements so as to keep to a minimum the effort 
needed to convince the Chamber of the necessity and opportunity to authorise the 
investigation. The reasoning in support of the request is generally in-depth and 
analytical with regard to jurisdictional issues—in particular jurisdiction ratione 
materiae—while this is not always the case with regard to admissibility, in particular 
with regard to the assessment of gravity. There is a clear symmetry between the 
length and complexity of preliminary examination activities—particularly of Phase 
3—and the attention dedicated in the requests to the complementarity assessment, i.e. 
of the existence and adequacy of national proceedings. For that purpose, the Office 
has shown the tendency to consider and review, out of abundance of caution, the 
results of national proceedings even when the competent authorities did not appear to 
																																																								
929 Ibidem, par. 147, 151-153, 154-176. 
930 Ibidem, par. 152. The position taken by the PTC seems particularly relevant in relation to 
transitional justice mechanisms entailing forms of truth-seeking that are alternative or complementary 
to criminal proceedings. The deployment of such mechanisms, in the PTC’s view, does not exclude 
per se the admissibility of potential cases at the ICC. 
931 Ibidem, par. 192-193 (emphasis in the original text). 
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enjoy full investigative powers or did not have a genuinely jurisdictional character. 
The OTP’s approach to the documents and materials provided in support of the 
requests is not devoid of inconsistencies across the different situations, revealing a 
degree of flexibility and discretion as regards the inferences to be drawn from such 
information. As regards exquisitely procedural issues, the Office has on at least two 
occasions sought to maintain the confidentiality of the authorisation procedure, 
requesting the PTC to entertain it ex parte and under seal. 
b) The Chambers have so far granted all the requests for authorisation, in 
general within a few months from the filing of the OTP’s submissions. The various 
authorising PTCs have interpreted their supervisory role with a good measure of self-
restraint, limiting any too direct interference on the exercise of prosecutorial 
discretion in framing the scope of the future investigation, and establishing low 
evidentiary thresholds for that purpose. With regard to the temporal and subject-
matter scope of the authorised investigations, the Chambers moved from the more 
restrictive approach of the Kenya authorisation to a more liberal and proactive one in 
subsequent decisions. In this regard, the PTCs have sometimes ‘manipulated’ the 
jurisdictional parameters, even going beyond the requests of the Office. The 
dissenting judges have provided alternative views on the scope of the supervisory 
powers of the Chamber—advocating either for a more stringent oversight or for a an 
even more generous approach of the PTC—but with limited influence on the overall 
methodological approach adopted by the majority of the various Chambers. On the 
average, a rather ‘minimalist’ attitude towards the exercise of judicial supervision 
has prevailed in the practice of the competent Chambers. 
c) For the above reasons, the OTP-PTC institutional relationship with regard 
to the authorisation procedure seems to be premised on an overall interpretive 
agreement on the main legal issues pertinent to the procedure, and have not shown 
significant instances of open clash among the relevant actors, with the exclusion of 
minor disagreements on certain procedural issues. Nevertheless, the practice shows 
that in some circumstances judges have sought to influence the prosecutorial practice 
as regards the structure and content of article 15(3) requests and the scope of the 
future investigation. One example relates to the PTC’s request to the Office to 
provide, together with the request for authorisation, preliminary lists of incidents and 
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perpetrators for the purposes of the admissibility assessment. The OTP has always 
conformed to the Chamber’s request, first formulated in the Kenya authorisation 
decision. This constitutes a clear example of pragmatic prosecutorial adaptive 
practice to the Chamber’s requests. By the same token, the Chambers have on some 
occasions tried to overcome the restrictive approach taken by the OTP as regards the 
inferences to be drawn from the available information. They did so by ‘suggesting’ 
to the Prosecutor to extend the scope of the prospective investigation so as to 
encompass conducts—or even entire categories of crimes—which had not been 
comprised in the request or relating to a temporal framework not initially envisaged 
in the OTP’s request. On one occasion this proactive attitude was enacted through 
the Chamber’s request for additional information pursuant to Rule 50(4) of the RPE. 
The success of this judicial trend aimed at putting the OTP ‘on the right track’ early 
in the proceedings, as well as its influence on the OTP’s investigative and charging 
practices can only be tested against the specific choices made by the Prosecutor at 
those subsequent stages of proceedings in the different situations. 
 
4. Other aspects of prosecutorial discretion beyond the preliminary phase and the 
OTP-PTC institutional relationship 
In the present study the main focus has been on the exercise of prosecutorial 
discretion and of its judicial supervision at the preliminary and pre-investigation 
stage of the proceedings at the ICC, consistent with the proposed delimitation of the 
field of analysis932. Nevertheless, it is of immediate evidence that a significant 
amount of discretion is exercised through the strategic choices and decisions of the 
OTP at subsequent stages of the proceedings. In addition to that, the effects of the 
exercise of discretion are not confined to the institutional interplay between the OTP 
and Chambers, but bear significant consequences on the rights of other subjects 
participating to the ICC proceedings, such as states, the suspect/accused person and 
victims. In order to provide a more complete understanding of the many 
ramifications of the exercise of discretion, the present paragraph briefly addresses 
these additional substantive and procedural aspects. 
																																																								
932 See, supra, Introduction. 
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The first aspect worth mentioning relates to the OTP’s decisions regarding 
prosecutions, which determine the shift from the situation to the individual cases 
within an investigation. The discretionary decisions made at the preliminary 
examination stage and that culminate in the opening of an investigation 
predetermine—albeit not in a rigidly binding manner—the material, temporal, 
territorial and personal scope of the prospective investigation. Based on the results of 
the investigation activities the Office is called to a further, more individualised, 
exercise of discretion leading to the decision on whom, for what crimes and under 
what mode of liability to prosecute. The OTP is confronted with the difficult 
identification of the criteria that must guide these choices, similarly to what happens 
with regard to the criteria relating to the discretionary selection of situations and the 
conduct of preliminary examination. With one significant difference: at the case 
stage the Prosecutor bears the sole responsibility for these selection choices, only 
subject to the confirmatory powers of the PTC933. In other words, the OTP—similarly 
to what happens in case of proprio motu—cannot rely on the authority of the 
referring state or of the UNSC as at the situational stage and it must develop its own 
consistent criteria for the exercise of individualised discretion leading to individual 
cases. In this sense, the already examined Policy Paper on Case Selection and 
Prioritisation934 constitutes an effort to provide a more principled approach towards 
prosecuting and charging decisions, which might contribute to increase the 
consistency of the current—sometimes highly unsatisfactory—practice of the Office. 
Without entering into a detailed analysis of such practice, it should be noted that on 
various occasions the selection decisions of the OTP have been criticised for their 
lack of consistency, reasonableness, or legal accuracy and have been on multiple 
occasions the object of significant ‘corrective’ interventions of the PTC and TC, 
whereby judges have sought to fix—or invited the OTP to fix—certain unconvincing 
initial selection choices. The unfolding of the Bemba and Katanga cases, as well as 
the disastrous outcomes of high-profile cases arising out of the Kenya situation, are a 
clear reminder for the OTP of the necessity to increase its efforts in developing a 
																																																								
933 Reference here is to the supervisory role of the PTC in the context of the procedure for the 
confirmation of charges. See article 61 of the Statute.  
934 For the analysis of this paper see, supra, Part Two, Chapter Two, par. 3.   
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more effective case selection practice and better case theories935. In any event, the 
discretion of the Office extends well beyond the charging decision, encompassing 
decisions that concern, inter alia, the choice of the evidentiary sources for the 
purposes of both the confirmation of charges and the trial stage; the leading of 
evidence; the decisions on appeals; etc. The practice-based methodology of analysis 
proposed and applied in the present study to the pre-investigation and pre-trial stage 
might be constructively applied to other areas of exercise of discretion, with a view 
to compare the law in the books and the law in action and the corresponding trends in 
the OTP-judges relations. 
A second aspect worth mentioning relates to the effects of discretionary 
choices on subjects other than the OTP and judges exercising supervision over the 
prosecutorial choices. While the OTP and judges are the two main institutional 
‘terminals’ in the dialectic of prosecutorial discretion, their decisions obviously have 
																																																								
935 As already recalled supra (footnote 482), in Bemba the OTP developed its case theory around the 
mode of liability of indirect co-perpetration, but was later forced by the PTC to amend the charges in 
order to include superior responsibility, under the substantial threat of non confirmation of the charges 
(see ICC, Decision Adjourning the Hearing pursuant to Article 61(7)(c)(ii) of the Rome Statute, 
Prosecutor v. Bemba, Situation in the Central African Republic, ICC-01/05-01/08-388, PTC III, 3 
March 2009, par. 19-20, 38-39, 46, 49 and ICC, Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the 
Rome Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor Against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Prosecutor v. 
Bemba, Situation in the Central African Republic, ICC-01/05-01/08-424, PTC II, 15 June 2009, par. 
344, 369, 372, 402-403, 444). The TC then went on to convict the Accused based on the mode of 
liability ‘suggested’ by the PTC (see, ICC, Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, Prosecutor 
v. Bemba, Situation in the Central African Republic, ICC-01/05-01/08-3343, TC III, 21 March 2016, 
par. 693-742). In any event, the Appeals Chamber, in a momentous decision adopted by majority, 
finally acquitted Bemba, reversing the TC’s findings (see, ICC, Judgment on the appeal of Mr Jean-
Pierre Bemba Gombo against Trial Chamber III’s “Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute”, 
Prosecutor v. Bemba, Situation in the Central African Republic, ICC-01/05-01/08-3636-Red, AC, 8 
June 2018). Similarly, in Katanga the TC completely rejected the OTP’s case theory and convicted 
the Accused only thanks to the legal recharacterisation of the mode of liability pursuant to Regulation 
55 of the Regulations of the Court, from indirect co-perpetration to contribution to a group crime 
pursuant to article 25(3)(d) of the Statute (see, ICC, Decision on the implementation of regulation 55 
of the Regulations of the Court and severing the charges against the accused persons, Prosecutor v. 
Katanga, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, ICC-01/04-01/07-3319-tENG, TC II, 21 
November 2012 and ICC, Judgment pursuant to article 74 of the Statute, Prosecutor v. Katanga, 
Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, ICC-01/04-01/07-3436-tENG, TC II, 7 March 
2014). As regards the Kenya situation, reference is to the OTP’s withdrawal of charges against 
President Kenyatta (see ICC-OTP, Notice of withdrawal of the charges against Uhuru Muigai 
Kenyatta, Prosecutor v. Kenyatta, Situation in the Republic of Kenya, ICC-01/09-02/11-983, 5 
December 2014) and to the rather convoluted solution provided by the TC to the “no case to answer” 
motion in the case against Samoei Ruto and Joshua Arap Sang, which brought the case to an end 
without prejudice to a retrial (see ICC, Decision on Defence Applications for Judgments of Acquittal, 
Prosecutor v. Ruto et al., Situation in the Republic of Kenya, ICC-01/09-01/11-2027-Red-Corr, TC 
V(A), 5 April 2016). In both cases the Prosecutor’s case hypothesis could not be sustained for the 
purposes of trial, leading to the termination of the proceedings. For a critique of the conduct of the 
Kenyan PE and investigation see, infra, footnote 975. 
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an impact—and are influenced by—the substantive and procedural rights and 
position of subjects such as states, the suspect/accused person, and victims. With 
regard to states, it is clear that the OTP’s intervention, both at the pre-investigation 
and pre-trial phase, impacts on the complementarity regime and may lead to 
determinations on the conduct of national authorities that disclose inaction, 
unwillingness or inability to investigate and prosecute crimes within the jurisdiction 
of the Court. The ICC legal regime, consistent with the priority assigned to national 
proceedings over international ones, protects states’ rights in that regard, assigning 
them the possibility to challenge the Court’s overall jurisdiction and/or the 
jurisdiction on or admissibility of individual cases, as well as to request the review of 
the OTP’s decision not to open an investigation pursuant to article 53(1) of the 
Statute. With regard to the suspect/accused, the impact of prosecutorial discretionary 
decisions is self-evident, considering that the right to a fair and expeditious trial is 
part and parcel of the institutional construct of international criminal justice936. 
Unfortunately, prosecutorial practice has not always paid sufficient attention to 
certain fair trial aspects of the proceedings, leading to harsh confrontations with the 
defence and judges937. Examples of this kind may be the excessive length of 
preliminary examinations and/or investigations, which might infringe upon the right 
to an expeditious trial; the OTP’s discretionary approach towards the use of evidence 
obtained under condition of confidentiality 938 ; or the OTP’s practice of 
alternative/cumulative charging that makes an effective defence particularly 
challenging, especially if combined with a liberal use of the power to change the 
legal characterisation of the facts or modes of liability on the part of the Chambers939. 
																																																								
936 See the reference to internationally recognized human rights in article 21(3) of the Statute, as well 
as the individual safeguards provided under articles 22, 23, 24 of the Statute. 
937 See, e.g., the Lubanga case where the OTP’s behaviour with regard to issues such as the disclosure 
of evidence obtained under confidentiality agreements and its refusal to comply with the Chamber’s 
orders of disclosure sparked controversy and led to harsh disagreements between the Office and 
judges, leading to two stays of proceedings. See, ICC, Decision on the consequences of non-
disclosure of exculpatory materials covered by Article 54(3)(e) agreements and the application to stay 
the prosecution of the accused, together with certain other issues raised at the Status Conference on 10 
June 2008, Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, ICC-01/04-
01/06-1401, TC I, 13 June 2008. On the Chamber’s use of discretion in the Lubanga trial see R. 
GALLMETZER, The Trial-Chamber’s discretionary power and its exercise in the trial of Thomas 
Lubanga Dyilo, in C. STAHN, G. SLUITER, op. cit., 501-524.  
938 Ibidem. 
939 See, supra, footnote 935. With regard to the issue of Regulation 55 and its potentially detrimental 
consequences on fair trial rights, see the Minority Opinion of Judge Christine Van den Wyngaert, 
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A satisfactory balance between the OTP’s assertion of discretion in the conduct of 
proceedings and the rights of the accused can only be the result of the dialectic 
between prosecutorial choices on one hand and vigorous defence practices on the 
other, with the necessary judicial supervision of the Chambers. Lastly, with regard to 
the position of victims it should be noted that the OTP’s discretionary decisions—
both at the preliminary examination, investigation, trial and appeal stage—bear 
consequences on their legal position, determining the objective and subjective scope 
of their participatory rights and, in the event of a final conviction, of the right to 
obtain reparations. Practice so far has shown that the victims’ right to participate to 
the proceedings at different stages might come in conflict with the Prosecutor’s 
intention to limit the access to relevant information, and that it might be necessary to 
strike a balance between the victims’ right to participate and present their views and 
the necessary protection of their safety and well-being940. Additionally, in light of the 
Court’s pertinent case law, it should always be borne in mind that the right to obtain 
reparations is limited—subjectively—to the people who can qualify as victims of the 
specific crimes investigated, charged and for which a final conviction is entered by 
the Court; and—objectively—to the harm personally suffered as a consequence of 
such crimes941. In other words, the selection choices made by the OTP as early as at 
the preliminary examination and investigation stage contribute to predetermine—
																																																																																																																																																													
Prosecutor v. Katanga, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, ICC-01/04-01/07-3436-
AnxI, 7 March 2014, par. 50-132. 
940 See, e.g., ICC-OTP, Public redacted version of “Request for authorisation of an investigation 
pursuant to article 15”, 6 September 2017, ICC-01/17-5-US-Exp, Situation in the Republic of 
Burundi, ICC-01/17-5-Red, 15 November 2017, par. 10-11, 12. 
941 See article 75 of the Statute and Rule 85 of the RPE. There is a growing body of case law on 
reparations at the ICC. The first decisions on the matter stem form the Lubanga trial, the first in which 
a final conviction was entered. See ICC, Decision establishing the principles and procedures to be 
applied to reparations, Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
ICC-01/04-01/06-2904, TC I, 7 August 2012. With particular emphasis on the subjective and 
objective limitations of the scope of reparations see ICC, Judgment on the appeals against the 
“Decision establishing the principles and procedures to be applied to reparations” of 7 August 2012 
with AMENDED order for reparations (Annex A) and public annexes 1 and 2, Prosecutor v. 
Lubanga, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, ICC-01/04-01/06-3129, AC, 3 March 
2015, par. 8, 184-186, 196-199. Reparation decisions have also been rendered in the Katanga and Al-
Mahdi cases. See respectively ICC, Order for Reparations pursuant to Article 75 of the Statute, 
Prosecutor v. Katanga, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, ICC-01/04-01/07-3728-
tENG, TC II, 17 August 2017, par. 146-147, 152, 158-161; ICC, Judgment on the appeals against the 
order of Trial Chamber II of 24 March 2017 entitled “Order for Reparations pursuant to Article 75 of 
the Statute”, Prosecutor v. Katanga, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, ICC-01/04-
01/07-3778-Red, AC, 9 March 2018; and ICC, Reparations Order, Prosecutor v. Al-Mahdi, Situation 
in the Republic of Mali, ICC-01/12-01/15-236, TC VIII, 17 August 2017, par. 42-44, 55-56. 
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together with the Court’s decisions—who and to what extent will have the chance to 
obtain reparations at the very end of the judicial proceedings, years after those initial 
choices were made. The OTP should carefully take into consideration these long-
term projections of its early discretionary selection choices, with a view to reduce the 
risk of unfair discrimination among victims across different situations and to 
maximise the restorative potential of judicial reparations 942 .
																																																								
942 For instance, the choice made by the Prosecutor in the Lubanga trial to confine the charges to the 
crimes under article 8(2)(e)(vii) of the Statute (conscripting or enlisting or using children under the 
age of fifteen to participate actively in the hostilities), with the exclusion of sex-related crimes, 
automatically excluded the people who suffered harm as a result of those conducts from any chance of 
obtaining judicial reparations under article 75 of the Statute. This limitative effect may also stem from 
the decisions of the Court as regards the criminal liability of the Accused, such as in the case against 
Katanga, who was found by the TC not guilty as an accessory to the crimes of rape and sexual 
slavery. For this reason the TC in its reparation decision held that it “[considered] itself to be 
intrinsically bound by the parameters of the conviction handed down against Mr Katanga, as 
determined by Trial Chamber II, sitting in its previous composition” and that it “[did] not regard itself 
as in a position to determine that the physical and psychological harm occasioned by rape and/or 
sexual violence or gender-based violence during the attack on Bogoro ensued from one of the crimes 
of which Mr Katanga was convicted” (see ICC, Order for Reparations pursuant to Article 75 of the 
Statute, Prosecutor v. Katanga, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, ICC-01/04-01/07-
3728-tENG, TC II, 17 August 2017, par. 147, 152). On this issues and the Court’s overall strategy in 
relation to victims see G. CARAYON, J. O’ DONOHUE, The International Criminal Court’s Strategies in 
Relation to Victims, in Journal of International Criminal Justice, vol. 15, issue 3, 2017, 567-591. 
With regard to the relations between the rights of victims and the accused’s fair trial rights see M. 
TONELLATO, The Victims’ Participation at a Crossroads: How the International Criminal Court 
Could Devise a Meaningful Victims’ Participation while Respecting the Rights of the Defendant, in 
European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice, vol. 20, issue 3, 2012, 315-359. 
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IS THERE A SIGNIFICANT DISSOCIATION BETWEEN THE 
STATUTORY MODEL OF PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION AND 




In Part Two and Three of the work we have carried out, respectively, the 
static analysis of the legal framework for the exercise of prosecutorial discretion and 
its judicial supervision at the preliminary stage and the dynamic analysis of its 
concrete exercise on the part of the OTP and judges. The purpose of this last part is 
to put forward a comparison between the two realities, i.e. the law in the books and 
the law in action, in order to assess—both quantitatively and qualitatively—the 
trends of interpretive agreement and disagreement between the involved actors and, 
ultimately, the most frequent and relevant patterns of convergence or dissociation 
among the normative formants at the ICC (Chapter One). This analysis is followed 
by an examination of the possible root-causes for these patterns of 
agreement/disagreement and convergence/dissociation of formants and of the 
potentially detrimental consequences of a systemic interpretive confrontation 
between the OTP and judges within the prosecutorial discretion and judicial review 
system (Chapter Two). Finally, we shall formulate a few proposals of institutional 
and normative character that might contribute to rationalise the practices of the OTP 
and judges as regards prosecutorial discretion, with a view to maximising their 
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consistency and foreseeability, and ultimately the legitimacy of the Court’s overall 
mandate (Chapter Three). 
The comparison between the static and dynamic dimension of prosecutorial 
discretion and judicial review builds on the conceptual tools exposed in Chapter One 
of Part Three, which have also guided the selection and categorisation of the relevant 
practice, and particularly on the dichotomy ‘open clash v. smooth functioning’ and 
the concept of ‘dissociation of formants’943. 
 
2. A quantitative and qualitative analysis through the ‘open clash v. smooth 
relationship’ dichotomy 
The prosecutorial and judicial practice with regard to the exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion and judicial review at the preliminary phase collected and 
systematised in Part Three of this work can at this point be more thoroughly analysed 
in its quantitative and qualitative dimension. For the purposes of this exposition, data 
concerning the pre-investigation stage are complemented with additional figures 
relating to the practice in the field of the confirmation of charges, retrieved from the 
OTP’s strategy and reporting documents, in order to provide a more complete 
understanding of the main trends in the OTP-judges relations at the pre-trial phase, 
through the lens of the dichotomy between instances of ‘open clash’ and of ‘smooth 
relationship’944. 
The following graphs and tables summarise the data concerning the OTP’s 
and Chambers’ practice as regards preliminary examination, the opening or 
authorisation of investigations and the confirmation of charges. The main attempt is 
that of providing a birds-eye-view on prosecutorial and judicial practices and of 
underlining the areas in which there seems to be a quantitative prevalence of either 
interpretive agreement or disagreement between the OTP and judges at the current 
stage of development of the ICC’s practice. It should be borne in mind that it is not 
																																																								
943 See, supra, Part Three, Chapter One, par. 4 and 5. 
944 Reference is to the OTP’s Strategic Plan for 2016-2018, with particular regard to the success rate 
of the Office’s charging practices under the new principles of the prosecutorial strategy. It should be 
noted that the whole practice of the OTP as regards the formulation of charges and the individualised 
exercise of prosecutorial discretion is not the main focus of the present study, as per the delimitation 
of the field of analysis. Nevertheless, various references to this issue are contained in previous Parts 
(see, e.g., supra, Part Three, Chapter 2, par. 4). 
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infrequent that aspects of interpretive agreement and disagreement actually coexist in 
the same procedures and/or prosecutorial and judicial decisions. Nevertheless, this 
ambivalence does not preclude the possibility of discerning areas where interpretive 
agreements prevail over disagreements or vice versa. 
 
Figures on preliminary examinations and the decisions on the opening or not 
opening of investigations 
 
Notes: 
- The total number of 28 PEs considers as separate situations those relating to the same 
country (e.g. CAR I e II; the first and second situation in Venezuela; etc.); as well as those 
relating to the same country and that have been closed and reopened (UK/Iraq). 
- The number of opened investigations and the scomposition per triggering mechanism take 
into account the proprio motu request in the situation in Afghanistan, which is currently sub 
judice (if granted the total number of opened investigations will increase to 12). 
- The UK/Iraq preliminary examination was initially closed partly due to the lack of 
jurisdiction ratione materiae and partly for the lack of the required gravity, thus it may 
figure in both cathegories. 
- In the situations in Palestine and Venezuela, currently on-going, PEs have originally been 
opened pursuant to proprio motu action of the Prosecutor. Nevertheless, in both situations a 
subsequent referral has been made, respectively, by Palestine and by six states with regard to 





5 State self-referral 
2 UNSC Referral 




Lack of preconditions for 
jurisdiction: 1 
Lack of jurisdiction ratione 
materiae: 5 




7 Proprio motu 
2 Proprio motu + state 
referral 
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Figures on Article 15 Procedures in case of proprio motu 
 
 





2012-2015 and 2016-2018945 
Total % Total % 
Charges confirmed 50 62.5 277946 89.1 
Charges not confirmed 30 37.5 34 10.9 





945 Data retrieved from the ICC-OTP, Strategic Plan 2016-2018, 16 November 2015, 5 and updated 
with the more recent decisions on confirmation of charges adopted after November 2015. 
946 The spike in the total number of charges is due to the high number of counts relating to the Article 
70 case for offences against the administration of justice in the CAR I situation (42 to 43 counts for 
the five accused, see ICC-OTP, Public Redacted version of “Document Containing the Charges”, 30 
June 2014, ICC-01/05-01/13-526-Conf-Anx B1, Prosecutor v. Bemba et al., Situation in the Central 
African Republic, ICC-01/05-01/13-526-AnxB1-Red, 3 July 2014 and ICC, Decision pursuant to 
Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute, Prosecutor v. Bemba et al., Situation in the Central 
African Republic, ICC-01/05-01/13-749, PTC II, 11 November 2011) and the exceptionally high 
number of charges brought in a single case against Ongwen. In this latter case the Chamber confirmed 
a total of 70 counts, only declining to confirm certain allegations of crimes against a person who put 
forward evidence that the Chamber considered irreconcilable with the remaining evidence. 
Nevertheless, the number of these unconfirmed charges remains unknown due to their confidential 
nature and the redactions both in the Document Containing the Charges and the confirmation decision 
(see, ICC-OTP, Public Redacted Version of Document Containing the Charges, Prosecutor v. 
Ongwen, Situation in Uganda, ICC-02/04-01/15-375-AnxA-Red, 22 December 2015, par. 66-127; 
ICC, Decision on the confirmation of charges against Dominic Ongwen, Prosecutor v. Ongwen, 
Situation in Uganda, ICC-02/04-01/15-422-Red, PTC II, 23 March 2016, par. 28, 135, 158). For this 
reason the confidential unconfirmed charges are not counted in these total numbers. 
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Main areas of ‘open clash’ and ‘smooth relationship’ between the OTP and 
judges 
Open Clash Smooth Relationship 
 
Trial Management measures (e.g. status 
conferences and requests for additional 
information at the preliminary examination 
and investigation phase). 
 
Scope of prosecutorial discretion under 
article 53(1) of the Statute and of the review 
under article 53(3)(a) of the Statute (standard 
of review, gravity, supervisory role of the 
PTC). 
 
Obligations regarding disclosure and 
confidentiality. 
 
Admissibility of a request for a preliminary 
ruling on jurisdiction (legal basis and pre-
preliminary nature of the request). 
 
Request and authorisation procedure under 
article 15(3) and (4) of the Statute (standard 
of review, evidentiary threshold, scope of 
PTC’s supervision). 
 
Lack of remedy against decisions not to open 
a preliminary examination or investigation 
for subjects other than the referring entity 
(especially in Reg. 46 procedures) 
 
 
Scope and application of the interests of 
justice clause. 
 
Admissibility of a request for a preliminary 
ruling on jurisdiction (principle to establish 
jurisdiction ratione loci). 
 
This last table concerning the prevalence of episodes of interpretive 
disagreement (open clash) and agreement (smooth functioning) requires further 
elaboration in order to justify the inclusion of certain specific procedures or patterns 
of practice in the respective field. 
With regard to issues on which significant patterns of interpretive 
disagreement between the OTP and Chambers exist at the current state of 
development of the ICC’s practice, a few considerations seem warranted in relation 
to the areas identified above. The PTC’s use of the power to convene status 
conferences or to ask additional information at the preliminary examination and/or at 
the investigation stage—especially in the case of apparent prosecutorial delay or 
inaction—has produced some of the clearest examples of open clash between the 
PART FOUR – CHAPTER ONE 
 270 
OTP and judges (particularly the PTC)947. Although the number of these contrasts is 
not very high in absolute terms948, the incompatibility of the interpretive claims 
advanced by the relevant actors has been on some occasions particularly acute, with 
the OTP pushing the limits of its general duty to cooperate in good faith with the 
PTC and abide by its decisions. Even when the OTP finally decided to provide the 
required clarifications or accepted to participate in the status conferences, it did so 
reluctantly and without conceding the existence of any legal duty to act as required 
by the Chamber949. These are clear examples of complex interaction between the 
OTP and judges, partly of a ‘reactive’ character—i.e. leading to total or partial non-
compliance or non recognition of certain legal duties—partly of ‘adaptive’ 
character—i.e. leading to a practice of implicit acceptance of a certain course of 
action on the part of the OTP or PTC950. Analogous observations can be made as 
regards the OTP’s practice concerning confidentiality of information and/or sources 
of evidence vis-à-vis its statutory and regulatory duties of disclosure. The tendency 
of the Office to emphasise the confidentiality aspects—allegedly based on the 
necessity to preserve the integrity of the examination or investigation and the 
security of victims and witnesses—was at times met with a severe reaction of the 
Chambers, preoccupied by the necessity to safeguard the rights of the accused and/or 
the participatory rights of victims951. While the Chambers have gradually moved 
from extremely harsh remedies (such as stays of proceedings) to more nuanced and 
																																																								
947 See, supra, Part Two, Chapter Three, par. 2.1 (particularly footnotes 520-528) for the exact 
reference to these cases. 
948 The most relevant examples in this field relate, to date, to the situations—or cases within the 
situations—in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (three decisions of the PTC), Central African 
Republic I (one decision of the PTC), Uganda (two decisions of the PTC) and Côte d'Ivoire (one 
decision of the PTC). Exact references to the cases and the OTP’s position vis-à-vis the Chambers see, 
supra, footnotes 520-528. 
949 See, e.g., the position of the OTP with regard to the OTP’s request of information on the status of 
the CAR I preliminary examination, unequivocally expressed in ICC-OTP, Prosecution’s Report 
Pursuant to Pre-Trial Chamber III’s 30 November 2006 Decision Requesting Information on the 
Status of the Preliminary Examination of the Situation in the Central African Republic, Situation in 
the Central African Republic, ICC-01/05-7, 15 December 2006, par. 10-11. 
950 For instance, the OTP’s strong opposition to the PTC’s request to provide an update of the status of 
preliminary examination in the CAR I situation probably had an influence on other PTCs in different 
cases, since no other requests of that character have been put forward by preliminary judges at the 
preliminary examination stage of proceedings. Correspondingly, the use of this trial management 
power by the PTC may have had an influence on the OTP’s subsequent practice with regard to the 
length of preliminary examinations and on the Office’s decision to establish a transparent and periodic 
reporting on the PE activities.  
951 On this crucial aspect see, supra, Part One, Chapter One, par. 1 (especially footnote 33) and Part 
Three, Chapter Two, par. 4 (especially footnote 937), with particular regard to the Lubanga trial. 
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targeted ones in recent practice, a satisfactory balance between the need for 
confidentiality and the respect of competing rights is still a matter of controversy 
between the OTP, defence and victims on the one hand, and judges on the other952. 
Finally, with regard to the scope of prosecutorial discretion under article 53(1) of the 
Statute and of the PTC’s judicial supervision of decisions not to open an 
investigation, it should be reminded that the current practice is limited to a single 
OTP-PTC interaction concerning the Comoros situation. Nevertheless, based on the 
decisions adopted in this situation a clear disagreement between the OTP and judges 
emerged with regard to the most relevant legal issues at stake, such as the 
discretional or “exacting” character of the criteria listed under article 53(1)(a)-(b), 
the nature and scope of the Chamber’s supervision, or again the approach towards 
the available information for the purposes of deciding on jurisdiction and 
admissibility, with particular regard to the construction of the concept of gravity953. 
All instances of practice pertaining to these three areas of disagreement have in 
common the judges’ attempt to restrict, guide or otherwise influence the 
discretionary choices of the OTP, and the Office’s resistance to these judicial 
interferences based on the alleged necessity to preserve its discretion and 
independence. 
With regard to the areas characterised by a substantial convergence of 
interpretations between the relevant actors, these mainly concern the authorisation 
procedure under article 15(4) of the Statute, as well as other aspects such as those 
relating to the exclusion of various procedural actors from any right to challenge 
preliminary examination decisions, as it emerged in procedures under Regulation 46 
of the Regulations of the Court. In the first case, as it clearly appears from the 
detailed analysis of practice carried out in Part Three, there is a substantial agreement 
between the OTP and PTCs on all the key legal features of the authorisation 
procedure954, although relatively minor differences may still be found especially on 
																																																								
952 See, supra, footnote 33.  See also, J. I. TURNER, Accountability of International Prosecutors, cit., 
391-394 on the evolution of the remedies against the OTP’s failure to abide by its disclosure 
obligations. 
953 Reference is here to the Comoros situation and the respective position of the OTP and PTC. For an 
in-depth analysis of this episode of OTP-PTC clash of interpretations see, supra, Part Three, Chapter 
Two, par. 3.1.3. 
954 See, supra, Part Three, Chapter Two, par. 3.2.2 (last part containing preliminary conclusions on the 
main trends in the prosecutorial and judicial practice pursuant to article 15 of the Statute). 
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certain procedural issues955. In particular, there is a substantial agreement on the 
criteria that integrate the jurisdictional and admissibility assessment for the purposes 
of granting the authorisation956. 
This convergence might have contributed to reduce the ‘supervisory grip’ of 
the Chamber over the OTP’s proprio motu decisions. The compatibility of such an 
‘evolutionary’ and rather liberal practice with the drafters’ intention to assure 
appropriate checks and balances on the independent Prosecutor is open to question, 
as remarked in certain dissenting opinions957. With regard to procedures under 
Regulations 46(2) and (3) of the Regulations of the Court, reference is here to the 
cases in which the Chamber excluded—in line with the OTP’s position—any 
possibility of judicial review of the Office’s decision not to open a preliminary 
examination, and clearly denied the possibility to challenge decisions under article 
53(1) for subjects other than the referring entities958. With regard to the procedure for 
the request of preliminary rulings on jurisdiction prior to the opening of a 
preliminary examination—which was brought by the OTP based on the procedural 
mechanism of Regulation 46(3)—the recent PTC’s decision concerning the alleged 
crimes of deportation against the Rohingya people provides an additional example of 
interpretive agreement between the OTP and the PTC on the fundamental underlying 
legal issue (namely, the possibility to rule on the request and to exercise jurisdiction 
based on the principle that it is sufficient that at least one element of the crime 
occurred on the territory of a State Party). Nevertheless, the Chamber utterly 
disregarded the legal basis relied on by the Office and provided critical remarks on 
																																																								
955 On issues of confidentiality and victims’ protection at this stage the position of the OTP and PTC 
have at times diverged, without in any case leading to major disagreements between the Prosecutor 
and judges. See, supra, Part Three, Chapter Two, par. 3.2.2 (especially footnotes 920-922). 
956 A general interpretive agreement on the reasonable basis to believe standard, as well as on the 
assessment of complementarity, gravity and the interests of justice, clearly emerges form the 
comparison between the OTP’s requests and the PTCs’ authorisation decisions. 
957 See the Dissenting Opinion of Judge Hans Peter Kaul attached to ICC, Decision Pursuant to Article 
15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of 
Kenya, Situation in the Republic of Kenya, ICC-01/09-19-Corr, PTC II, 31 March 2010, par. 3, 8-9, 
10, 14-15, 18-19, 148-150; and Separate Opinion of Judge Péter Kovács, Decision Pursuant to Article 
15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an Investigation into the Situation in Georgia, 
Situation in Georgia, ICC-01/15-12-Anx-Corr, 27 January 2016, par. 3-4, 5-7, 10. 
958 Reference is here to the proceedings initiated by the supporters of the Egyptian former President 
Morsi, with regard to their purported declaration of acceptance of the Court’s jurisdiction and their 
attempt to challenge the OTP’s failure to open a preliminary examination of the situation. For an in-
depth analysis of this peculiar procedure and the OTP’s and Court’s position on the matter see, supra, 
Part Three, Chapter Two, par. 2.2 (especially footnotes 650-656 for the punctual references to 
prosecutorial and judicial decisions on the matter). 
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its procedural behaviour and its qualification of the procedural phase in which the 
request was put forward as “pre-preliminary”. It also strongly suggested—one may 
think it somehow ordered—the expansion of the prospective 
examination/investigation to additional crimes and stressed the OTP’s duty to adopt 
its decisions without undue delay959. This is a clear example of how aspects of 
interpretive agreement and disagreement between the OTP and judges might coexist 
in the same decision. 
All these cases of convergence have in common the PTC’s tendency to 
recognise a good measure of deference to the OTP and/or to expand the scope of the 
OTP’s discretion. Sometimes, the Chambers’ decisions have progressively sought to 
enlarge the margins for the subsequent exercise of prosecutorial discretion, for 
instance by widening the scope of an authorised investigation compared to the OTP’s 
request. Nevertheless, this judicial ‘manipulation’ of the material and temporal 
parameters might sometimes produce more ambiguous results, and be interpreted as 
a judicial attempt to influence the direction of the prospective investigation, thereby 
suggesting (sometimes in forceful terms) to the OTP to follow a certain course of 
action in order to avoid potentially negative consequences at a later stage of 
proceedings960. 
 
3. Assessment of the consistency in the course of action of the OTP and judges 
After having provided an assessment of the most relevant features of the 
practice of the OTP and judges and their respective interactions, it seems appropriate 
to reflect on the internal consistency of such practices, taking into consideration their 
																																																								
959 ICC, Decision on the “Prosecution’s Request for a Ruling on Jurisdiction under Article 19(3) of the 
Statute”, Application under Regulation 46(3) of the Regulations of the Court, ICC-RoC46(3)-01/18-
37, PTC I, 6 September 2018, par. 75-77, 82-88. The Chamber’s position on the inexistence of a pre-
preliminary phase of the proceedings (i.e. one that precedes preliminary examinations proper) is in 
stark contrast with the position taken by the Office in its request and, possibly, with the practice of the 
OTP as regards the opening of preliminary examinations. 
960 On these ‘manipulative’ aspects of the authorisation decisions see, supra, Part Three, Chapter Two, 
par. 3.2.2 (particularly footnotes 893, 895-896, 912-913, 931). The same holds true for the PTC’s 
decision on the Rohingya, where the Majority effectively clarified that the Court might assert 
jurisdiction also on conducts other than deportation, provided that it is established to the applicable 
threshold that at least one element of those other crimes is committed on the territory of a State Party 
(Bangladesh in this case). The reference to the OTP’s duty to act without undue delay might also be 
interpreted as a ‘warning’ to the Office, providing an incentive to expeditiously complete the PE 
activities and eventually proceed with a request to open an investigation. 
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inevitably incremental character and the fluidity of the institutional and procedural 
contexts in which they are developed by the OTP and judges. 
With regard to the practice of the OTP as regards the exercise of discretion at 
the preliminary examination and pre-trial phase, the following observations can be 
made concerning its overall internal consistency. 
First, it should be noted that the OTP’s practice at the preliminary 
examination phase has benefited from the self-imposed proceduralisation, which has 
contributed to an increased transparency and predictability as regards the conduct 
and outcomes of PE. Nevertheless, the Office has frequently deviated from its policy 
and organisational standards, in particular with regard to the length and timing of 
preliminary examinations in general and of the expected length of the four discrete 
phases 961 . Nevertheless, the reporting practice of the Office—after the initial 
incoherencies—has now become consistent and increasingly detailed. Obviously, the 
proceduralisation of PE cannot eliminate the inherent unpredictability in the 
development of proceedings across the various situations, which require continuous 
adaptations and a degree of flexibility on the part of the Office. 
Second, the practice of the Office is relatively consistent in the differentiated 
approach to preliminary examinations activities of situations depending on the 
triggering mechanism. As it has been clearly demonstrated in Part Three, in 
particular with regard to their length and timing, there is a trend—with some 
exceptions—towards very short or short examinations in case of UNSC and state 
referrals, and for sometimes significantly longer PE in case of proprio motu962. As 
already explained, the reasons for such differences are both institutional—for 
instance regarding the OTP’s relationship with the UNSC and states—and situation-
specific, i.e. related to the particular factual and legal circumstances surrounding 
each situation. 
Third, the practice of the Office is relatively consistent in the interpretation 
and application of certain criteria laid down in article 53(1) for the purposes of a 
																																																								
961 On the variability in the duration of preliminary examinations across various situations and, within 
each PE, of the different phases see, supra, Part Three, Chapter Two, par. 2.3 and the tables collecting 
the data on the length of these activities. On the discrepancy between the expected average duration 
and the actual duration of the different phases see footnotes 688, 690-691 containing references to the 
Report on the Basic Size of the Office. 
962 See, supra, the tables of pages 193-194 and the discussion of their data. 
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decision on the opening or not opening of an investigation. The OTP’s steady trend 
is to consider the evidentiary standards and applicable thresholds as low and flexible 
as possible, in order to simplify the Office’s burden of the proof and increase the 
flexibility of its decision-making. In this sense the OTP’s position on the “reasonable 
basis to believe” standard, as well as on the structure of the admissibility test sub 
specie complementarity, seems to be increasingly consistent963. The same holds true 
for the Office’s strict and virtually unchanged position on the interests of justice964. 
To the contrary, an area in which the OTP’s practice reveals inconsistencies and lack 
of clarity concerns the elusive role of gravity as a selection tool and key component 
of the admissibility test. While in the context of article 15(3) requests issues of 
gravity are generally dealt with in a rather perfunctory fashion, in the only decision 
so far not to open an investigation on grounds of insufficient gravity the Office has 
put forward a more nuanced application of the criterion, underlining its inherently 
discretional and selective character965. It is precisely this approach that has led to the 
interpretive contrast with the Comoros PTC. Besides the strictly legal application of 
the concept, a recent empirical study suggested that the OTP’s substantive 
understanding of gravity—especially for the purposes of selecting situations—might 
have been on some occasions premised on imprecise factual assumptions leading to 
double standards and possible inconsistencies in the selection decisions966. 
Fourth and last, with regard to the article 15 authorisation procedures, the 
procedural behaviour of the Office seems sufficiently consistent, both in relation to 
																																																								
963 See, supra, Part Three, Chapter Two, par. 3.2.2. 
964 See ICC-OTP, Policy Paper on the Interests of Justice, September 2007, 3-4 and supra, footnote 
802 for precise references to the extremely limited discussion of issues pertaining to the interests of 
justice in the OTP’s requests for authorisation (in conformity with the restrictive approach adopted in 
the dedicated policy paper). 
965 This position is expressed especially in the ICC-OTP, Article 53(1) Report, Situation on the 
Registered Vessels of Comoros, Greece and Cambodia, 6 November 2014 and in the ICC-OTP, Final 
decision of the Prosecution concerning the “Article 53(1) Report” (ICC-01/13-6-AnxA), dated 6 
November 2014, Situation on the Registered Vessels of the Comoros, Greece and Cambodia, ICC-
01/13-57-Anx1, 30 November 2017. 
966 See the empirical study of A. SMEULERS, M. WEERDESTEIJN, B. HOLA, The Selection of Situations 
by the ICC: An Empirically Based Evaluation of the OTP’s Performance, in International Criminal 
Law Review, vol. 15, issue 1, 2015, 1-39. The Authors propose an interesting empirical methodology 
to assess the overall degree of gravity of national situations where a significant number of 
international crimes and/or gross violations of human rights has allegedly been committed, leading to 
a ranking of the gravest country-situations around the world. By comparing this quantitative analysis 
with the OTP’s discretionary choices, they conclude that the Office has not always in practice 
recognised gravity as a fundamental criterion inspiring its selection choices (for instance with regard 
to the Kenyan situation). 
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the drafting standards for the requests of authorisation and the main tenets of their 
reasoning. Nevertheless, there is a degree of variability in the respective importance 
assigned to the various jurisdictional, admissibility and procedural issues, which 
mainly relate to the underlying factual and legal specificities of the situations under 
consideration. With regard to the inferences to be drawn from the materials and 
information supporting the requests, the Office has on some occasions acted more 
restrictively—sometimes in an unjustified manner—than on others, as aptly observed 
by the authorising PTCs967. Lastly, the OTP proved consistent in the practice of 
providing the required documents to support the requests for authorisation, in line 
with the requests of the PTC968. 
Turning the attention to the consistency of the PTCs’ practice in the exercise 
of their powers of judicial supervision, it should preliminarily be reminded that the 
scope and justification of these powers are not identical in all situations and 
procedures envisaged by the Statute and applicable rules and regulations. 
Nevertheless, it is still possible to discern areas in which the Chambers’ practice 
seems more consistent and others were interpretive contrasts or issues not yet fully 
clarified exist—or might emerge in the future—across the different procedures and 
among the different Chambers. 
From the practice analysed in Part Three a clear asymmetry emerges with 
regard to the PTCs’ approach towards judicial review of discretionary choices under 
article 53(3)(a) and 15(4) of the Statute. With regard to the judicial review of 
prosecutorial decisions not to proceed with an investigation, the decisions adopted so 
far by the Pre-Trail Chamber reveal the judges’ intention to conduct a substantive 
and somehow intrusive judicial control over the OTP’s inferences leading to the 
decision not to open an investigation, with particular attention to the aspect of gravity 
in the Comoros situation. To the contrary, the approach of the various authorising 
PTCs has been significantly more deferential towards the OTP’s requests, with a 
relatively less stringent control over the inferences leading to the Prosecutor’s 
																																																								
967 See ICC, Decision on the Prosecutor’s request for authorization of an investigation, Situation in 
Georgia, ICC-01/15-12, PTC I, 27 January 2016, par. 35 and ICC, Public Redacted version of the 
“Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an Investigation into the 
Situation in the Republic of Burundi”, ICC-01/17-X-9-US-Exp, 25 October 2017, Situation in the 
Republic of Burundi, ICC-01/17-9-Red, PTC III, 9 November 2017, par. 141. 
968 See, supra, footnotes 842-843. 
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determination to proceed with an investigation, in particular on issues of 
admissibility. In other terms, there seems to be on some occasions an inverse 
correlation between the depth of judicial control exercised by the Chamber and the 
effects of the review decision envisaged by the statutory and regulatory texts. A more 
pervasive control is exercised in the context of a decision not binding as to the results 
of PE (pursuant to article 53(3)(a)), while a less pervasive control is exercised in the 
context of a binding decision (pursuant to article 15(4) of the Statute). Interestingly, 
the same asymmetry exists as regards the Chambers’ understanding of the selection 
function of gravity. While the Chamber—following the OTP’s practice—attaches 
relatively limited consideration to gravity in the context of authorisation decisions, it 
centred its review of the OTP’s no-action decision in the Comoros situation on 
arguments of gravity (based on the arguments put forward by the Comoros). 
In relation to the practice concerning article 15(4) authorisations, the various 
Chambers (including the dissenting judges)—while sharing a common position on 
the most relevant aspects of the procedure—have at times put forward partially 
conflicting interpretations, with particular regard to issues such as the possibility to 
modify the scope of the authorised investigation and the possibility to go beyond the 
requests of the Office; the judgement on the OTP’s approach to the evidentiary 
materials; and the requirements of confidentiality vis-à-vis the rights of victims969. In 
this vein, the more recent practice of the PTCs seems to move away from the Kenya 
precedent, adopting a progressively more liberal and proactive approach to these 
issues. In any event, the practice of the various Chambers is not always consistent, 
for instance as regards the permissible extension of the jurisdictional parameters, as 
regards both the material and temporal scope of the authorised investigation970. On at 
least one occasion, the Chamber departed from the previous (and subsequent) 
practice with regard to the analytical review of jurisdictional parameters, in an 
isolated attempt to simplify the judicial review and cut back on the length of the 
																																																								
969 See, supra, Part Three, Chapter Two, par. 3.2.2. 
970 See ICC, Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an 
Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Côte d'Ivoire, Situation in the Republic of Côte 
d'Ivoire, ICC-02/11-14, PTC III, 3 October 2011, par. 179; ICC, Decision on the Prosecutor’s request 
for authorization of an investigation, Situation in Georgia, ICC-01/15-12, PTC I, 27 January 2016, 
par. 35; ICC, Public Redacted version of the “Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on 
the Authorization of an Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Burundi”, ICC-01/17-X-9-
US-Exp, 25 October 2017, Situation in the Republic of Burundi, ICC-01/17-9-Red, PTC III, 9 
November 2017, par. 141, 192-193.  
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authorisation decision971. In any event, the lack of a shared and overarching approach 
to various issues relevant to this procedure is further demonstrated by the fact that 
out of the four authorisations granted so far only the one relating to the situation in 
Burundi was the result of a unanimous decision. 
With regard to the scarce practice under article 53(3)(a) of the Statute, it 
should be noted that the Comoros PTC put forward its own autonomous assessment 
of gravity, alleging that both jurisdiction and admissibility are to be considered 
“exacting legal requirements”, and that only evaluations concerning the interests of 
justice imply real discretion on the part of the OTP. Nevertheless, given the absence 
of other instances of practice in this area, it is not certain that other reviewing PTCs 
will uphold an analogous reasoning with respect to the assessment of gravity and 
complementarity, were the OTP to deny the opening of an investigation on this basis 
in the future. By the same token, the actual scope and intensity of the ex officio and 
binding judicial review of decisions not to proceed based solely on the interests of 
justice pursuant to article 53(3)(b) of the Statute still needs to be tested972. 
 
4. Assessment of the dissociation of formants 
At the beginning of Part Three we have formulated the hypothesis that the 
ICC’s system of prosecutorial discretion and of its judicial review could be 
empirically approached with a view to study the potential dissociation of formants of 
the considered legal system973. After having collected and analysed the relevant 
practice and assessed the quantitative and qualitative dimension of the patterns of 
‘open clash’ and ‘smooth relationship’ between the OTP and judges, it is now 
appropriate to put forward a normative assessment of the areas or specific issues 
where there seems to be an observable discrepancy between the statutory (and more 
generally textual) formant and the prosecutorial/judicial formant. 
																																																								
971 See, supra, footnotes 904, 914-915 regarding the simplified analysis of jurisdiction in the Georgia 
authorisation decision. 
972 On the different scope of these procedures—and the corresponding different intensity of the 
supervisory powers of the Chamber—see ICC, Decision on the admissibility of the Prosecutor’s 
appeal against the “Decision on the request of the Union of the Comoros to review the Prosecutor’s 
decision not to initiate an investigation”, Situation on the Registered Vessels of the Comoros, Greece 
and Cambodia, ICC-01/13-51, AC, 6 November 2015, par. 58-60. 
973 See, supra, Part Three, Chapter One, par. 5. 
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The first example of dissociation of formants relates to the procedure under 
article 15(3) and (4) of the Statute. In this regard, the combination of the OTP’s and 
PTCs’ practice has substantially reduced the actual scope of judicial supervision over 
prosecutorial selection choices; a judicial oversight whose introduction proved 
indispensable in order to reach a compromise in Rome on the proprio motu powers 
of the independent Prosecutor974. While the various authorising Chambers continue to 
maintain that the authorisation procedure is designed to ensure the respect (or re-
establishment) of legality in the unlikely event of frivolous, abusive and/or politically 
motivated decisions of the Office, the extremely narrow construction of the 
supervisory role of the Chamber and the low evidentiary standards applied have 
contributed to dilute the substantive supervisory character of the procedure. While 
one dissenting judge has criticised the rather liberal practice of the various PTCs for 
being even too intrusive vis-à-vis the OTP, the more rigorous approach called for by 
other dissenting judges has its merits in assigning a more stringent filtering role to 
the PTC975. The lengthy and analytical style of the authorisation decisions is not per 
se the indicator of an in-depth supervision, and Judge de Gurmendi is right in 
lamenting the fact that the various PTCs are at times simply duplicating the OTP’s 
assessment976. Deviations from the general self-restraint of the PTC—such as in the 
shaping of the scope of jurisdiction—mainly go in the direction of expanding, and 
not of restricting, the OTP’s discretion in the future conduct of an investigation. The 
above observations therefore disclose the existence of a normative discrepancy 
																																																								
974 On the negotiating history and the compromise leading to the adoption of article 15 of the Statute 
see, supra, Part Two, Chapter One, par. 2. 
975 See, e.g., Dissenting Opinion of Judge Hans Peter Kaul attached to ICC, Decision Pursuant to 
Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an Investigation into the Situation in the 
Republic of Kenya, Situation in the Republic of Kenya, ICC-01/09-19-Corr, PTC II, 31 March 2010, 
par. 3, 8-9, 10, 14-15, 18-19, 148-150 and Separate Opinion of Judge Péter Kovács, Decision Pursuant 
to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an Investigation into the Situation in 
Georgia, Situation in Georgia, ICC-01/15-12-Anx-Corr, 27 January 2016, par. 3-4, 5-7, 10. In 
retrospect, the more rigorous position advocated by judge H. P. Kaul might have been far-sighted, 
considering the difficult unfolding of the proceedings relating to the Kenya situation and the 
substantial breakdown of the OTP’s case theories against Kenyatta and Ruto. With regard to the 
conduct of the Kenyan preliminary examination and investigation, and their disastrous outcomes C. 
M. DE VOS, ‘Magical Legalism’ and the International Criminal Court: A Case Study of the Kenyan 
Preliminary Examination, in M. BERGSMO, C. STAHN (eds.), Quality Control in Preliminary 
Examinations: Vol. 1, cit., 283-284, 308-310 speaks of “hubris”, “poor quality of preparation 
undertaken by the Office”, and “overconfidence”. 
976 See Corrigendum to Judge Fernández de Gurmendi's separate and partially dissenting opinion to 
the Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorisation of an Investigation into 
the Situation in the Republic of Côte d'Ivoire, Situation in the Republic of Côte d'Ivoire, ICC-02/11-
15-Corr, 6 October 2011 par. 15-16. 
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between the apparently more demanding statutory and regulatory model of judicial 
supervision—also taking into consideration the negotiating history—and the more 
liberal practice of the relevant actors. Nevertheless, from these empirical 
observations does not necessarily flow a negative value judgement on the current 
status of the law in action in this area. It could be argued—especially from the point 
of view of a national observer used to a higher degree of prosecutorial discretion—
that the current balance of power between the OTP and Chambers better fits the 
institutional realities of the ICC legal system, and that a more stringent judicial 
supervision would result in undue delays and unnecessary restrictions on the work of 
the Office. Yet, it could also be argued that had the Chambers adopted the more 
rigorous approach to authorisations advocated by Judge Kaul in the Kenya dissent, 
the limited resources of the ICC could have been better deployed in more promising 
situations compared to the Kenyan one, whose almost complete breakdown has been 
particularly detrimental to the Court’s legitimacy. 
A second example of dissociation of formants relates to the exercise of 
judicial review under article 53(3)(a) of the Statute, as it emerges from the Comoros 
situation and the ensuing clear contraposition between the OTP and judges. While it 
is possible to agree on many of the PTC’s observations and critiques to the OTP’s 
decision not to proceed with an investigation and on the request for reconsideration, 
it seems that the rather confrontational approach adopted by the Chamber—in light 
of the non-binding effect of the request as to the outcomes of PE—is not entirely in 
line with the purpose and function of the review procedure under article 53(3) of the 
Statute. In particular, the Chamber’s insistence in framing the jurisdictional and 
admissibility parameters as “exacting legal requirements” devoid of any discretional 
character seems an excessive attempt to curb the OTP’s margin of appreciation when 
deciding not to open an investigation; one hardly compatible with a system premised 
on tempered prosecutorial discretion977. In this sense the OTP’s decision to confirm 
																																																								
977 See ICC, Decision on the request of the Union of the Comoros to review the Prosecutor’s decision 
not to initiate an investigation, Situation on the Registered Vessels of the Comoros, Greece and 
Cambodia, ICC-01/13-34, PTC I, 16 July 2015, par. 13-15. The AC, in an important obiter dictum, 
somehow tempered the clear-cut position of the PTC, holding that “the distinction between the powers 
of the Pre-Trial Chamber under article 53 (3) (a) and (b) reflects a conscious decision on the part of 
the drafters to preserve a higher degree of prosecutorial discretion regarding decisions not to 
investigate based on the considerations set out in article 53 (1) (a) and (b) of the Statute” (see ICC, 
Decision on the admissibility of the Prosecutor’s appeal against the “Decision on the request of the 
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its previous determination represents a clear reaffirmation of its discretion and, 
possibly, of the rationale behind the statutory design of the checks and balances 
procedure as regards nolle prosequi decisions978. 
A third and last example of dissociation of formants relates to the interests of 
justice as a possible discretional tool to deny the opening of an investigation or 
prosecution. As already underlined on multiple occasions the OTP’s understanding 
of this general clause—substantially shared by the Chambers—has so far literally 
sterilised in many respects the potential contribution of the OTP and of the Court at 
large to national peace, reconciliation and transitional processes979. While the primary 
objective of the Court is undoubtedly to mete out justice on the most responsible for 
the gravest international crimes, the inclusion of the interests of justice as a 
potentially countervailing argument in order not open an investigation or prosecution 
shows the drafters’ intention to allow the ICC’s organs to accommodate a more 
complex and comprehensive idea of justice, not limited to the administration of 
international criminal justice alone980. While the OTP’s choice not to make use of this 
																																																																																																																																																													
Union of the Comoros to review the Prosecutor’s decision not to initiate an investigation”, Situation 
on the Registered Vessels of the Comoros, Greece and Cambodia, ICC-01/13-51, AC, 6 November 
2015, par. 59, emphasis added). In other words, it seems that the appellate judges recognise that a 
certain degree of discretion is exercised also with regard to the components of the jurisdiction and 
admissibility test, and is ‘guaranteed’ by the non-binding character of the PTC’s review decision 
pursuant to article 53(3)(a) of the Statute. On the potentially negative consequences of the PTC’s 
approach, see A. LUBIN, op. cit., 118, according to whom “The PTC in essence sought to place itself 
as a second-tier prosecutor. However, the Chamber’s approach may only encourage the OTP to offer 
less reasoning, as such detailed reporting is not required under the Statute or the Rules. If the OTP 
provides no robust legal analysis of its decisions, there is nothing to micromanage, and that will be a 
detrimental blow to transparency and predictability”. 
978 Nevertheless, on the potential issues connected with the reasoning put forward by OTP in its final 
decision upon reconsideration, see K. J. HELLER, A Potentially Serious Problem with the Final 
Decision Concerning the Comoros, Opinio Juris, 1 December 2017 (available at 
http://opiniojuris.org/2017/12/01/33365/, last accessed 6 November 2018).  
979 For arguments in favour of a more active role of the ICC in promoting these processes see K. A. 
RODMAN, Why the ICC Should Operate Within Peace Processes, in Ethics & International Affairs, 
vol. 26, no. 1, 2012, 59-71 and K. A. RODMAN, Is Peace in the Interests of Justice? The Case for 
Broad Prosecutorial Discretion at the International Criminal Court, cit., 99-126. 
980 On the relationship between the Court’s jurisdiction, prosecutorial discretion and the possibility to 
consider the relevance of national peace processes (with particular regard to amnesties) see R. J. 
GOLDSTONE, N. FRITZ, “In the Interests of Justice” and Independent Referral: The ICC Prosecutor’s 
Unprecedented Powers, in Leiden Journal of International Law, vol. 13, issue 3, 2000, 655-667 and 
K. AMBOS, The Legal Framework of Transitional Justice: A Systematic Study with a Special Focus on 
the Role of the ICC, cit., 78-86. On the same lines, arguing for a more active role of the Prosecutor in 
the interpretation and application of the interests of justice clause see C. GALLAVIN, Article 53 of the 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: In the Interests of Justice?, in Kings College Law 
Journal, vol. 14, issue 2, 2003, 179-198. See also the analysis of this provision based on a rigorous 
VCLT approach by T. DE SOUZA DIAS, ‘Interests of justice’: Defining the scope of Prosecutorial 
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clause is understandable—and motivated by the intention to avoid the ex officio and 
binding review of the PTC—the current practice of both the Office and PTCs unveils 
an example of dissociation from to the object and purpose of the statutory regime 
with regard to the interests of justice, in what seems a tacit agreement for its non-
application. 
All the abovementioned hypotheses of dissociation between the statutory and 
the prosecutorial/judicial formants as regards the exercise and supervision of 
prosecutorial discretion at the preliminary stage have in common one feature: they all 
suggest the existence of a general presumption in favour of the opening of an 
investigation. Be it through the mild exercise of supervision at the authorisation 
stage, the attempts of intrusive review under article 53(3)(a), or the substantial 
neutralisation of the interests of justice clause, the combined effects of the current 
practices seem to create a gap between the law in the books law and the law in 
action. It cannot be denied that the normative design of the ICC rests on the one hand 
on the principle of complementarity—i.e. on the precedence of national proceedings 
over international ones and on the only residual intervention of the Court—and, on 
the other, on a tempered prosecutorial discretion—i.e. one that is subject to various 
forms of judicial supervision—in the adoption of the most relevant selection 
decisions at the preliminary stage. Contrary to this general textual and contextual 
framework, and due to the apparently contradictory approaches of the Chambers in 
the different supervisory procedures, the system seems to increasingly lean towards 
tempered legality, where in case of doubt—in light of the limited information 
available at the preliminary examination stage—the opening of an investigation is 
always warranted and represents the best course of action981. Irrespective of the 
																																																																																																																																																													
discretion in Article 53(1)(c) and (2)(c) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, in 
Leiden Journal of International Law, vol. 30, issue 3, 2017, 731-751. 
981 The Comoros reviewing PTC clearly expressed this position with the following words: “In the 
presence of several plausible explanations of the available information, the presumption of article 
53(1) of the Statute, as reflected by the use of the word “shall” in the chapeau of that article, and of 
common sense, is that the Prosecutor investigates in order to be able to properly assess the relevant 
facts. Indeed, it is precisely the purpose of an investigation to provide clarity. Making the 
commencement of an investigation contingent on the information available at the pre-investigative 
stage being already clear, univocal or not contradictory creates a short circuit and deprives the 
exercise of any purpose. Facts which are difficult to establish, or which are unclear, or the existence of 
conflicting accounts, are not valid reasons not to start an investigation but rather call for the opening 
of such an investigation. If the information available to the Prosecutor at the pre-investigative stage 
allows for reasonable inferences that at least one crime within the jurisdiction of the Court has been 
committed and that the case would be admissible, the Prosecutor shall open an investigation, as only 
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reconcilability of these structural developments with the governing texts, it is alleged 
that the current institutional, administrative and not least financial structure of the 
OTP (and of the whole Court) is not in the condition to sustain such a dramatic 
transformation of its mandate. There is therefore the need to pursue a more 
satisfactory balance between the recognition of the necessary margin of appreciation 
and discretion to the OTP, the material and institutional limitations of the Court, the 
rights of states under the principle of complementarity and the need to assure 
meaningful international justice for heinous crimes. 
The above considerations confirm the assumption that in the fragmentary and 
stratified legal framework of the ICC the actual practices of the involved actors—and 
in particular their dialectical combination through the respective patterns of adaptive 
or reactive behaviours—may contribute to confirm, complement, integrate or even 
contradict the results of a static analysis of the textual provisions, revealing the 
inherently creative e transformative role played by such practices.
																																																																																																																																																													
by investigating could doubts be overcome” (ICC, Decision on the request of the Union of the 
Comoros to review the Prosecutor’s decision not to initiate an investigation, Situation on the 
Registered Vessels of the Comoros, Greece and Cambodia, ICC-01/13-34, PTC I, 16 July 2015, par. 
13, emphasis added). 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE POSSIBLE EXPLANATIONS AND THE POTENTIAL 
ADVERSE CONSEQUENCES OF THE DISSOCIATION BETWEEN 
THEORY AND PRACTICE AND OF THE OTP-JUDGES 
DISAGREEMENTS 
	
1. Possible explanations for the dissociation of formants and the OTP-Judges 
confrontation 
In the previous Chapter a comparison between the static and dynamic 
dimension of prosecutorial discretion and judicial review at the ICC has been carried 
out, revealing the existence of areas of both interpretive agreement and disagreement 
between the OTP and judges as well as of patterns of potential dissociation between 
the textual/statutory formant and the prosecutorial/judicial formant with regard to the 
latitude of prosecutorial discretion and of its judicial review at the pre-trial stage of 
proceedings at the ICC. It is therefore appropriate to reflect on the causes of these 
empirical phenomena, which dig their roots in the institutional design of the ICC’s 
prosecutorial system, in the procedural mechanisms that ensure its application and, 
last but not least, in the specific manner in which the involved actors have so far 
interpreted their mandate under the Statute. Given their complex nature, only a 
multifactorial analysis will make it possible to provide plausible explanations for the 
phenomena under consideration. The following analysis proceeds first to analyse the 
objective/normative explanations—i.e. those connected to the limits and lacunae of 
the applicable legal texts—and then to examine the subjective explanations, i.e. those 
connected to the role played by the OTP and judges based on the trends in their 
respective practices, having regard to the influence exercised by their 
‘constituencies’. 
 
1.1 The inadequacy of the statutory and regulatory framework 
In the first and second part of this work we have analysed the international 
institutional and political premises leading to the adoption of the Statute, underlining 
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their fundamental influence on the normative design of the mechanism for the 
exercise of prosecutorial discretion and judicial review thereof. The results of the 
comparison between the law in the books and law in action seem to confirm the 
preliminary observations on the main features of this system, and particularly its 
open, fragmentary and incremental character982. 
The provisions of the Statute relating to prosecutorial discretion and its 
judicial review did not prove capable of providing in all circumstances a sufficiently 
clear guidance for the Prosecutor’s selection choices and the judicial supervision 
decisions, both having regard to the indications of principle (such as those contained 
in the Preamble)983, and to the more specific ones relating to the latitude of the 
powers and duties of the Prosecutor and judges at the pre-trial stage984. In particular, 
the statutory provisions on the evidentiary standards and the criteria for the selection 
of situations and cases revealed their insufficient precision and undisputable 
“constructive ambiguity” 985 . Notwithstanding the existence of areas of broad 
agreement, the uncertainty surrounding the most plausible interpretation of these 
standards contributed to spark significant interpretive disagreements on key issues 
such as the assessment of situational gravity for the purpose of admissibility or the 
scope of the supervisory procedures under article 53(3)(a) of the Statute. Alongside 
provisions that leave a wide margin for interpretation and integrative practice due to 
their—sometimes intentional—generic formulation, there are areas in which the 
primary normative texts are simply silent. One example may be the almost complete 
absence of practical indications on the manner in which the OTP should commence 
and conduct preliminary examinations, a lacuna only partially remedied through the 
RPE and applicable Regulations986. In these areas the practice of the Office plainly 
created if not the rules at least ‘patterns of regularities’—i.e. of relatively consistent 
																																																								
982 See, supra, Part Two, Chapter One. On these general features of ICL see M. COSTI, E. FRONZA, op. 
cit., 18-21. 
983 See, supra, Part Two, Chapter One, par. 3.1. 
984 See, supra, Part Two, Chapters One, Two and Three. 
985 See C. KRESS, The Procedural Law of the International Criminal Court in Outline: Anatomy of a 
Unique Compromise, cit., 603, 605. 
986 On the importance of regulatory texts on the exercise of prosecutorial discretion see, supra, Part 
Two, Chapter One, par. 4. It should be noted that the Regulations of the OTP and the Court are 
adopted—and can be modified—by the same subjects who are called to apply them (namely the 
Prosecutor and judges). 
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courses of action on specific legal issues—contributing to a certain degree of 
foreseeability of the OTP’s action987. 
The regulatory texts, namely the RPE and the applicable Regulations, do 
provide on certain issues a more detailed and specific set of rules concerning the 
micro-choices of the OTP and judges, but cannot alleviate the inconsistencies or 
lacunae of the primary source, also in light of their hierarchically subordinated 
position vis-à-vis the Statute988. Nevertheless, the Chambers have used—with mixed 
results—some of these provisions to influence or limit the exercise of prosecutorial 
discretion at the preliminary stage of the proceedings989. On the other hand, some of 
these provision have been the object of notable cases of non-compliance on the part 
of the OTP, in the absence of adequate procedural remedies other than stays of 
proceedings and the threat of disciplinary action against the Prosecutor or the 
individual trial attorneys acting on her behalf990. 
It seems reasonable to conclude that the structural ambiguity of the applicable 
rules couldn’t in any event have provided a complete and coherent framework for the 
adoption of both prosecutorial discretionary and judicial supervision decisions, and 
in some cases might have provided an incentive not to explore certain courses of 
action (such as those allowed under the interests of justice clause). While it could be 
argued that this degree of flexibility and adaptability to changing circumstances is a 
positive and indispensable feature of the system, the analysis of practice and of the 
episodes of dissociation of formants suggests that the integrative practices have yet 
to produce a satisfactory balance between the needs for flexibility and predictability. 
Nevertheless, as we shall see in last chapter of this work, to propose ambitious 
																																																								
987 For instance what we have here referred to as ‘proceduralisation’ of preliminary examinations has 
contributed to create these ‘regularities’ in the practice of the Office. See, supra, Part Three, Chapter 
Two, par. 2.1. On the distinction between ‘rule’ and ‘regularity’ see L. GRADONI, L’attestation du 
droit pénal international coutumier dans la jurisprudence du Tribunal pour l’Ex-Yougoslavie. « 
Régularités » et  « règles », in M. DELMAS-MARTY, E. FRONZA, É. LAMBERT-ABDELGAWAD (eds.), 
Les sources du droit international pénal. L’expérience des Tribunaux Pénaux Internationaux et le 
Statut de la Cour Pénale Internationale, Paris, 2004, 28-32. 
988 See article 51(4) and (5) of the Statute. See also, supra, footnotes 417-419 for a detailed analysis of 
the internal hierarchy between the various sources of procedural rules. 
989 This is particularly true for the Chamber’s power to request additional information to the OTP 
based on Regulations 28(1)-(2), 48(1) of the Regulations of the Court and Rule 50(4) of the RPE. 
990 For instance, it took the OTP two full years to reach a final decision concerning the Comoros, after 
the review decision of the PTC, notwithstanding the fact that Rule 108(2) of the RPE requires the 
Prosecutor to do so “as soon as possible”. On the disciplinary sanctions for prosecutorial misconduct 
or non-cooperation see, supra, Part One, Chapter One, par. 1 (especially footnotes 31-33). 
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normative changes of the primary normative texts does not seem, for various reasons, 
the most viable solution to their main deficiencies. 
 
1.2 The (inevitable) inadequacy of prosecutorial policies, strategies and guidelines 
As clarified in Part Two, the OTP has progressively put forward a number of 
strategy and policy documents, as well as regulations and guidelines which have a 
bearing on the exercise of prosecutorial discretion and may give substance to the 
generic statutory—and sometimes even regulatory—provisions. As largely 
anticipated in their static analysis, a comparison of these documents with the practice 
of the Office—combined when available with that of the Chambers—clearly 
confirmed that they could in no way be expected to compensate for the 
inconsistencies of the normative texts. This is not only due to their eminently non-
binding nature, but also to the fundamental reasons leading to their adoption, namely 
the OTP’s need to guarantee greater transparency of its decision-making process and 
to reassure the Chambers on the impartiality and even-handedness of preliminary 
examination activities. Those advocating for the introduction of policy documents 
containing rigid criteria for the selection and prioritisation of situation and cases 
failed to consider that it was very unlikely that the Prosecutor would have imposed 
on herself any such constraints, especially when the primary legal texts allow her 
significant margins of discretion. Besides this pragmatic argument, even from the 
point of view of the sources of the ICC’s legal regime, it seems highly implausible 
that acts of soft law adopted by the Office in the exercise of its administrative 
independence could make rigid what the legally binding documents had created 
flexible. 
In other words, notwithstanding the importance of these documents for the 
purposes of assessing the OTP’s performances and the consistency of its choices—as 
well as the degree of spontaneous observance of the stated policy—their practical 
impact should not be overstated. They are but one additional layer of the ICC’s 
expanding normative fabric, and they frequently limit themselves to record the 
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OTP’s discretionary practice, instead of pre-emptively providing clear guidelines for 
future action991. 
 
1.3 The Prosecutor’s ‘constituencies’ and self-perception of the Office’s institutional 
role 
Alongside the objective normative reasons that may provide an explanation 
for the patterns of dissociation of formants and those of open clash between the OTP 
and judges, also subjective institutional factors might shed light on the empirical 
phenomena emerged from the analysis of practice. In other words, certain trends in 
this practice may be explained on grounds of the OTP’s and judges’ attempt to assert 
their institutional role vis-à-vis the other actors of the ICC legal process, in line with 
an implicit or explicit prosecutorial or judicial philosophy or interpretive approach. 
Moreover, with particular regard to the OTP—and to a lesser extent judges—the 
institutional self-perception that contributes to shape its policies and discretionary 
decisions cannot be entirely divorced from the expectations and demands of the 
Court’s many ‘constituencies’. These include states (both State Parties and third 
states); international organisations of universal and regional character; NGOs; 
victims; as well as the national and international ‘community of jurists’ comprising 
national and international judges, lawyers and academics992. 
While it cannot be doubted that the OTP’s action is first and foremost based 
on genuinely legal considerations, underestimating the relevance of the inputs 
coming from these diverse constituencies would be an exercise of abstraction, for the 
assessment of the OTP’s overall discretionary practice cannot be conducted in vacuo. 
Nevertheless, a sociological inquiry on these issues is clearly beyond the scope of the 
present study and has already been the object of extensive elaboration in literature993. 
																																																								
991 On policy papers see, supra, Part Two, Chapter Two, par. 3 and Part Three, Chapter Two, par. 2.1 
992 On the concept of ‘constituency’ with regard to the activity of the ICC, see F. MÉGRET, In who’s 
name: The ICC and the search for constituency, in C. M. DE VOS, S. KENDALL, C. STAHN (eds.), 
Contested Justice: The Politics and Practice of International Criminal Court Interventions, 
Cambridge, 2015, 23-45, as well as the other contributions in the same volume. With particular regard 
to the constituency of victims of international crimes and their representation at the ICC see S. 
KENDALL, S. NOUWEN, Representational Practices at the International Criminal Court: The Gap 
Between Juridified and Abstract Victimhood, in Law and Contemporary Problems, vol. 76, 2014, 235-
262. 
993 On the separate but connected issue of the legitimacy of the Court as an international institution 
see, e.g., the contributions of A. FICHTELBERG, Democratic Legitimacy and the International Criminal 
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Suffices here to underline that the OTP’s selection choices are some of the most 
visible manifestations of the Court’s activity and are therefore subject to incessant 
international ex ante and ex post scrutiny994. This requires the Office to exercise a 
good measure of ‘legal diplomacy’ as well as the awareness of the institutional 
consequences of its decisions. Crucial in this sense is also the way in which the 
Office’s decisions are communicated to the public through the Court’s media and 
outreach facilities995. 
The OTP’s quest for legitimacy and the necessity to defend its role from 
allegations of bias and double-standards—or other forms of legal or political 
criticism—have certainly played a role in co-determining the course of action of the 
Office in the exercise of discretion, also based on some hard lessons learned from the 
early practice of the Office. The necessity to take into consideration this multifaceted 
international reality—including the necessity to rely on state cooperation for the 
enforcement of virtually all of the Office’s decisions—might at least partially explain 
certain oscillations and inconsistencies in the practice of the Office, as well as the 
																																																																																																																																																													
Court: A Liberal Defence, in Journal of International Criminal Justice, vol. 4, issue 4, 2006, 765-785 
and M. GLASIUS, Do International Criminal Courts Require Democratic Legitimacy?, in European 
Journal of International Law, vol. 23, issue 1, 2012, 43-66. Of particular interest is the concept of 
“discursive legitimacy”, referred to by M. J. STRUETT, The Politics of Discursive Legitimacy: 
Understanding the Dynamics and Implications of Prosecutorial Discretion at the International 
Criminal Court, in S. C. ROACH (ed.), Governance, Order, and the International Criminal Court: 
Between Realpolitik and a Cosmopolitan Court, Oxford, 2009, 113 who describes it as a 
“communicatively rational discourse about the rules of international criminal law and the fairness of 
their application in practice”. Fundamental in this debate is also the contribution of M. DELMAS-
MARTY, Le droit pénal comme éthique de la mondialisation, in Revue de Science Criminelle et de 
Droit Pénal Comparé, no. 1, 2004, 1-10, reflecting on the potential role of ICL in the construction of 
a set of globally shared values.  
994 See for instance the reporting activity of some of the most internationally active NGOs, such as 
Human Rights Watch or Amnesty International, with regard to the work of the Court. These 
organisations have put forward in the past years various reports, statements and documents relating 
both to general issues and to specific categories of crimes or country situation (the reports are 
available, respectively, at https://www.hrw.org/publications and 
https://www.amnesty.org/en/search/?q=icc, last accessed 6 November 2018). 
995 The Court’s structure comprises an Outreach Unit, within the larger Public Information and 
Documentation Section. This office has put forward some reports on outreach activities (from 2007 up 
to 2010). See also the ICC-Registry, Public Information and Outreach Engaging with Communities 
Report of activities in the situation related countries, Period: From January 2011-October 2014 and 
ICC, Integrated Strategy for External Relations, Public Information and Outreach, 18 April 2007. For 
a discussion on some relevant aspects of the outreach activities see the debate among experts on 
https://iccforum.com/outreach (last accessed 6 November 2018). 
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progressive changes in its strategic objectives and the development of new 
administrative and procedural practices996. 
On some occasions the Office considered it necessary to defend its 
discretionary prerogatives not from external actors, but from internal ones, such as in 
those cases in which it criticised any allegedly unwarranted interference of judges 
called to exercise supervisory powers. Given the ‘variable geometry’ of the 
Chambers’ practice in the exercise of judicial oversight, the Office has always tried 
to adapt to the different procedural contexts so as to maximise the flexibility of its 
action. 
All these things combined might therefore account for the external perception 
of the lack of consistency of certain prosecutorial choices, or contribute to explain 
the patterns of interpretive disagreement among the OTP and judges on the one hand, 
and the OTP and international stakeholders on the other997. 
 
1.4 Judges’ role and the lack of an overarching ‘judicial strategy’ as regards the 
exercise of judicial supervision 
The role played by the judiciary in the development of the current practice as 
regards prosecutorial discretion and judicial review thereof proved relevant and is 
marked by the apparently contradictory approaches adopted by the Chambers in the 
exercise of their supervisory powers within the different procedures calling for the 
intervention of judges998. While patterns of judicial practice have gradually stratified, 
consolidating areas of major agreement or disagreement with the OTP’s 
																																																								
996 For instance, the main tenets of the prosecutorial policy have significantly changed during the 
years, based on the previous experience and the necessity to adapt the strategy to the progressive 
expansion of the work of the Court. See, supra, Part Two, Chapter Two, par. 2. In this sense J. 
IVERSON, Disarming the Trap: Evaluating Prosecutorial Discretion in Preliminary 
Examinations beyond the False Dichotomy of Politics and Law, in M. BERGSMO, C. STAHN (eds.), 
Quality Control in Preliminary Examinations: Vol. 2, cit., 153 argues against the purportedly false 
dichotomy between politics and law, alleging that a pragmatic approach to the analysis of practice 
requires the recognition that the “Prosecutor’s choices are not determined entirely by law or politics”. 
997 As regards the criticism of international actors, one might recall—as far as states and international 
organisations of regional character are concerned—the political controversies concerning the 
relationship between the ICC and the African Union or some African states (on this subject see, supra, 
footnote 46), or the recent harsh criticism expressed by certain NGOs on the acquittal of Mr Bemba 
Gombo (see, e.g., Fédération Internationale des Droits de l’Homme (FIDH), Press release, Acquittal 
of Jean Pierre Bemba on appeal: an affront to thousands of victims, 8 June 2018, available at: 
https://www.fidh.org/en/region/Africa/central-african-republic/acquittal-of-jean-pierre-bemba-on-
appeal-an-affront-to-thousands-of, last accessed 6 November 2018). 
998 See, supra, Part Four, Chapter One, par. 3. 
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interpretation of the relevant standards, the overall perception remains that—also due 
to the almost complete lack of practice in certain areas—the judges’ review has been 
based more on a case-by-case approach, rather then on a comprehensive and 
systematic judicial strategy. There exist differences across Pre-Trial Chambers on the 
limits and scope of the judicial supervision and the possibility of a more 
active/directive role of judges at the preliminary examination and investigation stage 
of the proceedings999. These differences are mainly due to the variable composition of 
the Chambers and the differing cultural approaches to judicial review of judges 
coming from diverse legal orders and professional backgrounds1000. In addition, the 
absence of a forum to resolve such discrepancies and to provide a more principled 
guidance already at the situational stage of proceedings—due to the exhaustive 
character of the provisions relating to the possibility of appeal—makes it difficult to 
rationalise this judicial practice1001. 
With regard to the influence of constituencies on the work of the Court’s 
main bodies, the position of judges is substantially different from that of the OTP, 
considering that only the latter is a party to the proceedings; a position only partially 
mitigated—but not radically transformed—by the OTP’s statutory duty to assist the 
Court in the establishment of the truth and the judicial-like guarantees of the OTP’s 
independence1002. Nevertheless, while judges are not necessarily under the immediate 
‘fire’ of the international public opinion’s criticism, their decisions with regard to the 
supervision of the OTP’s discretionary choices frequently come under severe 
scrutiny par ricochet, as a result of certain restrictive selection decisions of the 
Prosecutor. It can be argued that it is for this reason that some PTCs have made use 
																																																								
999 Ibidem. 
1000 For instance, the dissenting opinions in the context of article 15 authorisation procedures were put 
forward by judges coming from civil law jurisdictions (Germany, Hungary, Argentina), systems that 
generally admit various forms of judicial supervision of prosecutorial choices. Interestingly, the views 
of the dissenting judges are not necessarily aligned with regard to the latitude and scope of the PTC’s 
supervisory powers, given that they have alternatively argued for a more extended or restricted role of 
judges at this procedural juncture. Nevertheless, all such opinions seem to share the view that the Pre-
Trial Chamber is permitted to interact with the OTP in co-determining the scope of the prospective 
investigation, especially with regard to its material and temporal scope. 
1001 See article 82(1) of the Statute. As regards the absence of a judicial forum to resolve these 
interpretive disputes and its consequences on the OTP-PTC relations, see ICC-OTP, Final decision of 
the Prosecution concerning the “Article 53(1) Report” (ICC-01/13-6-AnxA), dated 6 November 2014, 
Situation on the Registered Vessels of the Comoros, Greece and Cambodia, ICC-01/13-57-Anx1, 30 
November 2017, par. 14. 
1002 See article 54(1)(a) of the Statute. On this crucial issues see, supra, Part One, Chapter One, par. 1, 
especially footnotes 25-27. 
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of their discretion to redefine and judicially expand the scope of the Prosecutor’s 
requests for authorisation to investigate, or prompted her to modify the initial case 
theory or the original charges, both with regard to the crimes and the modes of 
liability. 
In conclusion, the current practical ‘distribution of power’ in the relations 
between the OTP and Chambers, in the light of the inevitable imperfections of the 
normative framework and of the competing demands of the Court’s other actors and 
stakeholders, seems to provide a plausible explanation for the empirical 
phenomena—the patterns of agreement/disagreement and of dissociation of 
formants— ascertained in the previous chapters. 
 
2. The (potentially detrimental) consequences of the dissociation of formants and of 
the episodes of open clash/smooth relationship between the OTP and judges 
After having analysed the possible explanations for the areas of dissociation 
of formants and the main patterns of interpretive agreement/disagreement between 
the OTP and judges in relation to the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, it is 
necessary to reflect on the substantive institutional consequences of these empirical 
phenomena. International organisations—especially those centred on the activity of 
judicial or quasi-judicial organs—are dynamic institutions whose degree of 
effectiveness can only be measured having regard the concrete outcomes of the 
practices of their actors. In this perspective, it would be methodologically wrong to 
assume that the mere existence of any discrepancy between the law in the books and 
the law in action necessarily brings about negative consequences on the overall 
functioning of the legal system under consideration. Moreover, it should be noted 
that there is not a necessary correlation between interpretive agreements and 
convergence of formants on the one hand, and between interpretive disagreements 
and dissociation of formants on the other. To the contrary, it could very well be the 
case—as shown in the previous chapters—that the prosecutorial/judicial formants 
distance themselves from the statutory formant as a result of the interpretive 
agreements between the OTP and judges on certain issues1003.  
																																																								
1003 See, supra, Part Four, Chapter One, par. 2. 
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In any event, it is alleged that the current state of affairs at the ICC with 
regard to the exercise of prosecutorial discretion and its judicial review poses some 
serious challenges to the present and future viability of the ICC’s legal system that 
need to be analysed with a view to reducing their potentially detrimental effects. 
 
2.1 Lack of cooperation between OTP and judges in case of interpretive 
disagreement 
The first potential consequence of the consolidation of patterns of interpretive 
disagreement on certain substantive and procedural issues is the ensuing lack of 
cooperation between the OTP and judges in the discharge of their respective duties. 
This has already happened on various occasions in the practice of the Court, with 
particular regard to situations in which the OTP reacted to certain decisions of the 
Chambers that threatened to interfere with its discretion 1004 . While it is 
understandable that the Prosecutor seeks to defend what she perceives as ‘reserved 
prerogatives’ vis-à-vis the Chambers, she must always consider that taking this 
approach to its extreme consequences—especially in the absence of dedicated 
dispute settlement procedures—might bring about inevitable negative consequences 
such as delays (impacting on the reasonable duration of the proceedings); challenges 
from other procedural actors (such states, the defence for the suspect/accused or 
victims) or prompt judges to adopt exceptional and invasive remedies to overcome 
the OTP’s non compliance with their previous decisions. This rather confrontational 
approach might also prove counterproductive in prospective situations and generate 
additional tensions that have on some occasions resulted in explicit—and sometimes 
arguably excessive—reprimands of the Chambers directed to the Office1005. The 
negative consequences of these episodes of institutional contraposition are not only 
internal to the system, but may have an external projection. In particular they may 
give the impression—especially to external unqualified observers—that the OTP is 
simply reluctant to abide by the Court’s decision, or to the contrary that judges 
																																																								
1004 See, supra, footnotes 950-951 for exact references to these cases. 
1005 See, e.g., the expressions used by the preliminary judges in ICC, Decision on the request of the 
Union of the Comoros to review the Prosecutor’s decision not to initiate an investigation, Situation on 
the Registered Vessels of the Comoros, Greece and Cambodia, ICC-01/13-34, PTC I, 16 July 2015, 
par. 51. 
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intend to curtail the Office’s discretionary action and reduce the impact of the 
Court’s work. While the organs of the Court shouldn’t act under the pressure of 
external influences, it is nevertheless necessary to reduce to a minimum the 
occasions of unwarranted controversy and enhance the efforts aimed at carefully 
explaining to the public the reasons for any interpretive disagreement1006. 
 
2.2 The oscillation between excessive judicial deference and excessive 
interventionism and its consequences 
In the previous chapters we have seen how the current trends in the practice 
of the Pre-Trial Chambers reveal significant oscillations between patterns of clear 
deference towards the OTP’s discretionary decisions and, to the contrary, instances 
of significant judicial interference with the Prosecutor’s discretion1007. Both excessive 
judicial deference and interventionism might have adverse consequences on the 
overall balance of the system of prosecutorial discretion and deepen the dissociation 
between the statutory formant and the prosecutorial/judicial formant of the legal 
system considered. Obviously, defining what might constitute an ‘excess’ of judicial 
deference or interference is not straightforward, and such an assessment must be 
carried out on the basis of a comparison between the normative structure of the 
checks and balances mechanism and the concrete outcome of its practical 
application. 
																																																								
1006 An excessive public exposure of these interpretive disagreements does not help shaping an 
effective communication strategy that fosters the legitimacy of the Court’s work. For instance, the 
recent and contested appeal decision in Bemba resulted in a public exchange of statements between 
the OTP and the Presidency, which did little to enhance the cohesion of the Court as an international 
judicial institution, and clearly demonstrates the influence of constituencies on the public projection 
and communication strategies of these two bodies. In its post-judgment statement, the OTP publicly 
criticised the approach taken by the Majority to the appellate review, relying on arguments contained 
in the opinion of the dissenting judges, and making frequent references to the expectations of justice 
of the victims (see ICC-OTP, Statement of ICC Prosecutor, Fatou Bensouda, on the recent judgment 
of the ICC Appeals Chamber acquitting Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, 13 June 2018, available at: 
https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=180613-OTP-stat, last accessed 6 November 2018). 
Following the OTP’s statement, the ICC President Chile Eboe-Osuji put forward a rather ‘clinical’ 
statement, recalling the fundamental principles underpinning the functioning of the Court—among 
which the necessary respect for the independence/impartiality of judges—indirectly criticising the 
OTP’s outspoken position with regard to the AC’s final decision, and underlining that the 
responsibility of the OTP and the Judiciary “must remain separate and independent functions” (see 
ICC, Presidency, Statement of the President of the Court in relation to the case of Mr Jean-Pierre 
Bemba Gombo, 14 June 2018, available at: https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=180614-
pres-stat, last accessed 6 November 2018). 
1007 See, supra, Part Four, Chapter One, par. 3-4. 
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An excess of deference towards prosecutorial discretionary choices might 
significantly weaken the function of the system of judicial supervision, thereby 
transforming its legal nature from that of substantive filtering mechanisms to routine 
administrative-like procedures1008. In this sense, an excessive judicial deference might 
be the by-product of the almost complete interpretive agreement between the 
prosecution—which generally aims at maximising its margin of discretion—and 
judges, on issues such as the low character of evidentiary standards for the opening 
of investigations1009. Paradoxically, a deferential approach might also result from 
decisions in which judges go ultra petita in considering the OTP’s requests based on 
prosecutorial discretion, thereby judicially enlarging the margins for the future 
exercise of such discretion1010. 
Also an excess of judicial interventionism might introduce imbalances in the 
functioning of the system. Sometimes the judges’ interference with prosecutorial 
discretion might take the form of attempts to rectify the OTP’s course of action, 
introducing alternative situation and/or case hypotheses. This has happened in 
practice on various occasions, both at the preliminary stage (especially in the context 
of the confirmation of charges) and even at the trial stage, especially based on 
Regulation 55 of the Regulations of the Court1011. In these cases it could be 
questioned whether under the Statute and applicable regulatory texts the ICC judges 
had the authority to directly or indirectly fix the defects of the OTP’s selection 
decisions, so as to put the investigation or prosecution ‘on the right track’ for the 
subsequent procedural steps. Some have argued that the peculiar legal and 
institutional environment of the ICC—as well as its operational constraints—require 
a more directive role of judges as early as at the preliminary stage and the 
																																																								
1008 This risk was underlined, for instance, in the Dissenting Opinion of Judge Hans Peter Kaul 
attached to ICC, Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an 
Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Situation in the Republic of Kenya, ICC-
01/09-19-Corr, PTC II 31 March 2010), par. 18-19. 
1009 On this agreement, especially in the context of article 15 authorisation procedures see, supra, Part 
Four, Chapter One, par. 2. 
1010 See, e.g., the PTCs’ attitude towards the extension of the jurisdictional parameters of authorised 
investigations, already examined, supra, in Part Three, Chapter Two, par. 3.2.2 and Part Four, Chapter 
One, par. 2. 
1011 See, e.g., the procedural unfolding of the Bemba and Katanga trials (see, supra, footnotes 482, 
935).  
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introduction of inquisitorial elements in the criminal procedure at the ICC1012. 
Nevertheless, while on some occasions the Chambers’ intervention on specific 
prosecutorial choices might have been justified in terms of judicial economy or in 
order to protect the competing rights of other procedural actors, it cannot be denied 
that the hybrid character of the ICC’s procedural regime—combining elements of 
both the adversarial and inquisitorial legal traditions—does not go as far as to 
introduce a penetrating judicial power of review on the merits of most prosecutorial 
choices, which largely remain an exclusive responsibility of the OTP1013. An excess 
of activism in correcting the choices of the OTP—however wrong or questionable 
they may be—risks of transforming the structure of the criminal procedure envisaged 
by the Statute and regulatory texts, thereby altering the delicate compromises which 
form their conventional basis. As already explained above, besides the effects of this 
judicial oscillations on the structure of the ICC’s criminal procedure, it can also be 
argued that excessive deference or interventionism may impact on the overall 
predictability and legal certainty of the system vis-à-vis other procedural actors such 
as states, the suspect/accused and victims. 
	
2.3 Inefficiency in the use of the Court’s resources 
As we have seen in the previous chapter, the combined effect of the PTCs’ 
deferential approach as regards the authorisation procedures and the more intrusive 
one with regard to the review of decisions not to proceed, seems to suggest a shift 
from tempered discretion to tempered legality at least with regard to an alleged 
presumption in favour of the opening of investigations at the conclusion of 
preliminary examinations1014. If this trend will prevail in the future practice the whole 
system of prosecutorial discretion and judicial review might become increasingly 
permeable—i.e. incapable of operating a sufficient selection of incoming 
																																																								
1012 In this vein, arguing in favour of the creation of investigating chambers at the ICC in order to 
overcome the alleged procedural issues affecting the functioning of adversarial systems in ICL see, 
e.g., J. DE HEMPTINNE, op. cit., 402-428. 
1013 In this sense see K. AMBOS, Treatise on International Criminal Law, Vol. III, International 
Criminal Procedure, cit., 384-385. See also F. GUARIGLIA, G. HOCHMAYR, Article 57, Functions and 
Powers of the Pre-Trial Chamber, cit., 1423-1424 on the OTP-PTC contrasts as regards the 
interpretation of article 57(3)(c) of the Statute and the possible expansion of the PTC’s supervisory 
and directive powers. 
1014 See, supra, Part Four, Chapter One, par. 4. 
PART FOUR – CHAPTER TWO 
 298 
situations—leading either to an inefficient use of the financial and human resources 
of the OTP and the Court at large, or to the need for a significant expansion of 
budgetary appropriations. 
The OTP’s performance objectives contained in the Strategic Plan and some 
of the ensuing selection choices—including charging practices—seem difficult to 
reconcile with the current human, financial and administrative capabilities of the 
Office and the Court at large1015. In this context it should be noted that the Office 
advanced a proposal for a budget increase for 2018 (roughly 2.2 million €, a 4.9% 
increase compared to the budget for 2017), which the ASP only granted for half of 
the requested figures1016. Moreover, the so-called Basic Size Model—indispensable to 
meet the OTP’s strategic objectives—is still far from being actually implemented, 
and has not been formally endorsed by the ASP for the purposes of the annual 
budgetary decisions1017. 
An additional source of concern as regards the future efficient use of 
resources comes from the potential—and likely unintended—consequences of the 
OTP-PTC querelle as regards the Comoros situation. In fact, while the Office has 
ultimately decided to confirm its previous decision not to open an investigation, the 
Final Decision of late 2017 contains a passage that might bear highly problematic 
consequences on the OTP’s future decisions under article 53(1) of the Statute. As 
suggested by one commentator, it seems that the OTP believes that the opening of an 
investigation is required whenever at least one potential case within a given situation 
																																																								
1015 See ICC-OTP, Strategic Plan 2016-2018, 16 November 2015, par. 69 and ICC-ASP/14/21*, 
Report of the Court on the Basic Size of the Office of the Prosecution, 17 September 2015, par. 21-25, 
whereby the OTP envisages the yearly expected output (total number of examinations during the year, 
new situations, active investigations, hibernated investigations, pre-trial procedures, trial procedures, 
appeals). It should be noted that charging decisions such as the one concerning Mr Ongwen (70 
charges confirmed, see supra, footnote 946), go against the idea of introducing manageable cases and 
will probably make it difficult for the OTP to meet the stated performance objectives.  
1016 See ICC-ASP/16/10, Proposed Programme Budget for 2018 of the International Criminal Court, 
11 September 2017, par. 225-226, for the proposal of budget increase formulated by the Office; and 
ICC-ASP/16/Res.1, Resolution of the Assembly of States Parties on the proposed programme budget 
for 2018, the Working Capital Fund for 2018, the scale of assessment for the apportionment of 
expenses of the International Criminal Court, financing appropriations for 2018 and the Contingency 
Fund, 14 December 2017, 1, for the ASP’s allocation of resources. 
1017 Ibidem, 7. With regard to the Basic Size model the ASP “stresses that the approval by the 
Assembly of the budget for 2018 is not to be understood as an endorsement of its budgetary 
implications as the budget for each year should be considered on its own merits as it is prepared by 
the Court on the basis of the actual needs foreseen for the specific year, and it is considered and 
approved by the Assembly on an annual basis” (emphasis added). 
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appears sufficiently grave to be admissible1018. This position would imply that every 
situation referred to the Office—especially those with a sufficiently wide territorial 
and temporal scope—where even a single potential case fulfils the jurisdictional and 
admissibility criteria, must be investigated, thereby allocating adequate resources to 
that end. This would not only represent a renewed incentive for states to improperly 
use the power of referral, but would likely overwhelm the OTP’s workload with 
additional situations, well beyond the current human and financial capabilities of the 
Office. If this were the correct interpretation of the OTP’s position stemming from 
the Comoros Final Decision, the Office would necessarily have to update its 
budgetary and human resources plans to cope with the potential expansion of its 
future activities. In any event, a clarification from the Office on this point, preferably 
in the sense of excluding a duty to open an investigation based on the one potential 
admissible case litmus test, would be useful in order to prevent future disagreements 
with the PTC. 
From the above considerations it seems clear that the combination of 
prosecutorial and judicial practice as regards the scope and limits of discretion at the 
pre-trial stage bears significant consequences not only on the actual functioning of 
the legal framework, but also on overarching administrative, budgetary and resource-
related aspects, which are of paramount importance for the orderly activity of the 
Court.
																																																								
1018 See K. J. HELLER, A Potentially Serious Problem with the Final Decision Concerning the 
Comoros, cit., referring to ICC-OTP, Final decision of the Prosecution concerning the “Article 53(1) 
Report” (ICC-01/13-6-AnxA), dated 6 November 2014, Situation on the Registered Vessels of the 
Comoros, Greece and Cambodia, ICC-01/13-57-Anx1, 30 November 2017, par. 11, 332. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
REDUCING THE GAP BETWEEN THE LAW IN THE BOOKS AND 
THE LAW IN ACTION AND MINIMISING THE CONSEQUENCES 
OF SYSTEMIC INTERPRETIVE DISAGREEMENTS 
	
1. Introduction 
In the previous chapter we have analysed the possible explanations and 
(potentially detrimental) consequences of the interpretive disagreements between the 
OTP and judges, as well as the more general phenomenon of the dissociation of 
formants with regard to the exercise of prosecutorial discretion and its judicial 
control, as they emerge from the ICC’s practice. The present chapter aims at 
complementing the work of critical assessment of this practice by proposing 
normative, institutional and administrative adjustments that may help reducing the 
current gap between the law in the books and the law in action, as well as to 
rationalise the existing interpretive disagreements in order to foster an increased 
predictability and consistency of both prosecutorial selection and judicial review 
decisions. 
It should preliminarily be clarified that while interpretive disagreements and 
patterns of dissociation of formants might be partially traced back to the inadequacy, 
lack of precision or lacunae of the Statute and of the other normative texts, 
proposing their amendment as an easy and pragmatic solution would be unrealistic 
and in some cases even politically impracticable. In this work we have demonstrated 
that the concrete outcomes of the exercise of prosecutorial discretion and its judicial 
review are the result of the complex interaction between the normative texts and the 
actual practice of the involved actors. Consequently, with the exception of relatively 
minor procedural issues, no quick-fix of the current trends in the ICC’s practice 
could reasonably be enacted merely by means of amendments to the legal texts1019. 
																																																								
1019 Obviously the relative ‘rigidity’ of the legal texts—hence the likelihood of their amendment—
differs across the spectrum. For instance, regulatory texts (such as the RPE and other Regulations) are 
much easier to change than the Statute. For this reason, proposals for amendment to the normative 
texts are put forward in par. 4 only with regard to regulatory sources. 
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For this reason—without ruling out the possibility that certain amendments or 
integrations, especially to the regulatory texts, could contribute to the enhancement 
of the coherence of prosecutorial and judicial practice—the present chapter 
concentrates on a number of correctives that could be enacted de lege lata, through 
the refinement, integration or rethinking of certain prosecutorial and judicial 
interpretive practices. 
 
2. The OTP’s role and the necessity of enhancing the consistency of prosecutorial 
choices 
The analysis of prosecutorial practices—and of their interactions with judicial 
ones—suggests that efforts need to be intensified in order to foster the consistency of 
prosecutorial choices at all stages of the pre-investigation and pre-trial phase. 
Considering the integrative and creative function performed by the organisational 
and procedural practices autonomously established by the Office throughout the 
years, it is purported that such practices need to be tweaked, rationalised and 
partially revised to address their current main inconsistencies and to increase the 
effectiveness of the OTP’s discretionary choices. 
As it will be seen in the following paragraphs, the improvements needed span 
from adjustments to the strategy/policy documents, to organisational and institutional 
developments, to working methods and procedural good practices capable of 
favouring a more constructive and less confrontational OTP-judges relation. Of 
course, none of these measures alone can guarantee the results aimed for, and only a 
synergy between these adjustments on the prosecutorial side and those that will be 
proposed as regards the judicial side of the equation of prosecutorial discretion could 
contribute to the increased coherence of the system. 
 
2.1 The consolidation of prosecutorial strategy and policy documents 
The analysis of prosecutorial strategies and policy papers revealed that 
especially the latter suffer from fragmentation, overlapping and even internal 
REDUCING THE GAP BETWEEN THE LAW IN THE BOOKS AND THE LAW IN ACTION AND MINIMISING THE 
CONSEQUENCES OF SYSTEMIC INTERPRETIVE DISAGREEMENTS 
 303 
contradictions, thereby reducing their ability to shape prosecutorial choices1020. 
Notwithstanding the observations concerning the relatively limited role of policy 
papers in predetermining the OTP’s concrete behaviour and selection decisions, it is 
alleged that a consolidation and rationalisation of these documents would be 
beneficial in providing a more coherent framework for the exercise of prosecutorial 
discretion1021. 
As regards the prosecutorial strategy, while the current one has certainly 
improved upon the preceding ones on various aspects—leading for instance to better 
results in terms of confirmation of charges—close monitoring of its implementation 
should be carried out on a continuous basis, in order to establish the realistic 
prospects of its fulfilment. The OTP will soon put forward an updated strategy for 
the years 2019-2021 together with an analysis of the results of the previous three 
years. It can nevertheless be observed that the objectives envisaged by the incumbent 
strategy were posited based on the prospect of implementation of the Basic Size 
Model, which is far from being completed1022. Therefore, adjustments to future 
performance objectives, especially with regard to the feasible caseload of the OTP 
and the Court based on the ASP’s budget allocations seem warranted1023. In addition 
to that, the possibility to formulate a long-term multiannual strategy, instead of a 
three-year one, deserves to be carefully considered by the Office. 
With regard to the policy papers and their proliferation in recent years, they 
surely require simplification and harmonisation. These documents have accumulated 
over a period of at least ten years without undergoing any systematic work of 
revision or harmonisation, notwithstanding the significant changes in the underlying 
prosecutorial strategy. They consist of roughly two hundred pages containing 
unnecessary duplications and inconsistencies in terms of content, purpose and 
																																																								
1020 See, supra, Part Two, Chapter Two, par. 3. 
1021 In this sense see K. AMBOS, Treatise on International Criminal Law, Vol. III, International 
Criminal Procedure, cit., 135. 
1022 See, supra, Chapter Two, par. 2.3 of this Part. 
1023 It should be reminded that the ASP has not yet endorsed the Basic Size Report for the purposes of 
budget allocations. See ICC-ASP/16/Res.1, Resolution of the Assembly of States Parties on the 
proposed programme budget for 2018, the Working Capital Fund for 2018, the scale of assessment for 
the apportionment of expenses of the International Criminal Court, financing appropriations for 2018 
and the Contingency Fund, 14 December 2017, 7. 
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style1024. It is therefore desirable that the OTP carries out in the near future a work of 
systematisation and simplification of these documents, possibly by creating a single 
and uniformly drafted master document, comprising an exposition of the general 
principles common to the current discrete papers, followed by issue-specific sections. 
Such unified policy document should then be periodically updated according to any 
changes in the underlying strategy, as well as to reflect judicial developments 
stemming from the Court’s decisions that have a bearing on the exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion. Of course, the proposed harmonisation does in no way 
prevent the Office from elaborating additional issue-specific policies to complement 
the existing ones. Moreover, the results of the implementation of the specific policies 
within the unified policy document could form the object of a dedicated periodic 
reporting activity, in order to monitor their efficacy.  
It is argued that this work would not only show the renewed OTP’s 
commitment towards a more transparent decision-making process, but would also 
make it easier to assess the effectiveness and internal consistency of prosecutorial 
discretionary choices and to monitor the Office’s overall performances. 
 
2.2 The duty to provide reasons for (all) prosecutorial discretionary choices 
Elsewhere in this work we have seen that interpretive disagreements among 
the different actors of the ICC’s legal process are to a certain extent physiological, 
provided that they do not result in the systematic failure to comply with the 
respective legal obligations1025. The absence of adequate legal avenues to resolve 
certain interpretive disagreement makes it necessary to engage in an open 
institutional dialogue between the involved actors, in order to put to test the 
plausibility of their competing interpretive claims. Such potentially constructive 
																																																								
1024 For instance, the Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations and the more recent one on Case 
Selection and Prioritisation contain almost identical expositions of the general principles of 
independence, impartiality and objectivity guiding the action of the Office. The same holds true for 
the elaboration on jurisdiction, admissibility and the interests of justice, with only minor adaptations 
in light of the different scope of selection decisions at the situation and case stage of the proceedings. 
The two policy papers, which deal with strictly connected policy issues, could easily be harmonised 
and condensed in a single document. Also the drafting style of the papers varies greatly across the 
spectrum, with the most recent papers on children and sex and gender-based crimes adopting a 
broader and more analytical approach when compared to earlier papers such as those on victims and 
the interests of justice. 
1025 See, supra, Chapter One of this Part. 
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dialectic can only take place if those actors commit to provide detailed and 
transparent reasoning for their discretionary decisions, even when a duty in that 
sense is not expressly stipulated by the pertinent rules or regulations1026. 
With regard to the OTP’s role in this dialectical process, it should be 
underlined that the Office has progressively moved from a relatively opaque 
decision-making—one in which reasons for certain decisions were either not 
provided to the public or in any event very limited—to a more transparent and 
constructive way of putting forward its discretionary decisions, especially those 
based on negative discretion (i.e. decisions not to proceed with further prosecutorial 
action)1027. It is advised that this approach to decision-making be continued and 
reinforced in the future practice of the Office, as the recent final decision regarding 
the Comoros situation seems to suggest1028. 
Even when regulatory texts do not expressly require that a prosecutorial 
discretionary decision state its reasons, this obligation might be implicit in the 
general principle of due diligence and constructive cooperation among the different 
articulations of the Court1029. In any event, stating the reasons for a decision allows 
the OTP, even in the absence of further judicial review, to publicly clarify its 
principled position on specific legal issues, thereby indicating to the judges its 
																																																								
1026 On some cases the legal texts expressly stipulate such a duty. See, e.g., Regulation 49(1)(b) of the 
Regulations of the Court with regard to the duty to provide reasons for the request of authorisation 
pursuant to article 15(3) of the Statute; Rule 49(1) of the RPE concerning the reasons in support of a 
decision not to ask for authorisation to investigate pursuant to article 15(6) of the Statute; Rule 105(3) 
and (5) and Rule 106(2) of the RPE concerning the OTP’s duty to provide reasons when notifying its 
decision not to initiate an investigation or to start a prosecution pursuant to, respectively, article 53(1) 
and (2) of the Statute; Rule 108(3) of the RPE on the notification of the OTP’s final decision on the 
investigation, pursuant to a PTC’s request for reconsideration adopted under article 53(3)(a) of the 
Statute. To the contrary, nothing is said with regard to the OTP’s decision to include or not to include 
a situation in the list of preliminary examinations. 
1027 See the more recent reporting activity on preliminary examinations and the issuance of detailed 
public reports in case of nolle prosequi. See, supra, Part Three, Chapter Two, par. 2.4. 
1028 See, e.g., ICC-OTP, Final decision of the Prosecution concerning the “Article 53(1) Report” (ICC-
01/13-6-AnxA), dated 6 November 2014, Situation on the Registered Vessels of the Comoros, Greece 
and Cambodia, ICC-01/13-57-Anx1, 30 November 2017, par. 14. 
1029 See B. D. LEPARD, How Should the ICC Prosecutor Exercise His or Her Discretion? The Role of 
Fundamental Ethical Principles, in The John Marshall Law Review, vol. 43, issue 3, 2010, 564, who 
considers the duty to provide and share the reasons for discretionary decisions an aspect of the more 
general obligation of transparency in decision-making, and qualifies it as a “fundamental ethical 
principle” that must guide the action of the Prosecutor. More generally on the importance of 
prosecutorial ethics and their influence on the perception of legitimacy of the Court, see A. HEINZE, F. 
SHANNON, Prosecutorial Ethics and Preliminary Examinations at the ICC, in M. BERGSMO, C. STAHN 
(eds.), Quality Control in Preliminary Examinations: Vol. 2, cit., 26-32, with particular emphasis on 
the Codes of Conduct adopted by the Office in recent years. See also F. FOKA TAFFO, op. cit., 230-233 
who speaks of the ethical principles of “bonne foi”, “loyauté” and “intégrité”. 
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preferred interpretation of the underlying provisions and on which the Prosecutor 
might rely in future cases. Documents stating the reasons for discretionary decisions 
therefore constitute practice of the Office that might be relevant for or relied on by 
other procedural actors in future cases. For this reason the Office should pay careful 
attention to the drafting of any document constituting an exercise of discretionary 
powers, and avoid exposing itself to contradictory legal interpretations of the 
relevant statutory and regulatory provisions. In any event, as already recalled 
elsewhere in this work, the normative—or merely deontological—duty to state the 
reasons for discretionary decisions could play a positive role and trigger constructive 
interpretive dynamics in the OTP-judges relations only if it is based on a clear and 
consistent prosecutorial strategy and policy. Failing such an underlying framework to 
guide the exercise of discretion—as it happened in the first years of the Court’s 
activity—transparent and open reasoning may be a double-edged sword in that it 
might reveal the flaws and inconsistencies of the OTP’s strategy or in its 
understanding of specific legal issues, thereby exposing the Office’s decisions to 
critique and judicial review1030. 
In light of the foregoing, it is advised that the OTP should carry on and 
possibly expand its current practice of in-depth reasoning for its discretionary 
decisions, but that it does so paying particular attention to the potentially unintended 
consequences of such reasoning and their influence on future cases1031. In particular, 
the Office should provide greater clarity with regard to the logical inferences 
between the information gathered during preliminary examinations and the legal 
assessment ultimately leading to a decision to proceed or not to proceed. This shall 
make the exercise of the PTC’s supervisory functions more straightforward, possibly 
reducing the incentive for judges to interfere with prosecutorial discretionary choices 
or to ‘re-shape’ the material or temporal scope of prospective investigations. 
																																																								
1030  In this vein, see M. M. DEGUZMAN, Choosing to Prosecute: Expressive Selection at the 
International Criminal Court, cit., 298-299. As A. C. RODRÍGUEZ PINEDA, Deterrence or 
Withdrawals? Consequences of Publicising Preliminary Examination Activities, in M. BERGSMO, C. 
STAHN (eds.), Quality Control in Preliminary Examinations: Vol. 2, cit., 355 clearly explains: “For 
transparency to have a real impact, it must be meaningful, exemplifying appropriate communication 
and ensuring accountability”. 
1031 See, supra, Chapter Two, par. 2.3 of this Part (particularly footnote 1018). 
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2.3 Organisational correctives: Implementing the Basic Size Model and other 
administrative adjustments 
There is no doubt that the internal organisational, administrative and 
managerial practices of the OTP have a significant impact on the implementation of 
the Office’s strategy and policies. They must therefore be designed and fine-tuned in 
order to attain the proposed performance objectives and be commensurate to the 
available human and financial resources. In this sense, we have analysed the OTP’s 
elaboration concerning the resources and organisational adjustments needed to keep 
up with the implementation of its current prosecutorial strategy, which resulted in the 
Report on the Basic Size of the Office of 20151032. Notwithstanding the obvious 
limits of a purely managerial approach towards such complex issues1033, the Basic 
Size Model constitutes a reasonable starting point to reflect on the organisational 
correctives needed to enhance the efficacy and efficiency of the OTP’s action, 
including the consistency of discretionary selection decisions. Nevertheless, it should 
be observed that to date, little progress has been made in the implementation of the 
Basic Size Model, mainly due to the lack of a clear endorsement by the ASP1034. 
The Basic Size Model is interesting in that it applies a demand-driven 
methodology in order to determine the resources needed by the Office to perform 
“mandated activities”, based on an extrapolation of past experience. It should 
nevertheless be recognised—as the Office does—that reliance on past practice, 
which was based on a significantly different prosecutorial strategy, is not necessarily 
helpful in determining the OTP’s future needs1035. In any event, with regard to the 
prosecutorial activities relevant to this work—namely preliminary and pre-trial 
activities—the OTP’s predicts to open two new preliminary examinations and to 
close other two every year. Along these lines, considering the inflow and outflow, 
																																																								
1032 On the Basic Size Model see, supra, Part Two, Chapter Two, par. 5. See also ICC-ASP/14/21*, 
Report of the Court on the Basic Size of the Office of the Prosecution, 17 September 2015. 
1033 For a critique of the concept of managerialism in international law see M. KOSKENNIEMI, The 
Politics of International Law-20 Years Later, in European Journal of International Law, vol. 20, no. 
1, 2009, 15-16 and, of the same Author, International Law, Constitutionalism, Managerialism and the 
Ethos of Legal Education, in European Journal of Legal Studies, vol. 1, issue 1, 2007, 12-13. 
1034 See ICC-ASP/16/Res.1, Resolution of the Assembly of States Parties on the proposed programme 
budget for 2018, the Working Capital Fund for 2018, the scale of assessment for the apportionment of 
expenses of the International Criminal Court, financing appropriations for 2018 and the Contingency 
Fund, 14 December 2017, 7. 
1035 See ICC-ASP/14/21*, Report of the Court on the Basic Size of the Office of the Prosecution, 17 
September 2015, par. 15-18. 
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the Office should deal yearly with a total of nine preliminary examinations1036. To 
cope with this demand the Office has envisaged an increase of the dedicated staff 
assigned to the Situation Analysis Section (SAS)—one of the two articulations of the 
Jurisdiction Complementarity and Cooperation Division (JCCD)—from 13 to 17 
analyst posts (excluding the related administrative positions, covered at the 
divisional level)1037. Since this structure is responsible for most of the activities 
carried out at the preliminary examination stage and on the basis of which the Office 
makes its early selection decisions—including the drafting of the interim and final 
reports, as well as field missions and other crucial tasks—it is contended that even 
with the increase proposed in the Basic Size Model it would be extremely difficult to 
cope with the current performance objectives. The Report envisages a significantly 
bigger increase in resources with regard to investigation and trial activities1038, 
possibly overlooking the fact that good investigations and trials necessarily stem 
from a careful selection and analysis at the preliminary examination stage. Hence, a 
more balanced distribution of the additional human and financial resources across the 
various articulations of the OTP seems warranted in the perspective of the future 
implementation and refinement of the Basic Size Model. 
In the absence of a thorough implementation of the Basic Size Model—
including the proposed adjustments in order to reflect the importance of preliminary 
examination activities for the development of future proceedings—it shall probably 
be necessary to amend the prosecutorial strategy for the years to come, scaling down 
the number of preliminary examinations per year that the Office plans to deal with. 
Such a retreat on the prospective goals of the Office would nevertheless have the 
effect of damaging the legitimacy of the Court and would certainly attract 
international criticism. The OTP might play on this threat to the legitimacy of the 
Court in trying to persuade the ASP to endorse the Basic Size Model and to support 
its implementation through adequate financial allocations1039. 
																																																								
1036 Ibidem, par. 21-23 
1037 Ibidem, Annex II, par. 17-19 and Annex III on other administrative issues.  
1038 Ibidem, par. 29 (with particular regard to the tables providing detailed numbers on the additional 
personnel needed for each articulation of the Office), and Annex II par. 23-24, 28-29, 35-46, 47-59, 
60.  
1039 On the role and functions of the ASP, also with regard to its budgetary powers vis-à-vis the other 
organs of the Court, see G. NESI, The Organs of the International Criminal Court and their Functions 
in the Rome Statute: The Assembly of States Parties, in F. LATTANZI, W. A. SCHABAS (eds.), Essays 
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In any event, it can be argued that the current workload of the OTP and of the 
Court in general is probably already exceeding the administrative and judicial 
capacity of its main organs. Therefore it is advised that the OTP avoids putting 
forward an updated strategy envisaging increased numbers as regards both 
prospective preliminary examinations and investigations in the absence of any actual 
strengthening of the human and financial resources currently available. At the same 
time, any development in the practice of the Office and Chambers that may further 
and excessively increase the workload of the Court—for instance the already 
mentioned trend towards a presumption in favour of the opening of investigations—
should not be encouraged without a careful assessment of the related financial and 
administrative consequences1040. 
	
3. The Judges’ contribution to the coherence of the system 
The overall consistency of the system of prosecutorial discretion and judicial 
review at the ICC—as clarified throughout this study—does not depend exclusively 
on the OTP’s strategy, policies and actual preliminary examination, investigation and 
prosecution choices. The contribution of judges, and particularly of preliminary 
judges, is paramount in the dynamic process of construction of a coherent 
institutional balance. 
The PTCs’ approach towards the exercise of supervisory powers does not yet 
reflect a comprehensive and sufficiently settled judicial strategy and proved to be 
characterised by certain interpretive inconsistencies1041. In any event, practice so far 
has shown a trend of judicial self-restraint in supervisory decisions with regard to the 
authorisation proceedings, whereas judicial interventionism seemed more 
pronounced in the only example of review of a nolle prosequi decision. 
																																																																																																																																																													
on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Vol. I, Ripa di Fagnano Alto, 1999, 233-250 
and, of the same Author, The International Criminal Court: its establishment and its relationship with 
the United Nations System; its composition, administration and financing, in F. LATTANZI (ed.), The 
International Criminal Court: Comments on the Draft Statute, Napoli, 1998, 171-191. 
1040 See, supra, Chapter One, par. 4 and Chapter Two, par. 2.3 of this Part. On the necessity to strike a 
balance between the need to investigate and prosecute, and the efficient use of the Court’s resources, 
with particular regard to the concept of proper administration of justice, see F. FOKA TAFFO, op. cit., 
184-188. 
1041 See, supra, Chapter One, par. 3 of this Part. 
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The quest for a more predictable exercise of prosecutorial discretion could 
greatly benefit from an effort of the competent PTCs in order to clarify and 
consolidate the interpretation of the legal standards for the supervision of 
prosecutorial choices, thereby overcoming the differences that have emerged among 
different Chambers on these issues. In addition to that, it is submitted that the 
practice of the Chambers—including of the AC—could contribute to improve 
judicial economy and efficiency, for instance by means of accepting and deciding on 
the OTP’s ‘pre-preliminary’ motions (i.e. filed prior to the opening of a preliminary 
examination) for an anticipatory ruling on jurisdiction and/or admissibility, or by 
accepting on exceptional basis to adjudicate on the merits of appeals against the 
PTC’s review decisions under article 53(3) of the Statute. Such creative practices, 
which are not alien to the practice of the Court in other areas of both substantive and 
procedural law1042, might then form the basis for amendments to or integrations of the 
regulatory texts, in the interest of legal certainty and predictability, which might be 
impaired by persistent interpretive disagreements between the OTP and preliminary 
judges and between the various Chambers. 
 
3.1 The use of pre-trial management powers and clarifications on the standards of 
review of prosecutorial choices 
The first manner in which the Judiciary could contribute to increase the 
overall consistency and predictability of the ICC’s selection choices would be to 
elaborate a more coherent approach towards the interpretation of both the legal 
criteria for the exercise of prosecutorial selection choices and the legal standards for 
their judicial supervision, when such a review is permitted under the Statute and 
regulatory texts. As we have seen in the previous chapter there are inconsistencies in 
																																																								
1042 For instance, the mistrial without prejudice to retrial declared by TC V(A) in the case of Ruto and 
Sang was a pure judicial creation of the Majority of the Chamber. See ICC, Decision on Defence 
Applications for Judgments of Acquittal, Prosecutor v. Ruto et al., Situation in the Republic of Kenya, 
ICC-01/09-01/11-2027-Red-Corr, TC V(A), 5 April 2016. On this decision see the analysis of K. J. 
HELLER, The Ruto Trial Chamber Invents the Mistrial Without Prejudice, Opinio Juris, 8 April 2016 
(available at: http://opiniojuris.org/2016/04/08/the-icc-invents-the-possibility-of-a-mistrial/, last 
accessed 6 November 2018); and W. A. SCHABAS, The Mistrial, An Innovation in International 
Criminal Law, PhD Studies in Human Rights Blog, 8 April 2016 (available at: 
http://humanrightsdoctorate.blogspot.it/2016/04/the-mistrial-innovation-in.html, last accessed 6 
November 2018). 
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the practice of the various Pre-Trial Chambers with regard to—inter alia—the PTC’s 
potential directive role at the preliminary stage 1043  and the margin of judicial 
discretion when authorising the investigation based on the OTP’s proprio motu1044. In 
addition to that, there are also serious uncertainties on the legal nature and concrete 
consequences of judicial review of prosecutorial negative decisions pursuant to 
article 53(3) of the Statute1045. 
With regard to the procedural tools provided for by the regulatory texts in 
order to guide the exercise of prosecutorial discretion as early as at the preliminary 
examination stage—such as the power to convene status conferences or to ask 
additional information—the Pre-Trial Chamber could more frequently make use of 
these tools, if this is required by reasons of judicial economy or procedural 
fairness1046. Nevertheless, the previous patterns of strong prosecutorial opposition to 
such measures should be carefully considered, in order to avoid sparking additional 
controversies and interpretive disagreements that might run contrary to the very 
reason for the adoption of such pre-trial management measures1047. In any event, the 
awareness that the Chamber is prepared to exercise these powers might be a 
sufficient incentive for the OTP to carry out preliminary examination activities 
thoroughly and within a reasonable period of time1048. 
With regard to the exercise of judicial supervision in the context of article 15 
authorisation procedures, future Pre-Trial Chambers should make additional efforts 
to overcome the inconsistencies of their current case law. In fact, while all 
authorising PTCs have so far adopted a largely shared—and rather liberal—approach 
to the judicial review of the OTP’s request for authorisation, they have at times 
differed on issues such as the nature and degree of judicial supervision over the 
																																																								
1043 See, supra, Part Two, Chapter Three, par. 2.1 (particularly footnotes 520-528), and Chapter One, 
par. 2 of this Part.  
1044 See, supra, Chapter One, par. 3 of this Part. 
1045 Ibidem. 
1046 On these powers and the possible justifications for their use see the analysis carried out, supra, in 
Part Two, Chapter Three, par. 2.1.  
1047 For instance the OTP’s refusal to timely abide by a directive decision of the Chamber—premised 
on insufficiently clear legal basis—might cause additional delays or impinge upon the participatory 
rights of other parties and participants. 
1048 This might be the case, for instance, with regard to the duration of preliminary examinations, 
notwithstanding the fact that the OTP continues to maintain that there cannot be specified time limits 
and that it is not under a duty to provide the Chamber with all the information acquired during 
preliminary examination—for instance for the purposes of a request of authorisation to investigate—
failing a formal request of the Chamber to that end. 
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OTP’s request and most importantly the margins for the judicial ‘manipulation’ of 
the material and temporal scope of the authorised investigations1049. While all 
situations have their peculiarities and need to be decided on their merits based on the 
requests of the Office, the Chambers should provide greater clarity and adopt a more 
principled approach to these legal standards, also in the interest of a more consistent 
prosecutorial practice based on judicial feedbacks and a system of incentives and 
disincentives. In any event, the current trends in the authorisation practices of the 
Chamber might be considered for certain aspects excessively liberal, due to the 
deferential approach towards the OTP’s assessment of the information and the 
tendency to expand—rather than constrain and supervise—prosecutorial 
discretion1050. In this sense, the possibility to revert to the more rigorous approach 
adopted by the Kenya PTC—without rejecting other innovations introduced in 
subsequent decisions—would not necessarily represent a step backwards and might 
contribute to reduce the degree of dissociation between the textual and the 
prosecutorial/judicial formants on this matter1051. 
With regard to the exercise of powers of judicial review pursuant to article 
53(3) of the Statute, the paucity of practice—which is limited to the decisions of the 
PTC in the Comoros situation—does not preclude the possibility to formulate 
proposals that might help future PTCs to overcome the current clash of 
interpretations between the Office and the Reviewing Chamber. In particular, the 
most problematic aspect of the Comoros review decision revolves around the 
Chamber’s holding that in the context of article 53(1) and (2) decisions true 
prosecutorial discretion would only be exercised based on the assessment of the 
interests of justice, whereas both jurisdiction and especially admissibility would 
																																																								
1049 See, supra, Chapter One, par. 2 and 3 of this Part. This comprises the inconsistencies across the 
different Chambers in the approach concerning the inferences to draw from the information and 
supporting materials provided by the Office and attached to the request for authorisation, as well as 
the possibility for the Chamber to go ultra petita in authorising the investigation. See, supra, footnote 
970. On these contrasts and lack of unanimity among judges—reflected in the various dissenting 
opinions—see M. E. CROSS, The Standard of Proof in Preliminary Examinations, in M. BERGSMO, C. 
STAHN (eds.), Quality Control in Preliminary Examinations: Vol. 2, cit., 214-217, who stresses that 
“Greater clarity about the standard of proof applicable to preliminary examinations will yield some 
particular benefits, beyond dispelling the myth that the Prosecutor’s analysis is purely oriented to 
delivering some kind of ‘preferred’ consequence”. 
1050 See, supra, Chapter One, par. 4 of this Part. 
1051 Ibidem. 
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entail a purely non-discretional application of “exacting legal requirements”1052. 
While one might be sympathetic with the Chamber’s willingness to put to test the 
OTP’s decision not to open an investigation on the Mavi Marmara incident, the 
Majority did so by subscribing to an excessively rigid and intransigent position, one 
that risks of unreasonably curtailing the Prosecutor’s margin of appreciation with 
regard to crucial selection tools such as gravity and complementarity. In addition to 
that, it can be argued that the Comoros PTC—as observed by the OTP in its Final 
Decision1053—while formally subscribing to an error-based review of the OTP’s 
decision, actually conducted a de novo review on the merits, overwriting its own 
autonomous assessment of situational gravity to that of the Office, without even 
asking the OTP to provide the complete information on which the decision not to 
proceed was based1054. Notwithstanding the non-binding character of the review 
decision with regard to the outcomes of reconsideration and the OTP’s confirmation 
of its prior decision in the specific situation at hand, it is desirable that future PTCs 
do not follow the Comoros precedent on these points. Following the precedent would 
determine a twist of the system towards quasi-mandatory investigations, with the 
consequences already examined in the previous chapter. In particular, future PTCs 
should depart from the approach of the Comoros PTC—following instead the more 
nuanced position of the AC1055—by confirming the at least partly discretional 
character of the criteria set out in article 53(1)(a) and (b) of the Statute. At the same 
time they should provide greater clarity and transparency with regard to the standard 
of review to be applied at the reviewing stage. Were the future Chambers to openly 
																																																								
1052 See ICC, Decision on the request of the Union of the Comoros to review the Prosecutor’s decision 
not to initiate an investigation, Situation on the Registered Vessels of the Comoros, Greece and 
Cambodia, ICC-01/13-34, PTC I, 16 July 2015, par. 14. This position is echoed by scholars who 
subscribe to the idea of the “purely legalistic nature of preliminary examinations”. See, e.g., M. E. 
GAWRONSKI, The Legalistic Function of Preliminary Examinations: Quality Control as a Two-Way 
Street, in M. BERGSMO, C. STAHN (eds.), Quality Control in Preliminary Examinations: Vol. 1, cit., 
181-184. A more nuanced—and therefore preferable—position is the one expressed by M. E. CROSS, 
op. cit., 239-243, who distinguishes the aspect of decision-making based on non-discretionary 
standards from the necessary recognition of “methodological discretion”, i.e. the ability to control and 
direct the process of analysis at the PE stage. 
1053 See ICC-OTP, Final decision of the Prosecution concerning the “Article 53(1) Report” (ICC-
01/13-6-AnxA), dated 6 November 2014, Situation on the Registered Vessels of the Comoros, Greece 
and Cambodia, ICC-01/13-57-Anx1, 30 November 2017, par. 51-52. 
1054 Ibidem, par. 68. 
1055 See ICC, Decision on the admissibility of the Prosecutor’s appeal against the “Decision on the 
request of the Union of the Comoros to review the Prosecutor’s decision not to initiate an 
investigation”, Situation on the Registered Vessels of the Comoros, Greece and Cambodia, ICC-
01/13-51, AC, 6 November 2015, par. 59. See also, supra, footnote 977. 
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subscribe to an in-depth de novo review of the OTP’s decisions not to proceed, they 
should then consequently ask the OTP to provide all the supporting information and 
documents, since no review on the merits can be reasonably conducted without 
access to information only available to the primary finder of fact1056. 
	
3.2 ‘Pre-preliminary’ rulings on jurisdiction and admissibility as an efficient pre-
investigation management tool 
Another contribution to the overall predictability and efficiency of the 
prosecutorial discretion regime might come from the PTCs’ readiness to accept and 
decide on the OTP’s requests for ‘pre-preliminary’ rulings on jurisdiction and/or 
admissibility, such as the one filed by the Office with regard to the alleged crimes 
against the Rohingya population across Myanmar and Bangladesh 1057 . The 
justification for such requests lies in the possibility to obtain an early judicial 
determination—albeit revisable at a later stage—on the existence of jurisdiction or 
on the admissibility of potential cases within a given situation, ahead of the opening 
of or during a preliminary examination. The gain in terms of judicial economy of 
such a procedure is self-evident. If the competent PTC declares at such an early 
stage—before the institution of any formal preliminary procedure or in its early 
stage—the lack of jurisdiction or the inadmissibility of the potential cases within a 
given situation, the OTP could then spare the human and financial resources needed 
to carry out a lengthy, complex and ultimately futile preliminary examination. 
Nevertheless, it must be observed that the unprecedented request put forward 
by the Office with regard to the alleged crimes against the Rohingya population 
seems to be premised on the exceptional circumstances of that situation, and in 
																																																								
1056 It is difficult to disagree with the following passage of the OTP’s Final Decision on the Comoros: 
“Disagreements concerning the evaluation of the available information can only be given very limited 
weight by the Prosecution when the reviewing body has not had opportunity to examine the available 
information itself” (ICC-OTP, Final decision of the Prosecution concerning the “Article 53(1) Report” 
(ICC-01/13-6-AnxA), dated 6 November 2014, Situation on the Registered Vessels of the Comoros, 
Greece and Cambodia, ICC-01/13-57-Anx1, 30 November 2017, par. 68). Against the recognition of 
the PTC’s power to conduct a de novo review, see M. E. CROSS, op. cit., 251. 
1057 On the novelty of this procedure in the practice of the Court see, supra, Part Three, Chapter Two, 
par. 2.2. The unprecedented character of this request is recognised by the OTP itself in its submissions 
(see ICC-OTP, Prosecution’s Request for a Ruling on Jurisdiction under Article 19(3) of the Statute, 
Application under Regulation 46(3) of the Regulations of the Court, ICC-RoC46(3)-01/18-1, 9 April 
2018, par. 6). 
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particular the construction of the trans-boundary element of the underlying alleged 
crime of deportation, which created a substantial legal uncertainty worth resolving 
prior to the opening of a preliminary examination1058. In any event, in the light of the 
recent Chamber’s decision that established the possibility to exercise jurisdiction on 
the alleged crimes against the Rohingya, the OTP could in the future consider to 
extend this kind of requests to issues of complementarity and/or gravity, especially in 
borderline situations marked by controversial factual and legal circumstances. In this 
scenario clarifications on the material, territorial, personal and temporal scope of a 
prospective preliminary examination and investigation—as well as on issues of 
admissibility—would be given ex ante and not ex post, thereby contributing to put 
prosecutorial activities on the right track from the beginning and reducing the risk of 
subsequent interpretive clashes at the time of authorisation of an investigation or 
judicial review of nolle prosequi decisions. 
The main issue with this novel approach—considering that the texts do not 
explicitly envisage nor exclude this kind of requests—is that the OTP, by asking an 
early pre-preliminary ruling to the PTC, would in essence partly shift from the Office 
to the Chamber the onus of making an assessment of jurisdiction and/or admissibility 
in particularly controversial cases. It is debatable whether this scheme of 
‘responsibility sharing’ in the adoption of early prosecutorial discretionary choices is 
in line with the separation of functions between the OTP and the Judiciary, and with 
their respective institutional independence. In this vein, the dissenting judge in the 
decision concerning the Rohingya stressed the fact that the OTP’s request at a pre-
preliminary stage seems to deviate from the established practice concerning 
preliminary examinations (what we have referred to as ‘proceduralisation’), and 
																																																								
1058 The doubts on the existence of the Court’s jurisdiction revolved around the construction of the 
constituent elements of the crime of deportation. In particular the question is whether the territorial 
jurisdiction of the Court is engaged when an essential legal element of the underlying offence—the 
crossing of an international border—occurred on the territory of a State Party, while the other 
elements of the crime occurred on the territory of a state that is not a party to the Statute. On the 
constituent elements of the crime of deportation and the differences with the cognate offence of 
forcible transfer of population, see J. M. HENCKAERTS, Deportation and Transfer of Civilians in Time 
of War, in Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, vol. 26, 1993, 469-496; E. AMATI, E. MACULAN, 
I crimini contro l’umanità, in E. AMATI, M. COSTI, E. FRONZA, P. LOBBA, E. MACULAN, A. VALLINI, 
op. cit., 373-374; M. C. BASSIOUNI, Crimes Against Humanity. Historical Evolution and 
Contemporary Application, Cambridge, 2011, 381-396. On the Chamber’s reasoning concerning the 
elements of the crime of deportation see ICC, Decision on the “Prosecution’s Request for a Ruling on 
Jurisdiction under Article 19(3) of the Statute”, Application under Regulation 46(3) of the Regulations 
of the Court, ICC-RoC46(3)-01/18-37, PTC I, 6 September 2018, par. 52-61. 
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pointed at the risk that by means of such requests the OTP could  “put to the Pre-
Trial Chamber hypothetical or abstract questions of jurisdiction” or “even shift the 
burden of assembling a case onto the Pre-Trial Chamber”1059. In his view, the 
decision of the Chamber was tantamount to an advisory opinion, devoid of any 
statutory basis1060. In any event, it cannot be easily predicted whether future PTCs 
called to decide on analogous requests will follow PTC I’s precedent, thereby trying 
to influence the scope of a preliminary examination before its formal commencement 
or, to the contrary, they will call upon the Office to discharge its primary duties with 
regard to the selection of situations, as well as to the factual and legal assessment of 
jurisdiction and admissibility1061. 
Be as it may, it is advised that the Chambers should not entirely rule out the 
possibility of accepting on case-by-case basis such requests, thereby adding an 
additional instrument to the spectrum of practice-based procedural mechanisms for 
the promotion of judicial economy. 
	
3.3 Allowing appeals against review decisions on extraordinary basis to solve 
interpretive disagreements with regard to the power of judicial review 
The appeal system of the ICC is characterised by a closed enumeration of the 
judicial decisions subject to appeal and the Appeals Chamber has on various 
occasions reaffirmed its rigidity1062. At the same time, the Statute precludes the 
																																																								
1059 See Partially Dissenting Opinion of Judge’s Marc Perrin de Brichambaut, Application under 
Regulation 46(3) of the Regulations of the Court, ICC-RoC46(3)-01/18-37-Anx, 6 September 2018, 
par. 13. The dissenting judge also reasoned that the Chamber—in accepting to decide on the request 
and in grounding its decision on a legal basis not relied upon by the Office—risked to “usurp the role 
of the Prosecutor” (ibidem, par. 30) and that challenges to the jurisdiction of the Court could have 
been in any event entertained at a later stage of the proceedings pursuant to article 19(3) of the Statute 
(ibidem, par. 31-32). 
1060 Ibidem, par. 33-35. Contra, favourably on the introduction of the possibility for the OTP to seek 
an advisory opinion from the Chamber on issues relevant to the preliminary examination stage, A. 
LUBIN, op. cit., 145. 
1061 In addition to this, it must be observed that a pre-preliminary decision on jurisdiction would 
generally address rather theoretical questions, such as the interpretation of certain elements of a crime 
for the purposes of establishing the Court’s territorial and material jurisdiction or, one can speculate, 
to solve uncertainties on the existence of personal jurisdiction. Differently, issues of complementarity 
or gravity involve a more concrete and substantive factual and legal analysis, one that is certainly 
more difficult to produce at such an early stage of the proceedings, prior to a full preliminary 
examination. 
1062 See article 81 and 82 of the Statute. The latter provision deals with appeals against decisions other 
than those of acquittal, conviction or on sentence, providing an enumerated list of decisions that can 
be appealed. On the “narrow interpretation” of article 82(1)(a) of the Statute by the AC see V. 
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possibility to challenge some of the most relevant prosecutorial discretionary 
decisions at the pre-investigation stage, with the notable exception of negative 
decisions pursuant to article 53(1) and (2) of the Statute. This rigidity and 
formalism—resulting more from the restrictive practice of the AC than from the text 
itself—explain the persistence of certain interpretive disagreements between the OTP 
and judges, which do not find a forum for authoritative judicial settlement. 
In this regard it should be recalled that the AC declined to decide on the 
merits of the OTP’s appeal against the PTC’s review decision in the Comoros 
situation, declaring it inadmissible in limine based on the settled case law concerning 
the admissibility of appeals1063. Nevertheless, this extremely restrictive approach does 
not seem to be mandated by the Statute with regard to the possibility to challenge 
																																																																																																																																																													
NERLICH, Article 82, Appeal against other decisions, in O. TRIFFTERER, K. AMBOS (eds.), op. cit., 
1957-1959; F. C. ECKELMANS, The First Jurisprudence of the Appeals Chamber of the ICC, in in C. 
STAHN, G. SLUITER, (eds.), op. cit., 538-541. More generally on the appeal system at the ICC see H. 
BRADY, Appeal and Revision, in R. S. LEE (ed.), The International Criminal Court: Elements of 
Crimes and Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Ardsley, 2001, 575-595. On the AC’s interpretation of 
the concept of “decision with respect to admissibility” for the purposes of appeal see, ICC, Judgment 
on the Prosecutor's appeal against the decision of Pre-Trial Chamber I entitled ‘Decision on the 
Prosecutor's Application for Warrants of Arrest, Article 58’, Situation in the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo, ICC-01/04-169-US-Exp, AC, 13 July 2006, par. 18; ICC, Decision on the admissibility of 
the ‘Appeal of the Government of Kenya against the “Decision on the Request for Assistance 
Submitted on Behalf of the Government of the Republic of Kenya Pursuant to Article 93(10) of the 
Statute and Rule 194 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence”’, Situation in the Republic of Kenya, 
ICC-01/09-78, AC, 10 August 2011, par. 15-16; ICC, Decision on the admissibility of the 
Prosecutor’s appeal against the “Decision on the request of the Union of the Comoros to review the 
Prosecutor’s decision not to initiate an investigation”, Situation on the Registered Vessels of the 
Comoros, Greece and Cambodia, ICC-01/13-51, AC, 6 November 2015, par. 41-52. Nevertheless, it 
should be reminded that the AC has on some occasions adopted a more flexible and less formalistic 
approach towards the admissibility of appeals against certain decisions of the PTC or TC. For 
instance, with regard to decisions on reparations for the benefit of victims, it declared admissible 
some of the appeals brought against the first decision on the principles for reparation in the Lubanga 
case (ICC, Decision establishing the principles and procedures to be applied to reparations, 
Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, ICC-01/04-01/06-2904, 
TC I, 7 August 2012). In its admissibility decision the AC reasoned that the Impugned Decision, 
although it did not formally qualify as an “order for reparations” pursuant to article 75(2) and 82(4) of 
the Statute and did lack some of the substantive features to qualify as such an order, it could 
nevertheless be deemed in substance a reparation order for the purposes of appeal. See ICC, Decision 
on the admissibility of the appeals against Trial Chamber I's “Decision establishing the principles and 
procedures to be applied to reparations” and directions on the further conduct of proceedings, 
Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, ICC-01/04-01/06-2953, 
AC, 14 December 2012, par. 51, 64; ICC, Judgment on the appeals against the “Decision establishing 
the principles and procedures to be applied to reparations” of 7 August 2012 with AMENDED order 
for reparations (Annex A) and public annexes 1 and 2, Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Situation in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, ICC-01/04-01/06-3129, AC, 3 March 2015, par. 29, 35-36. 
1063 See ICC, Decision on the admissibility of the Prosecutor’s appeal against the “Decision on the 
request of the Union of the Comoros to review the Prosecutor’s decision not to initiate an 
investigation”, Situation on the Registered Vessels of the Comoros, Greece and Cambodia, ICC-
01/13-51, AC, 6 November 2015, par. 41-52. 
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decisions adopted under article 53(3)(a) of the Statute by a Reviewing Chamber1064. 
In particular, as clearly pointed out by the dissenting judges, the AC could have 
retained the appeal for decision on the merits by qualifying the PTC’s decision as 
one with respect to admissibility in the sense of article 82(1)(a) of the Statute1065. This 
would have allowed the AC to clarify whether the standard of review applied by the 
PTC, as well as the reasoning and conclusions for requesting the Prosecutor to 
reconsider its previous decision, were correct. By refusing to enter into such 
discussion for procedural reasons, the AC created the conditions for the perpetuation 
of the disagreement between the OTP and the PTC, which was made explicit in the 
Office’s Final Decision. It is argued that the AC could have entertained the appeal 
without necessarily departing from its settled case law, considering that based on the 
current practice the procedure at hand proved to be infrequent (only one case in 
fifteen years), and does not risk to unreasonably increase the workload of the AC or 
to open the door to extensive appellate litigation1066. Nevertheless, the AC’s decision 
contained some useful indications—albeit obiter—with regard to the review scheme 
of article 53(3) of the Statute, thereby indirectly providing guidance for future 
practice on this matter. In particular, it clarified that whatever the outcome of the 
procedure and the standard of review applied by the reviewing Chamber, the Office 
has the final say on the opening or not opening of the investigation1067. 
																																																								
1064 See H. BRADY, op. cit., 578-579. The Author discusses the matter in the light of the states’ 
different positions at the time of the drafting of the Statute, arguing that “The wording of article 82, 
paragraph 1(a) is capable of being interpreted so as to cover the Pre-Trial Chamber’s decision under 
article 53, paragraph 3(a), when the decision involves jurisdiction or admissibility”. She nevertheless 
concludes that because under this procedure the final decision on the investigation is always for the 
OTP to make, an appellate review—irrespective of its outcome—would not make any real difference. 
While this might be true in practical terms, there is still merit in allowing the possibility to challenge 
the Chamber’s decision when it effectively—albeit not explicitly—rules on issues of admissibility, 
asking the AC to correct any error incurred in by the Chamber. See, infra, footnote 1068. 
1065 See Joint Dissenting Opinion of Judge Silvia Fernández De Gurmendi and Judge Christine Van 
Den Wyngaert”, Situation on the Registered Vessels of the Comoros, Greece and Cambodia, ICC-
01/13-51-Anx, 6 November 2015, par. 9-10, 19-21, 24-27, 29, 31-33, 36-37. 
1066 Ibidem. The dissenting judges pointed out that the precedents relied on by the Majority in 
dismissing the appeal as inadmissible were not pertinent to the case at hand. In particular, those 
precedents did relate to the admissibility of actual cases in the context of an already opened 
investigation, whereas the controversy before the AC in the Comoros situation related to the 
admissibility of potential cases in the context of the preliminary examination of a situation. 
1067 ICC, Decision on the admissibility of the Prosecutor’s appeal against the “Decision on the request 
of the Union of the Comoros to review the Prosecutor’s decision not to initiate an investigation”, 
Situation on the Registered Vessels of the Comoros, Greece and Cambodia, ICC-01/13-51, AC, 6 
November 2015, par. 58-59. The possibility to obtain this clarification—more than the real prospects 
of success of the appeal—was probably the main drive for the OTP in challenging the Chamber’s 
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It could be counter argued that the AC was better off leaving the issue to the 
dialectics between the PTC and the Prosecutor, thereby encouraging the OTP to 
openly clarify its position on the effects of the Chamber’s decision. In any event, in 
the interest of clarity and of the promotion of a less confrontational relationship 
between the OTP and PTC, it is advisable that the AC shall in future cases accept to 
adjudicate on challenges such as the one brought by the OTP in the Comoros 
situation, adopting a less formalistic approach towards the admissibility 
requirements. This could contribute to rectify any excesses and errors in the exercise 
of judicial review on the part of the PTC, and does not encroach per se with the 
exercise of discretion under article 53 of the Statute, as erroneously purported by the 
Majority of the AC1068. 
 
4. Proposals for amendment to the regulatory texts 
In concluding the presentation of the suggestions aimed at increasing the 
consistency of the prosecutorial and judicial practice and at reducing the gap between 
the law in the books and the law in action in relation to the exercise of discretion—
mindful of the observations on the impracticality of major statutory changes—we 
shall put forward a few proposals for amendment to the regulatory texts (RPE and 
Regulations of the Court). It is alleged that the proposed amendments might 
contribute to the development of current practices, providing incentives for a more 
cooperative relationship between the OTP and judges. The following table presents 




decision. While losing the case, the OTP was somehow reassured on the latitude of its discretionary 
powers. 
1068 Ibidem. The Majority argued that accepting to decide on the merits of the OTP’s appeal against 
the PTC’s decision, qualifying such decision as one with respect to admissibility, would have 
“[introduced] an additional layer of review by the Appeals Chamber that lacks any statutory basis”. 
The reasoning seems to imply that the OTP decided to appeal the Chamber’s decision not in order to 
protect its discretion, but to have it further restricted through the exercise of appellate review. This 
does not seem a very plausible reasoning and probably misinterprets the intentions of the Office in 
challenging the Chamber’s decision. In any event, had the AC decided on the merits of the Office’s 
appeal, such decision could only have had the effect of rectifying any error incurred by the PTC, 
without prejudice to the OTP’s right to a final say on the opening of an investigation. In this way, the 
statutory scheme of judicial review pursuant to article 53(3)(a) and (b) and the Prosecutor’s discretion 
would have been completely preserved. 






PROPOSED AMENDED VERSION 
 
Regulation 30 RoC 
Status conferences 






A Chamber may hold status conferences by 
way of hearings, including by way of audio- 
or video-link technology or by way of 
written submissions. The Chamber may 
require use of standard forms at a status 
conference as appropriate. Such standard 
forms shall be approved in accordance with 
regulation 23, sub-regulation 2. 
 
 
A sub-regulation is added to the text of 
Regulation 30: 
 
1. A Chamber may hold status conferences 
by way of hearings, including by way of 
audio- or video-link technology or by way of 
written submissions. The Chamber may 
require use of standard forms at a status 
conference as appropriate. Such standard 
forms shall be approved in accordance with 
regulation 23, sub-regulation 2. 
 
2. Having regard to the Chamber’s 
functions under article 57(3)(c), a status 
conference may also be convened at the 
preliminary examination stage by a Pre-
Trial Chamber constituted pursuant to 
Regulation 46(3) when, taking into 
account the complexity of the proceedings, 
the duration of preliminary examination 
exceeded a reasonable period of time, 
without a decision of the Prosecutor 
pursuant to article 53(1). The Chamber 
may alternatively request the Prosecutor 
to provide a written update on the 
activities performed and an estimate of 
the time needed to complete the 
preliminary examination. The Chamber 
shall be precluded from imposing a fixed 
time limit for the completion of such 
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Regulation 48 RoC  
Information necessary for the Pre-Trial 
Chamber 
Regulation 48 RoC 






1.  The Pre-Trial Chamber may request the 
Prosecutor to provide specific or additional 
information or documents in his or her 
possession, or summaries thereof, that the 
Pre-Trial Chamber considers necessary in 
order to exercise the functions and 
responsibilities set forth in article 53, 
paragraph 3 (b), article 56, paragraph 3 (a), 
and article 57, paragraph 3 (c).   
 
 
The words in bold are added to the text of 
sub-regulation 1: 
 
1.The Pre-Trial Chamber may request the 
Prosecutor to provide specific or additional 
information or documents in his or her 
possession, or summaries thereof, that the 
Pre-Trial Chamber considers necessary in 
order to exercise the functions and 
responsibilities set forth in article 53, 
paragraph 3 (a) and (b), article 56, 
paragraph 3 (a), and article 57, paragraph 3 
(c). 
 
Rule 50 RPE 
Procedure for authorization by the Pre-
Trial Chamber of the commencement of 
the investigation 
Rule 50 RPE 
Procedure for authorization by the Pre-






5. The Pre-Trial Chamber shall issue its 
decision, including its reasons, as to whether 
to authorize the commencement of the 
investigation in accordance with article 15, 
paragraph 4, with respect to all or any part of 
the request by the Prosecutor. The Chamber 
 
The words in bold are added to the text of 
sub-rule 5: 
 
5. The Pre-Trial Chamber shall issue its 
decision, including its reasons, as to whether 
to authorize the commencement of the 
investigation in accordance with article 15, 
paragraph 4, with respect to all or any part of 
the request by the Prosecutor. The Pre-Trial 
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shall give notice of the decision to victims 
who have made representations.   
 
Chamber shall, as a general rule, limit the 
authorisation to the legal and factual 
parameters contained in the Prosecutor’s 
request. If the Pre-Trial Chamber wishes 
to extend the scope of the authorized 
investigation beyond the material, 
temporal, territorial or personal 
parameters stated in the Prosecutor’s 
request, it shall do so only after having 
acquired and assessed any pertinent 
additional information pursuant to sub-
rule 4. The Chamber shall give notice of the 




Rule 58  RPE 
Proceedings under article 19 
Rule 58  RPE 




1. 1. A request or application made under 
article 19 shall be in writing and contain the 
basis for it. 
2.    
3. 2. When a Chamber receives a request or 
application raising a challenge or question 
concerning its jurisdiction or the 
admissibility of a case in accordance with 
article 19, paragraph 2 or 3, or is acting on 
its own motion as provided for in article 19, 
paragraph 1, it shall decide on the procedure 
to be followed and may take appropriate 
measures for the proper conduct of the 
proceedings. It may hold a hearing. It may 
 
The text in bold is inserted as sub-rule 3: 
 
1. A request or application made under 
article 19 shall be in writing and contain the 
basis for it. 
 
28. 2. When a Chamber receives a request or 
application raising a challenge or question 
concerning its jurisdiction or the 
admissibility of a case in accordance with 
article 19, paragraph 2 or 3, or is acting on 
its own motion as provided for in article 19, 
paragraph 1, it shall decide on the procedure 
to be followed and may take appropriate 
measures for the proper conduct of the 
proceedings. It may hold a hearing. It may 
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join the challenge or question to a 
confirmation or a trial proceeding as long as 
this does not cause undue delay, and in this 
circumstance shall hear and decide on the 
challenge or question first.  
4.  
5.  


















24. 3. The Court shall transmit a request or 
application received under sub-rule 2 to the 
Prosecutor and to the person referred to in 
article 19, paragraph 2, who has been 
surrendered to the Court or who has 
appeared voluntarily or pursuant to a 
summons, and shall allow them to submit 
written observations to the request or 
application within a period of time 
determined by the Chamber.   
join the challenge or question to a 
confirmation or a trial proceeding as long as 
this does not cause undue delay, and in this 
circumstance shall hear and decide on the 
challenge or question first.   
 
3. The Prosecutor may, on exceptional 
basis, file a request under article 19(3) 
prior to the commencement of or during 
preliminary examination, when 
compelling reasons of judicial economy 
and the complexity of the underlying legal 
issues make a judicial determination at 
that stage necessary for the proper 
administration of justice. The request 
shall be assigned to a Pre-Trial Chamber 
constituted pursuant to regulation 46(3) of 
the Regulations of the Court. Rule 59 shall 
apply mutatis mutandis. The competent 
Pre-Trial Chamber may invite the OPCD 
and OPCV to file observations and states, 
organizations or other persons to submit 
observations under Rule 103. 
 
29.  
30. 4. The Court shall transmit a request or 
application received under sub-rule 2 to the 
Prosecutor and to the person referred to in 
article 19, paragraph 2, who has been 
surrendered to the Court or who has 
appeared voluntarily or pursuant to a 
summons, and shall allow them to submit 
written observations to the request or 
application within a period of time 
determined by the Chamber.   




27. 4. The Court shall rule on any challenge or 
question of jurisdiction first and then on any 
challenge or question of admissibility.   
 
31.  
32. 5. The Court shall rule on any challenge or 
question of jurisdiction first and then on any 
challenge or question of admissibility. 
 
The first proposal aims at providing a regulatory basis for convening status 
conferences at the preliminary examination stage of proceedings or for requesting the 
OTP to provide a written update on their status, introducing a reasonable balance 
between excessive activism and self-restraint in the exercise of supervisory 
powers1069. In particular, the proposal recognises the necessity to take into account 
the complexity of the proceedings when evaluating the reasonableness of the OTP’s 
delay in reaching a decision under article 53(1) of the Statute, something that had 
been unduly overlooked by PTC III in the CAR I situation1070. The possibility for the 
Chamber to request an update on the status of the examination—even beyond the 
information made public by the OTP through its annual report—goes in the direction 
of overcoming the ‘information asymmetry’ between the OTP and the Chamber, 
which has been aptly criticised as one of the most unsatisfactory aspects of the 
																																																								
1069 On the necessity to strike a proper balance between these two extremes see D. SCHAFFER, A 
Review of the Experiences of the Pre-Trial and Appeals Chambers of the International Criminal 
Court Regarding the Disclosure of Evidence, in Leiden Journal of International Law, vol. 21, issue 1, 
2008, 158, 162-163. 
1070  Reference is to ICC, Decision Requesting Information on the Status of the Preliminary 
Examination of the Situation in the Central African Republic, Situation in the Central African 
Republic, ICC-01/05-6, PTC III, 30 November 2006, 4: “the preliminary examination of a situation 
pursuant to article 53 (1) of the Statute and rule 104 of the Rules must be completed within a 
reasonable time from the reception of a referral by a State Party under articles 13 (a) and 14 of the 
Statute, regardless of its complexity” (emphasis added). The PTC’s disregard for the complexity of the 
preliminary examination activities in evaluating the reasonableness of the OTP’s delay in taking a 
decision on the investigation has been criticised by K. AMBOS, Treatise on International Criminal 
Law, Vol. III, International Criminal Procedure, cit., 385. According to the Author an assessment of 
the reasonable length of the proceedings at the preliminary stage can only be made on a case-by-case 
basis, giving due consideration to the complexity of the proceedings. Contra, in favour of a more 
intrusive and official—as opposed to informal—supervisory role of the PTC already at the 
preliminary examination stage, H. KUCZYŃSKA, The Accusation Model Before the International 
Criminal Court – Study of Convergence of Criminal Justice Systems, Heidelberg/New 
York/Dordrecht/London, 2015, 76. It should be noted that in the recent PTC’s decision concerning the 
alleged crimes against the Rohingya, the Majority recalled the decision of PTC III in the CAR I 
situation, as well as stressing the OTP’s duty to proceed expeditiously with any activities that might 
lead to a decision on the investigation. See ICC, Decision on the “Prosecution’s Request for a Ruling 
on Jurisdiction under Article 19(3) of the Statute”, Application under Regulation 46(3) of the 
Regulations of the Court, ICC-RoC46(3)-01/18-37, PTC I, 6 September 2018, par. 75-77, 82-88. 
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system of checks and balances on prosecutorial discretion at the ICC1071. The opening 
reference to article 57(3)(c) of the Statute ensures that the exercise of the PTC’s pre-
trial management powers is functionally connected to the necessity to protect any 
relevant competing interests1072. The proposed formulation also excludes that a fixed 
time limit to adopt a decision may be imposed by the Chamber, although an 
amendment to the RPE, Regulations of the Court or Regulations of the OTP to the 
effect of introducing a maximum duration for PE cannot be completely dismissed in 
a perspective de lege ferenda1073. 
The second proposal aims at eliminating an evident normative inconsistency 
between the Regulations and the RPE. In fact, Regulation 48(1) excludes that the 
Pre-Trial Chamber may request additional information to the OTP for the purposes 
of exercising its power of review under article 53(3)(a) of the Statute, given that the 
provision only makes reference to letter (b) of that article. Nevertheless, Rule 107(2) 
of the RPE explicitly—and quite contradictorily—admits an analogous power for the 
PTC1074. While it could be argued that the exclusion in Regulation 48(1) was a 
deliberate choice as opposed to an unintended omission, it must be recalled that the 
Regulations are “subject to the Statute and the Rules”, and that these primary sources 
must prevail in case of discrepancy1075. In any event, a coordination of the two texts 
seems appropriate. 
The third proposal aims at addressing the issue, emerged in the practice of the 
authorising PTCs, concerning the scope of the authorisation vis-à-vis the content of 
the OTP’s request, and more specifically the possibility for the Chamber to go ultra 
																																																								
1071 In this sense see C. STAHN, Judicial Review of Prosecutorial Discretion: Five Years On, cit., 267, 
271-272, who stigmatises the PTC’s complete dependence on the information provided by the OTP 
for the exercise of meaningful judicial supervision, arguing that “Review under Article 53 (3) is based 
on a vicious cycle”. 
1072 Namely, along the lines of article 57(3)(c) of the Statute, the protection and privacy of victims, the 
preservation of evidence, the protection of the suspects and of national security information. 
1073 Alternatively, for a less radical solution and leaving the legal texts unchanged, the OTP could 
make a policy commitment to complete the PE activities within a reasonably predetermined period of 
time. In favour of such a solution, and indicating a three-year period as a possible maximum time 
limit, see A. PUES, op. cit., 451-452. The proposal is certainly reasonable, but seems at odds with the 
OTP’s firm stance against the imposition of any time limit to the duration of preliminary 
examinations. 
1074 The wording of the two provisions is very similar. The power to request additional information is 
functionally linked to the exercise of the other powers and responsibilities of the Chamber under the 
Statute. In other words, the information requested must be considered, in the view of the PTC, 
necessary to the exercise of its statutory functions. 
1075 See sub-regulation 1, Regulation 1 of the Regulations of the Court and article 52(1) of the Statute. 
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petita and authorise the investigation in wider terms than requested by the Office. It 
establishes that as a general rule the Chamber should remain within the limits of the 
request, and when it decides not to do so, it must have before it all the necessary 
information, including through the exercise of its power under sub-rule 4, thereby 
assuring that the Chamber’s decision finds sufficient factual basis in the materials in 
the possession of the Office and of other participants, once they are shared with the 
Chamber1076. 
The fourth and last proposal aims at providing an explicit regulatory basis for 
the procedure to obtain a pre-preliminary decision on jurisdiction and/or 
admissibility at the Prosecutor’s request, prior to the opening of or during the early 
stages of a preliminary examination. Obviously, the proposal to introduce such a rule 
might gain momentum after the PTC’s decision to declare admissible and grant most 
of the OTP’s request concerning the alleged crimes against the Rohingya. 
Nevertheless, it is proposed that the new rule clearly stipulates that the legal basis for 
such requests would be article 19(3) of the Statute and not, as purported by PTC I 
clearly acting ultra petita, article 119(1) or the general principle of Kompetenz-
Kompetenz. The judges themselves might consider the possibility to introduce a 
provisional amendment to the RPE or formulate a proposal for its amendment along 
these lines1077. Irrespective of the Chambers’ decision on the specific case and of 
future case law on other similar requests, the proposal is worth discussing in the 
event of future amendments of the RPE by the ASP1078. 
 
In conclusion, it is reiterated that only a mix of the policy, administrative, 
interpretive and legislative practices and innovations proposed above could 
reasonably contribute to more balanced and less confrontational relations between 
																																																								
1076 In addition to that, it could be argued that the PTC—when authorising the investigation ultra 
petita—should be required to provide a ‘reinforced’ reasoning in order to justify the extension of the 
authorisation to incidents or specific conducts (or legal characterisation thereof) not specifically 
covered by the Prosecutor’s request. 
1077 The judges, acting by a two-thirds majority, may introduce such a provisional rule, pursuant to 
article 51(3) of the Statute, or propose its adoption —acting by absolute majority—pursuant to article 
51(2)(b) of the Statute. On the “quasi-legislative” power endowed to judges in the adoption and 
amendment of procedural rules, see G. BOAS, J. L. BISCHOFF, N. L. REID, B. D. TAYLOR III (eds.), 
International Criminal Law Practitioner Library, Vol. III. International Criminal Procedure, 
Cambridge, 2011, 41-44. 
1078 See article 51(2) of the Statute, which requires a decision by a two-thirds majority of the members 
of the ASP for the adoption of amendments to the RPE. 
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the OTP and judges, in the interest of the legitimacy and full respect of the 
substantive and procedural components of the rule of law at the ICC.
!
 
  329 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
At the conclusion of this enquiry on prosecutorial discretion and its judicial 
review in the context of pre-trial procedures at the ICC, it is appropriate to briefly 
summarise the fundamental logical steps of the analysis and present its main 
findings. 
 
The analysis started from the assumption that, in the realm of international 
criminal law, prosecutorial discretion performs a fundamental and structural function 
of selection, one whose raison d’être can only in part be traced back to the traditional 
rationales adduced at the domestic level either in favour or against its adoption as a 
cornerstone of the criminal justice system. The uniqueness of international criminal 
justice—a consequence of the normative and institutional environment of 
international law1079—contributes to make the concept of prosecutorial discretion all 
the more elusive to define and slippery to approach in rigorous legal terms. Things 
are made even more complicated by the inextricable relation between discretion and 
judicial control, which cannot be understood in isolation from each other. 
In order to clarify the semantic contours of these intertwined concepts it has 
been necessary to resort to historical and comparative analysis. The diachronic and 
synchronic enquiry into the different manifestations of prosecutorial discretion and 
judicial control across the successive generations of international and 
																																																								
1079 It is maintained that the normative, institutional and procedural speciality of ICL and its 
enforcement when compared to domestic criminal law systems cannot be discarded on grounds of the 
fact that—in essence—it undeniably deals with the ascertainment of individual criminal responsibility 
with a view to imposing penalties; something that has not been historically associated with the 
functions of classic public international law. Some scholars, on the contrary, are of the view that the 
idea of a conceptual and normative autonomy of international criminal law is untenable, and that this 
phenomenon can be explained on the basis of a domestic analogy, as a transposition—mutatis 
mutandis—of the justification, functions and procedures of domestic criminal law systems to the 
international legal order. In this sense, see PASTOR D. R., El poder penal internacional. Una 
aproximación jurídica crítica a los fundamentos del Estatuto de Roma, Barcelona, 2006, 57-63. For 
this Author the consequence in terms of ‘legal culture’ of this position is that: “el derecho debe tender 
fundamentalmente a limitar y controlar la administración de ese poder penal internacional . . . Si la 
jurisdicción internacional ha tomado—y esto es indiscutible—una institución del derecho interno, 
ajena por definición al derecho internacional, tiene que tomarla con todo su significado y con los 
alcances que la cultura jurídica [ha desarrollado] de modo que no es argumentalmente afinado suponer 
que una vez que el sistema penal se ha “internacionalizado” pueda ser analizado con otra metodología 
que la propia del derecho penal . . . como si su estructura específica se hubiera modificado 
mágicamente con la aprobación de un tratado [como el Estatuto de Roma]” (ibidem, 63). On the same 
lines, see A. GIL GIL, Derecho Penal Internacional, Madrid, 1999, 20. 
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internationalised mechanisms for the enforcement of ICL revealed the dynamic and 
historically determined character of these legal concepts. In particular, it has been 
clarified that international criminal justice, during its evolutionary trajectory, 
gradually moved from the idea of subordination of the Prosecutor to the political will 
and instructions of the Powers creating international tribunals (such as the IMT and 
IMTFE), to an increasing attention for the safeguard of the institutional 
independence and impartiality of the prosecuting bodies. Symmetrically, the latitude 
of judicial supervision over prosecutorial discretionary choices has in general been 
expanded, notwithstanding the profound differences in the institutional and 
procedural structure of the legal regimes considered. The horizontal comparison 
carried out in Part One of the work eventually underlined—by means of contrastive 
legal analysis—the complex and composite character of the legal regime created by 
the Rome Statute in respect of—inter alia—prosecutorial discretion and judicial 
review thereof. 
At an overall look, the system of the ICC is premised on a fragile institutional 
balance between the recognition of a wide margin of discretion to the Prosecutor—
who unlike his or her counterpart at the ad hoc tribunals is allowed to select both 
situations and cases—and the necessity to guarantee adequate judicial scrutiny of 
discretionary choices. A pragmatic compromise between, on the one hand, the need 
to build a strong and independent international judicial institution and, on the other 
hand, to preserve state sovereignty and the functional connection of the Court with 
the UN system, came at the expense of clarity on the actual content and latitude of 
prosecutorial discretion and judicial review thereof1080. The vague character and 
constructive ambiguity of the few pertinent statutory provisions were instrumental in 
reaching the consensus necessary to bring the work of the Rome Conference to a 
positive conclusion. Consequently, the normative framework was designed from the 
beginning to leave the solution of the most contentious aspects concerning the 
exercise of discretion and its judicial review to the practice of the Court’s main 
actors, namely the OTP and judges, ensuring a wide margin of flexibility of the 
system. 
																																																								
1080 In this vein, see M. E. CROSS, op. cit., 237 who stresses that “transparent respect for [the rights of 
states] – while maintaining full independence, both of opinion and action – is highly important for the 
effective operation of the Prosecutor, and the success of international criminal justice more broadly”. 
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For this reason the research focused on the inherently integrative, 
transformative and creative role played by prosecutorial and judicial practices at the 
preliminary examination and pre-trial stage of the proceedings, with a view to 
comparing the static statutory and regulatory framework with its dynamic 
implementation on the part of the relevant actors. 
 
In order to carry out the proposed comparison it was first and foremost 
necessary to provide a thorough static analysis of the statutory provisions that 
constitute the legal basis for prosecutorial discretion and judicial review thereof, as 
well as of the regulatory provisions governing the practicalities of their exercise. To 
this preliminary normative analysis was dedicated most of Part Two of the work. 
The initial observations on the fragmentary, ambiguous and incomplete 
nature of the statutory framework were confirmed by the analysis of the relevant 
provisions and of their systemic interactions. The Statute does not provide clear 
guidance on the exercise of discretion at the pre-trial stage of the proceedings, 
especially as regards the procedural stage that precedes the formal opening of an 
investigation (i.e. the preliminary examination). The key provisions of article 15(3) 
on the OTP’s proprio motu powers, and 53(1) and (2) on the grounds for a 
Prosecutor’s decision not to open an investigation or prosecution are centred on 
unclear evidentiary standards and vague normative criteria, whose progressive 
definition and clarification could only be the result of the dialectical interpretive 
practices of the OTP and judges in concrete situations. A growing body of regulatory 
provisions (RPE, RoC, Regulations of the OTP, Regulations of the Registry) has 
gradually provided additional details on the practical exercise of discretion and 
control thereof. However, these texts could not make up for the lacunae or the lack 
of clarity of the Statute’s provisions. 
In particular, the definition of the broad lines of an overarching prosecutorial 
strategy—as well as of issue-specific policies—were almost completely left to the 
OTP’s practice to develop. Therefore, it has been necessary to study the numerous 
prosecutorial documents that integrate and complement—although by means of non-
binding and mainly internal administrative-like sources—the statutory and regulatory 
framework. For the purposes of this analysis the most relevant among such 
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documents are the triennial Strategic Plan (previously referred to as Prosecutorial 
Strategy) and the Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations. The successive 
strategies adopted since the establishment of the Court unveiled significant changes 
in the overall ‘prosecutorial philosophy’, reflecting the evolving institutional 
circumstances, the lessons learned from past experiences and the influence of the 
increasing body of judicial practice on many issues relevant to prosecutorial 
discretion. The Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations—building on the previous 
practice of the Office—shed light on the manner in which the OTP carries out its 
preliminary analysis, and in particular on the incremental four-phased procedure 
followed in order to reach a decision on the opening of an investigation. In addition, 
the relatively recent adoption of a Report on the Basic Size of the OTP provided the 
opportunity to reflect on the necessary correlation between the human and financial 
resources of the Office and the delivery of the results anticipated in the prosecutorial 
strategy. These documents, regardless of their soft law character, are also a clear 
manifestation of the broad administrative independence endowed to the OTP and 
constitute useful benchmarks to evaluate the consistency of the OTP’s action and its 
ability to meet the self-imposed performance objectives. 
With regard to the other term of the ‘equation’ of prosecutorial discretion, 
namely judicial supervision and control over discretionary choices, analogous 
observations can be made on the vagueness and incomplete character of the pertinent 
statutory and regulatory provisions. Given the limitation of the study to the pre-trial 
phase of the proceedings, attention was mainly focused on the supervisory role of the 
Pre-Trial Chamber at this stage. The static analysis of the applicable principles and 
rules pointed to the conclusion that the supervisory role of the PTC is not premised 
on a ‘monolithic’ general power of judicial review of the OTP’s decisions but, to the 
contrary, on powers that are procedure-specific and objective-driven. As a 
consequence, the supervisory role of judges consists in the sometimes-combined 
exercise of directive and management powers; authorisation powers; as well as of 
persuasive, corrective, confirmative and protective powers. This supervisory role is 
in general—and with only few exceptions of ex officio review—of a reactive 
character, i.e. premised on a specific request of the subjects expressly entitled to 
elicit judicial control based on the Statute and RPE. Overall, the static balance of 
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power between the OTP and PTC at the preliminary stage clearly leans in favour of 
the Office. Nevertheless, going beyond a formalistic understanding of the OTP-PTC 
relationships, the exercise of supervisory powers may in concrete circumstances 
substantially influence the Prosecutor’s selection choices by means of incentives, 
disincentives or warnings on the consequences of taking a certain course of action. 
 
Based on the static analysis carried out in Part Two, in Part Three the study 
sought to introduce a few structural hypotheses on the practical consequences of the 
ICC’s normative framework, which were then tested through an in-depth and 
systematic review of the relevant dynamic prosecutorial and judicial practice. These 
three propositions may be summarised as follows: 
1) The dynamics of prosecutorial discretion and judicial review may 
determine in the practice areas of substantial interpretive disagreement (open clash) 
or interpretive agreement (smooth relationship) between the OTP and judges, whose 
existence, latitude, causes and potential consequences need to be carefully assessed. 
2) The abovementioned patterns of agreement and/or disagreement might 
give rise to identifiable instances of dissociation of formants, namely the existence of 
a certain degree of discrepancy between the statutory/regulatory formant on the one 
hand, and the prosecutorial/judicial formant on the other. The frequency and depth of 
said instances of dissociation need to be quantitatively and qualitatively assessed 
with a view to establishing the overall degree of normative coherence of the ICC 
legal system. 
3) The system of checks and balances with regard to the exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion and its judicial review (when available) is generally 
premised on the direct proportionality between the degree of discretion embedded in 
a certain prosecutorial choice and the intensity of judicial control over that choice. 
 
The relevant prosecutorial and judicial practice was then collected, 
categorised and analysed following the ‘natural’ logical and chronological order of 
the proceedings according to the Statute and regulatory texts (i.e. preliminary 
examinations; decisions made at the end of PE in the sense of requesting or not 
requesting judicial authorisation for the opening of an investigation in case of 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 334 
proprio motu; decisions on the opening or not opening of an investigation with 
regard to the other triggering mechanisms; judicial control over these prosecutorial 
decisions and appellate proceedings thereof). Based on the analysis of the current 
body of practice it has been clarified that: 
• The conduct of preliminary examinations has been the object of a 
phenomenon here referred to as proceduralisation, i.e. the establishment of a 
four-phased incremental procedure where each phase is devoted to a specific 
legal or factual analysis. Things can only move forward when the OTP 
considers that the requirements of the previous phase are satisfied based on 
the applicable standards. This proceduralisation was a creation of the 
practices and policies of the Office. 
• With regard to the directive role of the PTC during preliminary examination, 
there have been various examples of judicial interventionism, mainly through 
the exercise of the power to convene status conferences or to request 
additional information. Most of these were met with severe disagreement by 
the OTP and led to institutional confrontation between the Office and PTCs. 
• On one occasion (concerning the alleged crimes against the Rohingya people 
across Myanmar and Bangladesh) the PTC accepted to rule on an 
unprecedented OTP’s pre-preliminary request for the ascertainment of 
jurisdiction. This procedure, not expressly envisaged nor excluded by the 
texts, might have a significant impact on the future prosecutorial practice and 
on the OTP-PTC relations at the pre-preliminary and preliminary stage. 
• The timing for the opening and the duration of preliminary examinations 
varies according to various factors, including the triggering mechanism used 
in each situation. State referrals and UNSC’s referrals generally correlate to 
short or very short PEs, whereas proprio motu procedures normally correlate 
to longer PEs. The complexity and uncertainty of the legal or factual 
circumstances of a specific situation may contribute to significantly extend 
the duration of Phase 2 and 3 of the PE (respectively devoted to the 
assessment of jurisdiction and admissibility). 
• The OTP has on various occasions concluded the PE with a decision not to 
proceed with the investigation or to ask for judicial authorisation to open one, 
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based on the lack of preconditions for the exercise of jurisdiction (Palestine); 
the lack of jurisdiction ratione materiae (Venezuela, Iraq/UK, Honduras, 
Republic of Korea, Gabonese Republic); and inadmissibility sub specie 
insufficient gravity (Union of the Comoros). The Office has yet to decline the 
opening of an investigation based on complementarity or the interests of 
justice. 
• The only refusal to proceed with an investigation based on article 53(1)(b) of 
the Statute in the Comoros situation led to the first—and to date only—
example of judicial review of a nolle prosequi decision, which culminated in 
a severe disagreement between the OTP and PTC on the standard of review 
and the scope of prosecutorial discretion under article 53(1) of the Statute. 
The competent PTC exercised an in-depth review of the OTP’s negative 
decision, deconstructing the Prosecutor’s assessment of gravity and 
ultimately asking her to reconsider the previous decision. The Office later 
confirmed the original decision after the AC’s refusal to rule on the merits of 
the OTP’s appeal against the Chamber’s reconsideration decision. 
• With regard to proprio motu procedures the OTP presented—up to date—the 
PTC with a request for authorisation to investigate on five occasions. On four 
occasions the competent Chamber granted the request. One request—relating 
to the situation in Afghanistan—is currently sub judice. 
• The PTC’s approach towards the exercise of supervisory powers at the 
authorisation stage has been, in general and with few exceptions, rather 
liberal and inspired by a remarkable degree of deference towards the 
prosecuting body. The relevant evidentiary standard (“reasonable basis to 
believe”) was construed as the lowest of the entire statutory framework. The 
supervision on the OTP’s assessment of jurisdiction and admissibility has on 
most cases been little more than a duplication of the analysis contained in the 
Office’s request. The Chambers have exercised on some occasions influence 
as regards the scope of the prospective investigation. Judges have gradually 
sought to expand the material and temporal scope compared to the requests of 
the OTP, extending the authorisation to sets of facts or conducts not expressly 
referred to by the Office. 
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In Part Four the law in action resulting from the practice of the OTP and 
judges—and their interrelation—was then compared to the law in the books, with a 
view to establish whether the three hypotheses formulated at the opening of Part 
Three had any empirical foundation. 
With regard to the hypothesis sub 1), it has been possible to identify the 
following areas of interpretive agreement (smooth relationship) and disagreement 
(open clash) between the OTP and judges. 
• Smooth functioning: 
o Authorisation procedures pursuant to article 15(3) and (4) of the 
Statute. In particular concerning the evidentiary standard applicable, the 
criteria under article 53(1) of the Statute and the (limited) scope of the 
PTC’s judicial supervision. 
o Exclusion of any remedy against the decision to put or not to put a 
situation on preliminary examination, resulting from the Court’s case 
law in procedures activated under Regulation 46 of the RoC. 
o Possibility to request a preliminary ruling on admissibility prior to or 
during preliminary examination. 
o Very narrow construction of the interests of justice clause as a potential 
tool for denying the opening of an investigation or prosecution. 
• Open clash: 
o Chambers’ use of pre-trial management tools (status conferences, 
requests of additional information, etc.). 
o Scope of prosecutorial ‘negative’ discretion under article 53(1) of the 
Statute, with particular regard to the discretional or exacting character 
of the jurisdiction and admissibility assessment; the scope of gravity as 
a selection criterion in relation to potential cases within a situation; the 
legal nature and the standard of the PTC’s judicial review pursuant to 
article 53(3)(a) of the Statute. 
o Confidentiality and disclosure obligations at the preliminary 




With regard to the hypothesis sub 2), it was possible to identify at least three 
main areas of dissociation between the statutory formant—resulting from a textual, 
contextual, purposive and historical interpretation of the relevant provisions—and 
the prosecutorial/judicial formant: 
• Function and latitude of judicial oversight pursuant to article 15(4) of the 
Statute. The current practice—resulting from the interpretive agreement 
between the OTP and PTCs—has gradually reduced the ‘supervisory grip’ of 
the PTC, making the authorisation procedure increasingly administrative-like, 
potentially expanding the OTP’s discretion with regard to the scope of the 
prospective investigation. 
• Scope and intensity of judicial review pursuant to article 53(3)(a) of the 
Statute. In the only instance of practice so far the PTC effectively conducted a 
de novo review of the OTP’s decision not to proceed, putting forward an 
excessively rigid interpretation of jurisdictional and admissibility criteria and 
suggesting—contrary to a reasonable interpretation of the provision—that 
true prosecutorial discretion is exclusively exercised under the interests of 
justice clause. 
• ‘Sterilisation’ of the discretionary and selection function of the interests of 
justice clause. The OTP’s extremely restrictive understanding of the content 
and scope of this discretionary clause—somehow reinforced by the PTCs’ 
case law—effectively excludes any reasonable prospects of its concrete 
application. 
 
These examples of dissociation of formants all seem to suggest the 
emergence, by means of practice, of a general presumption in favour of the opening 
of an investigation whenever at least one potential case within a given situation is 
deemed admissible. This state of affairs—although instable and subject to change—
seems hardly compatible with the principle of complementarity and the overall 
institutional design under the Statute, as well as with the resource constraints under 




With regard to the hypothesis sub 3), it should be noted that the ambivalence 
and inconsistency of certain interpretive choices and institutional behaviours of the 
OTP and judges allow to conclude that the general principle of direct proportionality 
between the degree of discretion of a prosecutorial decision and the degree of 
judicial control is not always verified in practice. In particular, there are situations in 
which the opposite principle of inverse proportionality seems to more faithfully 
describe the relations between the OTP and judges. More specifically: 
• When the Chamber enjoys a wider supervisory power (e.g. at the 
authorisation stage), it usually exercises a relatively superficial and less 
stringent judicial review. 
• When the Chamber enjoys a narrower supervisory power (e.g. in the review 
procedure under article 53(3)(a) of the Statute), it exercises an in-depth and 
more rigorous judicial review. 
 
This might also suggest that positive discretional decisions, i.e. those leading 
to further action of the Office and activation of the Court’s jurisdictional machinery, 
somehow possess a less discretionary character compared to negative discretional 
decisions, i.e. those leading to a discontinuance of the proceedings. Or, to put it 
differently, that as a consequence of the trend towards a general presumption in 
favour of the opening of an investigation, negative discretional decisions are 
perceived as a more troubling and less physiologic manifestation of prosecutorial 
discretion at the ICC; one that needs stronger justification and more rigorous 
supervision. 
 
Both the practice of the OTP and the PTCs show elements of structural 
ambivalence. As regards the OTP, while the Office has generally assumed a strong 
stance vis-à-vis the Chambers in order to protect its margin of appreciation and 
preserve its discretion in the widest possible terms, it has on some occasions—such 
as in the case of the request for a pre-preliminary ruling on jurisdiction in the 
situation relating to the Rohingya—sought guidance from the PTC as to the possible 
exercise of discretion, in the direction of a shared exercise of the power to adopt 
selection decisions. By the same token, some instances of the Chambers’ practice are 
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clearly ambivalent in than on the one hand they materially extend the possibility of 
exercise of prosecutorial discretion, but on the other hand they seek to guide and 
influence it, providing suggestions—which are sometimes more akin to 
instructions—to the OTP on the most appropriate course of action to follow. 
 
The current status of prosecutorial and judicial practice, as it emerged from 
the empirical analysis and comparison between the law in the books and the law in 
action, was then assessed with regard to its potentially detrimental consequences. It 
has been clarified that the possible adverse consequences of some of the current 
trends in the practice of the OTP and PTC are: 
• The lack of cooperation between the relevant institutional actors, in particular 
in the form of the OTP’s refusal to comply with—or take in due 
consideration—the Court’s decisions. This might cause unwarranted delays to 
the detriment of the rights of other parties and participants (such as 
suspect/accused persons, victims, states). 
• The lack of a reasonable degree of legal certainty and predictability of the 
overall system of prosecutorial discretion and judicial review. While it would 
make little sense to require absolute consistency as regards the outcomes of 
discretionary action and supervision thereof, a reasonable degree of 
consistency should at least be required with regard to the criteria and 
procedures that guide the exercise of discretion and judicial supervision. 
• The inefficiency in the use of the limited human and financial resources 
available. 
 
In an attempt to tackle these potential—and to some extent already 
occurring—negative consequences, suggestions were formulated in order to reduce 
the frequency and intensity of interpretive disagreements, as well as the most evident 
instances of dissociation of formants. The proposals span from policy suggestions to 
administrative, organisational and procedural adjustments for both the OTP and the 
Judiciary, including possible amendments to regulatory legal texts. 




• Consolidation and rationalisation of the strategic and policy documents, 
coupled with a continuous monitoring on their implementation.  
• Full commitment to the duty to provide reasons for prosecutorial 
discretionary decisions in order to foster transparency, but with a view to 
carefully consider the potentially unintended consequences of transparent 
decision-making in the absence of underlying clear and consistent strategy 
and policy principles. 
• Working with the ASP for the implementation of the Basic Size Model, 
including through adjustments with regard to the allocation of resources for 
preliminary examination analysis (currently under-sized). 
 
With regard to the judges’ side, the following recommendations were 
formulated: 
• Careful use of pre-trial management tools, when necessitated for the purpose 
of ensuring procedural fairness and providing incentives to the OTP in order 
to carry out reasonably expeditious PE and investigations. 
• Clarification and increased consistency in the construction and application of 
the legal criteria at the basis of prosecutorial discretionary choices and on the 
standards for their judicial review, through the adoption of an intermediate 
position between excessive deference and excessive interventionism. 
• Willingness to accept and decide on pre-preliminary and preliminary requests 
on issues of jurisdiction and/or admissibility, as an effective procedural tool 
to foster judicial economy. 
• Adoption on the part of the AC of a less restrictive approach towards the 
admissibility of appeals against the PTC’s supervisory decisions with respect 
to prosecutorial discretionary choices, in order to provide greater clarity and 
solve certain OTP-PTC interpretive disagreements. 
 
In conclusion, the analysis carried out in this work confirmed that the 
theoretical problem of prosecutorial discretion and judicial review thereof in 
international criminal law, and at the ICC in particular, is not susceptible of 
permanent and conclusive solutions. Its conceptual boundaries remain uncertain and 
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difficult to grasp. It is one of the classical problems of international criminal law in 
which the inherent tension between the criminal and the international component is 
most visible and shows extensive theoretical and practical ramifications1081. 
For this reason the search for an ideal model for the exercise of prosecutorial 
discretion and judicial review thereof at the ICC is not only a sterile exercise of legal 
abstraction, but also a missed opportunity to effectively address the pragmatic 
compromises necessary to make the current system work satisfactorily. The mere 
reproduction at the international level of domestic schemes of reasoning—although 
relativized through comparative law analysis—premised as they are on the 
sophisticated articulation and separation of state’s public authorities and functions, 
fails to provide a solid ground for the analysis of the normative structures of 
international criminal law and procedure1082. Prosecutorial discretion in ICL makes 
no exception to this general methodological observation. Therefore, it needs to be 
studied iuxta propria principia. With regard to the ICC, the limited margin for 
comprehensive statutory and regulatory reforms makes it imperative to understand 
the dynamics of prosecutorial and judicial practice as the main drives of the 
consolidation, adaptation, integration and transformation of the normative framework 
at the ICC. 
																																																								
1081 The complex relation between these two genetic components of ICL is eloquently explained by A. 
GARAPON, Crimini che non si possono né punire, né perdonare. L’emergere di una giustizia 
internazionale, Bologna, 2004, 36-38. In his words (own translation from Italian): “The idea of 
international criminal justice encompasses two fields of law that are a priori incompatible. In 
traditional legal thinking, in fact, international law and criminal law are mutually exclusive. They do 
not make use of the same scale: the former only deals with states, the latter only with individuals. The 
first is a body of law that coordinates sovereign and independent entities, the second is a fundamental 
feature of any sovereign state”. The inherent tension between the two logics is further clarified in the 
following terms: “International law rests on the model of battle, war and reconciliation; criminal law 
on that of transgression, justice and expiation. From this flows the clash between two logics – the 
moral punitive discourse of criminal law on the one hand, the pragmatic and restorative reason of 
international law on the other” (ibidem, 40). Other scholars consider that more than a mediation and a 
mutual integration between the ‘internationalist’ and ‘criminalist’ components of ICL, the starting 
point of any analysis of this branch of law should be the recognition of its inherently and 
predominantly criminal character—purportedly modelled on domestic criminal law—with regard to 
its justification, policy objectives, procedures. In this sense, see D. R. PASTOR, op. cit., 57-64. 
1082 See M. DELMAS-MARTY, Les forces imaginantes du droit. Tome 1: Le relatif e l’universel, Paris, 
2004, 15. As the eminent French jurist explains, the contribution of comparative analysis to the 
development of international criminal law depends on a radical application of comparative 
methodological instruments that goes beyond the mere juxtaposition of the different national legal 
traditions. In her words: “Il faut repérer les différences et trouver une grammaire commune qui 
permette soit un mise en compatibilité (harmonisation), soit une véritable fusion (hybridation)”. On 
the risks of an uncritical transposition to the international legal order of the national schemes of 
criminal justice, see A. GARAPON, op. cit., 44-46. 
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The composite model of criminal procedure introduced with the Rome 
Statute, fraught with ambiguities and lacunae, requires a constant search for 
pragmatic compromises and balances to be reached through the institutional dialogue 
between the Prosecutor and judges. This expression is a rather politically correct 
formula to describe the sometimes-harsh tensions and dialectical contrapositions 
among these actors1083. But these disagreements are not only—to some extent—
physiologic; they are necessary. Provided that they do not become systemic and 
completely jeopardise legal certainty, they are the sign of a live and functioning 
system of checks and balances. 
Nevertheless, a system of permanent international criminal justice with 
universal aspirations cannot afford to navigate the complexities of prosecutorial 
discretion and judicial review through a purely case-by-case approach. The needs of 
flexibility and adaptability of prosecutorial action must necessarily be reconciled 
with those of predictability, impartiality, and respect for “internationally recognized 
human rights” that all organs of the Court—and not only judges—must always 
uphold in discharging their duties and responsibilities1084. Throughout this work we 
have seen that at the current state of development prosecutorial discretionary and 
judicial supervisory practices at the ICC are not always principled, consistent and 
reasonably predictable. The system has yet to find a stable and satisfactory 
equilibrium. 
 
What is the role of scholars vis-à-vis these dynamics of international 
practice? The methodological proposal of this work lays in the recognition that 
scholars might contribute to the development of ICL and to the legitimacy of the ICC 
																																																								
1083 It is not necessary to delve into the scholarly debate on the connected but distinct issue of the 
international and multilevel ‘judicial dialogue’, on which copious literature exists. Suffices here to 
underline that the metaphor of dialogue does not always faithfully reflect the actual dynamics of the 
interactions between the institutional actors of a given legal system, such as the prosecutors and 
judges of international criminal tribunals. In very positive terms on the institutional construction of a 
“community of courts” in international criminal law, see W. W. BURKE-WHITE, A Community of 
Courts: Toward a System of International Criminal Law Enforcement, in Michigan Journal of 
International Law, vol. 24, issue 1, 2002, 86-101. 
1084 See article 21(3) of the Statute. This is one of the most evident aspects of the “paradoxical” 
relationship between criminal law and human rights, where the latter are at the same time “shield” 
against the exercise of punitive power, and “sword” in that their protection demands an increasingly 
pervasive use of criminal law. On this issue see F. TULKENS, The Paradoxical Relationship between 




only if they stay away from two extreme—and equally inconclusive—approaches. 
The first, a sort of ‘Ivory Tower Syndrome’, consists in confining the analysis either 
to the theoretical justifications of a general or specific legal construct (in our case 
prosecutorial discretion and judicial review thereof), or to limit it to an 
unconstructive and nihilistic critique of the inconsistencies of its application, without 
delving into its practicalities in a good faith attempt to understand the strategic 
reasoning behind prosecutorial and judicial decisions. The second is the tendency to 
approach practice in a purely descriptive and instrumental way, alternatively using it 
to confirm one’s interpretation of the relevant norms, or simply discarding it as 
erroneous when in contrast with the scholar’s views. International prosecutorial and 
judicial practice—in the broad sense adopted for the purposes of this study—must be 
taken (more) seriously. In this work it has been suggested that one possible way to do 
so consists in carefully comparing the law in the books and the law in action in order 
to identify the most relevant empirical trends in this practice and the related 
institutional consequences, and to identify—if any—the patterns of dissociation 
between the legal formants of the legal system. Such a critical assessment can then 
form the empirical basis for realistic proposals for the progressive development, 
integration, correction, and improvement of the practices of the legal order under 
consideration. Only in this way can the structural fuzziness and indeterminacy of 
ICL be reconciled with the need for a reasonable degree of (international) legal 
certainty. 
 
The success or failure of international criminal justice—both as a collective 
intellectual project and as a global institutional aspiration—rests on this relentless 
process of continuing experimentation and on the constant dialectic between the 
theoretical and the empirical, the universal and the relative.  The quest for the ‘right 
measure’ (métron) in the exercise of the international punitive power, on which the 
legitimacy of international criminal law largely depends, makes it necessary to resort 
to the creative capacity of the “imagining forces of law”. In the words of MIREILLE 
DELMAS-MARTY 
Faut-il néanmoins renoncer à une formule qui témoigne en tout cas d’un effort 
d’imagination pour trouver des réponses, même imparfaites, à l’ineffectivité 
des normes pénales à vocation universelle? Plutôt que la rejeter, mieux vaut 
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sans doute l’améliorer . . . le relativisme n’est pas réaliste et [le] réalisme serait 
de faire appel aux forces imaginantes du droit pour sortir de l’impasse. Les 
faiblesses [du droit pénal international], qu’il s’agisse des concepts flous ou 
des normes ineffectives, ouvrent peut-être une autre voie pour tenter de 
construire ensemble une future communauté de valeurs, en faisant le pari que 
le flou, le doux et le mou seraient comme les garde-fous de cette complexité-
là; il faut se nourrir de l’incomplétude des idées, pour ne pas subir la force 
des choses1085. 
																																																								
1085 See M. DELMAS-MARTY, Les forces imaginantes du droit. Tome 1: Le relatif e l’universel, cit., 





Between November 2018 and February 2019, after the manuscript of this 
dissertation was handed over to the referees, there have been certain procedural 
developments at the ICC concerning the Situation on the Registered Vessels of the 
Comoros, Greece and Cambodia, which have a direct bearing on some of the 
fundamental issues examined in this work. A succinct analysis of said developments 
is therefore warranted, with a view to assess whether the most recent prosecutorial 
and judicial practice fits in the interpretive framework proposed in this study. 
 
As already recalled, the Union of the Comoros had attempted to challenge the 
OTP’s Final Decision of late 2017 through which the Office—upon 
reconsideration—confirmed its previous decision not to open an investigation on the 
Mavi Marmara incident1. They did so on the assumption that the OTP’s Final 
Decision was itself a (second) article 53(1) decision, and that the Office had 
reiterated the same errors originally ascertained by the PTC in its 2015 request of 
reconsideration, substantially ignoring the reasoning put forward by the Chamber2.  
The PTC, in its new composition—deciding by Majority, Judge Kovács 
partly dissenting—largely granted the Comoros’ grounds for review3. At the outset, 
the Majority sharply criticised the language used by the OTP in the Final Decision as 
“unbefitting of a legal document” 4 , stigmatising the Office’s attitude and its 
“decision to willfully refrain from complying with the 16 July 2015 Decision”5. 
More specifically, in the view of the Majority the OTP arrogated itself the right to 
“independently determine the appropriate basis for her reconsideration”6, in an 
attempt to alter the “distribution of authority between the Pre-Trial Chamber and the 
																																																								
1 See, supra, 227-228. 
2 See Public Redacted Version of “Application for Judicial Review by the Government of the Union 
of the Comoros”, Situation on the Registered Vessels of the Comoros, Greece and Cambodia, ICC-
01/13-58-Red, 23 February 2018, par. 11, 12, 29-30. 
3 See ICC, Decision on the “Application for Judicial Review by the Government of the Union of the 
Comoros”, Situation on the Registered Vessels of the Comoros, Greece and Cambodia, ICC-01/13-68, 
PTC I, 15 November 2018 and Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Péter Kovács, Situation on the 
Registered Vessels of the Comoros, Greece and Cambodia, ICC-01/13-68-Anx, 15 November 2018. 
4 See ICC, Decision on the “Application for Judicial Review by the Government of the Union of the 
Comoros”, Situation on the Registered Vessels of the Comoros, Greece and Cambodia, ICC-01/13-68, 
PTC I, 15 November 2018, par. 82. 
5 Ibidem, par. 83. 
6 Ibidem, par. 85. 
ADDENDUM 
 348 
Office of the Prosecutor”7. The Majority asserted in the clearest terms that its 
previous request for reconsideration constitutes a “judicial decision” binding on the 
OTP, which had acquired the status of res judicata as a result of the AC’s decision 
on the inadmissibility of the OTP’s appeal pursuant to article 82(1)(a) of the Statute8. 
From this flow three fundamental consequences. First, the OTP is obliged to comply 
with the Chamber’s request and to carry out the reconsideration “in accordance with 
the decision issued by the Pre-Trial Chamber”9. Doing otherwise would “clearly 
contravene the judicial role of the Chambers and, in particular, the supervisory role 
of the Pre-Trial Chambers over the Prosecutor’s actions”10. Second, the PTC’s 
request must form the basis for the OTP’s reconsideration11. In other words, the 
Office, in order to provide meaningful reasons for its final decision pursuant to Rule 
108(3) of the RPE, must address the specific issues and errors identified by the 
Chamber in its review decision12. Third, as a result of the OTP’s flawed approach to 
reconsideration, the Office’s 2017 Decision cannot be considered “final” within the 
meaning of Rule 108(3) of the RPE, “until the Prosecutor has carried out her 
reconsideration in accordance with the 16 July 2015 Decision”13. Therefore, the 
Chamber remains seized of the matter in the exercise of its “continued oversight 
role”14. In conclusion, the PTC ordered the OTP to carry out a new reconsideration in 
accordance with the 2015 Decision and considering the already significant length of 
the proceedings it felt compelled to set a six-month deadline for its completion15. 
The OTP decided to approach the PTC under article 82(1)(d) of the Statute in 
order to seek a leave to file an interlocutory appeal, with a view to obtain from the 
																																																								
7 Ibidem, 86. 
8 Ibidem, par. 90, 91-92, 94. 
9 Ibidem, par. 96, 98, 109 (emphasis in the original text). 
10 Ibidem, par. 98-99. In this connection, the Majority stressed that “the phase of the proceedings does 
not affect the distribution of authority under the Statute” and that the “oversight role of the Pre-Trial 
Chamber over the parties to the proceedings, including the Prosecutor, is in [no] way reduced at the 
early stages of the proceedings”. The Chamber also made reference, in its contextual analysis, to the 
judges’ power to adopt disciplinary measures pursuant to article 71 of the Statute and Rule 171 to 
sanction any misconduct including the deliberate refusal to comply with its directions, in order to 
confirm the OTP’s duty to comply with the Chamber’s previous decision (ibidem, par. 102-104). 
11 Ibidem, par. 110. 
12 Ibidem, par. 113, 117. 
13 Ibidem, 114 (emphasis added). 
14 Ibidem, 116. 
15 Ibidem, par. 117-121. The Majority stressed the fact that the OTP’s delay in putting forward its 
(purportedly) final decision had been clearly “irreconcilable with the Prosecutor’s duty to reconsider 
her decision ‘as soon as possible’” (par. 120). 
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AC a final solution on the interpretive disagreements between the Office and the Pre-
Trial Chamber16. It identified three issues eligible for certification and additionally 
requested the PTC to impose a stay on its previous decision pending deliberation on 
the request for leave to appeal17. 
The PTC granted leave to appeal for the second and third of the issues 
identified by the OTP, namely: a) “Whether the Pre-Trial Chamber may find that a 
decision by the Prosecutor further to a request for reconsideration . . . cannot be 
considered to be final within the meaning of rule 108(3) of the Rules of Procedure 
and Evidence in circumstances in which the Prosecutor has not, in the view of the 
Pre-Trial Chamber, carried out her reconsideration in accordance with the 
aforementioned request”18; and b) “Whether the Prosecutor, in carrying out a 
reconsideration . . . is obliged to accept particular conclusions of law or fact contained 
in the Pre-Trial Chamber’s request, or whether she may continue to draw her own 
conclusions provided that she has properly directed her mind to these issues”19. It 
nevertheless denied to stay the previous decision20. Recently, the AC denied the 
OTP’s request21 for suspensive effect of the Impugned Decision. As a consequence 
the OTP remains bound to produce a new Final Decision by 15 May 2019, subject to 
the AC’s determination on the appeal22. 
The OTP has put forward an extensive and carefully drafted appeal brief23, 
requesting the AC to quash the PTC’s decision insofar as it erroneously established 
																																																								
16 See ICC-OTP, Request for Leave to Appeal the “Decision on the ‘Application for Judicial Review 
by the Government of the Union of the Comoros’”, Situation on the Registered Vessels of the 
Comoros, Greece and Cambodia, ICC-01/13-69, 21 November 2018. At par. 6, the OTP writes that it 
decided to follow this course of action in order to “[demonstrate] the Prosecution’s sincere respect for 
the Pre-Trial Chamber and desire to resolve constructively the legal ambiguities that have arisen”. 
17 Ibidem, par. 9, 11, 13, 22-24. 
18 See ICC, Decision on the Prosecutor’s request for leave to appeal the “Decision on the ‘Application 
for Judicial Review by the Government of the Union of the Comoros’”, Situation on the Registered 
Vessels of the Comoros, Greece and Cambodia, ICC-01/13-73, PTC I, 18 January 2019, par. 39-45. 
The PTC partly reformulated the issue compared to the OTP’s original formulation. 
19 Ibidem, par. 46-52. 
20 Ibidem, par. 54-55. 
21 See ICC-OTP, Prosecution’s omnibus request for extension of pages, extension of time, and 
suspensive effect, Situation on the Registered Vessels of the Comoros, Greece and Cambodia, ICC-
01/13-74, 21 January 2019, par. 12-15. 
22 See ICC, Decision on the Prosecutor’s request for suspensive effect, Situation on the Registered 
Vessels of the Comoros, Greece and Cambodia, ICC-01/13-81, AC, 31 January 2019, par. 10-12. The 
AC dismissed as “unconvincing” the OTP’s argument that carrying out the required reconsideration 
pending a decision on the appeal would be excessively resource-consuming. 
23 See ICC-OTP, Prosecution Appeal Brief, Situation on the Registered Vessels of the Comoros, 
Greece and Cambodia, ICC-01/13-85, 11 February 2019. 
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that the OTP is bound, in carrying out the reconsideration, to accept the Chamber’s 
reasoning (including its conclusions on specific issues of fact or law); and that the 
OTP’s “final decision” could be set aside as invalid, thereby requesting an additional 
reconsideration based on the PTC’s reasoning24. 
 
At the time of writing the appeal is still sub judice and this addendum cannot 
benefit from a final clarification of the AC on the correct interpretation of the 
relevant provisions of the Statute and RPE as regards the delimitation of powers 
between the OTP’s discretion and the Chamber’s supervisory role25. Nevertheless, it 
is submitted that the ongoing litigations in the Comoros situation clearly confirm the 
pattern of deep interpretive disagreement among the OTP and Chambers26, as well as 
the already discussed dissociation between the textual and the judicial formant27, with 
regard to the function and latitude of judicial review under article 53(3)(a) of the 
Statute. 
In particular, it is clear that the Prosecutor is determined to defend at all costs 
her purportedly inherent discretionary powers vis-à-vis the ‘intrusions’ of the PTC. 
More specifically, the Office seeks to protect its right to have the last word on the 
opening of the investigation, preserving a substantive margin of appreciation in the 
fulfilment of its procedural obligation to reconsider its previous decision pursuant to 
an article 53(3)(a) request. To the contrary, the PTC—notwithstanding the change in 
its composition—has confirmed its determination to exercise tight supervision on the 
OTP’s negative decisions, requiring the Office to strictly follow its judicial reasoning 
in order to comply with the duty of reconsideration. In other words, besides the 
strictly legal issues concerning the construction of gravity and the exact scope of the 
																																																								
24 Ibidem, par. 123 containing the conclusions of the OTP on the two grounds of appeal and the relief 
sought. 
25 One cannot avoid to observe that had the OTP correctly approached the PTC under article 82(1)(d) 
of the Statute already in 2015, or had the Appeals Chamber declared admissible the OTP’s appeal 
pursuant to article 82(1)(a) of the Statute—as suggested in this work and argued by the two dissenting 
judges—a clarification on the exact nature and content of the duty of reconsideration would have 
probably been given as early as in 2016, with considerable saving of time and resources. These 
decisions have simply postponed the solution of the fundamental issues that are now forming the 
object of the appellate proceedings. Nevertheless, the behaviour and decisions adopted by the OTP, 
PTC and AC in the past three years have been very instructive in confirming the trends in their 
interpretive stances and institutional relations. 
26 See, supra, Part Four, Chapter One, par. 2. 
27 See, supra, Part Four, Chapter One, par. 4. 
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duty of reconsideration, the OTP has considered that opening an investigation on the 
Mavi Marmara incident would divert human and financial resources from other more 
promising investigations, given the difficulty to produce viable prosecutions and 
trials. Preliminary judges, on the contrary, have reasoned that irrespective of issues 
of resources, efficiency or of the prospects of viable prosecutions, an investigation is 
in any event warranted in order to ascertain the facts and, ultimately, deliver the right 
to truth and justice to the alleged victims. In so doing they have significantly 
narrowed down (almost to the point of excluding it) the concrete margin of discretion 
of the OTP, leaving the impression that they would only be satisfied were the OTP to 
change the outcome of its decision and finally open an investigation. 
The two positions do not seem to be logically reconcilable and any attempt of 
the AC to strike a balance between these competing normative claims will produce a 
result that necessarily leans towards one of the two ‘poles of attraction’ of 
prosecutorial discretion and judicial supervision. Therefore, the appellate decision is 
likely to have significant institutional consequences on the future practice of both the 
OTP and PTCs. 
 
Ultimately, the Comoros situation exemplifies the normative dilemma of any 
legal regime premised on the recognition of a margin of discretion subject to judicial 
supervision: Where to draw the line between reasonable and unreasonable exercise 
of discretion? To what extent judicial authorities can interfere with discretionary 
decisions with a view to guarantee an acceptable degree of legal certainty (and/or 
protect the rights of other interested subjects) without completely defeating the 
purpose of discretion and depriving the system of a reasonable degree of flexibility?  
These questions can only partly be answered in purely static and legalistic 
terms and need to be approached in a practice-based and dynamic way, in order to 
interpret the patterns of the concrete institutional behaviour and reciprocal relations 
among the actors of the legal system considered. This is what this work has modestly 
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